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Abstract 
This thesis comprehensively examines in four key empirical chapters, if and how traits of the 
top management teams (TMTs) affect cross-border acquisition choices as well as consequential 
outcomes from the perspective of acquiring firms. Three aspects of the TMTs which are 
particularly relevant to these types of deals have been considered: their international 
experience, host country knowledge and national diversity. These TMT characteristics, has 
been termed as ‘international orientation’ here. The underlying premise of this thesis is that 
information asymmetry prevalent in these complex decisions are likely to be mitigated if and 
only if these specially-endowed TMTs are optimally orientated.  
 
A comprehensive dataset of listed cross-border acquirers from the United Kingdom from 1999-
2008 with their TMT characteristics has been used here with a variety of methodologies and 
modelling techniques, including short and longer window event study methods, multilevel 
modelling, etc. The first and second chapters explores the consequences of the decision-making 
process by the TMTs, as the returns to these bidder firms; while the third chapter looks at one 
of the key elements of the process itself in terms of payment mode choices by bidder TMTs. 
The final chapter investigates whether the moderating role these internationally oriented TMTs 
play, is recognised in the investors’ reaction to frequent cross-country acquisition 
announcements.  
 
The first chapter examined the short-term wealth effects of international orientation of TMTs, 
focusing on when it may (not) improve performance due to internationalization decisions, 
synthesising the views expressed in prior research. Although not robust, a negative effect of 
international experience on abnormal returns in line with the hubris hypothesis was observed. 
Further, some discernible benefits from national diversity or country-specific experience in 
TMTs in consonance with the view of TMT ‘international orientation’ as a valuable resource 
were also detected. However, additional analyses revealed that performance benefits may only 
accrue to the most experienced TMTs and may be detrimental if too many of TMT members 
have same host country exposure. Generally, the acquirer announcement performance seemed 
to be affected by TMT orientation in opposite ways with different TMT proxies. 
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The second chapter extended the investigation to both financial and operating performance for 
a one-year post-acquisition period to delve deeper into the effects of having globally-oriented 
TMTs in acquirer boards, motivated by lack of consensus on two counts. First, as to whether 
acquirers create or destroy wealth as far as the longer term outcomes are concerned; second, in 
respect of whether the TMTs of these firms act competently or take inefficient decisions on 
international expansions. The ‘international orientation’ of acquirer executives from two 
angles, i.e. their international experience and national diversity amongst them were examined. 
The findings presented strong evidence of curvilinear relationships of the chosen TMT proxies, 
although, in this case too, the effects observed were opposite for the different proxies. In 
particular, inadequate international knowledge of the team members at initial levels were likely 
to generate unfavourable outcomes, which could transform favourably at higher levels after a 
cut-off point. An opposite curvilinear relationship between the TMT proxy of foreigners’ 
presence and such performance was observed, however.   
 
The third chapter looked at the decision-making role of internationally-orientated TMTs of 
acquiring firms so as to whether and how such TMTs may(not) influence the preferred mode 
of payment, mitigating information asymmetry with a level of high uncertainty and complexity 
in deals involving international targets. In consonance with the findings of the previous 
chapters, non-linear effects of TMT ‘international orientation’ on the possibilities of making 
an appropriate choice of method of payment in cross-border transactions were proposed and 
tested.  It was revealed that only the most experienced TMTs and/or executive-teams with a 
greater diverse mix of nationalities were more likely to opt for pure cash or a mixed payment 
mode as against pure stock exchange, amidst high environmental uncertainties, often prevalent 
in decisions relating to expansion abroad. Specifically, internationally-oriented TMTs seem to 
be positioned to act more competently after surpassing a threshold of this orientation, thereby 
mitigating environmental uncertainties under extreme country risk and cultural distance. These 
findings shed new light on alleviation of information asymmetry in cross-border payment mode 
decisions, hitherto studied from the perspective of returns to acquirers in the domestic context. 
 
The final core chapter concentrated solely on short-term value creation serial acquirers in cross-
border deals as against in extant literature where mostly these firms are studied with one-time 
acquirers. Taking a more comprehensive view of earlier research, in this study the potential 
role of previously identified factors affecting their short-run returns against the backdrop of 
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‘international orientation’ of their top managerial teams (TMTs) is demystified. In other words, 
which of the forecasted effects, i.e. learning or post-acquisition integration issues, predominate, 
when TMTs of such firms have either international experience or host country familiarity or 
mix of diverse nationalities were analysed. Testing for the non-linear moderating influence of 
TMT orientation, the negative influence of indigestion, as an outcome of both frequent 
acquisitions and higher transaction values, cumulated over a prior three-year event window 
was documented. Nevertheless, this detrimental impact was likely to be mitigated at higher 
levels of international experience of acquirer executives. However, the findings failed to 
substantiate either the postulated benefits of ‘organizational learning’ or any moderating impact 
of TMT orientation thereon. These empirical results highlighted that when the hypothesized 
notion of indigestion effects outweighed that of learning for these serial bidders, moderating 
benefit of their internationally oriented TMTs is non-linear. This implied that beyond a cut-off 
point, more of these TMTs seem to mitigate either acquisition-indigestion or the memory-lapse, 
although the latter effect is not robust. 
 
Overall, the findings from the core chapters indicated that international orientation of bidder 
TMTs are beneficial after an optimal point, in respect of improved decision-making, favourable 
longer terms returns and finally, moderating the detriments of multiple acquisitions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Context and motivation  
With the advent of globalization, a substantial volume of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities have transcended geographical borders. During 2014, such activity totalled US$1.3 
trillion globally, accounting for 37% of overall M&A volume (ThomsonReuters, 2015), thus, 
evidencing its popularity. Further, these transactions have sustained the academic interest for a 
number of reasons. First and foremost, these transactions contribute immensely to the overall 
economic growth of any country. Secondly, these international deals akin to their domestic 
counterparts thus, continue to remain among the most significant investment projects 
undertaken by firms, having irrevocably long-lasting consequences on their ever-expanding 
operational performance. Finally, they have the potential to decimate shareholders’ wealth on 
a massive scale (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005; Betton, Eckbo & Thornburn, 2008). 
Undoubtedly therefore, there has been no dearth of studies dealing extensively with the factors 
which interact to affect the returns generated (involving mainly US public firms) from domestic 
M&As as well as their patterns (Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012).  This literature has improved 
our understanding with respect to cross-border M&As too. Yet, the confounding impact of 
severe information asymmetry in competitive foreign markets makes it still worthwhile 
exploring individual aspects that potentially affect these huge investment decisions and their 
consequences. Moreover, there are relatively under-researched dimensions which present 
challenges from the standpoint of their potential impact on the value creation for shareholders. 
One such challenging yet promising area, is to study the decision-making role of top managers 
or executive directors as far as these internationalisation choices are concerned. More so, since 
an opaque information environment surrounds these foreign transactions, it can be construed 
that observable characteristics and dispositions of top executives of bidder firms plays a 
significant role in international M&As. This was the underlying assumption of my study.                                                              
 
Prior corporate finance research (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983) had envisaged a board of directors to have a monitoring role to mitigate agency conflicts 
in all vital corporate decisions of firms. The voluminous literature on internal corporate 
governance (see for example, the survey by Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010) also 
investigated the efficacy of boards in strategic decision-making. Recent studies (e.g., Masulis, 
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Wang & Xie, 2009; Masulis & Mobbs; 2011; etc.) have attempted to examine different classes 
of directors from this standpoint. There has been another emergent stream of work (e.g. Roll, 
1986; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008; etc.) which dealt with the behavioural idiosyncrasies 
of executives affecting the corporate strategies and outcomes pertaining to their firms. 
However, research on top executives is not only relatively scarce, but the focus has usually 
been on a single executive, such as the chief executive officer (CEO). Rather, corporate finance 
research has not considered the collective decision-making consequences of top managerial 
teams1 (TMTs) or the internal directorial teams, as such. Similarly, the international business 
(IB) literature (please refer to the survey by Brouthers & Hennart, 2007) has also tended to 
hold a restricted view of how these executive directors jointly contribute in making foreign 
investment choices, like M&As. Therefore, both these different streams of research leave gaps 
to be addressed and explored further, in respect of collective responsibilities and the position 
of top executive decision-makers. However, the theory on ‘upper echelons’ in strategic 
leadership literature (see for example, Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2008) underscores 
the part played by these TMTs, rather than the board as a whole in the M&A decision-making 
process. Primarily, this thesis attempts to link the divergent streams of research such as, 
corporate finance, IB and management and strategic leadership and proposes the determinants 
of ‘international orientation’ of TMTs of acquiring firms. Synthesising the extant research, this 
thesis attempts to examine the cooperative role and efficacy of executive teams or TMTs in 
acquiring firms to influence the international acquisition choices and their outcomes. This 
thesis is therefore, all about the experiential and decision-making role of the inside or executive 
directorial teams of acquiring firms in the global market for corporate control.    
 
1.2 Key features and structure of thesis 
Prior research postulated that individual traits of executives inter alia, are likely to influence 
their perceptions of uncertainty with respect to foreign expansions, which could thereby affect 
their strategic decision-making abilities. Such characteristics documented are:  international 
careers of top executives (e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson 2001, etc.); their national cultural 
values and a heterogeneous mix of nationalities (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011); past exposure 
to the country(s) of proposed foreign host(s) (e.g., Barney, 1988; Piaskowska &Trojanowski, 
                                                          
1
 There has been a wide disparity in defining the “TMTs” in the strategic leadership literature (Finkelstein et al., 2008). 
Throughout this thesis, the TMT of a bidder has been categorized to be consisting of all executive or insider directors on the 
board of that firm, including the CEO, following Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders (2004). 
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2014); etc. These observable traits have loosely been termed ‘international orientation’ of top 
managerial/executive team for the purposes of this thesis. Primarily, this thesis takes up this 
crucial yet relatively under-researched factor, i.e., ‘international orientation’ of their executive 
directors or top managers. Whatever little extant research on top managerial team conducted 
until now, has been based on data from the United States (US) (e.g., Sambharya, 1996; 
Hambrick, 2007; etc.), when with the United Kingdom (UK) sample hardly any comprehensive 
research exists. Moreover, two unique features make the UK an interesting setting for our 
research. These are the prevalence of financing deals with cash and the predominance of private 
targets (both of which have been highlighted as potential reflection of managerial hubris, e.g., 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008). 
 
The fundamental premise is that TMT ‘international orientation’ is likely to have an impact on 
cross-border M&A choices and consequent outcomes from the perspective of acquiring firms. 
This central hypothesis was tested on a sample of such acquirers from the UK listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. The empirical analysis in each of the chapters utilised a combined 
dataset of 1965 cross-country acquisition announcements undertaken by these UK bidders 
during the period 1999 until 20082. This data merged with the pre-acquisition data on their 
TMTs3 and financial parameters. More details on the merged dataset are provided in the first 
empirical chapter, i.e. Chapter 2.   
 
The first two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3 respectively) explore the impact of decision-making 
with respect to cross-border acquisitions by virtue of ‘international orientation’ of acquirer 
TMTs as far as the performances of these firms are concerned. Specifically, the three-day 
cumulative abnormal announcement returns and the one-year post-acquisition announcement 
buy-and-hold abnormal and operating performance in terms of return on equity, etc. are 
investigated in these chapters. The study on longer term returns to the bidders was motivated 
from two perspectives:  A) If the stock market failed to acknowledge TMT ‘international 
orientation’ on the acquisition announcements by these bidder firms (which seemed to be the 
case in the short-run study), whether it was a delayed reaction. B) Whether the investors 
recognized and gave credit to the ‘international orientation’ of bidder TMTs for the longer 
                                                          
2
 Only completed acquisition announcements were included in the sample used. Therefore, the terms ‘acquirers’ and ‘bidders’ 
have been used interchangeably.  
3
 I am very grateful to Grzegorz Trojanowski and Dorota Piaskowska to kindly allow me to use their data on TMT-level, target 
country(s), which I have extensively used for all my empirical analyses.  
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term. C) Looking from the angle of operational returns, how did these firms fare as far as post-
acquisition profitability in the long-run was concerned? The third chapter looked at a crucial 
aspect of decision-making, viz. preference with respect to a particular payment mode by these 
TMTs, reflecting a superior choice to alleviate information asymmetry. Hence, while first two 
chapters examined the consequences of foreign acquisition choices by acquirer TMTs, the third 
looked at a prime constituent of such choice. The last but one chapter (i.e. Chapter 5) was 
devoted solely to studying the shorter term wealth effects (three-day cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns) to serial acquirers based on the conjectures on experiential learning or 
post-acquisition integration problems. Basically, which of the two impacts was predominant 
and whether either of these was moderated and somewhat mitigated by TMT international 
orientation, were investigated. The final chapter (Chapter 6) presents my concluding remarks 
summarising the principal findings of each key empirical chapter. I also discuss some common 
limitations of this research and the dataset used, concluding with suggestions for possible 
extension and direction for future work.       
 
1.3 Primary contributions 
The insight from prior literature would lead us to expect that a valuable asset such as, 
‘international orientation’ of acquirer TMTs would give a comparative edge to firms in the 
global market for corporate control. This is somewhat corroborated by the limited extant 
studies, (e.g. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014; etc.) which 
suggested a positive view of this quality in TMTs of such firms. But negative empirical findings 
in strategy research (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2008; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; etc.) on TMTs 
went against this common perception as well as empirical findings. Further, the CEO-focused 
behavioural research in finance, referred to in the last section, also substantiated the adverse 
impact of hubris and/or overconfidence (e.g. Roll, 1986) on firm profitability. In this thesis 
therefore, the aim was to reconcile this inherent positive notion with the negative effects shown 
in earlier studies. In other words, the main chapters attempt to document both the adverse 
effects of inadequate TMT orientation and the desired positive impacts of optimal level of such 
orientation for the bidding firms. This is intended to be the first and foremost contribution of 
this thesis. 
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As already mentioned, the essence of this thesis is to consider the role of the entire team of top 
executives, as a principal determinant of global diversification decisions and examine resultant 
outcomes. The concept of relating corporate strategies such as, acquisitions to decisions of an 
‘insider management team’ had hitherto neither been considered in finance, nor in management 
literature. This research thus, aims to broaden the envisaged role of CEOs as in corporate 
finance  and management (cf Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008) to 
include a team perspective (Nadolska & Barkema, 2014), whilst taking vital strategic decisions. 
Further, it complements the emerging research on TMTs and corporate boards and extends it 
to look into the plausible factors influencing cross-border acquisitions. 
 
Finally, this thesis also intends to extend the existing studies on firm-level acquisition 
experience (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) to include TMT-level international exposure. 
Thus, the scope of prior-acquisition experience in the context of foreign expansion becomes 
more comprehensive as a contributing aspect of such choice as well as consequences. 
 
To summarise, the primary focus of this thesis is to examine the collective role of TMTs of the 
UK listed acquiring firms engaging in cross-country acquisitions, from the perspective of the 
so-called ‘international orientation’. Basically, the key research questions examined in the 
following main empirical chapters were: Whether and how the teams’ ‘international 
orientation’ affects the performance of these firms both in the short-run and a longer term? 
Under what conditions these globally-oriented teams would be positioned to make superior 
strategic payment choices and decisions? Does this team orientation moderate short term 
returns of the multiple bidders? Thus, this research brings together  and integrates insight from 
different fields of work to investigate the part played by teams of top executives in respect of 
foreign acquisitions; indicating when and under what conditions optimization of benefits and 
detriments of ‘international orientation’ could be achieved.  
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Chapter 2: Twice as smart or too clever by half? TMT international orientation and 
announcement returns of cross-border acquisitions 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Cross-border M&As by virtue of their sheer size in terms of investment of the resources of a 
firm, entail vital strategic decisions on international diversification or foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). Therefore, such transactions have considerable impact on performance of 
a firm both in the short and long run (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001). International 
acquisitions in particular present firms with more unique challenges in comparison to their 
domestic counterparts due to additional elements of uncertainty, and often result in poorer 
performance (e.g. Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005).  
 
Prior research documented a range of factors which influence M&A outcomes. They include 
characteristics of the business environment, firm and deal features, and personal attributes of 
managers (see Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter & Davison, 2009 for a review). 
Focusing in particular on international experience in the management suite, research found that 
both executive experience and the mix of nationalities represented in TMTs play an important 
role in strategic decisions, including decisions about acquisitions (e.g. Sambharya, 1996; 
Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily & Dalton, 2000; Herrmann & Datta, 2006; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011, 
etc.). However, it remains unclear how TMT-level international experience and national 
diversity – the so-called TMT international orientation (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska 
& Trojanowski, 2014) – relate to performance. In this chapter we address this issue by focusing 
on how TMT international orientation influences shareholder wealth generated in the short 
term upon announcements of cross-border acquisitions.  
 
There are two alternative views on how TMTs international orientation (in particular, 
executives’ career experience) might affect cross-border M&As. One view, predominant in the 
international business (IB) literature, is that managers’ international orientation enhances their 
cognitive base and could therefore help them to spot and act upon opportunities in foreign 
markets, as well as to understand and manage local peculiarities, such as differences in cultural 
and institutional environments, business practices, and consumer needs and preferences (e.g. 
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Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2002; Herrmann & Datta, 
2006). It has also been postulated that international experience might affect executives’ 
perceptions of uncertainty associated with foreign expansions, which in turn influences the 
ownership stakes acquired (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Therefore, internationally-
oriented managers are expected to be particularly able to deal with information asymmetries 
arising in cross-border M&As.  
 
The alternative view, popular in corporate finance literature and some of the upper echelon 
studies, is that these very same managerial characteristics may disproportionately inflate top 
executives’ core self-evaluations (Billett & Qian, 2008; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) leading to 
distorted notions of superior capability to generate gains from such cross-border transactions. 
Previous studies argue that excessive confidence level of managers, achieved either through 
experience or ‘self-attribution bias’, may bias managers’ comprehension of the plausible pros 
and cons of a proposed deal and adversely impact their capacity to assess the synergies that 
might be generated from acquiring other firms (Roll, 1986; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Hiller 
& Hambrick, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2005 and 2008; Billett & Qian, 2008), leading to 
misevaluation of the target and thereby destruction of shareholder wealth in the process. This 
negative effect is consistent with Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis (see also Aktas, de Bodt, & 
Roll, 2009) and with more recent evidence on managerial overconfidence (Billett & Qian, 
2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2008).  
 
We revisit the two aforementioned views and present contrasting explanations for the effect of 
prior experience in the context of market reaction to cross-border acquisition announcements 
(cf. Hayward, 2002; Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Billett & Qian, 2008; Aktas et al., 2009). We 
subsequently synthesise these insights to investigate (1) whether there exists an appropriate 
balance of various dimensions of TMT international orientation which would benefit 
shareholders of the companies completing cross-border acquisitions and (2) how various levels 
of TMT international orientation translate into short-term wealth creation.  
 
Our starting point is the key insight of the upper echelon theory that top managers’ cognitions, 
personalities and experiences as well as their personal views and biases, become reflected in 
their decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Finkelstein, Hambrick, 
& Canella, 2008; Li & Tang, 2010). Given the complexity and potentially far-reaching 
consequences of cross-border M&A decisions, such strategic choices are bound to involve 
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TMTs of acquiring firms rather than just individual executives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Nadolska & Barkema, 2014).  
 
We also draw from IB literature, which has identified multiple factors that influence acquisition 
behaviour and performance, including aspects of the institutional environment, firm and deal 
characteristics, and managerial characteristics such as experience, cognition and personality 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009). We compare the insights from these two 
streams of literature together with those from the emergent stream of corporate finance 
literature focusing on the role of managerial traits and the consequences of behavioural factors 
in the context of financial decision making (e.g. Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Billett & Qian, 2008; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Aktas et al., 2013). 
 
On the empirical side, different measures of overconfidence or hubris are available in the extant 
literature (e.g. Malmendier & Tate, 2005 & 2008; Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012). These 
measures tend to focus on ‘revealed beliefs’ of managers, evidenced for example through 
holding options beyond rational thresholds. We take an alternative approach and use insights 
from the aforementioned streams of literature to make inferences about managerial 
overconfidence or hubris by considering some of the personal traits of TMTs of acquiring 
firms. In a marked departure from prior studies in the area of corporate finance, this approach 
allows us to relate not only the CEO’s beliefs, but also TMT-level traits to acquisition 
performance. While CEOs are perhaps the most visible decision-makers in companies, it is 
unlikely that they decide on major strategic decisions such as international acquisitions entirely 
on their own. TMTs are involved across the stages in this decision-making process and hence 
should be considered when making inferences about acquisition performance (Nadolska & 
Barkema, 2014).  
 
Thus, we argue that a bidder TMT’s international orientation, as captured through general 
international experience, specific target country experience, and national diversity on the team, 
makes it more capable and self-assured in deciding on a foreign acquisition. While superior 
capabilities may lead to positive acquisition outcomes, self-confidence might take a toll on 
them.   
 
We tested our hypotheses on a final sample of 1,818 completed cross-country acquisitions 
announced by 446 UK acquiring firms during the period 1999-2008. While the results 
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pertaining to the number of internationally experienced executives weakly pointed towards 
negative effects of TMT international experience on cross-border acquisition announcement 
returns, this was not the case for other measures of TMT international orientation. For instance, 
presence of either foreign nationals or of executives with target country experience on the 
acquirers’ TMTs had a positive significant effect on deal announcement returns, albeit not 
robust across all the model specifications. Additional analyses indicated that performance 
benefits may only accrue to the most experienced TMTs, whilst too many managers with 
similar host country familiarity may not be advantageous. Overall, our findings, while opening 
avenues for further research, already shed a new light on when TMT international orientation 
may improve performance due to internationalization decisions, over and beyond the impact it 
may have on the decisions themselves as documented in prior research.  
 
This chapter aims to make a number of contributions to the extant literature, some of which 
have already been mentioned in Chapter 1. First, we link different branches of literature on 
cross-country deals, namely corporate finance, IB, and upper echelons literatures to generate a 
set of predictions pertaining to cross-border M&A announcement effects. Second, by 
accounting for additional factors that could potentially affect acquirer returns, we provide new 
evidence on M&A announcement return and performance of bidding firms, which could help 
reconcile some inconsistencies in the findings in the M&A literature (cf. Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2011). Importantly, this chapter 
contributes to the emergent stream of corporate finance research examining how managerial 
traits and behavior may impact financial decision making (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Billett & Qian, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Aktas et al., 2013). Finally, we add and extend 
the extant literature by introducing TMT-level orientation to firm-level experience.  
 
2.2 Theoretical background  
Cross-border M&A activity necessitates considerable resource involvement from the 
acquirers’ perspective (Chari & Chang, 2009). Hence, prior literature considered whether these 
strategies generate gains to the shareholders of bidding firms. One common approach has been 
to examine acquisitions as a corporate strategy for international diversification, mainly in the 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI). Another common approach has been to correlate 
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bidder returns with country characteristics. However, the empirical evidence from these two 
approaches, primarily from event studies, is mixed. 
 
   2.2.1 The role of country characteristics 
The existing literature on stock market reactions reveal that country specific characteristics are 
a major factor that contributes to the complexity and the associated uncertainty and information 
asymmetries in international acquisitions. These characteristics include economic, institutional 
and legal environments, regulatory and capital market structures, enforcement and disclosure 
standards, as well as prevalent socio-cultural preferences (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997; House, Javidan, Hanges & Dorfman, 2002; Vankat & Kumar, 2006). These 
sources of uncertainty may also impede post-acquisition integration of foreign targets (Kang 
& Kim, 2010).  
 
Some studies document that international acquisitions fail to generate incremental value for 
shareholders (e.g. Grubel, 1968; Black, 1974; Mikhail & Shawky, 1979; Doukas & Travlos, 
1988; Dos Santos, Errunza & Miller, 2008). In addition, foreign investments underperform 
domestic ones, particularly in restrictive institutional environments (Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Yet, there exists evidence of emerging market M&As 
and other foreign acquisitions being positively received by the stock markets when bidders 
come from countries with high governance standards and strong investor protection regimes 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Kuipers, Miller, & Patel, 2009; Chari, Ouimet & Tesar, 2010; 
Ellis et al., 2011). 
 
   2.2.2 The role of experience in mitigating information asymmetry 
Much prior research in the area of strategy and IB focused on how firms may alleviate 
uncertainty and information asymmetry in international acquisitions, highlighting the 
importance of firms’ experiential learning over time (e.g., Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996; 
Haleblian, Kim & Rajagopalan, 2006). However, empirical evidence on its plausible benefits 
in terms of acquirer abnormal returns seems to be conflicting (Hayward, 2002; Conn Cosh, 
Guest & Hughes, 2004; Billett & Qian, 2008; Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Aktas et al., 2009). 
One possible explanation could be that this strand of research routinely does not consider the 
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role of bidding firms’ internal corporate governance and the integral role played by corporate 
boards in strategic decisions, including M&As (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
Crucially, bidder directors are valuable suppliers of human capital by virtue of their education, 
specific exposure to any firm and its industry, as well as their networks of ties to other firms 
(Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Directors decide on resource allocation 
for strategic investments such as M&As (Krug & Augilera; 2005) and have valuable firm-
specific knowledge and information (Fama & Jensen, 1983), including prior acquisition 
experience (Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008).  
 
   2.2.3 The role of decision makers: focus on TMTs 
Although these findings suggest the overall importance of boards in foreign acquisition 
decisions, bidder TMTs’ collective responsibilities therein remain understudied. Instead, while 
looking at acquisition outcomes, the decision-maker role of chief executive officers (CEOs) as 
one of the most powerful members of the TMTs has been widely researched both from agency 
perspective (e.g., Jensen, 1986) as well as behavioural perspective (e.g., Doukas & Petmezas, 
2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Empire building (Jensen, 1986 & 1988) and overconfidence 
of a bidding firm CEO (Malmendier & Tate, 2008) are among the most commonly cited 
explanations of poor acquisition announcement returns. Whilst the misuse of a firm’s resources 
by overinvesting may arise due to conflicts of interest between the firm’s CEO and 
shareholders, overconfidence is viewed as a manifestation of self-attributive bias of a CEO 
who believes that (s)he is acting in shareholders’ interest (Malmendier & Tate, 2008).   
The IB literature also tends to have a restricted view of TMTs’ role in acquisition decisions, 
with a prevalent focus being on the CEO (cf. Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). This is in contrast 
with research on the ‘upper echelons’ which indicates that perceptions, ‘orientations’, and 
values of entire TMTs influence strategic decisions (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Finkelstein et 
al., 2008; Li & Tang, 2010). Individual decision makers’ cognitions and personalities are 
shaped by various demographic factors like their education and experience. These factors 
underpin managerial discretion in situations with higher information asymmetry (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2011), such as strategic decisions concerning international M&As. They also 
contribute to a collective cognition and decision-making ability and attitudes of a TMT, thereby 
affect the consequences of organizational strategies (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein et 
al., 2008). Indeed, strategic decisions are likely to be taken by the TMT as a whole, or the 
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‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert & March, 1963), rather than any one executive (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Lee & Park, 2008; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014).  
 
Yet, the literature on the impact of TMT characteristics on the acquirer returns in cross-country 
transactions is relatively scarce. Agency theory measures of characteristics and composition of 
corporate boards (for instance, proportion of independent outsiders on board) have been used 
to examine the outcomes of acquisitions (Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Brown & Maloney, 1999). 
However, agency theory is silent on the issue of how bidder TMTs’ collective experiences and 
cognitions may influence such decisions, as suggested by ‘upper echelons’ theory, and thus 
shareholder value. In what follows we first revise the concept of TMT international orientation 
before combining insights from these streams of literature to argue about the relationship 
between TMT international orientation and shareholder wealth creation through foreign 
acquisitions.  
 
   2.2.4 TMT international orientation 
‘Upper echelons’ theory has defined TMT orientation as an “interwoven set of psychological 
and observable characteristics” (Finkelstein et al., 2008, p. 49) of every member thereof. These 
characteristics can be shaped through education and experience, among others (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). In particular, international experience of a CEO and the entire TMT can 
facilitate the development of international market knowledge and contributes to superior 
internationalization decisions (Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001). Such 
international exposure may also lead to development of informal network ties (Blomstermo, 
Eriksson, Lindstrand, & Sharma, 2004). Thus, general international experience is a key 
contributor to TMT international orientation (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & 
Trojanowski, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, specific host country experience in a TMT may put the team in an advantageous 
position while negotiating terms of the transaction with target management, since the team 
would have superior knowledge of alternatives available to both their own firm and to the 
proposed target (Stroup, 2012). We postulate that next to the general international experience, 
specific host country experience is a relevant aspect of TMT international orientation when 
considering its effect on shareholder value creation upon announcements of foreign 
acquisitions.  
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Finally, values and ideas ingrained in national cultures are likely to have a deep and lasting 
effect on TMT international orientations, independent of their cognitions and wisdom from any 
other foreign experience, the latter tending to be limited in time and scope (Nielsen & Nielsen, 
2011). Differences in such cognitions and cultural values due to diverse TMT nationalities may 
also affect the ways managers interpret and utilize available information, based on their home 
country familiarity, thereby affecting their strategic decisions. All these observable 
characteristics of executives may thus influence managers’ risk and uncertainty perceptions as 
well as add to their skills and confidence to manage deals across borders (Carpenter, Pollock 
& Leary, 2003; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; 2006).  
 
Situations of high information asymmetry such as those characterizing foreign M&A decisions 
are likely to induce top executives’ subjective evaluations of potential targets, the more so the 
more discretion the executives have (Finkelstein et al., 2008; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). 
However, when information asymmetry is combined with uncertainty, as is often the case in 
foreign acquisitions, prior experience may prove unreliable. Under such circumstances, TMTs’ 
collective confidence may be misplaced and prior international experience may be misapplied 
(cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), leading to overestimation of expected synergies and future 
cash flows (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). This is often the case for those top executives in the 
team who seem to possess high core self-evaluations (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). This self-
attributive assessment (Billett & Qian, 2008) of international orientation could lead to hubris 
(Roll, 1986) in future decisions on acquiring foreign targets. Moreover, TMT heterogeneity by 
virtue of mix of different nationalities may adversely affect the process of group decision 
making due to varied information resources, outlooks, and cognitive interpretations (Wiersema 
& Bantel, 1992).  
 
Therefore, in this study we explore whether and how international orientations of TMTs of 
acquiring firms influence the abnormal returns on the announcement of international 
acquisitions. In order to do so, we focus on quantifiable TMT orientation dimensions identified 
by upper echelons theory, namely general international experience, specific host country 
experience, and TMT nationality mix.  
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2.3 Research hypotheses 
As discussed above, cross-border acquisitions are likely to be associated with unique 
challenges attributable to their international nature, despite having similar patterns and 
rationales as the domestic ones. The additional element of country-level information 
asymmetry and uncertainty, absent in their domestic counterparts, makes the cross-country 
M&As fraught with more difficulties for managers. Thus, the complexity of unfamiliar 
environments and un-foreseeability of outcomes necessitate that foreign acquisition strategies 
are decided upon not by a single individual like CEO, but rather by the entire team of top 
executives. Moreover, since corporate regulations mandate that such critical strategic decisions 
can seldom be taken singlehandedly, it is logical that the quality of such decisions can improve 
when each member of the TMT contributes their own cognitions and expertise, thereby 
enriching the overall decision-making process.  
 
Since foreign acquisition choices are largely irreversible and inflexible, they are more 
susceptible to environmental risks and uncertainties compared with other firms’ choices. Under 
such circumstances, top managers of an acquiring firm’s face a lot of ambiguous information 
from sources both within and outside their firm. In such cases, they tend to use their existing 
cognitions and heuristics to scan and sort the available information to assimilate and interpret 
it in order to make a decision (Shaw, 1990). These cognitions and heuristics may also distort 
TMT perception of the strategic decision situation and lead to a suboptimal decision. They are 
shaped by their discernible background characteristics such as managers’ tenure with the firm, 
formal education, functional and international exposures (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Finkelstein et al., 2008). Managers’ insights and self-evaluations also develop during their 
young or formative age from their family and social environments, tending to play a major role 
in strategic choices like international acquisitions under intense uncertainty (Hiller & 
Hambrick, 2005; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014).  
 
As discussed earlier, international exposure of one or more members of the TMT may enhance 
the team’s deal negotiating and executing capabilities by virtue of better understanding of 
cross-cultural risks and cultural differences as well as of having developed superior local 
networks in the host country. Such international experience broadens the top executives’ 
horizon of knowledge of complex and uncertain deal characteristics in an international 
scenario. The amassed insight on foreign cultures and business practices may make a bidding 
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firm’s managers more adventurous and optimistic, and hence aggressive, in their foreign 
acquisition decision (Carpenter et al., 2001). From a team perspective, the presence of a large 
number of such knowledgeable executives should generate higher team cognitive capacity and 
confidence to alleviate the perceived risks, filtering and processing all available information 
and thereafter making a judgment on the transaction (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The presence of higher number of internationally-experienced executives in 
acquiring firms’ TMTs will be associated with higher abnormal returns at the time of 
announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
 
However, the skill set discussed above may at the same time disproportionately boost up top 
executives’ core self-evaluations (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) which can lead to distorted notions 
of superior capability to generate gains from cross-border transactions, tarnishing the benefit 
of international experience garnered. This overestimation of self-abilities tends to be more 
prominent in situations of limited information and uncertainty (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007), as 
happens in the case of cross-border acquisitions. Thus, the TMT collective ego may bias their 
comprehension of the plausible pros and cons of the decision at hand (Hambrick & Cannella, 
1993), affecting the rationality of evaluation of returns from their strategic choice. This is likely 
to create an overoptimistic estimation of the features of the proposed deal, leading to mispricing 
of the target, and thereby destruction of shareholder wealth in the process, consistent with 
Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis.  
 
The notion of ‘self-serving attribution’ is predicted to give rise to overconfidence with regard 
to one’s own abilities (e.g. managerial skills) in judging the expected gains from international 
acquisitions, resulting in overestimation thereof (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Also, as 
suggested by psychologists, overconfidence in individuals stems from the perception of 
prospective outcomes deemed to be under their control and to which they feel very committed 
(Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Klein, 2002). ‘The combination of overconfidence and 
optimism is a potent brew, which causes people to overestimate their knowledge, underestimate 
risks, and exaggerate their ability to control events’ (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998, p. 54). Thus, 
internationally experienced TMTs of bidding firms may be expressly optimistic about future 
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returns from cross-country acquisitions whilst underestimating the plausible risks, thereby 
suffering from an ‘illusion of control’ (Langer, 1975; March & Shapira, 1987).  
 
Misjudgement might not arise solely due to agency problems as theorised by Jensen (1986, 
1988). TMTs may believe that M&A decisions would be in the interest of the shareholders 
(Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Consequently, TMTs with higher 
number of executives having any sort of international experiences will tend to have a 
misperceived interpretation of cross-country information ambiguity. Such misleading view of 
uncertainty, simply by dint of greater number of internationally oriented executives, may 
encourage TMTs to take more daring initiatives, such as higher number of international 
acquisitions or bidding more aggressively, resulting in paying higher premiums. These could 
decrease the returns from M&A deals. Therefore, we propose the following competing 
hypothesis to Hypothesis 1a: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The presence of higher number of internationally-experienced executives in 
acquiring firms’ TMTs will be associated with lower abnormal returns at the time of 
announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
 
Apart from general international experience, host-country specific experience and the resulting 
knowledge, abilities, and personal connections may be a valuable managerial resource 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) when deciding upon foreign acquisitions. Such experience can be 
gained through domicile or employment and it facilitates the development of insights regarding 
regulatory environment, governance, market structures, disclosure practices, culture, economy, 
and institutions (Barney, 1988). Therefore, TMTs including such individuals would be in a 
better position to (1) identify attractive acquisition targets due to superior insight into the host 
market and (2) effectively negotiate the deal with its foreign target. Such superior information 
could place the bidder at an advantage in the transaction. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The presence of higher number of executives having familiarity with target 
country in the TMT of an acquiring firm will be associated with higher abnormal returns at the 
time of announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
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Country-specific experience could substantially tone down the TMT’s perceived uncertainty 
pertaining to the host country, arguably more so than general international experience or 
presence of foreigners in the TMT would. Consequently, the TMT may pursue the acquisition 
transaction in a familiar host country with greater aggressiveness or over-optimism, thereby 
obfuscating the possible advantages of familiarity. Therefore, if TMT includes greater number 
of executives with host country experience, it can be argued that the collective source of similar 
knowledge might bring about a sense of complacency in the team. This effect may also be due 
to the ‘groupthink’ phenomenon (cf. Benabou, 2013): TMT members with similar host-country 
specific experience may tend to agree with one another, creating pressures for conformity, 
which in turn may result in failure to consider alternatives, selective processing of information, 
under-appreciation of risks and illusion of invulnerability (Janis & Mann, 1977). This may lead 
to overoptimistic acquisition decisions. For these reasons the usefulness of superior 
information can wane, leading to deterioration in the overall structure and value of the deal. 
Accordingly, we propose the following contrasting hypothesis to Hypothesis 2a: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The presence of higher number of executives having familiarity with target 
country in the TMT of an acquiring firm will be associated with lower abnormal returns at the 
time of announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
 
The last of the three elements of TMT international orientation that we consider is the national 
diversity of the team (cf. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). Research on national cultural psychology 
suggests that different inherent values and thinking patterns, which guide individual behavior 
and actions, are inculcated in early childhood. These patterns tend to be so deep-rooted so as 
to surmount later experiences in life (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Thus, foreign executives on 
TMTs contribute to a heterogeneous mix of cross-cultural cognitions and perceptions on the 
team. Cultural diversity in the team increases its international orientation, and the mix of 
cultural values of managers becomes reflected in their judgments (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). 
Therefore, the presence of higher number of foreign nationals amongst top managers may 
improve their comprehension of cross-country issues and provide access to enhanced home-
country networks, thus moderating the overall team’s uncertainty perceptions (Greve, Nielsen 
& Ruigrok, 2009; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3a: The presence of a higher number of foreign nationals in the TMT of an 
acquiring firm will have a positive effect on the acquirer’s shareholders returns at the 
announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
 
A nationally diverse TMT is likely to consider a wider range of alternatives and, once selected, 
arrive at their decision on an international acquisition with greater confidence. However, 
heterogeneous TMT may suffer from suboptimal, slow decision making (Tihanyi et al., 2000). 
For instance, more foreigners in TMT expend larger resources of the acquiring firm in hiring 
greater number of consultants, additional discussions  due to lower consensus, etc. (Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2011). Hence, the acquisition process is more likely to become costlier. Slow TMTs 
may wear out the patience of target firm’s management or be preempted by faster bidders, 
resulting in on average lower quality targets being acquired by such teams. Further, more 
heterogeneous mix in the TMT may lead to inefficient communication (Priem, 1990) and 
conflicts. Thus, the benefits of TMT diversity may taper off with greater TMT heterogeneity 
generating overconfidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008), slowing the decision making 
process and making it costlier. Thus, we propose the following competing hypothesis to 
Hypothesis 3a: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The presence of a higher number of foreign nationals in the TMT of an 
acquiring firm will have a negative effect on the acquirer’s shareholders returns at the 
announcement of cross-country acquisition. 
 
2.4 Sample and methodology 
To test our hypotheses about how different elements of TMT international orientation relate to 
short-term stock market performance of firms upon cross-country acquisition announcements, 
we collected a sample of the listed UK acquirers listed on the London Stock Exchange at any 
time between 1999 and 2008. The initial sample was obtained by merging data from SDC 
Platinum, BoardEx, and Thomson One Banker/DataStream. The data from the SDC Platinum 
database yielded 2,278 completed foreign acquisitions by 642 UK public companies for the 
chosen sample period. All other relevant information on these acquisition announcements like, 
transaction value, method of payments (i.e., cash payment, stock payment, or mixed payment), 
foreign target status (i.e. whether public or private or subsidiary) were also collected. The study 
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focused on the universe of listed firms and did not exclude any specific industry types, like 
financial firms. The cross-country deals in the sample were only filtered to include those with 
value of at least £ one million. This data was then merged with the data on financials of 
acquiring firms obtained from DataStream. The combined dataset was then matched with the 
information on acquiring firms’ TMTs from BoardEx UK universe (as in Piaskowska & 
Trojanowski, 2014). Target country-level data were collected from World Bank, Transparency 
International, Geert Hofstede’s research (Hofstede, 2001), and Euromoney magazine. The 
merging processes of different data sets and limited availability of data on some of the variables 
required for analysis restricted the final sample size to 1,965 acquisitions completed by 479 
firms. However, due to missing observations on all the variables employed for the analyses, 
the analyzable data came further down to 1818 cross-country acquisitions by 446 such firms. 
 
The first step in the empirical analyses involved obtaining a measure of acquirer performance, 
i.e. the cumulative abnormal return on announcement of a cross-border M&A transaction, 
which we generated using a standard event study procedure. In the second step we used 
multiple linear regression models (using ordinary least squares (OLS) method) to explain the 
acquirer performance generated in the first step. Before presenting detailed model 
specifications, below we discuss operationalization of key variables of interest. All the 
variables, except indicator variables, have been winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile levels to 
avoid the results being affected by outliers.  
 
   2.4.1 Dependent variable 
We used short-run (a three-day period) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the UK 
acquiring firms as dependent variable in our regression analyses. The CARs using daily stock 
returns were estimated using the widely-accepted event study method (cf. Brown & Warner, 
1985). This method relies on Fama’s (1970) contention that all important events are accurately 
and promptly incorporated in the share prices of firms. A three-day event window (from one 
day before to one day after cross-country acquisition announcements) is in line with the recent 
studies (e.g., Chari et al., 2010; Ahern et al., 2012). Similar tests were later repeated with 
eleven-day CARs as a robustness check.  
 
The announcement stock returns were calculated using two models: (a) market model (MM) 
and (b) market adjusted returns (MAR) model. For MM, the expected return (R) was 
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computed for each acquirer’s stock i on day t, the implicit assumption being that stock returns 
can be explained by a single factor, i.e. market return:4  
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit, (2.1) 
where RMt is FTSE all-share market index return for the same day t as R and ε	is the error 
term. The acquirer firm’s stock-specific parameters  and 	were estimated using a 190 
trading-day non-event window period from 250 to 60 trading days before the acquisition 
announcement for each security i. The daily abnormal returns (AR) for each security i were 
calculated as the difference between observed returns for day t and the expected return 
computed from Equation 1 above, i.e.: 

 =	 −	( + 				) (2.2) 
where α  and β	 are the OLS estimates of the regression parameters  and		.  
 
For MAR model, no such non-event estimation period is required. The daily abnormal returns 
(AR) for each company stock i are given as the difference between the observed stock returns 
on day t and the corresponding market return on the same day: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt (2.3) 
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) of the announcement effect over a three-day 
window around the announcement date i.e. CAR (-1, +1) were obtained by aggregating the 
sample ARits on the event dates and one day before and one day after the same, given as: 

(−1,+1) = 1	∑
 ! 

"
#
 
(2.4) 
The statistical significance of the CARs was tested using t-test and Wilcoxon test. Since event 
samples tend to have stocks with varied trading status, stock returns tend to be thick-tailed 
where approximation by the normal distribution would be poor (Fama, 1976). Hence, t-test 
might not be reliable and non-parametric tests (e.g., generalized sign test) tend to perform better 
under relatively general distributional assumptions regarding ARs (Cowan, 1992).  
                                                          
4
 More precisely, throughout this section i denotes a particular M&A deal announced by a given acquirer. In cases 
where a particular acquirer announced multiple deals on separate dates over the 10-year sample period, the 
parameters of the market model were estimated separately for each deal.  
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   2.4.2 Independent variables 
Information on acquirer managers’ demographic characteristics like education and 
employment history gathered from the data sources aforementioned was used to determine the 
international orientation of TMT members. This data was then used to operationalize the 
following two variables:  
a) TMT international experience (Num TMT Intl experience): The number of TMT 
members who obtained educational qualification or ever been employed outside 
their country of domicile or nationality until one year prior to the acquisition under 
consideration; - to be used in Equation 2.5 below.  
b) TMT host-country specific experience (Num TMT host country experience): 
The number of TMT members who had familiarity with country of the proposed 
target by virtue of living and / or working therein up to one year before the 
announcement of the focal acquisition deal; to be used in Equation 2.6 below. 
We also created two additional proxies for TMT international experience, represented by the 
average number of years and the average number (range) of countries of international 
experience for each acquiring firm TMT. These proxies were utilized for further analyses of 
the effect of bidder TMT orientation.  
c) TMT national diversity (Num TMT foreign nationals) was measured as the 
number of foreign (i.e. non-UK) nationals in the managerial team of the acquiring 
firm one year prior to the deal announcement and was employed as a regressor in 
Equation 2.7 below. The number of nationalities represented in TMTs.  
 
   2.4.3 Control variables 
Prior studies found a range of acquirer and deal characteristics which influence abnormal 
returns to acquisition announcements (e.g., Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller, 2002; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2003; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2004). The control variables included in the 
analysis can be classified into three categories: deal-specific, bidder-specific, and target 
country-specific variables. 
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Deal-specific variables:  
Prior research (e.g. Travlos, 1987) has indicated that acquisitions financed solely with stocks 
of bidding firms are likely to generate lower returns for their shareholders. Thus, we distinguish 
three different methods of payment, i.e. cash, stock, and a combination of both along with debt, 
etc. To code this information, two binary variables were constructed: the first one (i.e. Cash) 
takes the value of one for pure cash payments and zero otherwise, the second one (i.e. Stock) 
takes the value of one for pure stock payments and zero otherwise. Full acquisition denotes 
transactions where upon completion of the acquisition, the acquirer gains full control of the 
target, i.e. at least 95% stake (cf. Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Transaction value (in £ 
millions) is expressed in logarithmic form. 
 
Bidder-specific variables: 
Acquiring firm characteristics such as size and profitability have also been shown to influence 
M&A announcement returns. Acquirer’s size is measured as the logarithm of total market 
capitalization expressed in £ millions at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-
border transaction. Acquirer’s profitability is operationalized as the ratio of return on assets 
(ROA) and also measured at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border 
transaction. Finally, a binary variable was constructed to control for diversifying acquisitions 
by a bidding firm. This indicator variable is equal to one when an acquisition involved any 
industry other than the acquirer core macro industry (based on Fama-French industry 
classification), and zero otherwise. We also included TMT Size as an additional control in line 
with Carpenter et al. (2004) to take into account the range of opinions that may arise in the 
process of decision-making amongst the TMTs, for reasons other than their international 
orientation. 
 
Target country-specific variables: 
Cultural differences between the acquirer and the host counties have also been the subject of 
previous research showing that environmental risk and uncertainty perceptions regarding target 
markets rise with greater cultural differences (Kogut & Singh, 1988) and impact acquisition 
decisions (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Since the frequency of acquisitions between 
pairs of countries reduces with increasing cultural disparities (Ahern et al., 2012), this factor is 
also likely to increase the costs to the acquiring firms (Erel et al., 2012) and may lead to 
diminished value to the bidders’ shareholders. We quantify cultural differences as the distance 
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between the target country and the country of the acquiring firm (i.e. the UK) using Kogut & 
Singh’s (1988) index on the basis of four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001). These 
dimensions were power distance, avoidance of uncertainty, individualism vs. collectivism and 
masculinity vs. femininity (see Appendix p.64 for more details).  
 
Information on both objective and subjective factors relating to a country like its political risk, 
economic performance, and access to finance both in the long and short terms, debt indicators, 
etc. was incorporated into Euromoney magazine index (Euromoney, 2009). This time-varying 
index of riskiness of the host country termed as country risk, was quantified in such a way that 
higher values meant higher risk. Finally, development of the target country was measured by 
one-year lagged GDP per capita in USD thousands with the data provided by World Bank. 
 
Previous studies (e.g. Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Ellis et al., 2011) show that bidder 
shareholder returns are affected by the status of the target firm, i.e. whether it is a public 
company, private company, or a partly-owned subsidiary of the bidding firm. We therefore, 
introduce two dummy variables as to whether the target is private target represented as one 
and zero otherwise, and whether it is listed target coded as one and zero otherwise, as target-
specific controls.  
 
We estimate the following regression to test Hypothesis 1a v Hypothesis 1b: 
 
CARit = α1 + β1NumTMTIntlexperiencei + β2Cashi + β3Stocki + β4FullAcquisitioni + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7ROAi + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + 
β11GDP_PerCapitai + β12PrivateTargeti + β13ListedTargeti+ β14TMTSizei + ε1it      
(2.5) 
 
 
In Equation 2.5, CARit is the three-day CAR estimated for a bidding firm  at its announcement 
of cross-border acquisition on day t, εit is the standard error term, and α1t, β1t … β14t denote 
regression coefficients. All the regressors are defined above.   
 
For the next two regression models, the main explanatory variable in Equation 2.5 (i.e. Num 
TMT intl experiencei) is substituted with other measures of TMT international orientation that 
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we use. In Equation 2.6, we use Num TMT host country experiencei instead, counting the 
number of executives having experience of the host country in the TMT of a bidder i in the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement, which allows us to test Hypothesis 2a v 
Hypothesis 2b. In Equation 2.7 we use Num TMT foreign nationalsi representing the number 
of foreign nationals in the TMT of an acquiring firm i in the year preceding year of the 
announcement of a cross-country acquisition, in line with Hypotheses 3a and 3b above. The 
control variables in the regressions below are the same as those in Equation 2.5 earlier. 
 
CARit = α2 + δ1NumTMThostcountryexperiencei + δ2Cashi + δ3Stocki + δ4FullAcquisitioni 
+
 
δ5LogTransactionValuei + δ6Log_MktCapitalizationi + δ7ROAi + 
δ8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + δ9CulturalDistancei + δ10CountryRiski + 
δ11GDP_PerCapitai + δ12PrivateTargeti + δ13ListedTargeti+ δ14TMTSizei + ε2it              (2.6)         
 
CARit = α3 + γ1NumTMTForeignNationalsi + γ2Cashi + γ3Stocki + γ4FullAcquisitioni + 
γ5Log_TransactionVaueli + γ6Log_MktCapitalizationi + γ7ROAi + 
γ8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + γ9CulturalDistancei + γ10CountryRiski + γ11GDP_PerCapitai 
+
 
γ12PrivateTargeti + γ13ListedTargeti+ γ14TMTSizei + ε3it          (2.7) 
 
 
The same model specifications are used to test our hypotheses in the multilevel mixed-effects 
linear regression framework to check the sensitivity of the findings from the OLS models 
originally used. Extant research (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 
2014) adopt a multilevel research design arguing that such structure seems more appropriate 
where acquisitions are not only nested within firms, which in turn are nested within industries; 
and also within the different host countries.  
 
As a further measure of robustness as well as to examine whether a composite measure of 
international orientation of the TMTs of the acquirer firms affects announcement CARs, an 
exploratory factor analysis is also performed. The rationale for this method is that the predictor 
variables in Equations 2.5-2.7 are correlated with one another, as indicated by Table 2.2.  
 
 
 
2.5 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics and significance tests for the CARs. Using both 
parametric and non-parametric tests for 3-day and 11-day CARs, both tests show CARs are 
significantly different from zero at 1% level for MM. For MAR model, 11-day CARs are 
statistically significant at 10% level for the parametric test while the non-parametric test for 
11-day CARS shows significance at 1% level. The average CARs are positive for the chosen 
event windows.  
[ Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2 about here ] 
 
The means and standard deviations and the correlation matrix of all the independent and control 
variables used for analysis with the corresponding p-values in parentheses are shown in Table 
2.2. In the sample, UK bidding firms have on average a market capitalization value of £7,710 
million and return on assets of 5.16% in the year preceding acquisition announcements. 
 
With regard to the deal characteristics, it can be seen that 60.7% of the cross-border transactions 
undertaken by UK acquirers are paid fully in cash, whilst only 3.3% are wholly stock-financed 
deals. Moreover, considering the status of the acquired foreign targets, it can be seen that about 
51.7% of the deals involve private targets, public targets being a mere 10.5%. These findings 
are consistent with the features of UK equity market as reported by Faccio & Masulis (2005) 
and Doukas & Petmezas (2007). In more than three quarters of the sample acquisitions the 
bidder gains full control over the target as a result of the deal. 
 
Except the host country experience predictor, the other two predictor variables have a negative 
correlation with bidder CARs (using MM), although the correlation coefficient is significant 
only for the number of internationally experienced managers on acquirer’s TMT (ρ = -0.07, p-
value < 0.00). 
 
[ Insert Table 2.3 about here ] 
2.6 Results 
   2.6.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 2.3 presents CARs of the bidding firms over a three-day period surrounding the 
announcements of cross-border acquisitions tabulated as a function of TMT international 
orientation indicators. Specifically, the table shows how large the acquiring firms’ CARs are 
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in presence (or absence) of TMT members with international experience, foreign nationals in 
TMTs, and TMTs with members familiar with host country.  
 
It can be seen that presence of internationally-experienced executives in bidding firm TMTs 
lowers these firms’ CARs in both MM and MAR model. The difference between the two 
categories (i.e. presence v. absence of such executives) is significant at 5% level for MM and 
10% for MAR model. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test also shows that the distributions of the 
acquirer CARs are statistically different between the two categories at 10% level for MM and 
5% for MAR model. These results suggest that the market fails to perceive the presence of such 
specially-endowed bidder TMTs as facilitators of superior announcement abnormal returns to 
bidder shareholders and the market reaction is more consistent with overconfidence and hubris 
explanations proposed earlier.  
 
The results pertaining to the presence of host country knowledgeable TMT members indicate 
a small increase in average CARs, although this difference is not statistically significant either 
using the t-test or Wilcoxon rank-sum test for neither MM nor MAR model. This is also the 
case in both MM and MAR model. These findings suggest that the stock market fails to 
recognize the value of TMT host country specific experience. 
 
The presence of foreign nationals in TMTs of the acquiring firms’ is associated with a small 
decrease of these firms’ CARs for both MM and MAR model (compared to the case where 
such executives are absent on a TMT). While the direction of this difference is opposite to the 
difference due to TMT host-country specific experience, it is similarly insignificant either for 
t-test or for Wilcoxon rank-sum test for either MM or MAR model.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.4 about here ] 
 
   2.6.2 Multivariate results 
Table 2.4 reports the multivariate regression estimates corresponding to models specified by 
Equations 2.5 (i.e., Models 1A and 1B), 2.6 (i.e., Models 2A and 2B), and 2.7 (i.e., Models 3A 
and 3B), respectively. Models 4A and 4B combine all the variables used into single 
specifications. The results are tabulated for acquiring firms’ CARs over a three-day event 
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window using both MM and MAR model, where the models marked ‘A’ report CARs based 
on MM, those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on MAR model.  
 
The first two regression models (i.e. Models 1A and 1B) examine how the number of 
internationally experienced executives on boards of acquiring firms impacts abnormal returns 
to these firms in cross-border acquisitions, in conjunction with other control factors as detailed 
above. The results show that as postulated by Hypothesis 1b (and contrary to the competing 
Hypothesis 1a), the international expertise of bidder TMTs is inversely related with the CARs 
of the acquiring firms, although this effect is statistically insignificant. Hence, everything else 
constant, the impact of number of executives in a TMT with prior international exposure cannot 
be meaningfully interpreted for either the MM or the MAR model.  
 
Models 2A and 2B examine whether higher number of bidding firm managers with host 
country exposure influences abnormal returns to these firms, as postulated by either Hypothesis 
2a or 2b. The key explanatory variable in this model (i.e. the number of acquirer’s TMT 
members with host country experience) shows statistical significance at 10% level only for 
MAR model. However, for MM, the corresponding estimate is insignificant, although with a 
positive sign. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is at most weakly supported, being also consistent with the 
findings of Stroup (2012) that such knowledge might be conducive to greater likelihood of 
cross-country acquisition decisions. 
 
The next two models (i.e. Models 3A and 3B) investigate the prediction of Hypothesis 3a v 
Hypothesis 3b as to whether the greater numbers of foreign nationals in acquirer TMTs have 
an impact on the CARs of the acquiring firms. The results show that for neither MM nor MAR 
model, the number of foreign executives on the bidder team is a statistically significant 
determinant of CARs (albeit the sign of the coefficient estimate for either model is positive, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3a on the lines of the beneficial impact of diversity on cross-border 
decisions as reported by Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). So, the 
number of foreign managers in UK acquiring firm TMTs does not appear to have any influence 
on the announcement returns of the acquiring firms. 
 
Only two of the control variables employed in the analysis namely, diversifying cross-border 
acquisition indicator and lagged acquirer size are consistently significant across all model 
specifications. Each of the variables influence acquirer firm CARs negatively, ceteris paribus. 
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Diversifying acquisition announcements are accompanied by CARs lower by about 33 b.p. for 
MM, as implied by Model 1A (and by 44 b.p. for MAR model, as implied by Model 1B). Cross-
border acquisitions announced by larger firms are also perceived less favorably by the market. 
 
With respect to other control variables, country risk, GDP per capita and listed targets 
respectively appear significant in a number of models. It seems that acquisitions in more risky 
countries are perceived more favorably by the market. It suggests that value-creation potential 
might be higher for acquisitions in countries with high growth potential, even if the 
corresponding risk of investing there could be higher. The evidence with respect to higher 
CARs in cases of expansions into host countries with higher per capita GDP and negative effect 
of listed targets on CARs are quite expected and support prior related findings. All the other 
control variables are insignificant even at a generous 10% level in all regression specifications.    
 
The last two models reported in Table 2.4 (i.e. Models 4A and 4B) illustrate the combined 
effect of the explanatory variables examined earlier. The negative effect of international 
expertise of bidder TMT on announcement CARs (documented by Models 1A and 1B) is now 
significant at 5% and 10% respectively for MM and MAR models, supporting Hypothesis 1b. 
The coefficients corresponding to the other two key explanatory variables are also significant 
in Model 4B, although in Model 4A, only that of foreign nationals in the TMTs show 10% 
significance. Therefore, we can reject either Hypotheses 2b or 3b and find strong support for 
Hypothesis 3a and some for Hypothesis 2a. Economically, this implies everything else 
constant, when the number of internationally experienced executives increases (decreases) by 
one standard deviation, the magnitude of average bidder CARs decreases (increases) by 48 
basis points (b.p.) in case of MM and by 61 b.p. for MAR model, respectively. It would also 
imply that, ceteris paribus, if the number of foreigners increase in the TMT, bidder CARs on 
average would increase in magnitude by 34 and 55 b.p. for MM and MAR model respectively.  
Our findings in respect of international experience of top managers uphold the evidences based 
on overconfidence as documented by Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Doukas & Petmezas, 2007, 
etc. However, the findings also show the postulated advantages in respect of the other two 
proxies of TMT orientation (i.e. number of managers with host country knowledge and 
different nationalities), as advocated by the other strand of literature (e.g., Carpenter et al., 
2001; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011, etc.). The results corresponding to control variables in Models 
4A and 4B are quite similar to those discussed earlier for Models 1A-3B. Both MM as well as 
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MAR model yielded generally similar results showing that these findings are consistent across 
the event study technique adopted. 
 
2.7 Additional analyses regarding TMT international orientation 
Considering the key lines of theoretical arguments presented in this paper, one can argue for 
nonlinear or conditional effects of TMT international orientation on abnormal returns upon 
acquisition announcements. Prior research showed that initial firm-level acquisition experience 
influenced performance negatively due to firm’s inability to learn from such a complex 
experience and the likelihood of misapplying any lessons learned to subsequent acquisitions 
(e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). The benefits of acquisition experience may not become 
apparent until enough of it is gained for a firm to be able to distinguish which past lessons can 
be applied and which cannot when a new acquisition decision is being taken. A similar effect 
may exist in the case of TMT international experience where initial international experience 
may provide limited lessons while being a source of perhaps unwarranted sense of confidence 
in the team’s judgment and ability.  
 
The effect of TMT host-country specific experience in foreign acquisition decisions may be 
different: initially, specific knowledge may be helpful, but at higher levels it may lead to 
‘groupthink’ (Benabou, 2013) and therefore negatively impact shareholder wealth. The 
benefits of TMT national diversity may also follow a nonlinear pattern, bringing initial benefits 
which may fade as heterogeneity and risk of misunderstanding and slow decision making 
increases. 
 
Thus, we explored quadratic relationships between TMT international orientation measures 
and CARs. We also used alternative operationalization of the measures involved as well as a 
composite measure of TMT international orientation achieved by factor-analyzing the three 
original components. Finally, we considered potential interactive effects of different elements 
of TMT international orientation, in the expectation that for example lack of foreign nationals 
on a team may be compensated for with higher international experience.  
 
While most of the associated estimates were insignificant, when the effect of international 
experience of bidding firms’ TMTs was measured using average years thereof, as opposed to 
42 
 
count of such executives, we found evidence of a U-shape relationship with inflection point at 
about 60th percentile of the sample, equivalent to approximately 6 years of average international 
experience on the TMT (see Table 2.5).  The detrimental effect of greater international 
experience appeared to be toned down as more of it is gained with time. This is a particularly 
interesting result as it shows that TMT international experience may benefit only the most 
experienced teams – in other words, such experience is valuable, but may hurt if insufficient. 
Indeed, being hard to replicate, extensive international experience on the TMT may form a 
basis of competitive advantage of the firm. However, we notice the contrasting effect in case 
of more host country acquainted managers. As argued before, we find that the advantage of 
this facet of international orientation actually wanes after a threshold. E.g. in Model 5B, we 
find an inverted U-shaped association at about 90 percentile of the sample, signifying at most 
2 managers with same host country experience in TMT can be beneficial, beyond which it 
could be disadvantageous owing to either ‘groupthink’ or choosing sub-optimal targets on 
account of familiarity.  
 
[ Insert Table 2.5 about here ] 
 
Another set of analysis involved the use of two composite factors, one capturing acquirer TMT 
international exposure and the other reflecting target-country familiarity (both of which were 
obtained as a result of factor analysis). When these factors were used separately in multiple 
regression models with the same controls as in Equations 5, 6, and 7, TMT international 
orientation showed a positive relationship with bidding firm CARs for both MM and MAR 
models, albeit insignificant. The host-country knowledge factor also shared a similar relation 
with acquirer abnormal returns, being statistically non-significant for both the models just as 
the former composite orientation factor. We do not report this result here. 
  
Finally, we re-tested our hypotheses replacing the numbers of TMT members with particular 
attribute reflecting international orientation by the proportion (or percentage) thereof. The 
corresponding results were in line with those earlier for the counterparts of Models 1A-3B 
reported in Table 2.4 and are provided in the appendix in Table 2.6.  
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2.8 Further robustness tests 
The models presented in Table 2.4 were re-estimated using a longer event window, eleven-day 
CARs. However, the overall models’ statistical significance diminishes in this case for MM. 
The results uphold our original findings with respect to three-day CARs for all the new Models 
7A-10B. Thus, eleven-day Models 10A and 10B support Hypotheses 1b, 2a and 3a. Among 
the control variables employed, the diversifying acquisition indicator loses its earlier 
significance in the regressions, although acquirer size still retains significance in all the models. 
We find full acquisition dummy and private target dummy becoming at least marginally 
significant in some specifications. These findings are reported in the appendix in Table 2.7. 
 
We also adopted multilevel mixed-effects linear regression methodology as a further test of 
our hypotheses. The results obtained using the multilevel technique, are consistent with those 
of the OLS method. The models are not reported here since the likelihood ratio test-statistic 
was insignificant in most cases – we consider it a limitation of our analysis. Significant 
association of CARs with the TMT proxies was only noticed in the combined specification 
with all of the latter. Overall, the findings here, including those for the control variables, are 
largely in line with those reported in Table 2.4 above.  
 
Since the sample period witnessed two major crises, i.e. the post-2000 dot-com bubble burst 
and the financial crisis beginning in late 2007, year dummy variables were used to check for 
fixed time effects. Since the corresponding results are broadly consistent with those reported 
earlier while overall significance of the models deteriorates, they are not included here. 
 
Since the sample includes the universe of all UK acquirers, the original models are rerun after 
dropping the financial firms from the sample (based on Fama-French 17 industry 
classification), resulting into a loss of 186 observations. The results from both MM and MAR 
models are in principle consistent with the main findings presented in Section 2.6; hence, not 
reported here for the sake of brevity. 
 
The larger the deal size, the greater might be the involvement of the TMTs of the acquiring 
firms in the decision making process. Thus, it can be expected that in a case of a large deal, the 
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impact of TMT attributes is likely to be more profound. We estimated a series of models where 
the centered measures of international orientation were interacted with the centered deal value 
to check for this possibility. The resulting coefficient estimates were negative, albeit 
statistically insignificant. These findings are reported in Table 2.8 in the appendix. 
 
Finally, we employed a quartile distribution specification of another variant of TMT 
international experience variable, i.e. range of countries where the managers may have accrued 
their international exposures from. The high quartile showed positive relationship with CARs 
in both MM and MAR, shown in Table 2.9 in the appendix. This result indicates that more 
variety of international experience could be beneficial for the internationalizing firms, thus 
positively affecting their performance, thus also upholding the likely advantages of 
international experience in top executives, as predicted by one strand of literature (e.g., Daily 
et al., 2000; Stroup, 2012;).     
 
2.9 Discussion and conclusion  
This chapter is motivated from a combination of different strata of literature on cross-country 
deals. First, there seems to be confounding empirical evidence on the wealth creation for 
acquiring firms’ shareholders and the plausible reasons it might be attributable to, of which 
information asymmetry appears to predominant. Second, research on whether information 
asymmetry can be alleviated in the process of firms learning through acquisition experience 
also fails to present consistent findings. Third, the role of board of directors of such bidding 
firms, more specifically that of the TMT, in making strategic decisions like acquisitions amidst 
uncertainty, has been highlighted by prior literature. Building upon the various predictions and 
findings from all of these streams of research, we have proposed here to extend the role of 
international orientation of acquirer TMTs in upper echelons and IB literatures in an attempt 
to explain the gains, if any, accruing to bidders’ from such foreign acquisitions. Specifically, 
this chapter has looked at stock market perceptions of international experience or foreign 
nationality or host country knowledge of TMTs of acquiring firms, using abnormal returns 
accruing from cross-border acquisitions as its measure.  
 
Prior research in upper echelons and IB has accentuated the importance of international 
exposure (e.g., Lee & Park, 2008) and national diversity (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011) of 
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TMTs on their foreign expansion strategies. It has been conjectured and shown that such TMTs 
are endowed with special capabilities and knowledge which enhance the entire teams’ decision 
making ability. This is because the expanded ‘cognitive and value base’ improves the teams’ 
perceptions of uncertainty and complexities involved, thus boosting up their confidence levels 
leading to higher acquisition stakes in host countries. This positive influence tends to be 
documented in many extant studies (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 
2014). However, this specially endowed TMTs’ level of confidence may also generate an 
overoptimistic assessment of their foreign investment decisions, leading to over-estimation of 
the perceived benefits therefrom. Also, internationally-oriented executives may have high core 
self-evaluations; making them further overconfident of their managerial skills to negotiate an 
acquisition deal in a different country (e.g., Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). This biased perception 
of superior skill set might obscure the expected positive outcomes.  
 
Looking into the short-term stock market reaction upon announcements of cross-country 
acquisitions, our results show some support for greater number of foreign executives and those 
with host country exposure appears to have some positive significant impact on acquirers’ 
short-run CARs. We also find weak evidence that greater number of internationally 
experienced executives in the acquiring firms’ teams tends to negatively influence the 
abnormal acquisition announcement returns. However, this negative effect diminishes at very 
high levels of TMT international experience when measured by average years of such 
experience among TMT members as well as a greater range of countries of exposure. These 
findings add to the body of existing studies  portraying the positive moderating effect of the 
international orientation of bidder executives on perceived uncertainty associated with foreign 
acquisition decisions (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Stroup, 2012; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 
2014) by explicitly addressing performance consequences of such decisions. Our results also 
highlight the negative consequences associated with diminishing perceived uncertainty, in line 
with Roll’s hubris hypothesis (1986) and findings of studies such as Malmendier & Tate 
(2005), and Hiller & Hambrick (2005).  
 
Our findings so far indicate that TMTs of firms considering cross-border expansion decisions 
should have an optimal combination of internationally oriented executives, as supported by 
preliminary evidence revealing nonlinearity in the association between the number of years of 
international experience of bidder TMTs and CARs. We also notice an opposite non-linear 
effect, although weak, in case of number of managers with target country familiarity. However, 
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neither of these results is robust to both the event-study models used. These results suggest that 
superior outcomes may be achieved with a proper balance in the team of internationally-
experienced managers. Presumably balanced teams would not suffer from any collective 
judgment bias, which could otherwise affect their acquisition performance. Since such personal 
characteristics may shape managerial perceptions about the complexities involved due to 
information asymmetry in decision-making, this might manifest more distinctly, when 
explored in the long-run study. Therefore, we specifically examine whether this is sustained in 
the one-year post-acquisition announcement as well as operating returns in the next chapter. 
 
This chapter is not without limitations. First, it focuses on acquirers from a single country: the 
UK. As mentioned in Chapter 1, using a sample from the UK helps us to draw inference as to 
whether and how the incidence of cash financed deals private targets, advocated in some of the 
studies as referred above to be a latent source of overconfidence of top executives. Whilst this 
is a distinctive characteristic making our analysis more interesting, but since most of the TMT 
members in the sample have a common nationality, this could have potentially influenced the 
acquisition decisions, and consequently, the outcomes. Thus, a comparative study using 
different home countries to explore the effect of international orientation of TMTs on 
acquisition performance of firms may be useful to investigate how country-specific governance 
structure types interact with TMT international orientations and other TMT characteristics to 
the benefit or detriment of shareholder value.  
 
Second, although the explanatory variables used for this study were analogous to the ones in 
the prior research (e.g. Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014), their operationalization requires 
further work. For instance, there was insufficient information in certain cases as to when an 
executive worked or studied abroad or about foreign assignments of such executive during the 
time of employment with the acquiring firms. Also, limited data on international career 
experience of executives might have affected the proxy used for number of internationally 
experienced managers to estimate its potential influence on acquirer returns. Finally, controls 
such as, industry exposure of managers and acquiring firms’ prior operations in host countries 
might have had some impact for the results discussed here.  
 
To conclude, this chapter adds to a vast body of existing literature on short-run event studies 
investigating so-far under-researched TMT-level factors that might affect the abnormal returns 
to the bidding firms. It also adds to the understanding about how the backgrounds of top 
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executives shape their behavior, which in turn guides firms’ international expansion choices 
and influences the returns therefrom. However, the relationship found in this study between 
ambiguity integral to foreign expansions and TMT demographics, especially their international 
exposure, needs to be explored further. 
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Table 2.1: Cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the announcement of cross-border acquisitions. 
 
CAR measure CAR Std. Dev. 
t-test 
p-value 
Wilcoxon test  
p-value  
3-day CAR (MM) 0.00654 0.05896 0.000 0.000 
3-day CAR (MAR) 0.00652 0.08095 0.000 0.000 
11-day CAR (MM) 0.00763 0.09480 0.000 0.000 
11-day CAR (MAR) 0.00862 0.22594 0.071 0.000 
 
Note to Table 2.1: This table shows the summary statistics and p-values for parametric and non-parametric tests of acquiring 
firms’ CARs over three-day (i.e. from day -1 to day +1) and eleven-day (i.e. from day -5 to day +5) event windows using 
market model (MM) and market adjusted return model (MAR).  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of independent and control variables. 
Variable Mean S.D. Correlations    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 3-day CAR (MAR) 0.008 0.05                
   
2 3-day CAR (MM) 0.007 0.05 
 
0.96** 
 
              
   
3 Num TMT int’l experience 2.06 1.63 
-0.07** 
 
-0.07** 
 
             
   
4 
Num TMT 
host country 
experience 
0.53 0.96 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.32** 
 
            
   
5 
Num TMT 
foreign 
nationals 
0.85 1.10 -0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.64** 
 
0.18** 
 
           
   
6 Amount of int’l experience 5.19 4.83 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.61** 
 
0.20** 
 
0.47** 
 
       
  
 
   
7 Cash 0.61 0.50 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05* 
 
0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
      
  
 
   
8 Stock 0.03 0.18 0.01 
 
0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 
-0.05* 
 
0.01 
 
-0.23** 
 
     
 
  
   
9 Full acquisition 0.79 0.41 -0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.09** 
 
0.09** 
 
-0.09** 
 
-0.09** 
 
-0.05* 
 
-0.02 
 
    
 
  
   
10 Transaction 
value 2.01 1.99 
-0.000 
 
0.003 
 
0.12** 
 
0.14** 
 
0.03 
 
0.13** 
 
0.35** 
 
0.04+ 
 
0.01 
 
   
 
  
   
11 Acquirer size 6.51 2.35 -0.11
**
 
 
-0.10** 
 
0.52** 
 
0.12 
 
0.36** 
 
0.47** 
 
0.06* 
 
0.14** 
 
-0.04+ 
 
0.30** 
 
     
   
12 Acquirer ROA 5.16 15.7 -0.04
+
 
 
-0.06* 
 
0.000 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.08** 
 
-0.20** 
 
0.03 
 
0.05+ 
 
0.28** 
 
    
   
13 Diversifying 
acquisition 0.33 0.47 
-0.05* 
 
-0.05* 
 
-0.05* 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.06* 
 
-0.08** 
 
-0.05* 
 
-0.07** 
 
0.06* 
 
-0.17** 
 
-0.10** 
 
0.04 
 
   
   
14 Cultural distance 0.06 1.58 
-0.002 
 
-0.01 
 
0.14** 
 
-0.32** 
 
0.13** 
 
0.16** 
 
-0.04+ 
 
0.02 
 
-0.25** 
 
-0.04+ 
 
0. 13** 
 
-0.05* 
 
-0.11** 
 
  
   
15 Country risk 0.01 0.17 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.16** 
 
-0.22** 
 
0.15** 
 
0.17** 
 
-0.02 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.32** 
 
-0.06* 
 
0.11** 
 
-0.06* 
 
-0.14** 
 
0.58** 
 
 
   
16 GDP per capita 27.7 14.3 -0.001 
 
0.02 
 
-0.18** 
 
0.24** 
 
-0.16** 
 
-0.10** 
 
0.01 
 
-0.04+ 
 
0.28** 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.11** 
 
0.06* 
 
0.13** 
 
-0.53** 
 
-0.84** 
 
   
17 Private target 0.52 0.50 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
-0.18** 
 
-0.05* 
 
-0.15** 
 
-0.19** 
 
-0.12** 
 
-0.02 
 
0.06* 
 
-0.20** 
 
-0.25** 
 
0.03 
 
0.12** 
 
-0.10** 
 
-0.09** 
 
0.12** 
 
  
18 Listed target 0.10 0.30 -0.05
*
 
 
-0.04+ 
 
0.19** 
 
0.11** 
 
0.15** 
 
0.21** 
 
0.10** 
 
0.08** 
 
-0.22** 
 
0.31** 
 
0.24** 
 
0.02 
 
-0.08** 
 
0.004 
 
0.06* 
 
-0.08** 
 
-0.35** 
 
 
19 TMT size 4.01 1.70 -0.06
*
 
 
-0.05* 
 
0.57** 
 
0.19** 
 
0.40** 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.11** 
 
0.02** 
 
0.04+ 
 
0.36** 
 
0.11** 
 
-0.001 
 
0.04+ 
 
0.01 
 
-0.13** 
 
-0.08** 
 
0.06* 
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Note to Table 2.2: 3-day CAR (MAR) is the cumulative abnormal return for the a firms announcing a cross-border acquisition computed over a three-day event window (i.e. from day -1 to day 
+1) using market adjustment model. 3-day CAR (MM) is the cumulative abnormal return for a firm announcing a cross-border acquisition computed over a three-day event window (i.e. from day 
-1 to day +1) using market model. Num TMT int’l experience, Num TMT host country experience and Num TMT foreign nationals, denote the number of acquiring firms’ TMT members with 
international career experience, those who have had exposure to the host country, and those who are non-UK nationals, respectively, and are measured at the end of the financial year preceding 
the focal cross-border transaction. Amount of int’l experience is the average number of years of acquiring firms’ TMT members’ international career experience and is measured at the end of the 
financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction. Cash and Stock are indicator variables for transactions paid purely in cash and stock, respectively. Full acquisition denotes transactions 
where upon completion of the acquisition the acquirer gains full control of the target, i.e. at least 95% stake. Transaction value is the transaction value (in £ millions) is expressed in logarithmic 
form.  Acquirer size and Acquirer ROA are the logarithm of market capitalisation of the acquiring firm (expressed in £ millions) and the ratio of return on assets, respectively, and are measured 
at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction. Diversifying acquisition is the indicator variable equal to one when an acquisition involved any industry other than the 
acquirer core macro industry, and zero otherwise. CultDist is the distance between the target country and the country of the acquiring firm (i.e. the UK) using Kogut & Singh’s (1988) index on 
the basis of four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001). CountryRisk and GDP per capita are the Euromoney country risk index and one-year lagged GDP per capita (in USD thousands) of the 
host country. The correlation table reports pairwise correlation coefficients with +, *, and **denoting the corresponding significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on CARs surrounding the announcement of a cross-country acquisition: univariate analysis. 
TMT international orientation measure 
Abnormal 
return measure  
(3-day CAR) 
TMT international 
orientation measure = 0 
TMT international 
orientation measure > 0 
Tests for the significance of 
the difference 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
t-test 
statistic 
Wilcoxon test 
statistic  
Num TMT int’l experience 
MM 0.00177 0.04966 0.00576 0.04920 2.078* 1.929+ 
MAR 0.01235 0.05046 0.00663 0.04912 1.973+ 2.019* 
 N = 352 N = 1643   
 MM 0.00610 0.04848 0.00839 0.05112 -0.964 -1.070 
Num TMT host country experience MAR 0.00692 0.04869 0.00921 0.05091 -0.963 -1.103 
  N = 1369 N = 626   
Num TMT foreign nationals 
MM 0.00866 0.05228 0.00659 0.04627 0.843 0.181 
MAR 0.00774 0.05223 0.00588 0.04617 0.940 0.118 
 N = 1008 N = 987   
 
Note to Table 2.3: + and * denote significance at 10% and 5%, respectively. All the variables are defined the same way as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
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Table 2.4: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on CARs surrounding the announcement of a cross-
country acquisition: multivariate regressions. 
  Model1A Model1B Model2A Model2B Model3A Model3B Model4A Model4B 
                  
Num TMT int’l experience -0.0978 -0.0392        -0.253* -0.224+ (-0.94) (-0.37)         (-1.97) (-1.75) 
  
                
Num TMT host country 
experience 
   0.149 0.232+     0.217 0.281+ 
    (1.08) (1.69)     (1.51) (1.96) 
  
             
Num TMT foreign nationals       0.145 0.210 0.270+ 0.308* 
      (1.10) (1.64) (1.74) (2.04) 
                  
Cash 0.144 0.0999 0.139 0.0892 0.140 0.0902 0.114 0.0634 (0.51) (0.35) (0.49) (0.31) (0.49) (0.32) (0.40) (0.22) 
               
Stock -0.291 -0.461 -0.324 -0.473 -0.356 -0.522 -0.279 -0.451 (-0.27) (-0.44) (-0.31) (-0.45) (-0.33) (-0.49) (-0.26) (-0.43) 
                  
Full acquisition -0.467 -0.508 -0.439 -0.481 -0.459 -0.510 -0.466 -0.509 (-1.48) (-1.62) (-1.41) (-1.55) (-1.47) (-1.64) (-1.50) (-1.64) 
               
Transaction value 0.0573 0.0664 0.0595 0.0698 0.0513 0.0573 0.0538 0.0611 (0.75) (0.87) (0.78) (0.91) (0.67) (0.75) (0.70) (0.80) 
                  
Private target -0.146 -0.250 -0.156 -0.261 -0.148 -0.249 -0.150 -0.254 (-0.59) (-1.01) (-0.63) (-1.05) (-0.60) (-1.01) (-0.60) (-1.03) 
               
Listed target -0.741 -0.883+ -0.838+ -0.977* -0.819+ -0.954* -0.819+ -0.976* (-1.60) (-1.89) (-1.80) (-2.09) (-1.77) (-2.05) (-1.76) (-2.09) 
                  
Acquirer size -0.201** -0.261** -0.242** -0.293** -0.231** -0.278** -0.196** -0.253** (-2.88) (-3.74) (-3.78) (-4.61) (-3.73) (-4.48) (-2.81) (-3.66) 
               
Acquirer ROA -0.0120 -0.00273 -0.0100 -0.00134 -0.0101 -0.00131 -0.0125 -0.00326 (-1.05) (-0.25) (-0.90) (-0.13) (-0.90) (-0.12) (-1.09) (-0.30) 
                  
Diversifying acquisition -0.651** -0.577* -0.640** -0.563* -0.666** -0.602* -0.660** -0.591* (-2.63) (-2.32) (-2.58) (-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.39) (-2.63) (-2.35) 
               
Cultural differences -0.0422 -0.0705 -0.0469 -0.0756 -0.0183 -0.0314 -0.00802 -0.0258 (-0.47) (-0.79) (-0.52) (-0.85) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.09) (-0.28) 
                  
Country risk 
2.608+ 3.308* 2.329 3.078* 2.322 3.056* 2.489+ 3.159* 
(1.73) (2.18) (1.57) (2.06) (1.56) (2.04) (1.66) (2.09) 
               
GDP per capita 0.0289+ 0.0283+ 0.0278+ 0.0277+ 0.0257 0.0244 0.0268 0.0255 (1.78) (1.71) (1.72) (1.69) (1.57) (1.47) (1.63) (1.53) 
                  
TMT size 0.0376 0.0119 -0.0317 -0.0449 -0.0217 -0.0322 0.0265 -0.00130 (0.41) (0.13) (-0.40) (-0.57) (-0.29) (-0.42) (0.29) (-0.01) 
                  
Intercept 1.320 1.911+ 1.935* 2.403** 1.870* 2.327** 1.400 2.009* (1.34) (1.93) (2.21) (2.72) (2.16) (2.67) (1.42) (2.03) 
                  
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.0231 0.0254 0.0233 0.0268 0.0232 0.0269 0.0262 0.0299 
F 2.895** 3.184** 2.737** 3.228** 2.731** 3.178** 2.782** 3.251** 
 
 Note to Table 2.4: This table reports the results of OLS regressions showing the effect of TMT international orientation 
variables with relevant controls on the 3-day CARs of an acquiring firm. All the variables are defined the same way as in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on MAR 
model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and **denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Non-linear effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on CARs surrounding the announcement of a 
cross-country acquisition. 
  Model5A Model5B Model6A Model6B   
          
Num TMT host country experience 0.401 0.490*                 (1.63) (2.02)                 
         
(Num TMT host country experience)2 -0.126 -0.129    (-1.24) (-1.28)    
          
Amount of int’l experience     -0.00676 0.0127 
    (-0.19) (0.35) 
         
(Amount of int’l experience)2     0.00837+ 0.00486 
    (1.81) (1.06) 
          
Cash 0.144 0.0934 0.135 0.0955 (0.51) (0.33) (0.47) (0.34) 
          
Stock -0.36 -0.527 -0.365 -0.519 (-0.34) (-0.50) (-0.34) (-0.49)    
         
Full acquisition -0.473 -0.524+ -0.426 -0.483 (-1.51) (-1.68) (-1.36) (-1.55)    
          
Transaction value 0.0473 0.0532 0.0652 0.0719 (0.62) (0.70) (0.85) (0.94) 
         
Private target -0.157 -0.258 -0.119 -0.232 (-0.63) (-1.04) (-0.48) (-0.93)    
          
Listed target -0.832+ -0.968* -0.831+ -0.957*   (-1.80) (-2.08) (-1.81) (-2.06)    
         
Acquirer size -0.231** -0.277** -0.257** -0.306** (-3.72) (-4.48) (-3.59) (-4.29)    
          
Acquirer ROA -0.00967 -0.000922 -0.011 -0.00188 (-0.86) (-0.09) (-0.97) (-0.17)    
         
Diversifying acquisition -0.665** -0.601* -0.625* -0.557*   (-2.65) (-2.39) (-2.52) (-2.23)    
          
Cultural differences -0.0131 -0.0261 -0.044 -0.0741 (-0.15) (-0.29) (-0.49) (-0.83)    
         
Country risk 2.39 3.126* 2.21 2.992*   (1.61) (2.09) (1.46) (1.96) 
          
GDP per capita 0.0255 0.0243 0.0268 0.0263 
-1.57 -1.46 -1.63 -1.57 
         
TMT size -0.0145 -0.0248 0.037 0.0255 (-0.19) (-0.33) -0.48 -0.33 
          
Intercept 1.959* 2.419** 1.558+ 2.112*   (2.25) (2.76) (1.65) (2.22) 
          
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.024 0.0278 0.025 0.0266 
F 2.601** 3.032** 2.808** 3.024** 
 
Note to Table 2.5: This table reports the results of OLS regressions showing the non-linear effect of TMT international 
orientation variables with relevant controls on the 3-day CARs of an acquiring firm. All the variables are defined the same 
way as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on 
MAR model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Appendix: Additional analyses for robustness- 
Table 2.6: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on 3-day CARs surrounding the announcement of a 
cross-country acquisition: multivariate regressions. 
  Model11A Model11B Model12A Model12B Model13A Model13B 
             
Percent TMT int’l experience -0.177 0.0370        (-0.43) (0.09)        
              
Percent TMT host country experience     0.478 0.765    
    (0.91) (1.47)     
 
          
Percent TMT foreign nationals       0.498 0.656 
      (0.93) (1.25) 
              
Cash 0.146 0.101 0.138 0.0892 0.142 0.0928 (0.51) (0.36) (0.49) (0.31) (0.50) (0.33) 
              
Stock -0.298 -0.481 -0.337 -0.490 -0.361 -0.532 (-0.28) (-0.45) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-0.34) (-0.50) 
             
Full acquisition -0.459 -0.502 -0.440 -0.484 -0.458 -0.508 (-1.46) (-1.60) (-1.42) (-1.56) (-1.46) (-1.63) 
              
Transaction value 0.0576 0.0662 0.0595 0.0695 0.0520 0.0582 (0.75) (0.87) (0.78) (0.91) (0.68) (0.76) 
             
Private target -0.148 -0.252 -0.155 -0.258 -0.152 -0.254 (-0.60) (-1.02) (-0.62) (-1.04) (-0.61) (-1.03) 
              
Listed target -0.764+ -0.905+ -0.837+ -0.969* -0.812+ -0.944* (-1.65) (-1.94) (-1.81) (-2.08) (-1.76) (-2.03) 
             
Acquirer size 
-0.216** -0.273** -0.242** -0.290** -0.231** -0.277** 
(-3.10) (-3.96) (-3.76) (-4.54) (-3.73) (-4.48) 
              
Acquirer ROA -0.0112 -0.00203 -0.0101 -0.00155 -0.00996 -0.00114 (-0.98) (-0.19) (-0.91) (-0.15) (-0.89) (-0.11) 
             
Diversifying acquisition -0.651** -0.577* -0.634* -0.556* -0.663** -0.598* (-2.63) (-2.32) (-2.56) (-2.23) (-2.65) (-2.38) 
              
Cultural differences -0.0424 -0.0714 -0.0447 -0.0724 -0.0220 -0.0363 (-0.47) (-0.80) (-0.50) (-0.81) (-0.24) (-0.40) 
             
Country risk 2.519+ 3.225* 2.348 3.118* 2.356 3.105* (1.66) (2.12) (1.58) (2.08) (1.58) (2.07) 
              
GDP per capita 0.0284+ 0.0278+ 0.0277+ 0.0276+ 0.0263 0.0253 (1.74) (1.68) (1.72) (1.68) (1.62) (1.53) 
             
TMT size -0.00736 -0.00419 -0.00195 -0.00203 -0.00325 -0.00350 (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.05) 
              
Intercept 
1.615+ 2.082* 1.803* 2.199* 1.773* 2.178* 
(1.80) (2.30) (2.11) (2.55) (2.08) (2.54) 
             
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.0227 0.0253 0.0231 0.0262 0.023 0.0265 
F 2.770** 3.108** 2.725** 3.160** 2.724** 3.167** 
 
Note to Table 2.6: This table reports the results of OLS regressions showing the effect of TMT predictors expressed in 
proportions (percentages) instead of the original specification as numbers in Table 2.4 and relevant controls, on the 3-day 
CARs of an acquiring firm. The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on 
MAR model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.7: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on 11-day CARs surrounding the announcement of a 
cross-country acquisition: multivariate regressions. 
  Model7A Model7B Model8A Model8B Model9A Model9B Model10A Model10B   
  
                
Num TMT int’l experience -0.123 -0.0977        -0.402* -0.414*   (-0.77) (-0.62)         (-2.03) (-2.11)    
  
        
    
    
Num TMT host country 
experience 
    0.284 0.346     0.383 0.439+   
    (1.20) (1.49)     (1.55) (1.82) 
  
    
    
        
Num TMT foreign nationals         0.295 0.360+ 0.489+ 0.553*   
        (1.34) (1.68) (1.91) (2.20) 
                 
Cash 0.77 0.485 0.757 0.467 0.761 0.471 0.716 0.423 (1.64) (1.05) (1.61) (1.02) (1.62) (1.03) (1.53) (0.92) 
                  
Stock -1.125 -1.371 -1.167 -1.403 -1.227 -1.477 -1.102 -1.346 (-0.69) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-0.81)    
                 
Full acquisition -0.906+ -0.943+ -0.859 -0.893+ -0.899 -0.942+ -0.903+ -0.941+   (-1.65) (-1.76) (-1.57) (-1.67) (-1.64) (-1.76) (-1.65) (-1.76)    
                  
Transaction value 0.0559 0.173 0.0604 0.179 0.0445 0.159 0.0498 0.166 (0.48) (1.47) (0.51) (1.52) (0.38) (1.35) (0.42) (1.40) 
                 
Private target -0.651 -0.842* -0.669 -0.862* -0.653 -0.842* -0.658 -0.850*   (-1.52) (-2.00) (-1.56) (-2.04) (-1.52) (-2.00) (-1.53) (-2.01)    
                  
Listed target -0.254 -0.364 -0.417 -0.538 -0.375 -0.487 -0.394 -0.522 (-0.36) (-0.50) (-0.59) (-0.74) (-0.53) (-0.67) (-0.55) (-0.72)    
                 
Acquirer size -0.243* -0.404** -0.307** -0.468** -0.284** -0.439** -0.233+ -0.393**  (-2.01) (-3.36) (-2.70) (-4.15) (-2.59) (-4.02) (-1.94) (-3.28)    
                  
Acquirer ROA -0.028 -0.0122 -0.025 -0.00931 -0.0251 -0.00945 -0.0288 -0.0131 (-1.38) (-0.61) (-1.25) (-0.47) (-1.25) (-0.48) (-1.41) (-0.66)    
                 
Diversifying acquisition -0.606 -0.518 -0.585 -0.493 -0.636 -0.554 -0.621 -0.536 (-1.41) (-1.21) (-1.37) (-1.16) (-1.47) (-1.29) (-1.44) (-1.25)    
                  
Cultural differences -0.0871 -0.183 -0.0955 -0.192 -0.0405 -0.125 -0.0272 -0.114 (-0.60) (-1.31) (-0.66) (-1.37) (-0.27) (-0.87) (-0.18) (-0.78)    
                 
Country risk 2.521 3.828 2.081 3.382 2.083 3.385 2.31 3.587 (1.02) (1.55) (0.85) (1.39) (0.85) (1.39) (0.94) (1.46) 
                  
GDP per capita 0.0319 0.0157 0.0305 0.0144 0.0264 0.00949 0.0284 0.0116 (1.22) (0.59) (1.17) (0.55) (1.01) (0.36) (1.08) (0.44) 
                 
TMT size 0.0104 -0.0211 -0.0985 -0.131 -0.0757 -0.104 -0.0094 -0.0436 
-0.07 (-0.15) (-0.79) (-1.05) (-0.62) (-0.85) (-0.07) (-0.31)    
                  
Intercept 2.171 4.190* 3.129* 5.152** 2.975+ 4.964** 2.313 4.352**  (1.27) (2.53) (1.99) (3.38) (1.92) (3.29) (1.35) (2.62) 
                 
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.0178 0.024 0.0185 0.0254 0.0183 0.0251 0.0214 0.0288 
F 1.962* 2.976** 1.898* 2.936** 1.904* 2.936** 1.963* 2.96** 
 
Note to Table 2.7: This table reports similar results as the models in Table 2.4 with 11-day CARs as the dependent variable. 
All the variables are defined the same way as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while 
those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on MAR model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and ** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on 3-day CARs surrounding the announcement of a 
cross-country acquisition: multivariate regressions showing interactions of TMT predictors with transactions value. 
  Model14A Model14B Model15A Model15B Model16A Model16B 
              
Num TMT int’l experience -0.0981 -0.0399        (-0.94) (-0.38)        
            
Num Int'l exp * transaction value -0.00955 -0.0217        (-0.31) (-0.71)         
            
Num TMT host country experience    0.153 0.242+    
   (1.11) (1.76)    
            
Num host country exp * transaction value    -0.00603 -0.0177    
   (-0.10) (-0.30)    
              
Num TMT foreign nationals        0.144 0.212+ 
       (1.10) (1.66) 
             
Num foreign nationals * transaction value        0.00135 -0.0252 
        (0.02) (-0.44) 
              
Cash 0.147 0.106 0.139 0.0928 0.140 0.0882 (0.52) (0.37) (0.49) (0.33) (0.49) (0.31) 
            
Stock -0.297 -0.476 -0.324 -0.482 -0.360 -0.535 (-0.28) (-0.45) (-0.31) (-0.46) (-0.34) (-0.51) 
              
Full acquisition -0.467 -0.508 -0.439 -0.484 -0.458 -0.505 (-1.49) (-1.62) (-1.41) (-1.56) (-1.46) (-1.62) 
            
Transaction value 0.0616 0.0762 0.0592 0.0742 0.0515 0.0580 (0.78) (0.96) (0.77) (0.96) (0.67) (0.76) 
              
Private target -0.146 -0.250 -0.156 -0.262 -0.148 -0.250 (-0.59) (-1.01) (-0.63) (-1.06) (-0.60) (-1.01) 
            
Listed target -0.731 -0.861+ -0.838+ -0.964* -0.815+ -0.943* (-1.58) (-1.84) (-1.81) (-2.06) (-1.77) (-2.04) 
              
Acquirer size -0.202** -0.262** -0.242** -0.293** -0.232** -0.279** (-2.89) (-3.77) (-3.78) (-4.60) (-3.73) (-4.50) 
            
Acquirer ROA -0.0121 -0.00291 -0.0100 -0.00137 -0.0100 -0.00124 (-1.06) (-0.26) (-0.90) (-0.13) (-0.90) (-0.12) 
              
Diversifying acquisition -0.650** -0.576* -0.640** -0.565* -0.667** -0.604* (-2.62) (-2.31) (-2.58) (-2.27) (-2.66) (-2.40) 
            
Cultural differences -0.0410 -0.0677 -0.0470 -0.0740 -0.0181 -0.0309 (-0.46) (-0.76) (-0.53) (-0.83) (-0.20) (-0.34) 
              
Country risk 2.598+ 3.285* 2.331 3.040* 2.319 3.045* (1.72) (2.16) (1.56) (2.02) (1.56) (2.03) 
            
GDP per capita 0.0288+ 0.0280+ 0.0278+ 0.0273+ 0.0256 0.0242 (1.76) (1.69) (1.71) (1.65) (1.57) (1.46) 
              
TMT size 0.0386 0.0143 -0.0316 -0.0460 -0.0216 -0.0319 (0.42) (0.15) (-0.40) (-0.58) (-0.28) (-0.42) 
            
Intercept 1.440 2.056* 2.052* 2.564** 1.977* 2.454** (1.42) (2.01) (2.24) (2.79) (2.20) (2.71) 
              
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.0231 0.0256 0.0233 0.0269 0.0232 0.0269 
F 2.702** 3.010** 2.560** 3.024** 2.547** 2.967** 
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Note to Table 2.8: This table shows the results of OLS regressions showing the effect of interaction of the centred TMT 
predictors with centred transaction value on the 3-day CARs of an acquiring firm. All the variables are defined the same way 
as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while those marked ‘B’ show CARs based on MAR 
model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.9: The effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on 3-day CARs surrounding the announcement of a 
cross-country acquisition: multivariate regressions showing high and low quartile range of TMT international experience. 
  Model17A Model17B Model18A Model18B 
          
High range of int'l experience 0.537+ 0.519+     (1.75) (1.70)     
         
Low range of int'l experience     0.0185 -0.0923 
    (0.06) (-0.32) 
          
Cash 
0.140 0.0934 0.147 0.104 
(0.49) (0.33) (0.52) (0.37) 
          
Stock 
-0.413 -0.560 -0.323 -0.485 
(-0.39) (-0.53) (-0.30) (-0.46) 
          
Full acquisition 
-0.418 -0.467 -0.455 -0.501 
(-1.34) (-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.60) 
          
Transaction value 0.0585 0.0677 0.0572 0.0656 (0.77) (0.89) (0.75) (0.86) 
          
Private target 
-0.157 -0.259 -0.150 -0.251 
(-0.63) (-1.05) (-0.60) (-1.02) 
          
Listed target 
-0.866+ -0.979* -0.783+ -0.913+ 
(-1.88) (-2.10) (-1.69) (-1.96) 
          
Acquirer size 
-0.272** -0.314** -0.226** -0.277** 
(-4.09) (-4.76) (-3.43) (-4.23) 
          
Acquirer ROA 
-0.00855 -0.000181 -0.0106 -0.00186 
(-0.75) (-0.02) (-0.95) (-0.17) 
          
Diversifying acquisition 
-0.647** -0.574* -0.649** -0.581* 
(-2.61) (-2.30) (-2.61) (-2.33) 
          
Cultural differences 
-0.0490 -0.0762 -0.0436 -0.0725 
(-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.49) (-0.81) 
          
Country risk 
2.088 2.900+ 2.450 3.194* 
(1.39) (1.91) (1.63) (2.11) 
          
GDP per capita 
0.0261 0.0261 0.0280+ 0.0275+ 
(1.62) (1.59) (1.71) (1.66) 
          
TMT size 
0.00975 0.00854 -0.00424 -0.00421 
(0.13) (0.11) (-0.06) (-0.06) 
          
Intercept 
1.894* 2.251** 1.685+ 2.145* 
(2.21) (2.60) (1.84) (2.34) 
          
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 
R-squared 0.0241 0.0267 0.0225 0.0253 
F 2.875** 3.269** 2.731** 3.092** 
 
Note to Table 2.9: This table reports the results OLS regressions showing the effect of TMT predictor of international 
experience in terms of range of countries (breadth) with a different specification in highest and lowest quartiles of this 
predictor, on the 3-day CARs of an acquiring firm. The models marked ‘A’ show MM-based CARs, while those marked ‘B’ 
59 
 
show CARs based on MAR model. The t-statistic using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, and ** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Kogut and Singh (1988) cultural distance index is based on: 
 
 
 
where Iij stands for the index for the ith cultural dimension for country j.Vi is the variance of the index of the ith dimension, u indicates UK. (dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity and individualism) 
Value Dimension  Value Description  High Score  Low Score  
Power Distance Index (PDI)  
           The degree of equality, or 
inequality, between 
people in the country's 
society  
           Indicates that inequalities of power 
and wealth have been allowed to 
grow within the society. These 
societies are more likely to follow 
a caste system that does not allow 
significant upward mobility of its 
citizens.  
           Indicates the society de-emphasizes 
the differences between citizen's 
power and wealth. In these 
societies equality and opportunity 
for everyone is stressed.  
Individualism (IDV)  
             Degree to which a 
society reinforces 
individual or collective 
achievement and 
interpersonal 
relationships.  
            Indicates that individuality and 
individual rights are paramount 
within the society. Individuals may 
tend to form a larger number of 
looser relationships.  
           Typifies societies of a more 
collectivist nature with close ties 
between individuals. Reinforce 
extended families and collectives 
where everyone takes responsibility 
for fellow members of their group.  
Masculinity (MAS)  
            Degree to which a society 
reinforces, or does not 
reinforce, the traditional 
masculine work role 
model of male 
achievement, control, and 
power  
            Indicates the country experiences a 
high degree of gender 
differentiation. Males dominate a 
significant portion of the society 
and power structure, with females 
being controlled by male 
domination.  
            Indicates the country has a low 
level of differentiation and 
discrimination between genders. 
Females are treated equally to 
males in all aspects of the society.  
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)  
            Level of tolerance for 
uncertainty and 
ambiguity. within the 
society - i.e. unstructured 
situations.  
           Indicates the country has a low 
tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity Creates a rule-oriented 
society that institutes laws, rules, 
regulations, and controls in order 
to reduce the amount of 
uncertainty.  
           Indicates the country has less 
concern about ambiguity and 
uncertainty and has more tolerance 
for a variety of opinions. Reflected 
in a society that is less rule-
oriented, more readily accepts 
change, and takes more and greater  
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Chapter 3: TMT international orientation of acquiring firms and their post-acquisition 
performance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The market for corporate control with respect to cross-border M&As have always evoked much 
interest from widely different fields of studies. Thanks to the voluminous research which has 
looked at this type of strategic investment decision from the perspective of shareholder wealth 
generation, albeit there has been lesser attention to the longer term. Since not only the empirical 
findings of prior research, but the factors influencing them are somewhat confusing, we aim to 
add value to it by choosing to explore the post-foreign-acquisition one-year performance of 
bidding firms from the UK in terms of both financial (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) and 
accounting (return on assets and return on equity) returns. In the previous chapter on short-run 
announcement returns, not only did we document divergent effects of the proxies we adopted 
for international orientation, but also a non-linear effect of a few proxies. Therefore, in this 
chapter we re-examine the impact of international orientation in a slightly different framework 
to get a better understanding of those apparent inconsistencies we observed with respect to the 
determinants of TMT orientation. Therefore, our object here is to study how the longer term 
post-acquisition outcomes are shaped by the different features of TMT-level ‘international 
orientation’ for these bidding firms.            
 
Looking at a multitude of factors extant literature has documented wealth creation or 
destruction for M&A announcements, although quantifying those concerning cross-border 
acquisitions continue to pose a challenge. Amongst them, more attention had been devoted to 
the business setting in which firms operate, characteristics of M&A transactions as well as the 
involved firms, etc. (see Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000; Haleblian et al., 2009 for reviews). Individual 
attributes of managers have also warranted some attention, albeit on a lesser scale. Extending 
this latter under-researched yet more intricate determinant of cross-country strategic outcomes 
with a two-pronged approach, i.e. international experience and national diversity at the bidder-
TMT-level is what we focus on in this chapter. Basically our focus is on how these two features 
of ‘international orientation’ of top executive teams looked into by earlier studies (e.g., Nielsen 
& Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014), eventually influence post-acquisition 
performance of these acquiring firms through choice of foreign hosts by their respective TMTs.  
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As noted above, it is not only that prior studies on long-run post-acquisition returns have 
reported conflicting findings, varied research streams such as corporate finance, international 
business (IB) and upper echelons did present similar contradictory views on managerial 
motives and behaviours. Limited information coupled with the latitude of action induce top 
executives on the board of firms to act and judge in specific observed manners that can have 
long-lasting impacts on performance as well as value of their firms. For instance, it has been 
argued in both IB and upper echelon studies (e.g., Carpenter et al.,  2004; Nielsen & Nielsen, 
2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) about the facilitating role played by top manager(s) 
in being able to identify and venture for more ambitious strategies concerning expansion abroad 
with their globally-oriented perceptions. Thus, it can be expected that managerial behaviour as 
well and action tend to play a key role in their firms’ vital strategies and investments and 
consequently, affect their long-term performance. Although rare, there are similar studies both 
in corporate finance (e.g., Roll, 1986; Malmendier & Tate, 2008) and IB (e.g., Finkelstein et 
al., 2008; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) which presented findings with totally contrary 
implications. In particular, this literature showed either an agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) or a behavioural (e.g., Roll, 1986;  Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) backdrop. For example, it 
suggests that past favourable experiences and successes could generate a sense of excessive 
self-assurance and attribution causing an hubristic attitude. This could adversely affect their 
subsequent strategies resulting shareholder wealth destruction on a massive scale. Also, 
evidence of U-shaped (curvilinear) relationships (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Schmid 
& Dauth, 2014) have been hypothesized and traced with the determinants of international 
orientation of mangers and performance of their firms. Integrating these surmised views and 
the findings in earlier studies, we examine in this chapter the following fundamental questions 
from a bidder firm’s standpoint: (1) Can international-orientation, if present in its TMT, ensure 
better decision-making thus, ultimately reflecting in the longer term post-cross-border-
acquisition performance? (2) Under what conditions TMT international experience and 
diversity might generate superior returns from such acquisitions? (3) Is an optimal level of this 
hypothesized ‘international orientation’ achievable?                  
 
We seek to find answers to these questions using a multilevel research design capturing the 
inherent heterogeneity of acquiring firms and their industry structures as well as the different 
target countries these firms opt to expand their businesses to. Extant researches contended that 
international orientation of TMT is revealed in the team members’ international exposure and/ 
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or national diversity (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014; etc.). We 
associate these features with ensuing outcomes post-acquisition in a framework of cross-
country acquisitions for a longer time frame of one year, although this had also been studied in 
the Chapter 2, but from a shorter-term perspective, as already mentioned. Also, since prior 
literature generally highlights the unfavourable impact of takeovers as far as acquirers are 
concerned (see for instance, Andrade et al., 2001; Haleblian et al., 2009), we consider 
investigating further these consequential effects in the longer term. Further, given the 
underlying intricacies of a global environment not only due to cultural divergence and risks of 
institutional and market stringencies, but other multifarious unobservable factors, bidders in 
cross-border acquisitions tend to underperform (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). Therefore, 
acquirer TMT perspectives and impacts of their decision-making in the cross-border setting 
with a long term outlook, seems intriguing to explore.  
 
We brought in two complementary facets of international exposure as our predictors of long-
run post-acquisition returns, viz., its amount in terms of the number of years (depth) and its 
range in terms of the number of countries (breadth). Specifically, the postulations and evidence 
advocating both the positive and negative effects of managerial behaviour and actions led us 
to conjecture a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship of these two aspects with post-acquisition 
performance in a one-year window. Our contentions for this proposed curvilinear shape were 
that if one or more managers in a team of top executives have international wisdom, then: (a) 
initial inadequate levels of this knowledge might fall short of its desired advantages due to 
optimism bias causing hubris (Roll, 1986) and/or overconfidence. This could bring about 
detrimental outcomes for an acquirer firm. (b) However, as the team gathers more of this 
knowledge, either in terms of more years or more countries, the team is likely to behave more 
prudently, being better capable of evaluating the pros and cons of the decision to acquire a 
cross-border target. Yet, taking stock of the advantages and disadvantages of nationality mix 
(e.g. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011) in acquirer TMTs, our conjectures were just the opposite with 
respect to the benefits. We hypothesized an inverted U-shaped association between cultural 
diversity and the long-term aftermath of cross-country acquisitions. This is due to the fact that 
initially diversity in moderation could achieve superior cognition of the technicalities of global 
expansion. This however, tends to fade as problems of effective communication with more 
foreigners in the bidder TMT might undesirably delay decision-making, escalating costs, and 
even resulting in ‘adverse selection’ issues over foreign targets. Our empirical analyses 
employing our original sample substantiated our theoretical predictions.         
64 
 
 
This chapter makes the following contribution to existing literature: first, we suggested and 
offered a more comprehensive picture not only of ‘international orientation’ at the TMT-level 
of bidding firms, but also related it to eventually positive long-term consequential outcomes. 
Second, we attempted to reconcile both the alleged benefits and detriments of TMT 
international orientation, showing how the two could be balanced and optimised to generate 
desired positive effects on long-term performance. Third, we conceived more nuanced 
indicators of TMT international experience, i.e. its depth and breadth to relate the longer term 
performance of these firms. Fourth, incorporating the contradictory evidence envisaged by 
prior research, we extended it in two ways: (i) our econometric specifications allow us to study 
the relationship of the overall impact of strategic choices by bidder TMT on the profitability of 
cross-border acquisition outcomes in the longer term. This is opposed to the earlier focus of 
both corporate finance and IB studies examining behavioural influence of a single executive, 
like CEOs. (ii) complementing firm-level acquisitive learning as professed by previous studies 
(e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) with learning from ‘international orientation’ at the team-
level. Fifth, in view of the ambiguous inferences as well as scarcity of studies looking at long-
run post-acquisition operating returns (e.g., Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; etc.), 
our study also offers an extension. Last but not the least, we predict and explain this 
performance bringing in novel explanations of the TMT-role using multifaceted aspects of their 
global orientation to affect acquisition decisions and outcomes, having demonstrated this 
divergence in our empirical results. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: Starting with theories influencing the long-run 
studies and a brief review of the background literature, the succeeding sections develop the 
research hypotheses, followed by the research design and the sample description. While the 
last but one section discusses the empirical results of our postulates, the final one, the 
implications and limitations of this chapter making suggestions for further research. 
 
 
3.2 Motivating theories  
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An extensive review of the literature on long-run post-acquisition performance by Agrawal & 
Jaffe (2000) discussed the theoretical motivations for the empirical findings summarised in the 
next section. They looked primarily at the following:  
 
(1) the market efficiency in terms of the speed of price reaction to the news of merger 
announcements: (a) stocks of acquiring companies react instantaneously to the announcement 
news of M&As as evidence of market efficiency. So, any later price adjustment would be 
attributable to other factors unrelated to that news; (b) stock prices of firms concerned might 
under-react or over-react to these news, implying market inefficiency.  
(2) different methods of payment used for M&As: Myers & Majluf (1984) conjectured that 
overvalued firms were more likely to issue equity. This was linked by Loughran & Vijh (1997) 
to negative abnormal returns, experienced by acquiring firms resorting solely to equity 
exchange for their targets.   
(3) extrapolation of past performance in M&A decisions: Rau & Vermaelen (1998) 
hypothesized that investors as well as top executives of bidders are predisposed to infer from 
the previous experience of M&A outcomes, whilst considering their current decision. So, 
‘glamour’ firms with earlier M&A successes would be viewed favourably with respect to the 
current M&A decision. The long-run returns of these firms however, reflect re-evaluation of 
the initial market reactions at announcements of M&As by these firms, which would be 
negative since glamour firms tend to be overvalued. Also, due to their past better performances 
in comparison to value firms, management in the former would presumably consider the 
current M&A decision in that light. This suggests somewhat lax and/or optimistic decisions 
(e.g. paying higher acquisition premiums) at the executive-level of these glamour firms, while 
for value firms, a contrary scenario would most likely apply.     
(4) earnings-per-share (EPS) myopia: Rau & Vermaelen (1998) also put forward a corollary 
theory to their performance over-assessment theory that overpayment in the form of high 
premiums may also indicate the aim of a bidder management to achieve a high EPS ratio, which 
subsequently could be corrected by the market. This correction would then be reflected in an 
inferior long-run performance by such a firm. 
 
Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) also surveys the studies which empirically test the above hypotheses 
which we discuss in the next section. 
3.3 Prior related literature 
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Cross-border M&As have always remained one of the riskiest strategic investment ventures 
from the standpoint of acquiring firms as far as resource involvement is concerned. Therefore 
imperatively, value creation in terms of such decisions has been empirically investigated both 
from short and long term perspectives. Whilst extensive empirical evidence hitherto is 
primarily derived from short-run event studies; extant research albeit somewhat scarce, on the 
long-run post-acquisition performance of acquirers, both in terms of financial and operating 
performance is rather mixed. Thus, virtually the inference of this research indicates a lack of 
consensus. As Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) pointed out, limited research on the returns from a long-
run perspective could be ascribed possibly to the strong conviction in the ‘Efficient Market’ 
hypothesis by Fama (1970). Since studies mainly focused on takeovers involving US acquirers 
and targets, evidence from the UK has been somewhat limited (Martynova et al., 2007), 
notwithstanding that the majority of these papers looked at the combined profitability of both 
acquirers and targets, post-takeover.  
 
The said review by Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) also segregates these studies into the ones 
preceding the seminal one by Franks, Harris & Titman (1991), and those that succeeded it. Out 
of the studies prior to the paper by Franks et al., (1991), it was only Asquith (1983) who 
reported significantly negative cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CAARs) over a 
post-announcement window of 240 days of mergers, which were also viable from an economic 
standpoint. Most of the other papers during this pre-period failed to distinguish between 
mergers and tender offers5. Therefore, it cannot be convincingly concluded that the pre- Franks 
et al. (1991) studies presented empirical evidence contradicting the market efficiency theory. 
 
The paper on long-run performance with a sample of listed US acquiring and target firms by 
Franks et al. (1991), improved the methods employed for computation of these returns, thereby 
shaping the way for use of more refined techniques in later research. They used three different 
benchmarks, viz. equally-weighted, value-weighted and ten-factor and eight-portfolio, to 
calculate abnormal returns, with quite different results. However, they attached more 
importance to the insignificant returns from considering the third approach as superior-most in 
comparison to the others they followed since it accounted for the ‘cross-correlation’ in returns 
of individual firms in their sample (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000).  
 
                                                          
5
 The main difference between mergers and tender offers comes from the dissimilar exchange medium employed in either 
case: while the former usually involves cash, the latter equity (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). 
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The studies following the paper by Franks et al. (1991), were differentiated by Agrawal & Jaffe 
(2000), sub-grouping them into those looking at long-term performances of mergers as well as 
tender offers (abbreviated as TOs henceforth). Considering only the outcomes of mergers, 
those studies with the US data (e.g. Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Anderson & 
Mandelker, 1993; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; etc.), reported significant 
negative abnormal returns. All the aforesaid papers except Loughran & Vijh (1997), estimated 
CAARs, while they computed buy-and-hold returns. Gregory’s (1997) estimation of CAARs 
using the UK data substantiated the findings of these previously mentioned papers, although 
he did not present his results separating mergers and TOs. Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) concluded 
the presence of an ‘anomaly’ against the populist notion about ‘efficient market’ based on their 
review of these papers which also suggested economically significant negative long-run returns 
following mergers, despite the associated methodology issues. However, they were unable to 
make a similar inference whilst summarising the findings of those papers (e.g. Agrawal et al., 
1992; Loderer & Martin, 1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; etc.) which separated TOs. This is 
because, in this latter case, two of these papers, viz. both of Agrawal et al., (1992) and Loderer 
& Martin (1992) reported statistically insignificant but positive CAARs. 
 
While exploring the factors motivating the observed long-term performances of acquirers, 
Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) did not find much support for the theory (1)(b) (mentioned in the 
previous section) positing investors’ under-reaction to M&A announcements. For instance, the 
empirical findings of Agrawal et al., (1992) for their whole sample period, could only suggest 
the presence of a likely anomaly to the theory of ‘efficient markets’. But this paper failed to 
explain the findings from the time dimension of statistically significant stock price reactions to 
the announcement news. As suggested by the payment mode theory that all-equity-paying 
bidders suffer from adverse returns in the longer term, Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) did find some 
support for this notion. For example, Franks, Harris and Mayer, (1988) observed that those 
opting for their targets in exchange for only cash were more unlikely to perform worse in 
comparison to their counterparts opting for equity only. Franks et al. (1991) however, did not 
find any significant evidence of superior long-run abnormal returns by all-cash paying firms. 
Gregory (1997) reported partial support for this theory, although without the statistical tests for 
the observed difference in outcomes, separated by payment modes. But, the paper by Loughran 
& Vijh (1997) also showed a stronger substantiation of this theory. Finally, Mitchell & Stafford 
(2000) also corroborated this hypothesis, whilst taking care of some of the methodological 
concerns.  Agrawal & Jaffe’s (2000) review of the paper by Rau & Vermaelen (1998) to 
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validate the performance extrapolation hypothesis referred to in the last section, shows that the 
three-year abnormal returns for the glamour acquirers tended to be lower than that of the value 
acquirers, controlling for both payment method and form of acquisition. However, the 
empirical evidence from this paper did not indicate any support for the theory suggesting EPS 
myopia of the market as well as bidder management.  
 
As discussed in the above paragraphs, Agrawal & Jaffe’s (2000) all-encompassing survey of 
the long-term M&A outcomes, did suggest some evidence of worsening post-takeover returns 
for the studies succeeding Franks et al., (1991). However, several methodological concerns 
have generally been raised in respect of the computation of abnormal returns in the longer term 
(e.g., Kothari & Warner, 1997; Barber & Lyon, 1997; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; Mitchell & 
Stafford, 2000). Further, looking at the conflicting empirical findings of the extant studies, 
Fama (1998) in his comprehensive literature review of the overall performance by firms in the 
long-run, observed (p.304) that “Consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the 
anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction of stock prices to information is about as 
common as under-reaction….”. So, according to Fama (1998) the documented evidence of 
abnormal returns, either positive or negative as supposed rebuttals to ‘efficient markets’, tended 
to be ambiguous at best. Notwithstanding Fama’s conclusions from a broader perspective, 
Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) still adhered to their inference on long-run under-performance 
following both TOs and mergers. They opined that having reviewed a wide array of studies 
from both the US and the UK with diverse-ranging sample periods, the persistent report of 
underperformance might not solely be attributable to either ‘chance’ as conjectured by Fama 
(1998) or flawed methodologies employed as argued by the aforesaid papers. In the subsequent 
paragraphs, we take a brief look at some of the more recent papers on long-run outcomes, 
including the relatively scant post-acquisition operating performance literature, in order to 
either retain Agrawal & Jaffe’s (2000) basic conclusion on ‘underperformance of acquiring 
firms’ or refute it.  
 
Using data from the UK, Baker & Limmack (2002) showed significantly negative buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) over a 60-month event window, using eight different 
benchmark models. The study by Moeller Schlingemann & Stulz (2003) of post-acquisition-
completion performance abnormal using US data also showed significantly negative BHARs, 
but across a three-year period. However, they could not document any such evidence using the 
calendar time portfolio method. Again, Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) employing a sample of 
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UK bidding firms showed three-year BHARs after acquisitions, were significantly worse for 
glamour firms, thus upholding the primary findings of Rau & Vermaelen (1998). However, 
these authors found a stronger support for the payment hypothesis than that of extrapolation, 
in contrast to the latter authors, thus corroborating the extant empirical evidence of shareholder 
wealth destruction by those bidders opting for solely equity swaps. A study with a sample of 
Canadian firms by Andre, Kooli & L’Her (2004) reported insignificant calendar time returns 
for a 36-month post-acquisition period. This paper however, suffered from a limited data (only 
267 Canadian acquisitions) issue. Similarly, the study by Dube & Glascock (2006), employing 
US sample (with a small sample of 255 acquisitions) failed to show a significant risk-adjusted 
abnormal performance for the acquirers. The CTAR methodology with Fama-French 
regression they used, did not show any trace of abnormal stock returns either for a 12-month 
or a 36-month period following the acquisitions. The paper by Moeller et al. (2005) evidenced 
large losses to the US acquiring firms, where they documented significantly negative post-
acquisition BHARs for a 24-month period. Sudasanam & Huang (2007) also reported 
significantly negative momentum-adjusted 36-month BHARs with a sample of US acquirers. 
Further, the more recent studies on UK data (e.g. Cosh, Guest & Hughes, 2006; Antoniou, 
Petmezas & Zhao, 2007, etc.) also reported significant losses to the bidding firms, despite 
having used different benchmarks for abnormal returns computation. Specifically, the latter 
study by Antoniou et al., (2007) employed the calendar-time methodology and their findings 
suggested significantly negative abnormal returns over a three-year window to the frequent 
acquirers, irrespective of the listing status of their targets. 
 
Notwithstanding the above findings, Lyon et al. (1999) suggested that a pragmatic approach of 
computing post-acquisition returns using both event-time as well as calendar-time approaches 
would perhaps better deal with the criticisms levelled on the methodological front. This seems 
to be the norm followed by the recent studies, including some of those cited above. For 
instance, another study on Canadian firms by Dutta & Jog (2009) using both these approaches 
failed to detect any significant abnormal performance in the three years after the effective date 
of these acquisitions. Nor, did they find any significant indication of under-or-over-
performance in terms of operating returns to these firms. 
 
A thorough review of the literature on long-run operating performance following M&As by 
Martynova et al. (2007) leads them to conclude that there has been confounding evidence 
documented in various studies. Further, they could not present any significant influence of the 
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factors, like payment methods, industry relatedness, etc. on post-merger operating outcomes. 
For instance, the US-based studies (e.g., Moeller & Schlingemann, 2004, etc.) failed to detect 
any post-merger improvement as far as bidders were concerned. The UK-based papers on the 
other hand, presented more conflicting results than their US counterparts on investigating the 
long-run operating outcome of acquisitions. For example, while Dickerson, Gibson & 
Tsakalotos (1997) reported a significant fall in the return on assets of the bidders, Powell & 
Stark (2005) found an increase in operating profits. Studies looking at continental Europe (e.g., 
Martynova et al. 2007, etc.) also provided empirical evidence which infers somewhat 
inconclusively of a significant improvement in post-acquisition profitability.  
 
In view of the foregoing summary of the extant literature examining post-M&A profitability 
of returns, unanimity on the superior performance of the acquiring firms is perhaps not tenable. 
This could be ascribable to the methodological issues and sometimes a relatively smaller 
sample sizes which plagued a number of the earlier studies reviewed above. The later studies 
(e.g. Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Powell & Stark, 2005, etc.) however, employing more 
sophisticated techniques (whilst estimating either stock performance or operating performance 
post-takeover) also failed to report consistent findings. Moreover, the research reviewed here 
were mostly on domestic M&As with only a few ones (e.g., Martynova et al. 2007, etc.) taking 
a broader approach bringing in the international context. Notwithstanding, the lack of clarity 
as to whether these reported findings are either favourable or not, our intent with respect to this 
chapter is slightly different. We want to ascertain whether strategic decision-making pertaining 
to cross-border acquisitions at TMT-level of the UK bidder firms permeate by affecting the 
outcomes thereof from a longer term perspective. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 TMTs as decision makers – focus on their international orientation 
We have touched upon both the bidder-and-deal-specific factors that may affect abnormal 
returns in the longer term in our review of empirical research on long-run performance in the 
previous section. But the part played by the top-managers of acquirers as the primary source 
of stimulus has not been discussed. Hardly any prior corporate finance studies have explored 
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post-acquisition value creation and/or destruction in the long-run from this perspective. 
Something similar had been the outlook of IB research (e.g., Haleblian et al., 2009).  
 
The neo-classical theory of M&As has rested on the fundamental assumption that managers 
act rationally and seek to maximize firm value based on a synergistic view of acquisition 
strategies. However, empirical evidence (e.g., Malmendiar & Tate, 2008, etc.) substantiate 
otherwise, whilst behavioural theories and premises (e.g., hubris by Roll, 1986; agency by 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976, etc.) provide more realistic explanations, but mostly from a shorter-
term approach. Researchers on ‘upper echelons’ (Finkelstein et al., 2008) have indeed looked 
into the consequences of international M&A decisions due to the experiential learning of 
acquirer TMTs, albeit that these were also from a shorter-term viewpoint, being generally event 
studies (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009, etc.). Some IB and 
organisational behaviour literature (e.g., Halebilan & Finkelstein, 1999; Hiller & Hambrick, 
2005, etc.) however, supported the behavioural finance research on managerial motives, 
upholding the misperceived subjective evaluation of foreign targets and envisaged synergies. 
 
The previous chapter had talked in detail about the lesser focus on the decision-making role of 
the overall TMTs of the bidder firms by both corporate finance and IB research. Moreover, it 
was also argued that whilst dealing with complex and risky strategies such as cross-country 
acquisitions, the entire TMT (Cyert & March, 1963; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014) acts in unison 
to choose a potential host. This view in respect of TMT behavioural patterns, is underscored 
by ‘upper echelon’ studies and is in contrast to the views expressed by the corporate finance 
and IB research, which predominantly focused on decision-making at an individual-level, viz., 
by acquirer chief executive officers CEOs (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Haleblian et al., 2009).  
 
We had also deliberated in detail in our previous chapter on the contentions of research on 
‘upper echelons’ (Finkelstein et al., 2008) that: (a) accumulated wisdom from having diverse 
nationalities and previous global experience lead to ‘international orientation’ of these top 
executives; (b) how their individual persona and traits (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) interact to 
influence their discretionary powers (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011) which in turn affect 
strategic decisions as well as their consequences, as in cases of international acquisitions; (c) 
the facilitating role of the TMTs (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001) of acquiring firms in 
garnering positive outcomes by virtue of their superior decision-making abilities.      
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These visible individual personalities in a TMT in turn would tend to shape its strategic 
decision-making with respect to cross-border acquisitions (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; 
Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize that an ‘internationally oriented 
TMT would possess the efficiency as well as the confidence to deal with the uncertainties and 
risks inherent in cross-country acquisitions (Finkelstein et al., 2008; Crossland & Hambrick, 
2011).  
 
Notwithstanding the professed advantages of ‘international orientation’, when opting for cross-
country M&As, the complexity and riskiness involved in these deals tend to make decision-
making more difficult, as already discussed in Chapter 2. The inherent inflexibility of choices 
made in international acquisitions presumably heightens its uncertainties where ‘international 
orientation’ may give rise to unwarranted optimism and overconfidence (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). This could obfuscate decision-making or judgements and may lead to 
circumstances where this so-called advantage is likely to be misapplied. Moreover, 
‘international orientation’ as discussed in Chapter 2, may also inflate one’s high core self-
evaluations (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) and could generate a hubristic attitude (Roll, 1986). 
This coupled with one’s misperception of prior favorable acquisition outcomes being 
attributable to past international experience or due to the influence of foreign national culture, 
is also likely to generate a ‘self-attributive’ syndrome as pointed out by Billet & Qian (2008). 
These perceptible anomalies in the behaviour of top managers, detailed in the previous chapter, 
have been recognized in IB studies (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999) and by a recently emergent branch of corporate finance (e.g. Malmendier & Tate, 2008). 
The latter group of studies assumed that these indivduals have a preconceived belief that their 
decisions and actions are in the best interest of their firms; therefore, free from the so-called 
‘agency conflicts’ as posited in corporate finance (Jensen, 1986).  
 
From the foregoing discussions, it can be hypothesized that overall decision-making by a team 
of top executives of a bidder can potentially be affected by the idiosyncrasies of individualistic 
attitudes and mindsets. Under these circumstances, the perceived benefits of ‘international 
orientation’ might fail to facilitate superior judgement by an acquiring firm’s TMT as a whole, 
in respect of a prospective foreign host. Since uncertainties associated with limited information 
available, are more likely to surface in acquisition deals abroad, this specialist knowledge of 
bidder TMTs could be misused and/ or misapplied. Therefore, the following section on 
‘Hypotheses’ development would delineate more precisely: whether there exists a threshold 
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after which TMT ‘international orientation’ can in reality benefit the acquiring firms opting for 
cross-border targets. What level of competence would prevent the TMTs from potential 
misjudgement or overoptimistic assessment of expected synergies of the deals-at-hand or 
downsizing the risks involved?    
 
3.5 Research hypotheses 
The last section has highlighted the pros and cons pertaining to the ‘international orientation’ 
of one or more TMT members which interact to influence their collective judgement. We also 
have considered the envisioned threat posed by the hazards of cross-country acquisitions, 
which may offset the postulated benefits of this so-called ‘international orientation’ to effect 
better acquisition decisions. In this section we shall build upon all these arguments to predict 
how either the international experience of managers or their foreign backgrounds could have 
consequences on the long-run performances of the acquiring firms. In other words, we explore 
in the subsequent paragraphs how and under what conditions the desired beneficial effects of 
this orientation, can be optimized whilst outweighing the alleged adverse ones.         
 
As discussed in the earlier chapter as to how amidst a host of environmental factors that operate 
in the cross-border contexts, both firm and industry level considerations interplay to exacerbate 
the complexity and unpredictability of these transactions. Our review of previous empirical 
literature examining the long-run performance of bidding firms revealed ambiguous evidence. 
According to Agrawal & Jaffe (2000), amongst others, the statistically significant determinants 
that were documented to contribute to such outcomes, most noteworthy were the different 
payment methods used (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000) and extrapolation of past performances 
(Rau & Vermaelen, 1998), etc. We have developed further the extrapolation theory pertaining 
to managerial behavioural idiosyncrasies and its empirical results in the earlier section, to 
investigate the detrimental consequences of the likelihood of developing a ‘self-attributive 
bias’ and/or ‘hubris’ which may arise by virtue of extrapolation of previous successful 
outcomes. Here, we extend it to investigate the overall impact of exercise of discretionary 
powers by acquirer TMTs, emphasizing the circumstances when not only these may be 
mitigated, but rather generate favourable outcomes in the longer term for bidders.        
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As contended earlier, it is the team of top executives of an acquiring firm, rather than just an 
individual executive, who is responsible for decisions on these strategic investments such as 
cross-border acquisitions. Cyert & March (1963) referred such a team as the ‘dominant 
coalition’ as opposed to the opinion of a single executive (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; etc.) 
expressed in both corporate finance and IB studies. Each strategic foreign acquisition decision 
is likely to have a combination of varied motives. This tends to make the scope of learning 
based on prior experience from factors like residence or education and/or work abroad, 
somewhat limited and difficult at the same time. This situation seems more probable when the 
number of years of such exposure is inadequate. Expressed differently, insufficient depth of 
international experience would make the process of synthesizing and integrating the 
experiential learning more challenging. Hence, it could be anticipated that this limited 
international knowledge would inhibit rationalizing the inference that would be warranted from 
similar acquisitive activities. Consequently, behavioral biases like ‘self-attribution’ ‘hubris’, 
etc. posited earlier, may be manifested. Therefore, it is essential that the learning from earlier 
international experience is effectively applied when opting for a cross-country host in view of 
the multifarious complexities involved. In order to do so, the entire TMT of an acquiring firm 
should have the ability and competency garnered through an appropriate number of years of 
international insight. Hence, it could be predicted that as this exposure grows in time, the TMT 
of a bidder, would be in a position to make a more suitable assessment of all the challenges of 
the cross-border acquisition-at-hand leading to a more tactical judgement.        
 
Therefore, we posit that if the TMTs of these bidder firms possess greater depth of international 
experience (in terms of average number of years), they would be better-equipped to optimize 
this insight more competently. This would in turn be revealed as a favorable effect on the long 
run outcomes for these bidders which had been postulated in the previous IB studies.  On the 
lines of Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999), it could thus be expected, that the depth in years of 
TMT international exposure would have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the post-
acquisition returns. Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between the depth of TMT 
international experience and the longer term post-acquisition performance. 
 
Just like the depth of international exposure of one or more TMT members acquired over time, 
the range or the breadth of this international experience too, can act as a valuable source of 
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TMT ‘orientation’ for the acquiring firms embarking on cross-border acquisitions. The range 
of this exposure is likely to be broadened and enriched by virtue of staying in a number of 
countries for either education or career progression. This type of exposure would make an 
individual manager privy to the diversity of cultural, economic and regulatory factors and 
associated risks of doing business in these countries. Thus, familiarity with a large number of 
countries by more than one top executive translates into a wider expanse of international 
experience which in turn, tends to benefit the overall TMT by augmenting the whole team’s 
‘international orientation’. This would presumably make a bidding firm’s TMT capable of 
handling deals involving foreign targets more efficiently. Potentially for the TMT of an 
acquirer, the more the familiarity with a varied range of market structures in different countries, 
the higher will be its skill set to evaluate efficaciously the synergistic ‘fit’ of an international 
host. The breadth of this exposure would go a long way to facilitate acquisitions with respect 
to the countries with smilar institutional  and cultural frameworks as well as risk profiles 
(Barkema et al., 1996). This breadth of international experience from a range of dissimilar 
countries tends to enrich the ‘international orientation’ of the TMT of an acquirer firm, which 
is likely to give it an edge in negotiating and managing a cross-border deal.  
 
The theory of ‘transfer effect’ by Cormier & Hagman (1987) implied past experiential learning 
from certain events under prescribed conditions, may be successfully transferred to similar 
subsequent occurences. However with respect to this theory, Ellis,  Reus, Lamont, & Ranft 
(2011b) surmised that a lower range of experience in terms of lesser  number of countries might 
not be favourable with respect to better decision-making in cross-country acquisitions. This is 
because initially, lesser breath of this exposure could generate unwarranted self-confidence and 
optimism amongst TMT members. This would obfuscate the envisaged benefits of 
international experience in IB research, leading to the behavioral idiosyncrasies observed 
among the top executives, as outlined in the preceding section. But, as the team of executives’ 
overall experience across a wider range of countries continues to expand and develop, such a 
TMT would learn more adaptively from the ‘quality’ of this exposure. Thus, this team would 
be better-able to appropriately apply this learning to judge a transaction across borders, by 
weighting the risks arising from limited information. Hence, on the lines of our arguments for 
the previous hypothesis, we propose:  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between the breadth of TMT 
international experience and the longer term post-acquisition performance. 
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A third feature of ‘international orientation’ that we study here, is the TMT composition in an 
acquiring firm with a heterogeneous mix of nationalities in addition to depth and breadth of 
international experience that we considered for our last two hypotheses. This aspect is a variant 
of the number of diverse nationalities in the managerial team that was hypothesized in the last 
chapter along the lines of Nielsen & Nielsen (2011); Piaskowska & Trojanowski (2014), etc. 
Further, the research on cultural psychology, advocated the presence of high number of 
foreigners on the board of a firm. It is envisaged that a nationally diverse TMT is more likely 
to have an enhanced understanding of cross-cultural differences. As Nielsen & Nielsen (2011) 
put forward, a greater accessibility to local networks as well as an insight into home country 
institutional culture could benefit the whole team by virtue of the existence of foreigners 
amongst top executives. Finally, national diversity in TMT is likely to improve the overall 
team’s international orientation’ (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Thus, this team would 
presumably deal with the available information more realistically and competently which will 
be reflected in its superior decision-making ability.  
 
Conversely, the aforesaid professed beneficial effects of nationality mix in the TMT of an 
acquiring firm may not be realized and get obscured, if there exists too much diversity within 
the TMT. For instance, the advantages may be outweighed by difference of opinions, 
necessitating the seeking of advice from hire of more consultants, making the whole process 
of decision-making slower and costlier (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011).  Also, problems might 
surface as a result of culture conflicts arising from negative ‘groupthink’ leading to 
communication issues (Priem, 1990) within a team of executives. All these concerns arising 
due to a more diverse nationality mix in a TMT of a bidding firm, could eventually lead to 
losing the potential target to a faster bidder or the host firm management walking away from 
the deal, intensifying the problem of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1980) for the bidder TMT.  
 
From the above contentions, it can be conjectured that TMTs of acquirer firms with either low 
or moderate levels of different nationalities, are likely to have an improved cognition and 
perception of the complexities of acquiring a foreign host. However, as these teams become 
increasingly diverse, the benefits tend to become overshadowed by the negative effects of 
ineffective communication, leading to a protracted and hence, more expensive decision-making 
process. Therefore, we expect a contrary curvilinear impact here as envisaged in the case of 
our last two hypotheses, where the presence of higher-than-a-certain cutoff level of foreigners 
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in the TMT of a bidder could cause a decline in post-acquisition performance. Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between national 
diversity of TMTs and the longer term post-acquisition performance. 
 
3.6 Sample and methodology 
We used the same sample as in Chapter 2 to empirically test our hypotheses described in the 
preceding section. Since the original sample of TMT determinants as well as most of the control 
variables are common for all the chapters, details of their obtainment and preparation for 
analysis were given in the first chapter and not repeated here. For the calculation of the post-
acquisition one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), we used London Share Price 
Data (LSPD) for this chapter. Due to the data demands of this new study (in particular, 
unavailability of data for one-year post-acquisition return computation), the final sample used 
here is smaller than that in Chapter 2. Hence, while merging these one-year BHARs with the 
rest of the dataset used in the previous chapter, we were finally left with 428 UK bidding firms 
completing 1,697 acquisitions in 92 target countries.  
 
We employed a mixed-effects linear regression framework to study one-year post-acquisition 
performance. This framework has been suitably recommended for research designs akin to 
ours, where multiple levels are nested within one another (SAGE Publications, 2004). In our 
sample the acquisitions were not only nested within the bidders, they were also nested within 
industries of these firms, as well as within the different target countries, therefore showing a 
multilevel formulation. Also, extant studies (e.g. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & 
Trojanowski, 2014) looking at cross-country M&As had opted for a similar research technique. 
The methodological specifics are detailed in the following sub-sections. As mentioned in the 
last paragraph, since most of the variables that have been employed for empirical analysis in 
this chapter have been comprehensively discussed in the last chapter, only operationalization 
of the new variables are mentioned here. Consistent with the previous chapter, the new 
variables used have been winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile levels to avoid the results being 
affected by outliers. 
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   3.6.1 Dependent Variables 
Three separate performance indicators i.e., BHARs as well as return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) were used; all these measures being for one year after the cross-border 
acquisition announcement, in respect of the acquiring firms. While the first denotes stock 
market performance, the latter two are accounting proxies representing operating performance. 
Using these multifaceted approaches, we aimed to look at the wealth creation aspect of these 
international acquisitions in a more comprehensive way.  
 
The one-year post-announcement month BHARs were calculated using a standard long-run 
event study procedure (see for example, Lyon et al., 1999; Rosen, 2006). We employed a 
benchmark portfolio approach using FTSE all-share index as the benchmark returns index for 
the estimation of BHARs. Thus, BHARs for each acquiring firm’s stock i for the time period 
τ1 to τ2 (i.e. for months 0 to 12 in relation to an acquisition announcement) were computed as: 
BHARiτ = ∏ (1 +%&% Riτ) - ∏ (1 +%&% Rbτ) (3.1) 
where Riτ is the return for each such firm for month τ and Rbτ is the benchmark return for the 
same period captured by FTSE all-share market index return.  
 
The BHARs for each acquiring firm’s stock i for the time period τ1 to τ2 (i.e. for months 0 to 
12 in relation to an acquisition completion or effective date of acquisition) were also calculated 
to check the robustness of the original results for BHARs based on acquisition announcement 
dates. 
 
   3.6.2 Independent Variables 
We followed the same definition of TMT as used in Chapter 2 along the lines of Carpenter et 
al. (2004), using the same dataset from Boardex. However, the following modifications in the 
operationalisation of international orientation are used which were slightly different than that 
in Chapter 2: 
  
a) Amount of TMT international experience (Depth) was measured as the average number 
of years of international experience of TMT members on account of either education or 
employment outside their country of domicile or nationality, until one year prior to the 
acquisition.  
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b)  Range of TMT international experience (Breadth) was measured as the average 
number of countries in which TMT members had experience in living and/or working, 
up to one year prior to the acquisition.  
c) TMT national diversity was captured with the Blau index6 of national diversity 
measured one year prior to the acquisition announcement.  
 
All TMT variables used in our analyses were mean-centered to alleviate potential collinearity 
problems and to make the interpretation of the results easier (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 
   3.6.3 Control Variables 
As, mentioned in first paragraph of this section describing the sample, the control variables that 
have been included for our analysis were mostly similar to Chapter 2 where we looked at 
market reaction over a short-term window of three-days. This is because we extend our study 
here to explore the post-acquisition abnormal returns as well as operating outcomes for the 
bidder firms in the longer term. These variables are also in line with those used in the extant 
studies examining M&A returns (e.g., Moeller & Schlingemann (2004). Thus akin to Chapter 
2, they are classified as (a) deal-specific; (b) bidder-specific; and (c) target-specific as 
explained below: 
 
Lagged accounting measures (ROA and ROE), were used to control for the past operating 
performance along the lines of prior studies (Martynova et al., 2007; Powell & Stark, 2005). 
This allowed us to control for the endogeneity of the acquisition decisions (see Horton, Millo, 
& Serafeim, 2012 for a similar argument). Finally, we included year dummy variables to 
control for fixed time effects such as those associated with major crises. Two such crises 
happened during our sample period: the post-2000 dot-com bubble burst and the financial crisis 
beginning in late 2007.  
 
Deal-specific controls: 
                                                          
6
 Blau Index – diversity index is calculated as: 
' = 1 −	!(&
 

 
 
 
where Pi is the proportion of the TMT in the ith nationality group and N is the number of nationalities. (0 implies homogeneous 
and 1 implies heterogeneous, 4 groups as .25 =.75). 
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Our review of prior research earlier had suggested payment mode to be one of the important 
determinants of long-run returns to the bidders (e.g., Gregory, 1997). Hence, akin to the first 
chapter, we focused three different methods of payment, i.e. cash, stock, and a combination of 
both along with debt, etc. Also, analogous to the last chapter we used the two binary variables: 
the Cash and the Stock. The other deal-related controls, viz., Full acquisition dummy; and 
Transaction value (in logged GBP millions) were the same variables used in Chapter 2.   
 
Bidder-specific controls: 
Firm size (in terms of natural logarithm of total assets of the acquirers) as a bidder-specific 
variable as well as Diversifying acquisition indicator variable used in Chapter 2 had also been 
used here, being prominent in influencing acquisition outcomes in the longer term. TMT size 
was also used as an additional control in this chapter to account for the range of opinions that 
could affect the overall decision-making process in the team of acquirer managers, apart from 
their international orientation (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
 
Target-specific controls: 
Exactly the same target country-specific variables that we employed in the Chapter 2, were 
used as controls to investigate the one-year post-acquisition performance of the bidder firms. 
Therefore, in line with Kogut & Singh’s (1988) index Cultural differences based on the original 
four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001); and from Euromoney (2009), the time-varying 
index of Country risk was quantified; finally GDP per capita in USD thousands was  used.  
 
The following basic regression Equations 3.1 - 3.3 are employed for the multilevel approach 
that we use to test Hypothesis 1, where the main predictor variable is the amount of 
international experience of the TMT members of an acquiring firm i computed in the year 
preceding the announcement of a cross-country acquisition, used in linear and quadratic forms. 
While Equation 3.1 estimates the one-year post-acquisition BHAR of an acquirer i, as specified 
above, Equations 3.2 and 3.3 show the one-year post-acquisition announcement ROA and ROE 
respectively, for a firm i: 
 
BHARiτ =α1 + β1AmountIntlexperiencei + β2AmountIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
81 
 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei + ε1iτ                                                                                                                                                                          (3.1) 
ROAiτ =α1 + β1AmountIntlexperiencei + β2AmountIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROAi + ε1iτ                                                                                                                              (3.2) 
ROEiτ =α1 + β1AmountIntlexperiencei + β2AmountIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROEi + ε1iτ                                                                                                                              (3.3) 
 
We use similar basic regression Equations 3.4 - 3.6 and 3.7 - 3.9 with dependent variables 
similar to those estimated as in case of Equations 3.1 - 3.3 so as to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 
respectively, as shown below: The set of Equations 3.4 - 3.6 have as the main regressor the 
range of countries of international experience of TMT members for acquirer i one year prior to 
an acquisition announcement, whereas Equations 3.7 - 3.9 have the national diversity index 
(Blau Diversity) for each such firm i one year before the acquisition announcement. 
 
BHARiτ = α1 + β1RangeIntlexperiencei + β2RangeIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei  + ε1iτ                                                                                                                                                                          (3.4) 
ROAiτ = α1 + β1RangeIntlexperiencei + β2RangeIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROAi + ε1iτ                                                                                                                              (3.5) 
ROEiτ = α1 + β1RangeIntlexperiencei + β2RangeIntlexperiencei2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + 
β5Log_TransactionValuei + β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + 
β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei + β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + 
β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROEi + ε1iτ                                                                                                                              (3.6) 
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BHARiτ =α1 + β1BlauDivi + β2BlauDivi2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + β5Log_TransactionValuei + 
β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei 
+ β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + β12TMTSizei  + ε1iτ                                                                 (3.7) 
ROAiτ =α1 + β1BlauDivi + β2BlauDivi2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + β5Log_TransactionValuei + 
β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei 
+ β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROAi + ε1iτ                     (3.8) 
ROEiτ =α1 + β1BlauDivi + β2BlauDivi2 + β3Cashi + β4Stocki + β5Log_TransactionValuei + 
β6Log_AcquirerSizei+ β7FullAcquisitioni + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + β9CulturalDistancei 
+ β10CountryRiski + β11GDP_PerCapitai + β12TMTSizei  + β13LaggedROEi + ε1iτ                     (3.9) 
 
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of variables used in our 
analyses. The post-acquisition one-year ROA, ROE and BHARs for the bidding firms are on 
average, positive. The standard t-test shows BHARs statistically significant at 10% level while 
the non-parametric test shows BHARs are significantly different from zero at 1% level.  
All three main predictor variables have a negative correlation with bidder BHARs. This was 
not the case with the other two indicators of performance, viz., ROA and ROE. 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
3.7 Results 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the findings of our multilevel models for each regressand i.e. 
BHARs, ROAs and ROEs respectively, of the bidder firms. The first Model (A) presented in 
each of the tables represents the benchmark with only effect of the control variables. The 
subsequent Models (B, C and D) shown in each tables individually, correspond to each of the 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, respectively, while the final Model (E) in each table shows all the 
explanatory variables corresponding to these hypotheses, combined into a single specification.  
 
[ Insert Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 about here ] 
 
Our findings in all the three tables in respect of Model B substantiated Hypothesis 1 where we 
posited a U-shaped relationship between the depth in average years of international experience 
of acquirer TMTs with their respective firms’ post-acquisition performance indicators, i.e. 
BHARs, ROA & ROE, respectively. The coefficient estimates corresponding to the quadratic 
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terms of the depth of TMT international experience of bidder firms were positively significant 
at 5% level for Model 1B and at 1% level for both Models 2B and 3B, whereas those for the 
linear terms were negative, albeit significant only in respect of Model 2B. This suggests that 
insufficient international exposure (in terms of years) takes a toll on TMT decision-making, 
which in turn adversely affects the long-run outcome of the acquiring firms. Therefore, it 
appears from our empirical results that with less depth of international experience, a bidder 
TMT might not make the profit-maximizing choice for its firm. Instead its overconfidence and 
misapplication of TMT orientation tends to overshadow its judgment. However, at higher 
levels of depth, the TMT seemed to reap the benefits with increased cognizance of the 
complexities and risks involved with the cross-border deal-at-hand. For instance, we found that 
the threshold after which the TMT of an acquiring firm could see the advantages of depth of 
international orientation is 7.73 years on average (the trough of the postulated U-shape in 
Model 2B). Thus, a positive effect on long-run operating performance post-acquisition will 
only be achievable by an acquirer TMT beyond this depth of international experience. In our 
sample, less than a third of the TMTs have this requisite depth.  
 
Our results also upheld our conjecture of a U-shaped association of breadth of international 
experience with the post-acquisition long-run performance by a bidding firm in respect of the 
Hypothesis 2. Similar to our previous Models ‘B’ with respect to TMT-depth, for all the Models 
1C, 2C and 3C, the estimated coefficients of the quadratic terms of breadth were positive. 
However, for both the Models 2C and 3C, significance was at 5% level, whilst in the case of 
Model 1C the significance level was marginal (p < 0.10). The linear term coefficients were also 
negatively significant, barring Model 1C. These findings underscore our postulations with 
respect to the negative effects of over-optimism of acquirer TMTs at the initial levels of breadth 
giving way to an adverse impact on post-acquisition performance. As documented in the last 
paragraph, we found a cut-off point corresponding to the trough implied by Model 2C to be 
equivalent to 2.04 countries on average, in which TMTs of these firms had gained their 
international knowledge. Below this point, i.e. an exposure to less than an average of 2 
countries, would perhaps only lead to incompetent decisions that would be reflected in 
subsequent long-run performance of the bidding firm. As seen in our sample in the case of 
depth, only a limited fraction (about 10%) of our sample bidder TMTs could meet this threshold 
in respect of breadth of their international orientation.        
 
84 
 
With respect to our prediction in Hypothesis 3 of an inverted U-shaped relation between the 
national diversity amongst the acquirer team members and its long term post-acquisition 
outcome, our results were also corroborated, although somewhat weakly. With the exception 
of Model 2D, the coefficients corresponding to the quadratic terms of the acquirer TMT 
national diversity index, were negatively significant at 5% level. Therefore, as expected the 
positive influence of having foreigners in the TMT of a bidding firm is likely to diminish as 
diversity increases, presumably due to communication issues. Thus, apparently inefficacy in 
decision-making takes its toll on the performance of the firm post-acquisition. For example, in 
the case of Model 1D the Blau diversity index equivalent to 0.25 represents the peak of the 
hypothesized inverted U-shape relationship aforementioned. In our sample, more than the 
median of the TMTs of the bidding firms fall short of this nationality mix.  
 
The full models (i.e. Models 1E, 2E, and 3E) by-and-large supported our above findings. One 
noteworthy difference was observed with respect to Model 2E estimating post-acquisition 
ROA. While the coefficient corresponding to the quadratic terms of breadth of TMT 
international experience in Model 2C was statistically significant, it is no longer the case here. 
However, the coefficient for the quadratic term of the TMT national diversity index was 
insignificant in Model 2D, it turned out to be highly significant in the full model (Model 2E), 
as posited under Hypothesis 3. Thus, our findings in respect of curvilinear relationships of the 
above three proxies for TMT international orientation with one-year post-acquisition outcomes 
tend to strengthen the contentions and evidences in the extant studies (e.g. Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Schmid & Dauth, 2014; etc.)       
 
With respect to the control variables included in our model specifications, most of these did 
not show statistical significance. The only two consistent exceptions were TMT size and the 
stock payment method indicator, variables. Our result pertaining to stock exchange for foreign 
hosts documenting a detrimental impact on the profitability of the bidders upholds the prior 
empirical evidence (e.g. Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). Also, the harmful impact of having larger 
boards noted in earlier research (e.g. Yermack, 1996), is highlighted in our results. Our finding 
potentially strengthns our contention that having more foreign nationals on the bidder board 
detrimentally affects the firm’s post-acquisition performance in the longer term.   
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3.8 Additional analyses for robustness  
A series of additional analyses were conducted so as to ensure the robustness of our results to 
have further support for our Hypotheses 1 to 3. The results of the analyses described in this 
section are given in the Appendix to this chapter. In most cases our model specifications 
explaining one-year post-acquisition BHARs as well as the post-effective date BHARs, could 
not be reported since the convergence of these models could not be achieved. This is a 
limitation of our analysis. 
 
   3.8.1 Prior firm-level acquisition experience 
Extant IB research had advocated for the ‘right quality’ of prior acquisition experience at the 
firm-level, to influence learning. This facilitates better decisions as well as outcomes for 
subsequent acquisitions (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). Both studies 
mentioned above had argued and documented a non-linear i.e. U-shaped effect of this previous 
experiential learning on the performance of later acquisitions. To account and control for this 
possibility, we constructed an additional variable counting all acquisitions completed by the 
sample firms over the respective 5-year periods preceding the cross-border acquisitions 
sampled by us. However, the prior acquisition counts data when supplemented with our original 
sample reduced the sample size, when the original models are rerun with this added control. 
 
Using a linear and a quadratic term for the firm-level acquisition count variable, adopting a 
mean-centering procedure, we reran all the aforesaid models. Our findings corroborate these 
studies. We observed in all our models, examining post-acquisition operating performance with 
return on assets with this additional control variable, a significantly negative linear coefficient 
while that for the quadratic term was significantly positive. Our earlier findings with respect to 
depth and breadth of the international exposure of the bidder TMTs together with national 
diversity amongst TMT members, are also maintained. These results are reported in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6 in the Appendix, as mentioned. 
 
   3.8.2 Target country-specific knowledge 
Familiarity with the country of the prospective host can add value to the human capital 
component of an executive (e.g. Barney, 1988; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) by dint of local 
knowledge of the regulatory and market environment, etc. and also fosters network 
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connections. This knowledge could be acquired through either domicile or earlier employment. 
Therefore, it could be assumed that this experience at acquirer TMT-level could aid superior 
insight into the uncertainties when dealing with acquisitions invloving targets from the same 
country (Ellis et al., 2011b; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). However, this knowledge could 
also lead to complacency in subsequent judgements and might cause ‘adverse selection’ of 
same-country targets. The multilevel models with the amount of host country experience 
expressed in average number of years among TMT members of the acquiring firms as a 
predictor seems to corroborate the adverse effect of having prior target country experience by 
bidder TMTs. The corresponding linear coefficients explaining post-acquisition one-year 
operating performance showed negative statistical significance. This unfavorable impact could 
also be ascribable to the fact that the bulk of our sample TMTs lacked any knowledge of the 
country of the prospective host. However, we did not observe any non-linear effects of host-
country experience on post-acquisition long-run performance in our multilevel setting. The 
corresponding results are provided in Table 3.7. 
 
   3.8.3 Acquisition target status 
The listing status of target firms had also been shown to influence post-acquisition returns (see 
for example Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Chang, 1998, etc.). More specifically, it had been 
documented by Chang (1998) that private hosts acquired with stock swaps generate positive 
returns for the acquirers. Further, Malmendier & Tate (2008) indicated that acquisition of 
privately held targets could potentially reveal signs of ‘hubris’ of the executives, which could 
adversely affect the profitability of these takeovers. Therefore, we added two binary variables 
taking the value of one for private targets and zero otherwise and one for public targets and 
zero otherwise, adding them as further controls to our original multilevel regression models.  
   
However, neither the addition of either of the dummy variables showed statistically significant 
coefficients except for the models estimating ROEs, nor their inclusion affected our primary 
results described in the previous section.  We report these findings in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 in the 
Appendix, as mentioned before. 
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   3.8.4 Other TMT characteristics: age and tenure 
As mentioned in our earlier sections, the upper echelons theory (cf. Carpenter et al., 2004) 
postulates that strategic corporate decisions by top executives as a team, reflecting their 
cognitions as well as biases, are inherently based upon their personal traits. Apart from 
managerial characteristics which have been a primary foundation of this chapter, we looked at 
some others which have been emphasized in prior studies to affect acquisition decisions and 
consequently, their outcomes. For instance, Herrmann & Datta, (2006) suggested tenure of top 
managers to influence firm performance, whereas Yim (2013) suggested that age of individual 
executives mattered. Therefore, we employed these proxies as our additional controls and re-
estimated our original multilevel model specifications. Proxies measuring within-TMT 
averages and standard deviations of tenures and age of acquirer TMTs were constructed. We 
used three alternative specifications to define the tenure of a bidding firm TMT executive(s) as 
the time each such individual spent:  (a) in his or her role (i.e. as time in role or TiR), (b) on 
the board of a particular company (i.e. as time on board or ToB), or (c) in the company overall 
(i.e. time in company or TiC). These indicators were added to our models as controls, one-by-
one. The corresponding results by and large sustained our earlier inferences, highlighted in 
Section 3.7. Hence, we concluded that these additional controls indicated that our primary 
results were not affected by omitted variable(s) bias. However, the significance levels for 
coefficients corresponding to the national diversity in TMT (Hypothesis 3) are somewhat 
weaker for the models estimating acquirer post-acquisition ROA.  
 
In respect of these controls, we observed that post-acquisition operating performance in terms 
of a one-year ROE was positively influenced by the average age of bidder TMT members. 
Moreover, we found post-acquisition ROA seemed to be positively affected by the average 
TMT tenure. Also for the post-acquisition BHAR models which are only available for (a) TMT 
TiR, we found positive influence of this control on these BHARs. However, variation in neither 
tenure nor age of bidder TMT appeared to have any impact on the determinants of post-
acquisition performance. We do not report these findings for the sake of brevity.     
 
   3.8.5 Alternative to BHARs: CTARs 
We also supplemented our analysis of financial performance using the calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal return (CTAR) alternative approach also known as the Jensen-alpha approach. 
CTARs had been preferred by both Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) to BHARs. 
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This is because the former has been acknowledged to have better control with respect to the 
issue of cross-correlated performance of acquiring firms, whereas computation of the latter 
relies on the assumption of independence of the abnormal returns of the sample firms.  
 
Since we estimate one-year holding period returns, we created event-acquirer portfolios, 
including all firms announcing cross-border acquisitions in the previous 12 months. The time 
series of monthly excess returns were regressed using a multivariate regression setting, 
separately based on both the Fama-French (1993) and the Carhart (1997) factors following 
Kothari & Warner (2006) and Mitchell & Stafford (2000). We based our computations on 
‘Constructing and Testing Alternative Versions of the Fama-French and Carhart models in the 
UK’, by Gregory, Tharyan, & Christidis (2013). The CTARs cannot be used in regression-
based tests, as other measures of abnormal performance (Gregory & Wang, 2013). Hence, to 
test our hypotheses predicting curvilinear association between the TMT determinants and one-
year post-acquisition performance, we compared the one-year abnormal performance estimates 
(the alphas) of portfolios of acquiring firms, partitioned in the manner as described in the 
following paragraph.  
 
Initially we sub-divided our sample based on binary variable(s) which took the value of one 
for presence of each of depth and breadth of TMT international experience as well as foreigners 
in the TMTs; and zero for absence of each of these TMT proxies. Thus, distinguishing the 
presence from the absence of each of these three proxies, we further re-partitioned the resulting 
‘presence’ sub-sample(s) into ‘high’ and ‘low’ quantifications for each of these TMT 
determinants. The high and the low categorisations of the ‘presence’ of depth, breadth and 
foreigners in TMT are based on above and below median values of the corresponding 
‘presence’ sub-sample of TMT determinants. Then pairwise comparisons between the alphas 
of the resulting categories are made using the approach of Gregory, Guermat & Al-Shawraweh 
(2010). We used an indicator variable (say for example, the indicator, D taking the value of 
one for low depth and zero otherwise, appending the first group to the second) for each of the 
categorisation mentioned below:  
 
(1) Low vs. absence of depth of TMT international experience; 
(2) High vs. low depth of TMT international experience; 
(3) Low vs. absence of breadth of TMT international experience; 
(4) High vs. low breadth of TMT international experience; 
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(5) Low vs. zero Blau index of foreigners in the team; 
(6) High vs. low Blau index of foreigners in the team. 
 
By using a testing procedure based on the above three classification of partitioned portfolios 
along each TMT dimension (e.g. no intl. experience, low depth of intl. experience, high depth 
of intl. experience), we expected to observe significant difference in abnormal returns (shown 
by the alpha) reflected in these pairwise comparisons. However, no indication of such 
significant difference was observed in any of the above six pairs.  
 
When the same testing procedure is repeated with one-year CTARs recalculated based on 
effective dates of the cross-border acquisitions, we have similar findings in principle. But, these 
results are along the lines of most of the studies using CTAR approach (e.g. Mitchell & 
Stafford, 2000; Dutta & Jog, 2009; etc.), taking into account the cross-sectional dependence of 
stock returns. We only report the test results based on the one-year post-announcement CTARs 
(presented in Table 3.10); whereas those with the one-year post-effective date CTARs are not 
reported for the sake of brevity. 
 
   3.8.6 Excluding financial firms 
We reran the models reported in Section 3.7, dropping the financial firms (based on Fama-
French 17 industry classification) from the original sample based on listed UK acquiring firms, 
and are left with 1509 firm-event observations. Although the main findings with respect to one-
year post-acquisition ROA and ROE are upheld, the BHAR results could not be verified since 
the models failed to converge. 
 
3.9 Discussion and conclusion 
In the previous chapter, we had looked into the short-run wealth implications of TMT 
‘international orientation’ in the context of cross-border acquisitions by bidding firms from the 
UK. Given some of the inconsistencies in our findings there as well as to get a more 
comprehensive picture of the facets of this TMT orientation, we expand our investigation in 
this chapter, whilst aiming to look at the performance of these firms in the longer term. 
Basically, we wanted to re-examine the fundamental question on TMT international orientation 
which we had explored in Chapter 2: can the international experience and diversity of the TMTs 
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of these firms improve these corporate strategies, thereby affecting their post-acquisition 
outcomes in a longer term?  
 
Precisely, we look again at the pre-conditions for acquirer TMT ‘international orientation’ (in 
terms of depth and breadth of prior international experience as well as different nationalities in 
the managerial team), which could bring about improved performance outcomes for such firms. 
Chapter 2 looked at the market reaction to presence of internationally oriented acquirers but 
the findings left our central question on efficacy of TMT international orientation expressed in 
the first paragraph, somewhat unclear. Therefore, shifting our focus to a longer term 
perspective, we believed this would provide a better insight into this fundamental query and 
indeed, our empirical findings indicated this. In this chapter, we attempt to pinpoint the optimal 
form of TMT orientation with respect to each of the determinants. These predictors are 
envisioned and formulated based on our contentions reconciled from corporate finance, IB and 
upper echelons research, to estimate performance for one year after cross-country acquisition 
announcements in terms of three proxies: BHARs, ROA and ROE respectively.   
 
Our postulates regarding international exposure pertaining to bidding firm TMTs were: (1) the 
preliminary levels were likely to cause over-optimism and excessive high opinion of one’s 
capabilities, being reflected in poor acquisition decisions, consequently long-run post-
acquisition performance; (2) at higher levels of such experience, TMTs could manage the 
foreign deal-complexities more rationally and competently. Our empirical analyses of both the 
post-acquisition financial market and operating returns confirmed our conjectures. For 
example, for the model estimating post-acquisition operating performance, it was documented 
that on average 7.73 years of international experience of acquirer managers could benefit their 
firm after one year of the cross-border acquisition announcement. However, the majority of 
TMTs in our sample could not meet this documented level of competence amongst the 
members to garner positive outcomes for their firms. In respect of the number of countries of 
international experience, just prior knowledge of 2 countries on average seemed adequate to 
be advantageous as far as post-acquisition announcement performance was concerned. Again, 
our sample showed that there were not many of the bidder TMTs with this breadth of 
international exposure.     
 
Our conjecture with respect to mix of nationalities amongst the executive team was however, 
contrary to our predictions on depth and breadth of TMT international experience. We argued 
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here as to the initial impact of having foreigners in the team, being advantageous in superior 
decision-making leading to improved long-run profitability. This effect tends to wane after a 
threshold; thenceforth increased diversity resulting in a negative ‘groupthink’, would rather 
affect profitability adversely. This was also upheld in our empirical findings. The cutoff level 
of the Blau diversity index as an indicator of nationality mix in the managerial team turned out 
to be just 0.25 for the model estimating post-acquisition stock performance. Since our sample 
had even less than a median of the TMTs which possessed this level of national diversity, the 
dominant effect on post-acquisition returns was probably unfavorable.    
 
We have examined ‘international orientation’ in respect of two aspects: international 
experience and national diversity and found these to have opposing effects on post-acquisition 
outcomes. Can these two aspects complement each other? Also, how can an optimal balance 
between the negative and positive influences of TMT orientation be achieved so that strategic 
decisions taken by an internationally oriented TMT, can benefit its firm? These are some of the 
questions which need to be investigated further, and which the limited scope of our study has 
not allowed us to investigate. Also, how it is possible for ‘international orientation’ to be 
tailored to suit the risk profile considering the investment strategies pursued by a firm, could 
be another avenue for future research. 
 
Notwithstanding the possibilities that our study has given rise to, it has also contributed to the 
extant literature by combining not only different fields of studies, viz., corporate finance, IB 
and upper echelons. Moreover, it has reconciled and integrated widely divergent views. For 
instance, both corporate finance and IB studies championed for decision-making outcome by a 
single executive like CEOs; whereas upper echelons professed TMTs as strategy formulators. 
Given that the extant studies contended both positive influences (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; 
Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) as well as damaging impacts (e.g., Billett & Qian, 2008; 
Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) of such executive orientation, we attempted some sort of 
amalgamation here. In other words, our postulations and empirical results aimed to provide a 
more explicable as well as rationalistic view of these two contradictory interpretations. Further, 
we presented a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of ‘international orientation’ of 
acquirer TMTs: their depth and breadth of international knowledge and their national cultural 
backgrounds. These different indicators of orientation could be further expanded in future 
research to construct a balanced team of managers who may be better positioned to take 
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competent decisions. Also, we contributed towards an under-researched determinant, viz., 
TMTs as decision-makers, impacting on post-acquisition performance of the bidder firms.      
 
This chapter has its limitations similar to Chapter 2. The analogous constraints of studying a 
single home country as well as the issues encountered whilst coding and operationalization of 
the TMT variables had already been highlighted and discussed in more details in the first 
chapter too. Hence, we do not repeat those here. Further, the methodological issues pointed out 
with the longer run return measures may plague our chapter, although we attempted mitigating 
them by complementing our examination of BHARs with CTARs. However, the BHARs as 
well as the CTARs have their relative share of merits as well as demerits (Mitchell & Stafford, 
2000; Loughran & Ritter, 2000; etc.). So, our findings with respect to one-year BHARs and 
CTARs in this chapter need to be treated and interpreted in the light of the shortcomings of 
either approaches. To circumvent this issue, we had employed the accounting indicators: ROE 
and ROA. Finally, our sample size was compromised to some degree due to the non-availability 
of data on long-run accounting operators and also for computation of BHARs.  
 
In summary, this chapter brings to light the different aspects of ‘international orientation’ that 
have been viewed only in isolation by prior research, albeit rarely. These features of bidder 
TMTs have been related to determine post-acquisition returns in the longer term. This chapter 
also provides a more comprehensive view of how the previous backgrounds of TMT members 
influence their behavior impacting on strategic decision-making by the overall team; and how 
team decisions are revealed in the consequential outcomes in terms of generation of wealth, 
making an inherent assumption of profit maximization motive of TMTs. However, our study 
is just a stepping stone to further in-depth research on how a competent team of managers can 
efficiently decide on global expansion modes which in turn could positively affect the 
performance of acquiring firms. In particular, this proposed extension could be a promising 
avenue for future research in view of the steady increase in mixed ethnic cultural backgrounds. 
It would be worthwhile revisiting the hypothesized associations in this chapter to explore 
whether mixed ethnicity amongst executives mitigates the complexities and uncertainties 
involved in different strategies and what could be the consequences of their decisions. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean Median S.D. Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 BHAR 1.65 -0.94 38.73                
               
2 ROA 5.19 6.41 13.12 0.14
**
               
               
3 ROE 10.41 12.58 57.46 0.02 0.39
**
              
               
4 Amount of int’l expeirence  5.16 4.20 4.82 -0.01 0.01 -0.01             
               
5 Range of int’l experience 0.86 0.67 0.80 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.76
**
            
               
6 National diversity 0.22 0.00 0.25 -0.02 0.06
*
 0.03 0.45** 0.48**           
               
7 Cash 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.08
**
 0.06* 0.05* -0.01 0.01 0.01          
               
8 Stock 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.15
**
 -0.06* 0.01 0.06* -0.03 -0.23**         
               
9 Full acquisition 0.79 1.00 0.41 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.08
**
 -0.18** -0.06* -0.05* -0.02        
               
10 Transaction value 2.00 1.59 1.98 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.12
**
 0.18** 0.05* 0.35** 0.04+ 0.01       
               
11 Diversifying acquisition 0.34 0.00 0.47 -0.05
*
 0.00 -0.03 -0.08** -0.07** -0.07** -0.05* -0.07** 0.06* -0.17**      
               
12 Firm size 6.60 6.48 2.35 0.04 0.21
**
 0.14** 0.47** 0.48** 0.35** 0.07** -0.15** -0.05* 0.33** -0.11**     
               
13 TMT size 4.01 4.00 1.70 -0.03 0.06
*
 0.06* 0.05* 0.07** 0.25** -0.03 -0.11** 0.02 0.04+ 0.00 0.36**    
               
14 Cultural differences 1.45 0.69 1.57 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.16
**
 0.23** 0.15** -0.04+ 0.02 -0.25** -0.04+ -0.11** 0.14** 0.04+   
               
15 Country risk 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.17
**
 0.28** 0.15** -0.02 0.05* -0.32** -0.06* -0.14** 0.11** 0.01 0.58**  
               
16 GDP per capita 27.83 31.52 14.26 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.10
**
 -0.21** -0.14** 0.01 -0.04+ 0.28** 0.05* 0.13** -0.11** -0.13** -0.53** -0.84** 
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Note to Table 3.1: BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the firms announcing a cross-border acquisition computed over a 12-month event window (i.e. from month 0 to month +12 
following the announcement) using market adjustment model. ROA and ROE are the ratios of return on assets and return on equity, respectively. Amount of international experience is the average 
number of years of acquiring firms’ TMT members’ international career experience Range of international experience is the average number of countries where acquiring firms’ TMT members’ 
gained their international career experience and is measured at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction. National Diversity is the Blau index of national diversity 
of the acquiring firm TMT. All experience and diversity measures are measured at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction. Cash and Stock are indicator variables 
for transactions paid purely in cash and stock, respectively. Full acquisition is an indicator variable denoting transactions where upon completion of the acquisition the acquirer gains full control 
of the target, i.e. at least 95% stake. Transaction value is expressed in GBP millions in logarithmic form. Diversifying acquisition is the indicator variable equal to one when an acquisition involved 
any industry other than the acquirer core macro industry, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the logarithm of total asset value of the acquiring firm (expressed in £ millions). TMT size is the number 
of executive directors on the board of directors of the acquiring firm. Cultural differences variable is the distance between the target country and the country of the acquiring firm (i.e. the UK) 
using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index on the basis of four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001). Country risk and GDP per capita are the Euromoney country risk index and one-year lagged 
GDP per capita (in USD thousands) of the host country. All the variables (except indicator binary variables) are winsorized at 1% level. The correlation table reports pairwise correlation coefficients 
with +, *, and **denoting the corresponding significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on 12-month 
post-announcement buy-and-hold returns. 
 Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 1E 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience    -0.53 -1.47     -0.94 -1.58 
Amount of int’l experience2   0.12 2.40*     0.15 2.53* 
Range of int’l experience     -1.14 -0.47   3.25 0.84 
Range of int’l experience2     2.56 1.66+   0.37 0.19 
National diversity       3.64 0.60 6.95 1.06 
National diversity2       -66.73 -2.21* -82.88 -2.69** 
Cash 3.01 1.43 2.90 1.37 2.99 1.42 3.19 1.51 3.15 1.50 
Stock -3.33 -0.59 -3.10 -0.55 -3.28 -0.58 -3.17 -0.56 -3.53 -0.62 
Full acquisition -2.39 -0.98 -2.31 -0.95 -2.40 -0.99 -2.34 -0.97 -2.05 -0.85 
Transaction value 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.24 
Diversifying acquisition -0.83 -0.39 -0.73 -0.35 -0.81 -0.38 -0.76 -0.36 -0.70 -0.33 
Firm size 0.70 1.09 0.79 1.18 0.62 0.93 0.72 1.11 0.62 0.90 
TMT size -1.54 -1.94+ -1.32 -1.65+ -1.41 -1.77+ -1.69 -2.09* -1.45 -1.77+ 
Cultural differences 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.20 
Country risk 10.21 0.77 11.35 0.86 8.80 0.66 10.73 0.81 10.23 0.77 
GDP per capita 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.27 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.26 
Intercept and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:      
- Target country level 4.30*10-5 4.28*10-5 4.28*10-5 4.25*10-5 4.20*10-5 
- Acquirer industry 
level 
10.52 6.75 11.42 12.60 8.07 
- Acquiring firm level 394.15 398.47 401.38 412.76 431.80 
- Residual 1128.74 1123.84 1123.51 1117.75 1104.69 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 81.85** χ2(3) = 81.97** χ2(3) = 83.19** χ2(3) = 84.85** χ2(3) = 87.03** 
Model test χ2(19) = 63.61** χ2(21) = 70.01** χ2(21) = 66.72** χ2(21) = 68.47** χ2(25) = 79.37** 
No. of acquiring firms 428 428 428 428 428 
No. of observations 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
 
Note to Table 3.2: The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the firms announcing a cross-border 
acquisition computed over a 12-month event window (i.e. from month 0 to month +12 following the announcement) using 
market adjustment model. The measures of the amount and range of international experience and the national diversity index 
are mean-centred. Acquiring-firm-specific control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same 
way as in Table 3.1. All the regressions are estimated as multilevel regression models taking into account the target country 
where the focal acquisition took place, the acquiring firm’s industry, and the acquiring firm’s identity. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on assets. 
 Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2E 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience    -0.54 -4.03**     -0.36 -1.76+ 
Amount of int’l experience2   0.11 6.18**     0.11 5.36** 
Range of int’l experience     -2.71 -2.99**   -1.86 -1.38 
Range of int’l experience2     1.15 2.28*   0.34 0.56 
National diversity       0.09 0.04 2.31 1.09 
National diversity2       -9.94 -1.08 -22.69 -2.44* 
Lagged ROA 0.14 5.94** 0.13 5.60** 0.14 5.85** 0.14 5.91** 0.12 5.41** 
Cash 0.62 1.06 0.43 0.74 0.59 1.01 0.66 1.12 0.54 0.93 
Stock -10.89 -6.19** -10.48 -6.03** -10.48 -5.96** -10.87 -6.18** -10.20 -5.87** 
Full acquisition 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.46 
Transaction value -0.13 -0.90 -0.11 -0.74 -0.12 -0.80 -0.14 -0.93 -0.11 -0.77 
Diversifying acquisition -0.49 -0.81 -0.47 -0.79 -0.46 -0.75 -0.49 -0.81 -0.44 -0.74 
Firm size 0.20 0.65 0.27 0.86 0.36 1.16 0.21 0.67 0.30 0.97 
TMT size -0.66 -2.47* -0.46 -1.73† -0.65 -2.45* -0.68 -2.49* -0.55 -2.03* 
Cultural differences 0.10 0.49 0.13 0.63 0.11 0.52 0.11 0.53 0.15 0.74 
Country risk -5.52 -1.45 -4.73 -1.27 -5.11 -1.34 -5.61 -1.48 -4.36 -1.17 
GDP per capita -0.03 -0.62 -0.02 -0.53 -0.02 -0.52 -0.03 -0.67 -0.03 -0.57 
Intercept and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:      
- Target country level 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.14 
- Acquirer industry 
level 
7.75 6.68 6.79 7.79 6.45 
- Acquiring firm level 196.04 203.73 196.11 197.59 206.25 
- Residual 73.19 70.50 72.72 72.97 69.90 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 590.01** χ2(3) = 616.28** χ2(3) = 591.90** χ2(3) = 587.34** χ2(3) = 608.44** 
Model test χ2(20) = 211.45** χ2(22) = 252.15** χ2(22) = 221.75** χ2(22) = 212.63** χ2(26) = 261.00** 
No. of acquiring firms 413 413 413 413 413 
No. of observations 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 
 
Note to Table 3.3: The dependent variable is ROA measured in the year following the acquisition announcement, i.e. t + 1. 
The measures of the amount and range of international experience and the national diversity index are mean-centred. Lagged 
ROA is measured in the year preceding the acquisition announcement, i.e. t - 1. Acquiring-firm-specific control variables are 
lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 3.1. All the regressions are estimated as multilevel 
regression models taking into account the target country where the focal acquisition took place, the acquiring firm’s industry, 
and the acquiring firm’s identity. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on equity. 
 Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C Model 3D Model 3E 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience    -0.89 -1.40         0.43 0.43 
Amount of int’l experience2   0.35 4.22**      0.31 3.14** 
Range of int’l experience     -7.98 -1.89+   -13.51 -2.10* 
Range of int’l experience2     5.68 2.24*   5.18 1.68+ 
National diversity        13.30 1.32 19.10 1.79+ 
National diversity2        -84.91 -1.76+ -139.43 -2.84** 
Lagged ROE 0.02 0.87 0.02 1.07 0.02 0.82 0.02 1.06 0.03 1.32 
Cash 2.68 0.84 2.14 0.67 2.54 0.80 3.08 0.96 2.76 0.87 
Stock -41.87 -4.70** -40.95 -4.62** -40.34 -4.52** -41.62 -4.68** -38.64 -4.35** 
Full acquisition 1.00 0.27 1.30 0.36 0.68 0.19 1.21 0.33 1.31 0.36 
Transaction value -0.45 -0.57 -0.33 -0.42 -0.36 -0.46 -0.48 -0.60 -0.28 -0.35 
Diversifying acquisition 2.10 0.64 2.40 0.73 2.27 0.69 2.12 0.65 2.69 0.83 
Firm size 0.84 0.69 0.58 0.46 1.29 1.03 0.77 0.63 0.68 0.54 
TMT size 0.29 0.22 1.10 0.83 0.45 0.34 -0.15 -0.11 0.50 0.37 
Cultural differences 0.36 0.30 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.41 0.34 0.50 0.41 
Country risk -12.42 -0.60 -10.07 -0.48 -12.15 -0.58 -12.16 -0.58 -8.18 -0.40 
GDP per capita 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.28 
Intercept and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:      
- Target country level 13.94 14.37 14.31 13.02 12.75 
- Acquirer industry 
level 
69.68 57.16 62.78 69.28 57.92 
- Acquiring firm level 2220.63 2265.72 2182.49 2216.37 2246.94 
- Residual 2331.41 2291.20 2330.92 2327.12 2275.54 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 373.94** χ2(3) = 343.17** χ2(3) = 327.26** χ2(3) = 339.60** χ2(3) = 338.22** 
Model test χ2(20) = 167.51** χ2(22) = 189.15** χ2(22) = 173.46** χ2(22) = 171.30** χ2(26) = 202.96** 
No. of acquiring firms 427 427 427 427 427 
No. of observations 1681 1681 1681 1681 1681 
 
Note to Table 3.4: The dependent variable is ROE measured in the year following the acquisition announcement, i.e. t + 1. 
The measures of the amount and range of international experience and the national diversity index are mean-centred. Lagged 
ROE is measured in the year preceding the acquisition announcement, i.e. t - 1. Acquiring-firm-specific control variables are 
lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 3.1. All the regressions are estimated as multilevel 
regression models taking into account the target country where the focal acquisition took place, the acquiring firm’s industry, 
and the acquiring firm’s identity.  +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix: Results of robustness tests 
Table 3.5: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on assets with prior firm experience as additional control. 
  Model 4B Model 4C Model 4D 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience  -0.47 -3.63**       
Amount of int’l experience2 0.10 5.81**       
Range of int’l experience    -2.08 -2.36*    
Range of int’l experience2    1.43 2.79**    
National diversity       -0.67 -0.34 
National diversity2         -8.75 -0.95 
Lagged ROA 0.14 6.06** 0.14 6.35** 0.15 6.43** 
Cash 0.31 0.74 0.46 0.81 0.47 0.83 
Stock -13.11 -7.57** -13.29 -7.59** -13.63 -7.79** 
Full acquisition -0.04 -0.07 0.13 0.20 -0.06 -0.09 
Transaction value -0.07 -0.49 -0.09 -0.60 -0.09 -0.66 
Diversifying acquisition -0.51 -0.90 -0.49 -0.84 -0.51 -0.88 
Firm size 0.50 1.56 0.51 1.61 0.38 1.21 
TMT size -0.34 -1.31 -0.49 -1.91+ -0.52 -1.96+ 
Cultural differences 0.09 0.45 0.08 0.39 0.08 0.44 
Country risk -3.33 -0.94 -3.83 -1.06 -4.09 -1.13 
GDP per capita -0.02 -0.38 -0.01 -0.28 -0.02 -0.40 
Prior firm acquisition 
experience -0.16 -3.34
**
 -0.16 -3.10** -0.14 -2.88** 
Prior firm acquisition 
experience2 6.13*10
-4
 3.64** 5.82*10-4 3.38** 5.36*10-4 3.14** 
Intercept and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:       
-          Target country level 8.12*10
-7
 3.08*10-6 7.99*10-7 
-          Acquirer industry level 7.22 8.2 7.79 
-          Acquiring firm level 188.30 184.84 197.59 
-          Residual 58.10 59.96 72.97 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 605.47** χ2(3) = 583.68** χ2(3) = 580.50** 
Model test χ2(24) = 285.67** χ2(24) = 258.94** χ2(24) = 249.99** 
No. of acquiring firms 399 399 399 
No. of observations 1513 1513 1513 
 
Note to Table 3.5: Replicates Table 3.3 above, except 5-year firm prior-experience added as additional control. +, *, and ** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on equity with prior firm experience as additional control. 
  Model 5B Model 5C Model 5D 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience  -0.98 -1.58       
Amount of int’l experience2 0.25 3.07**       
Range of int’l experience    -9.39 -2.25*    
Range of int’l experience2    6.27 2.51*    
National diversity       14.78 1.56 
National diversity2         -76.20 -1.67+ 
Lagged ROE 0.02 0.86 0.01 0.65 0.02 0.88 
Cash -1.22 -0.43 -0.91 -0.32 -0.48 -0.17 
Stock -46.25 -5.48** -45.89 -5.42** -47.30 -5.60** 
Full acquisition 1.45 0.43 1.06 0.32 1.53 0.46 
Transaction value 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.30 0.15 0.22 
Diversifying acquisition 0.96 0.33 1.07 0.37 0.97 0.33 
Firm size 1.67 1.22 1.99 1.47 1.26 0.94 
TMT size 0.12 0.10 0.27 -0.21 -0.88 -0.69 
Cultural differences 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.73 
Country risk -9.54 -0.51 8.58 0.46 8.23 0.44 
GDP per capita 0.27 1.17 0.30 1.26 0.28 1.21 
Prior firm acquisition 
experience -0.67 -2.69
*
 -0.65 -2.59* -0.58 -2.31* 
Prior firm acquisition 
experience2 0.002 2.76
*
 0.002 2.67* 0.002 2.37* 
Intercept and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:       
-          Target country level 9.38 10.85 9.27 
-          Acquirer industry level 75.81 88.30 90.77 
-          Acquiring firm level 3005.90 2961.62 3002.79 
-          Residual 1554.88 1562.20 1561.74 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 489.52** χ2(3) = 484.32** χ2(3) = 490.97** 
Model test χ2(24) = 174.75** χ2(24) = 172.06** χ2(24) = 168.30** 
No. of acquiring firms 413 413 413 
No. of observations 1525 1525 1525 
 
Note to Table 3.6: Replicates Table 3.4 above, except 5-year firm prior-experience added as additional control. +, *, and ** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Multilevel regressions models explaining influence of the acquirer’s TMT target country experience on one-year 
post-announcement BHARs, ROA and ROE respectively. 
  Model 6-BHAR Model 7-ROA Model 8-ROE 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of target country 
experience  -0.006 -0.73 -0.534 -2.38
*
 -2.11 -1.70+ 
Amount of target country 
experience2 0.0003 0.35 0.027 1.06 0.222 1.60 
Lagged ROA     0.139 5.99**     
Lagged ROE       0.019 0.85 
Cash 0.030 1.44 0.651 1.10 2.53 0.79 
Stock -0.031 -0.55 -10.64 -6.05** -41.96 -4.71** 
Full acquisition -0.024 -0.98 0.160 0.23 1.07 0.29 
Transaction value 0.001 0.27 -0.107 -0.73 -0.365 -0.46 
Diversifying acquisition -0.008 -0.38 -0.495 -0.81 2.20 0.67 
Firm size 0.007 1.13 0.197 0.65 0.818 0.68 
TMT size -0.611 -1.91+ -1.41 -2.30+ 0.458 0.34 
Cultural differences -0.001 -0.14 0.019 0.09 0.243 0.20 
Country risk 0.11 0.83 -5.31 -1.43 -12.24 -0.59 
GDP per capita 0.0005 0.34 -0.020 -0.46 0.090 0.36 
Intercept and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:       
-          Target country level 4.30*10-9 2.55*10-6 8.45 
-          Acquirer industry 
level 0.001 7.45 69.01 
-          Acquiring firm level 0.039 196.79 2216.54 
-          Residual 0.113 72.76 2331.00 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 81.39** χ2(3) = 590.93** χ2(3) = 329.88** 
Model test χ2(21) = 64.59** χ2(22) = 223.27** χ2(22) = 170.67** 
No. of acquiring firms 428 413 427 
No. of observations 1697 1666 1681 
 
Note to Table 3.7: The dependent variable in each model is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the firms announcing a cross-
border acquisition computed over a 12-month event window, ROA and ROE respectively, the latter two are measured in the 
year following the acquisition announcement, i.e. t + 1. The measure of TMT proxy: average years of target country experience 
is mean-centred. Lagged ROA and ROE are measured in the year preceding the acquisition announcement, i.e. t - 1. Acquiring-
firm-specific control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 3.1. All the 
regressions are estimated as multilevel regression models taking into account the target country where the focal acquisition 
took place, the acquiring firm’s industry, and the acquiring firm’s identity. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on assets with target’s listing status as additional control. 
  Model 9B Model 9C Model 9D 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience  -0.543 -4.03**       
Amount of int’l experience2 0.105 6.12**       
Range of int’l experience    -2.70 -2.98**    
Range of int’l experience2    1.17 2.31*    
National diversity       0.089 0.04 
National diversity2         -9.79 -1.07 
Lagged ROA 0.13 5.64** 0.14 5.90** 0.14 5.96** 
Cash 0.421 0.72 0.58 0.99 0.66 1.10 
Stock -10.41 -5.99** -10.39 -5.90** -10.78 -6.13** 
Full acquisition 0.078 0.11 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.01 
Transaction value -0.09 -0.61 -0.09 -0.59 -0.11 -0.72 
Diversifying acquisition -0.448 -0.74 -0.428 -0.70 -0.46 -0.76 
Firm size 0.269 0.86 0.36 1.16 0.21 0.68 
TMT size -0.451 -1.70+ -0.64 -2.40* -0.66 -2.45* 
Cultural differences 0.112 0.53 0.086 0.40 0.09 0.41 
Country risk -4.85 -1.29 -5.30 -1.39 -5.80 -1.52 
GDP per capita -0.025 -0.55 -0.026 -0.55 -0.032 -0.70 
Private target -0.355 -0.63 -0.383 -0.67 -0.37 -0.65 
Listed target  -0.793 -0.89 -1.101 -1.22 -1.09 -1.21 
Intercept and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:       
-          Target country level 0.438 0.48 0.467 
-          Acquirer industry level 2.559 2.581 2.763 
-          Acquiring firm level 14.268 14.003 14.05 
-          Residual 8.39 8.52 8.54 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 616.94** χ2(3) = 593.39** χ2(3) = 588.09** 
Model test χ2(24) = 253.30** χ2(24) = 223.58** χ2(24) = 214.42** 
No. of acquiring firms 413 413 413 
No. of observations 1666 1666 1666 
Note to Table 3.8: Replicates Table 3.3, except that additional control added here is target listing status. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Multilevel regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on post-
announcement return on equity with target’s listing status as additional control. 
  Model 10B Model 10C Model 10D 
Variable Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Amount of int’l experience  -0.87 -1.37       
Amount of int’l experience2 0.35 4.13**       
Range of int’l experience    -7.78 -1.85+    
Range of int’l experience2    5.68 2.24*    
National diversity       13.20 1.31 
National diversity2         -83.89 -1.74+ 
Lagged ROE 0.03 1.20 0.02 0.96 0.03 1.19 
Cash 1.82 0.57 2.21 0.69 2.75 0.86 
Stock -40.24 -4.54** -39.57 -4.44** -40.81 -4.59** 
Full acquisition -0.39 -0.10 -1.17 -0.31 -0.66 -0.17 
Transaction value -0.21 -0.26 -0.21 -0.26 -0.32 -0.39 
Diversifying acquisition 2.67 0.82 2.56 0.78 2.42 0.74 
Firm size 0.52 0.41 1.20 0.96 0.71 0.58 
TMT size 1.16 0.87 0.54 0.41 -0.07 -0.05 
Cultural differences 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09 
Country risk -10.40 -0.50 -12.74 -0.61 -12.70 -0.61 
GDP per capita 0.08 0.30 0.07 0.29 0.06 0.25 
Private target -5.84 -1.90+ -6.04 -1.95+ -6.00 -1.94+ 
Listed target  -8.42 -1.71+ -9.42 -1.91+ -9.49 -1.92+ 
Intercept and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
Variance of random effects:       
-          Target country level 3.75 3.78 3.60 
-          Acquirer industry level 7.37 7.78 8.19 
-          Acquiring firm level 47.70 46.87 47.20 
-          Residual 47.76 48.15 48.12 
LR test vs. linear regression χ2(3) = 345.92** χ2(3) = 331.04** χ2(3) = 342.20** 
Model test χ2(24) = 194.98** χ2(24) = 179.98** χ2(24) = 177.84** 
No. of acquiring firms 427 427 427 
No. of observations 1681 1681 1681 
Note to Table 3.9: Replicates Table 3.4, except that additional control added here is target listing status. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.10: using CTAR-based models of pairwise comparisons of 12-month post-announcement acquisition alphas of acquirer portfolios of absence vs. low; and low vs. high categorisations of 
each of the TMT determinants of depth, breadth and Blau index of national diversity. 
 
TMT proxy(ies) categories Fama-French (1993) 
alpha Difference  
Carhart (1997) 
alpha Difference  
No  amount of int’l experience -0.002   -0.002   
  (-0.55) 0.0005 (-0.74) 0.003 
Low  amount of int’l experience -0.001 (0.12) 0.0001 (0.50) 
  
(-0.42) 0.002 (0.06) 0.001 
High amount of int’l experience 0.0012 (0.71) 0.0014 (0.38) 
  (0.64)   (0.74)   
No  range of int’l experience -0.0007   -0.00072   
  (-0.24) -0.0002 (-0.23) 0.00001 
Low range of int’l experience -0.0009 (-0.06) -0.0006 (0.01) 
  (-0.50) 0.0012 (-0.37) 0.0014 
High  range of int’l experience 0.0003 (0.42) 0.0007 (0.47) 
  (0.13)   (0.30)   
Absence of foreigners -0.0002   0.00016   
  (-0.12) -0.0004 (0.08) -0.0003 
Low national diversity -0.0006 (-0.12) -0.0001 (-0.10) 
  (-0.26) 0.0015 (-0.06) 0.0008 
High national diversity 0.0009 (0.42) 0.0007 (0.22) 
  (0.32)   (0.25)   
 
Note to Table 3.10: The table shows differences in the long-run alpha between each pair of partitioned portfolios (as mentioned above) of acquiring firms based on three categories (i.e. absence, 
low and high) of each of the TMT proxies. The high and low classifications of the respective TMT proxies are based on above-median and below median presence respectively. The difference 
between each pair of portfolio alpha (Gregory et al. 2010) is tested using a binary variable. For example, the binary variable takes the value of one for low and zero for absence for the portfolio 
pair absence vs. low TMT variable. Similarly for the portfolio pair high vs. low TMT variables, the binary variable takes the value of one for high and zero for low. The figures reported in 
parentheses below each alpha estimate as well as the coefficient of difference in alphas, is the respective t-statistic. No coefficient is significant. 
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Chapter 4: TMT international orientation and effective choice of payment mode 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Extant literature considers payment methods7 in M&As as an important determinant affecting 
the returns to the acquiring firm shareholders (see Andrade et al., 2001; and Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008; for reviews) with a rather limited vision on how the mode of payments is 
decided upon in M&A transactions. Studies have generally examined different motivations 
behind the use of each payment method. The focus was on how each payment option impacted 
on the concerns of information asymmetry, predominantly from the viewpoint of returns of 
acquiring firms in domestic context. However, none of these studies have considered the 
strategic role of the directors of acquiring firms, including their TMTs as decision-makers. We 
strive to fill this gap by examining how these corporate managers at the helm of decision-
making with their globally-oriented mind set, act to choose a payment method over other 
options.  
 
In other words, the fundamental question which we attempt to explore in this study is that if 
we have the so-called ‘internationally-oriented’ executives, can we expect them to choose 
payment options tailored to mitigate these risks and uncertainties? This is because cross-
country acquisitions present firms with unique challenges in comparison to their domestic 
counterparts due to additional elements of uncertainty; therefore, high levels of risk are 
customary. Also, the ambiguous information environment involved with these choices is more 
likely to impart more latitude of action to the top executives by virtue of their power and 
position in their firms. Hence, expansion decisions under higher uncertainty are not only more 
difficult to make, but are also bound to involve greater discretion of the TMTs of acquiring 
firms. With such a research setting we aim to scrutinize how such payment preferences by 
internationally oriented bidder TMTs may effectively alleviate the risk of information 
asymmetry in these extreme situations amidst the plethora of uncertainties in the global market 
for corporate control.  
 
                                                          
7
 All the terms ‘payment methods’, ‘mode of payment’, ‘medium of exchange’, etc. used throughout this chapter 
interchangeably have the same connotation.  
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Prior IB research has acknowledged that features like, the international career experience of 
executives, mix of nationalities represented at the board level in general contribute to the so-
called TMT ‘international orientation’, which is a crucial factor in  strategic decision-making, 
including acquisitions across borders (Hermann & Datta, 2005; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; etc.). 
Such views on TMTs are, however, scarce in corporate finance literature, which primarily 
studies CEO roles in strategic decisions in offering a rather restricted approach of behavioural 
biases of managers (Roll, 1986, Malmendier & Tate, 2008; etc.). While CEOs are perhaps the 
most visible decision-makers in companies, it is unlikely that they determine major strategic 
decisions such as international acquisitions entirely on their own. Therefore, it follows that 
internationally-oriented managers are likely to be capable of making better choices with respect 
to foreign hosts (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) by virtue of their 
superior knowledge about diverse cultural and institutional environments, business practices, 
in addition to market-specific expertise and connections (Hermann & Datta, 2006). Such 
insight could play a significant role in augmenting overall cognitive diversity in their teams, 
thereby increasing the range and innovation of strategic alternatives (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 
2011). Therefore, internationally-oriented TMTs can be projected to be better-equipped to deal 
with information asymmetries arising in cross-border M&As.  
 
However, this established notion is contradicted not only by the paucity of empirical support, 
but also by conflicting theories in both corporate finance and some ‘upper echelon’ studies on 
executive cognitions and resulting biases, together with the documented findings. Particularly, 
these researches indicated that international wisdom as aforementioned, may 
disproportionately inflate top executives’ core self-evaluations. Thus, hubris or distorted 
notions of superior capability to make better-informed choices, attributed to past successes 
(Roll, 1986; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Billet & Qian, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2008) might 
arise. This could lead to potentially poor judgement about the risk profile of a foreign deal, 
inducing TMT overconfidence, particularly when extreme uncertainty is coupled with 
enormous latitude of action (Finkelstein et al., 2008). Hence, we cannot ordinarily count on 
international experience and diversity in bidding firm TMTs to enable them to make competent 
choices. So a key question arises: when and what kind of ‘international orientation’ can be 
optimal for TMTs of internationalizing firms to make payment choices that facilitate mitigation 
of extreme information asymmetry in the global market? 
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Akerlof’s (1970) ‘Market for Lemons’ setting is likely to be more pronounced in the 
international context, where ascertaining the true worth of a foreign target can be quite 
challenging for a bidding firm. This problem, while valuing a potential host firm is essentially 
more acute not only for those bidders having no or little familiarity with the global market, but 
also for the multinational firms. This is because considerable uncertainties may manifest 
themselves in the international market for corporate control (Reuer, Shenkar & Raggozzino, 
2004). Hence, prior studies advocated the importance of experience and learning in acquisitions 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Haleblian et al., 2009; Aktas et al., 2013). However, corporate 
finance studies are yet to recognise the TMT role, whilst IB papers have recently acknowledged 
the fact that much of this experience and learning occurs at the TMT level of a firm (Nadolska 
& Barkema, 2014). We propose to extend this view by hypothesizing when and at what levels 
TMT international exposure and diversity can prove to be advantageous in making payment 
choices in order to alleviate information asymmetry at extreme levels.  
 
Specifically we conjecture that higher the riskiness of a cross-country acquisition, the greater 
is the possibility of choosing pure cash or a combination of cash, stock, etc. relative to pure 
stock swaps. This is because in cross-country acquisitions with more intense information 
asymmetry, either cash or mixed payments are feasibly the more preferred medium in 
comparison to pure stock exchange (Reuer et al., 2004; Sudarsanam, 2010). Relying on this 
fundamental assumption, we synthesise the intuitions from different areas namely, corporate 
finance, IB and ‘upper echelon’ research to develop our hypotheses on behavioural aspects of 
acquirer TMTs. Our objective here is to understand how such behaviour shaped by their 
observable characteristics, may influence the preference for payment mode in respect of a 
foreign host. Our reasoning is influenced by the arguments in studies by Haleblian & 
Finkelstein (1999) and Aktas, et al. (2013), etc. We combined various insights from these 
divergent streams to propose a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between the aspects of TMT 
international orientation and payment choice under severe conditions of environmental 
uncertainties predominant in cross-country deals. Our rationale is that initial levels of 
international orientations in bidder TMTs could bring about unwarranted optimism and 
confidence, whilst dealing with an extremely risky foreign target. Given the high discretion 
available in arriving at a choice in such a case with its inherent unpredictability could prompt 
improper choices of payment currencies. However, as higher levels of such orientations take 
root with time, TMTs tend to become more mature in making appropriate choices that would 
serve to diminish risks and uncertainties in a more uncertain cross-border setting. In other 
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words, we surmise that a higher level of TMT ‘international orientation’ is likely to strike a 
balance between confidence and competence, leading to an efficient payment choice, i.e. a 
higher likelihood of cash and/or mixed mode of payment relative to stock. 
 
Our theoretical conjectures were upheld when empirically tested with public UK bidding firms 
opting for internationalization. A sample of 1708 cross-country deals announced by 429 UK 
acquiring firms during a period from 1999 until 2008 was used for our analysis. Our results 
demonstrated a significant non-linear association of overall international experience in terms 
of amount and range as well as nationality mix in TMTs with the probability of opting for cash 
only or mix of cash, stock, etc. payments relative to stock exchanges. These findings generally 
indicate that below a certain threshold, international orientation is likely to be inaptly 
transferred; specifically when a deal entails intense information asymmetry, thereby resulting 
into an inappropriate choice of payment method, i.e. a lower probability of choosing cash 
and/or mixed payment. 
 
In addition to the contributions to the existing literature highlighted in Chapter 1, this chapter 
promotes a comprehensive view of TMT ‘international orientation’. Particularly, we attempt 
to resolve the puzzle – how apparent excessive optimism may translate into optimality with 
respect to payment choice in foreign acquisitions, when the level of risk and uncertainties in 
the global market is severe. Further, this chapter extends prior research in respect of the 
following:  
(1) Extant IB research tended to take a positive view of the observable indicators of 
‘international orientation’ as facilitators of international diversification (e.g. Herrmann & 
Datta, 2005) or expansion decisions across borders (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & 
Trojanowski, 2014). We complement these positive interpretations by: (a) accounting for the 
perceived negative aspects of TMT international orientation, (b) proposing more nuanced 
indicators of TMT ‘international orientation’ employing both amount (depth) and range 
(breadth) of international experience, in addition to TMT national diversity; and (c) relating 
them to the likelihood of opting for cash or mixed forms of payment in relation to using stocks.  
(2) While most prior studies documenting ‘hubris’ or overconfidence effects, focus on CEOs 
only (Roll, 1986; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008, etc.); we argue 
that such effects can manifest in the overall TMT. Specifically, we present a holistic range of 
TMT indicators of (over)confidence to relate payment preferences amidst complexities 
involved in internationalization decisions. Prior researches have not considered such 
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preferences of mode of payment based on TMT-level decision-making attributable to their 
‘international orientations’.  
(3) Finally, in a marked departure from the existing studies on payment modes, we consider 
the plausible role of ‘international orientation’ of acquirer TMTs on mitigation of 
environmental concerns of risk and uncertainties, whilst affecting preferences of payment 
modes by such TMTs.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Beginning with the hypotheses on payment modes, 
we briefly review the related extant literature. The subsequent sections develops the research 
hypotheses based on the motivating theories discussed in the first section, followed by the 
research design adopted and description of how the sample had been constructed. Thereafter, 
we analyze the empirical findings from tests of our proposed hypotheses. The concluding 
section discusses the implications and the limitations of this chapter whilst making some 
suggestions for future research. 
 
4.2 Motivation and theoretical background 
A number of studies show that the choice of exchange medium could be influenced by certain 
considerations as hypothesized in existing literature. We summarise them in the following 
premises: 
 
The problem of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970) is widespread between the acquiring 
and the target firms in respect of their private values, which are known only to them. Such 
asymmetric information in M&As has thus, predominantly been modelled to affect the bidders’ 
options to pay for their targets (e.g., Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino & 
Heinkel, 1990; etc.) by either cash or equity or a combination of both. This leads to the two 
below-mentioned theories: 
 
(a) Risk-sharing hypothesis: Uncertainty regarding a target company can create difficulty in its 
proper valuation. To mitigate this, a bidder may offer to the target its own stock as payment 
consideration in order to share the risk (Hansen, 1987) of being adversely affected when the 
target’s value turns out to be lower than estimation. In a cash offer on the other hand, the bidder 
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retains control with no dilution in shareholding, but at the expense of mis-valuation of its target 
and therefore, becomes exposed to the risk of overpayment.  
 
(b) Signalling & mis-valuation hypotheses: The payment decision by such a firm is construed 
as a signal to the participants in the market with respect to its own value; hence interrelated to 
each other. So, a cash offer by an acquirer to a target firm signals to the market that the former 
is undervalued, hence interpreted as ‘good news’. Moreover, it also signals the target valuation 
that its prospects to the bidder are good; thus, alleviates information asymmetry in respect of 
the target. For instance, an offer of cash would signify a high valuation of the proposed target 
and therefore, is likely to thwart competition from other potential bidders (Fishman, 1989). The 
contrary is likely to be signalled in the case of an offer of stock. 
Market mis-valuation of the stock of a firm proposed by Myers & Majluf (1984) using a 
theoretical framework and developed later by Hansen (1987), conjectured that a bidding firm 
would prefer to pay using an equity swap for its acquisition, if overvalued. This is referred as 
overvaluation hypothesis. Contrarily, if the firm perceives itself to be undervalued, it would 
use cash instead.  
 
While (a) and (b) are collectively grouped under ‘information-content’ hypothesis by 
Chatterjee & Kuenzi (2001), they also propose an Investment opportunity hypothesis 
(conceptualised by Martin, 1996). They proposed that acquisitions financed with exchange of 
acquirers’ equity could be viewed as profitable for these firms having positive net present value 
investment prospects. Put differently, growth opportunities of a firm would drive the medium 
of exchange in corporate takeovers which was tested by Martin (1996). Assuming an implicit 
similarity between the rationales behind choice of two primary sources of financing, i.e., debts 
and equity; and payment method employed for acquisitions, he found empirical support for this 
conjecture. Thus, Martin (1996) evidenced that stock payment signified greater investment 
opportunities in respect of the pre-acquisition performance and stock run-ups experienced by 
the acquiring firms in his sample.  
 
(c) Free cash flow hypothesis: Jensen (1986) put forward an ‘agency’ theory where excess cash 
could either benefit or cause detriment to the bidder firm shareholders, depending on the 
managerial incentives, inter alia. For example, his theory predicts that cash acquisitions 
financed with debt might reduce the agency costs of free cash and thus, garner higher gains to 
the acquiring firm. Alternatively, if these acquisitions represent a means of using free cash in 
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lieu of paying it out to the shareholders as dividends, etc., it would rather exacerbate the agency 
conflicts. Therefore, such corporate strategies induced by self-interested executives (e.g. 
empire building) would tend to be value-destructive.  
 
4.3 Empirical evidence in prior literature 
The role of ‘medium of exchange’ or ‘method of payment’ affecting returns to shareholders 
has been a widely researched topic in M&As (see for example, Travlos, 1987). The empirical 
evidences and analyses to this effect are all based on either the information asymmetry 
framework of Myers & Majluf (1984) or the cash flow model by Jensen (1986). The seminal 
paper by Travlos (1987) brought into light the relationship between payment mode and 
abnormal returns of bidders upon announcement of acquisitions. He found over a period from 
1972 until 1981 that the abnormal returns for an announcement window of 2-days (-1, 0) for 
the US acquiring firms using own-equity-swaps were significantly negative, although for those 
firms acquiring with cash, returns were positive but insignificant. While there has been 
confounding empirical evidence on acquiring firm returns, studies looking into the value 
creation impact of payment mediums in M&As, have documented negative announcement 
returns to stock-paying acquirers. This effect was found to be more pronounced in cases of 
public targets (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2007). 
 
In essence similar findings were reported in the works of Travlos & Papaioannou (1991), and 
Wansley, Lane & Yang (1987, but with different event announcement windows and time 
periods. Both these studies deal with US acquiring companies. For instance, the latter showed 
statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for those bidder 
companies which offered cash payment to their targets. A work by Eckbo et al. (1990) 
modelled an optimal mix of cash and equity as payment consideration, which could be 
determined by the respective value information of acquirers and targets. Eckbo et al. (1990) 
further demonstrated that in equilibrium, structure of such offer made would reveal to a target 
the true post-acquisition value of its acquiring firm; such firm-value being monotonically 
increasing and convex in the fraction of cash payment. However, their theoretical predictions 
could not be upheld in their empirical analysis with Canadian firms; although they found 
significantly positive announcement-month abnormal returns to acquirers which were highest 
for a mix of cash and stock paid deals. The paper on US bidders by Brown & Ryngaert (1991) 
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showed contradictory evidence to that of Eckbo et al. (1990). Examining a sample of US firms 
acquiring privately-held targets, Chang (1998) reported completely divergent results where 
acquirers offering common stock as the exchange method, earned significantly positive 
abnormal returns; notwithstanding that cash acquirers failed, i.e. they had zero abnormal 
returns. He ascribed this profitability for the former group of acquirers to a positive correlation 
between the new block-holder created by virtue of equity exchange as well as the amount of 
such issue with their returns, revealing likely effective monitoring by large shareholders. 
Nonetheless, the results from Chang’s analysis with respect to acquisition of public targets with 
common stock, were along the same lines as Travlos (1987). The study of UK bidding firms 
by Draper & Paudyal (1999) also echoed Travlos’s (1987) findings that those firms doing a 
stock swap for their targets were worse-off than their counterparts exchanging cash. While the 
latter failed to generate any significant abnormal returns, that for the former group turned out 
to be significantly negative. All the papers discussed in this paragraph therefore, generally 
supported the key findings by Travlos (1987), representing empirical evidence of the 
information asymmetry hypothesis reflected through choice of payment medium.  
 
Some of the more recent studies investigating the implications of the different methods of 
payments on returns to bidding firms are namely, Chatterjee & Kuenzi (2001); Fuller et al., 
(2002); Shleifer & Vishny (2003); Officer, Poulsen & Stegemoller (2009); Chemmanur, 
Paeglis & Simonyan (2009); Gregory & Bi (2011); etc. Essentially, all these studies 
documented significantly higher gains from acquisitions with common stock; this finding by 
both the studies by Fuller et al. (2002) and Officer et al. (2009), was primarily with respect to 
privately-held and/or ‘difficult-to-value’ targets. Therefore, studies by both Fuller et al. (2002) 
and Officer et al. (2009) principally upheld the predictions of information asymmetry 
hypothesis. Chatterjee & Kuenzi (2001) however, did not find enough support for their 
investment opportunity hypothesis. The papers reviewed until now, looked at how cash or 
equity as exchange medium affected the announcement returns to acquirers. Thus, all of these 
indirectly inferred on how information asymmetry pertaining to either the acquirer or the target, 
might drive such decision making on acquiring firm’s mode of payment.  
 
The theoretical model proposed by Shleifer & Vishny (2003) implied that stock market 
valuations are one of the main drivers for M&As; positing adverse returns for stock acquirers, 
but favourable returns for cash acquirers in the longer term. They contended that stock-financed 
acquisitions were positively associated with high stock valuation (at an aggregate or industry 
112 
 
level), while the contrary was applicable for cash-financed ones. Further, they associated 
managerial entrenchment in the form of earnings manipulation, insider trading etc. with firms 
using stock as exchange methods for their targets. The predictions of signalling hypothesis 
however, were contradicted in the study by Goergen & Renneboog (2004) for European 
M&As, where stock bids seemed to be more favourably accepted by the market. The study by 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) empirically examined how private information related to both US 
acquirers and their publicly-held targets interacted to influence the choice of cash or stock 
payment to targets by acquiring firms. They depicted a significantly higher propensity for 
overvalued acquirers to pay through equity exchange therefore, earning lower abnormal 
announcement returns. Finally, the findings by Gregory & Bi (2011) with a sample of bidders 
from the UK supported the predictions of Shleifer & Vishny (2003) that overvalued firms were 
more likely to use stock exchange for their targets, which also tended to be overvalued, but to 
a lesser extent than the acquirers.  Broadly categorised, all these studies also represented tests 
of the asymmetric information or ‘information-content’ hypothesis.  
 
These aforementioned studies generally do not analyse the impact of other factors which are 
likely to drive the choice of exchange medium in M&As. The paper on financing decision by 
Faccio & Masulis (2005) of bidding firms across Europe however, focused on determinants 
other than those hypothesized above. Basically, they looked into how the payment choice might 
impact on the control structure of bidders whilst affecting its financial condition, as an 
aftermath of such a decision; i.e. how the relative importance of these two factors determined 
choice of financing by European acquirers in respect of their targets. Their empirical evidence 
showed that both these elements in conjunction with deal features as well as specific acquirer 
and target characteristics interplayed affecting the finance decision by acquiring firms. For 
instance, their results show that acquiring firms were more likely to opt for cash exchange for 
their targets when control of a dominant holder was at stake, especially in cases of concentrated 
shareholdings of target firms. This was in line with the negative relationship of acquirers’ 
managerial ownership with their choice of using equity as mode of payment evidenced by other 
studies with US companies (e.g. Martin, 1996; etc.). Martynova & Renneboog (2009) however, 
did not solely look into payment modes in their sample of European bidding firms. Rather, this 
paper studied how the preference for varied sources of financing available to them, was 
impacted by the exchange mediums for their targets in line with their diverse motives of 
information asymmetry alleviation, retention of control, etc. Their results show that whilst cost 
of capital at both firm and country levels dominated financing preferences of bidders during 
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takeovers, mode of payments only affected such choices indirectly. More specifically, their 
analysis reveals that the financing and payment decisions were not influenced by a similar set 
of determinants. Faccio & Masulis (2005) on the other hand, dealt with a subset of financing 
decisions, viz. debt constraints and looked at the trade-off between the same and control 
preference of acquiring firms.  
 
To summarise, the empirical studies reviewed above are predominantly US-focused and tend 
to look at how the returns to the bidding firms’ are affected due to varied modes of payments 
in M&As, with just a few studies (e.g., Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2009) relating financing decisions with payment methods. Moreover, these studies considered 
the ‘information asymmetry’ theory primarily from the standpoint of bidder firms in a domestic 
context, whilst we examine payment mode preferences in a cross-country setting. 
 
4.4 Risk and uncertainty in international deals 
In international acquisitions, the range of sources of uncertainties may inter alia, be either at 
the host country-level (e.g. economic, social and political factors) or at the target firm-level 
(e.g., new product/initial phase of business with less reliable data, higher proportion of 
intangible assets; see Officer et al. (2009) for example), or simply include a combination of 
both levels. Further, the bidder firm could suffer also from an inherent ‘liability of foreignness’ 
(Zaheer; 1995) ascribable to inexperience with the culture and institutional setup of its host. 
All such situations make cross-border corporate control market similar to ‘market for lemons’ 
(Akerlof, 1970) where associated problems of ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ are 
severe. Therefore, alleviation of information asymmetry is particularly important, when a 
substantial investment choice is likely in the form of a foreign acquisition and/or when 
prospects of credible evaluation of target resources look impaired. In this context, host country 
risk and cultural differences amongst nations (e.g. Barkema et al., 1996; Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) represent two of the most frequently referred to aspects that 
could impede the due diligence process carried out by an acquirer in valuing its prospective 
foreign host.   
 
According to Miller (1992) a common source of uncertainty conventionally recognized, is the 
risk of the country where the prospective host firm is located. The factors encompassing host 
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country risk could include its economic and social standards, capital market and regulatory 
framework and governmental norms. All of these interact to generate a climate conducive to 
business operations; e.g. the purchasing power of consumers in a country would determine 
profitability of its product market which in turn would pave the way for foreign firms looking 
for greener pastures. Moreover, the presence of skilled low-cost labor, a well-developed 
infrastructure and a congenial business climate would make it an attractive prospect for foreign 
acquirers. On the other hand, a hostile political environment, poor infrastructure and adverse 
investor market would increase the risk of a potential host country, consequently making it an 
unfavorable destination for global expansion. 
 
In addition to target country risk, another customarily accepted environmental factor is the 
inherent disparities in fundamental cultural values (Hofstede, 2001) that exist among different 
nations. International business literature (e.g., Barkema et al., 1996; Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Zaheer, 1995) has identified ‘cultural differences’ to be a significant contributor to an uncertain 
business climate in potential target nations. For instance, with different business and ethical 
culture prevailing in a country, foreigners would face complex interactions with local 
population that might lead to recurrent misunderstanding and conflict, impeding normal 
business operations. Hence, bidders with foreign targets that are culturally wide apart are more 
likely to face serious post-merger integration issues.  
 
As outlined above, these specific uncertainties and their likely prevalence in the global setting, 
adds to the complexities in international deals, making them highly risky and therefore, less 
attractive to potential bidders. Hence, earlier studies in international business have suggested 
as a remedial measure, less commitment-involving alternatives in the form of joint ventures; 
or resorting to other contractual or institutional remedies like performance-based contingent 
payments in the form of earn-outs; etc. (Barkema et al., 1996; Reuer et al., 2004). An 
acquisition in a foreign host country may facilitate increased familiarity with local culture and 
institutions and markets.  Therefore, in the present era of globalization, a cross-country 
acquisition can be beneficial in the long-run. But, asymmetric information could heighten the 
acquiring firm’s risks of an excessive outlay in transaction costs associated with due diligence 
and negotiation of the proposed deal. Furthermore, there could be potential overpayment once 
the deal is finalised and last but not least, the integration could also pose a challenge. In such 
situations, the bidding firm would be more likely to prefer cash or a mixed medium of exchange 
so as to maximise its returns from the deal. On the one hand, it would attempt to garner the true 
115 
 
value from the transaction involving acquisition of the foreign targets. On the other hand, it 
would minimise the risk of failure in the face of potentially harmful effects of a myriad of 
factors, which includes, high levels of both country risk and cultural distance.  
 
4.5 Does international orientation of executives alleviate information asymmetry? 
As discussed in the Chapter 2, extant studies in both corporate finance8 and IB have taken a 
rather narrow viewpoint in considering the integral position of bidding firm boards, including 
their TMTs when looking at foreign acquisitions. These streams of literature unanimously 
underscore the significance of the decisive factors of acquisition namely, deal and firm 
characteristics, etc. However barring ‘upper echelons’ theory, focus on the collective role of 
TMT as key contributors to the deal-related decisions is rather scarce. Specifically, this latter 
theory highlights the behavioural aspects of TMTs as already reviewed in Chapter 2.   
 
We had also highlighted in Chapter 2 how the ‘upper echelons’ hypothesis posits that 
characteristic traits are influenced by idiosyncratic personalities as well as perceptions of 
individual executives are likely to be shaped up by diverse demographic factors such as 
education and experience, inter alia (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein et al., 2008). 
Hence, international experience of one or more TMT members in a firm as well as mix of 
nationalities therein, can act as a prime facilitator of superior decision-making by the entire 
team (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). Thus, all such observable 
characteristics of individual executives interact to develop the team ‘international orientation’ 
which is conjectured to provide the managerial team with the requisite skills and self-assurance 
to tackle the range of complexities involved in international acquisition deals. Therefore, in 
scenarios fraught with very high uncertainties due to greater cultural distance or more country 
risk, bidder TMTs’ collective cognition built up through their thus-acquired values and 
‘orientations’, contributes to the process of TMT decision-making (Finkelstein et al., 2008).  
 
It is intuitive that whilst dealing with unfamiliar and complex situations such as cross-border 
acquisitions (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007), inherent idiosyncrasies could bias accurate 
assessment of the prospective target. These possibilities have been discussed in detail in 
                                                          
8 Both these literatures have focussed on chief executive officers (CEOs) as one of the most powerful members of the TMTs 
(See for example, Jensen, 1986; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). 
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Chapter 2 and could lead to mere prior ‘international orientation’ being inadequate and 
unreliable. As mentioned before, the literature on corporate finance holds a restricted view, 
accounting for all these apparent irregularities in managerial behaviour arising from ‘agency’ 
problems (Jensen, 1986; 1988). However, it could be equally possible that these TMTs believe 
that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Doukas & 
Petmezas, 2007). As envisaged in the earlier Chapter 2, this scenario seems more common in 
cross-border deals, especially with more culturally distant hosts or ones from highly risky 
countries where decision-making specifically entails a wide range of autonomy to a bidder 
TMT. Thereby such wisdom would be misapplied and risk involvement might be downplayed 
while deciding upon expanding business abroad in countries with higher risk and cultural 
disparity.  
 
Amongst the multifarious elements inherent to decision-making in such cross-country M&As, 
the mode of payment to be chosen constitutes one of such key determinants. Therefore, it is 
imperative to delineate the importance of the TMT of acquiring firm contributing to the same: 
when TMT ‘international orientation’ can be advantageous for the acquiring firms going in for 
cross-border targets. At what level of acquired expertise would the bidder TMTs desist from 
an overoptimistic deal-evaluation or from misjudging the expected synergies or from choosing 
an inappropriate payment mode for the cross-country host? 
 
4.6 Research hypotheses 
The above section explains the criticality of the decision-making role of the TMT of a firm 
embarking on international acquisitions. The following paragraphs in this section will build 
upon the arguments made both in favour and against ‘international orientation’ in the preceding 
section. In this section, we postulate how and when these alleged negative effects can be 
overcome and instead synthesized into beneficial effects. In other words, is it possible to 
optimise as well as balance the two opposing effects to have an overall positive impact for a 
bidding firm? 
 
As reviewed earlier, it is evident from the existing literature that prospective acquiring firms 
attempt to focus on their mode of payment when conditions of ‘adverse selection’ exist. For 
instance Officer et al. (2009), showed in their paper that there is a significant impact of the 
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method of payment selected by a bidder firm on its returns when the ‘information environment’ 
in which its host operates is relatively obscure. Also as noted before, environmental concerns 
in conjunction with a multitude of factors at both industry and firm levels interplay, making 
strategic investment decisions like international acquisitions highly complex and 
unpredictable. In particular, we focus here on the two quantifiable forms of environmental 
uncertainties viz., country risk and cultural distance, which are underpinned by all the different 
strands of literature previously discussed, while controlling for the firm level variables in our 
empirical settings. From the perspective of these two forces prevailing in the global 
environment, we revisit the contentions over benefits and disadvantages of international 
orientation. 
 
We argued in the preceding sections that opting for equity to pay for unfamiliar foreign targets 
in these scenarios could be employed to minimise the downside risk of a bidding firm, which 
seems a better choice in domestic scenarios. However, since these uncertainties are more likely 
to be exacerbated in an international context (Barkema et al., 1996) with riskier countries and 
culturally distant hosts, it is more likely that an acquirer would be more inclined to use cash or 
mixed payments as exchange medium instead of other options, so that its risk can be reduced. 
Although empirical evidence on the profitability of cross-country returns are mixed, but the 
fact that payment method adopted is a crucial contributor to the success of such international 
transaction, is indisputable (see for example, Georgen & Renneboog, 2004). It has been 
discussed before that these strategic decisions are made by the TMT en bloc, or the ‘dominant 
coalition’ (Cyert & March, 1963), rather than by any single manager in a bidder firm (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014; etc.), as mostly envisaged in both previous 
corporate finance and IB studies. As discussed in the previous section, at high levels of country 
risk and cultural distance, making the right judgement on the foreign deal-at-hand can be both 
daunting and challenging. As mentioned before, typically under these scenarios involving high 
discretion, considerable latitude of action is available to the TMTs of acquirers, whereby 
disposition and other executive traits come into play (Finkelstein et al., 2008). Potentially, 
‘international orientation’ of the entire TMT can be a comparative advantage to facilitate better 
decision-making in such circumstances. But, from the reflections on the pros and cons of 
‘international orientation’ of these TMTs of acquiring firms, it follows that unless optimal, 
such ‘orientation’ may not prove helpful in making the right choices when deciding on 
acquisitions abroad. 
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As contended in Chapter 3 that the inherent heterogeneity of cross-border acquisitions 
generally, can impede drawing consistent inferences from prior exposures on account of any 
single factor such as education, work or domicile in any foreign nation. Therefore, modest 
international experience may limit the scope of learning and consequently utilizing this in 
subsequent acquisitions. If the same is limited in time, i.e., unless, such experience is acquired 
through a number of years, it might be improperly assimilated and hence, may tend to be 
misapplied as is evident from the detrimental impacts of overconfidence leading to faulty 
evaluations of ‘international orientation’.  
 
While deciding upon the various aspects of acquiring a foreign host amidst extreme incidence 
of the above-mentioned uncertainties in global environment, competence and efficacy to make 
the requisite choices need to be achieved. In order to do so, more of such experience over a 
longer time-frame needs to be accrued by the overall TMT of a bidder, given the multitude of 
uncertainties in the global market of corporate control. Also as contended in some studies (e.g., 
Reuer et al., 2004; Sudarsanam, 2010, etc.) either cash or mixed payments are feasibly the 
more preferred medium in comparison to pure stock exchange since, cross-country acquisitions 
are associated with more intense information asymmetry. Therefore, higher the riskiness of a 
cross-country acquisition, the greater is the possibility of choosing pure cash or a combination 
of cash, stock, etc. relative to pure stock swaps. In other words, we expect as overall 
international exposure of the entire TMT matures over time after a threshold; the said TMT 
will be in a better position to make this choice of mode of payment for its foreign host to 
mitigate information asymmetry in acute situations of country risk and cultural distance. In the 
opposite situation where neither country risk nor cultural is so seriously concerning, we would 
not expect such exposure to play such a critical role. Hence, we conjecture for these bidders 
with TMTs possessing an optimal depth of international experience (in terms of average 
number of years), there would be a higher probability of choosing cash or mixed payment over 
pure stock to pay for their targets. This is ascribable to the fact that it might not be feasible to 
use only stock payments for hosts in riskier or culturally distant countries. Hence, depth of such 
wisdom only beyond a sub-optimal level, tends to mitigate information asymmetry in the 
presence of greater country risk and cultural distance. We therefore, expect the depth as 
measured in number of years of TMT international experience to have a curvilinear (U-shaped) 
relationship (as hypothesized by Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) with the probability of only 
cash or combination payment relative to stock when higher levels of two of these 
environmental considerations coexist. Thus, we hypothesize:  
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Hypothesis 1a: Under higher levels of country risk, the amount of TMT international 
experience in average number of years will have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with 
the probability of paying cash in cross-border acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 1b: Under higher levels of cultural distance, the amount of TMT international 
experience in average number of years will have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with 
the probability of paying cash in cross-border acquisitions. 
 
As argued in Chapter 3, it is not only the depth of international experience acquired through 
over time, but also breadth of the same knowledge could also serve as an essential aspect of 
the TMT ‘orientation’ of a firm intending to expand beyond its own country borders. This 
breadth is gained from exposure to a number of countries with different socio-economic and 
institutional cultures and associated risks. Specifically, the quantifiable environmental aspects 
of country risk and cultural distance are likely to be toned down with TMT exposure to a large 
number of countries, as a wider range of such experience would enable them to have a more 
enriching knowledge of business regulations. More of this insight therefore, can be assumed to 
be crucial in choosing the cash or mixed payment mode relative to stock under extreme 
conditions of both these forms of uncertainties. Therefore, in all probability the TMT of a 
bidding firm tends to become better equipped in managing foreign deals as their range of 
international exposure increases on account of disparate backgrounds in a number of countries. 
Moreover, as a firm embarks on more foreign acquisitions, its TMT has the potential to garner 
a richer expertise becoming acquainted with varied business practices and cultures. Such 
knowledge would be beneficial in making expansion decisions in countries with similar 
intitutional and regulatory cultures (Barkema et al., 1996). It would also increase the breadth 
of international experience for an increased range of countries. Such exposure to diverse 
countries serves to complement the overall international wisdom of a TMT, adding to its 
richness, thus, its overall competence.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the transfer effect theory (Cormier & Hagman, 1987) suggests 
that learnings from past experience can be effectively applied to later similar events in certain 
circumstances. However, as put forward by Ellis et al. (2011b), the potential effects of 
experience on subsequent undertakings (as implied by this theory) may not be beneficial every 
time. It also indicates that the initial phase of TMT international exposure might not achieve 
the desired beneficial effect of successfully managing cross-country acquisition decisions when 
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selection of a host from either a highly risky or culturally distant country needs to be made. 
This is ascribable to excessive optimism and self-assurance which are the likely impact of 
inadequate ‘orientation’. However, as the breadth of managerial team’s experience over range 
of countries continues to grow, such TMTs would tend to build on their expertise to apply their 
discretionary power more aptly. Therefore, in the light of the discussion on the feasibility of 
preference of cash or a mixed mode of payment to mitigate riskiness of cross-border deals, an 
optimal breadth of international exposure would enable the TMT to take stock of the 
uncertainties of acquiring a foreign host in a riskier as well as a culturally disparate country 
because of the limited information. Hence, on the lines of Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999), we 
hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Under higher levels of country risk, the range of TMT international experience 
in an average number of countries will have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the 
likelihood of opting for cash to pay in cross-border acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 2b: Under higher levels of cultural distance the range of TMT international 
experience in an average number of countries will have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship 
with the likelihood of opting for cash to pay in cross-border acquisitions. 
 
Apart from depth and breadth of international experience, we consider another important aspect 
of ‘international orientation’ i.e. a firm’s TMT composition with diverse nationalities, as we 
did in the last Chapter 3. Based on the extant literature (see for example, Nielsen & Nielsen, 
2011; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) together with the research on the psychology of 
culture (e.g. Tadmor, Tetlock & Peng, 2009), we believe that the presence of more foreign 
nationals in a firm’s TMT enhances its cultural diversity. Thus, such a diverse team of 
executives is likely to have a superior cognition of cross-country dissimilarities that tends to 
mold their uncertainty perceptions when either country risk or cultural distance of a target 
complicates proper judgements. Therefore, this entire team could be adequately competent to 
opt for the payment choice of pure cash or mixed modes, which would most likely alleviate 
appropriately both these environmental concerns between the acquiring firm and its foreign 
host. Further, foreigner managers could to bring the table expertise of their home country 
cultures regulations and network access (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). Also, the TMT with foreign 
managers might be benefited from a broader and improved comprehensiveness of information-
at-hand and greater ‘international orientation’ (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014), thereby 
leading to a superior choice of payment mode for a foreign target. On the other hand, the said 
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favorable impacts of having foreign nationals in the TMT of a firm may also be obscured due 
to a difference of risk and uncertainty perceptions attributable to different cultural cognizance. 
This may lead to conflicts resulting in slower and costlier decision-making (e.g., Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2011). Nevertheless, a greater nationally diverse team of executives is likely to possess 
a more holistic view during prevalence of greater environmental uncertainties, both in terms of 
host country risk and cultural differences with the acquiring firm. With an improved 
understanding and perception of such risk and uncertainties for such teams, we conjecture that 
such internationally diverse teams are more likely to make less risky payment choices in the 
form of cash or mixed modes of payment so as to reduce information asymmetry. However, 
this facet of international orientation might not be that relevant in the contrary scenarios of 
lower environmental uncertainties. Hence, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Under higher levels of country risk, the national diversity of TMTs will have a 
curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the possibility of using cash payment for an 
international host.  
Hypothesis 3b: Under higher levels of cultural distance, the national diversity of TMTs will 
have a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the possibility of using cash payment for an 
international host. 
 
4.7 Sample and methodology 
We tested the hypotheses discussed in the last section using the original sample of UK 
acquiring firms, detailed in the Chapter 2. The unavailability of information on payment mode, 
cultural distance and country risk reduced the number of observations that could be used for 
analysis so that the final sample had 1,708 acquisitions completed by 429 firms in 93 host 
countries. 
 
The operationalization of variables and detailed methodology are outlined below. All variables, 
except indicator variables, were winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile levels in order to avoid the 
results being affected by outliers. 
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4.7.1 Dependent variable 
Based on three different methods of payment i.e. cash, stock, and combinations of both along 
with debt, etc., we coded two binary variables as: the Cash with the value of one for pure cash 
payments and zero otherwise and the Stock variable having value of one for pure stock 
payments and zero otherwise. Then, we regrouped them to create a new ordered variable 
payment modes (Yi discussed in the following sub-section), taking the values one, two and 
three respectively, where Yi has the value of one if Cash was one; Yi is two if both the binary 
variables Cash or Stock, were zero; and finally Yi is three, if Stock was one. 
 
4.7.2 Independent variables 
The key explanatory variables are the same as those used for the Chapter 3 on longer term 
performance of the bidder firms. Therefore, detailed explanation of the following proxies for 
the ‘international orientation’ of the TMT of an acquirer firm already provided in that chapter 
is not repeated here:  
a) Depth/Amount of TMT international experience was quantified as the average number 
of years of international experience of the TMT members until one year prior to the 
announcement of the focal acquisition.  
b)  Breadth/Range of TMT international experience was measured as the average number 
of countries up to one year prior to the focal acquisition.  
c) TMT national diversity using the Blau index of national diversity measured one year 
prior to the acquisition announcement.  
 
Analogous to the previous chapter (Chapter 3) using the same determinants of ‘international 
orientation’, we continued using the mean-centered TMT variables (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 
4.7.3 Control variables 
The control variables included in our analysis are in line with the studies on payment modes 
reviewed earlier and are relevant as far as an information asymmetry problem is concerned. 
They can be classified into three categories: target country-specific, deal-specific, bidder-
specific and lastly target-specific variables, as explained below:  
 
Target country-specific controls 
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Empirically we account for two quantifiable environmental concerns (as described in the 
Section 4.6) which are target country-specific variables, namely, Country risk and Cultural 
distance. These variables have also been employed in the other chapters, but they are 
specifically important in this chapter from the point of view of our research design. These 
factors can be assumed to intensify the associated ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ that 
plague the international market for corporate control. However, we hypothesize that 
appropriately higher levels of ‘international orientation’ of acquiring firms’ TMTs tend to 
mitigate the severity of these risks, leading to a better choice of payment modes for their foreign 
hosts. 
 
The time-varying index of Country risk (Euromoney, 2009) and Cultural distance (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001), as detailed in Chapter 2 were used for the analysis. For either 
Country risk or Cultural distance, we looked at median values of the respective variables across 
the whole sample to we create two dummy variables. Those above median were classified as 
High_Risk and High_CulturalDistance, while the below median values as Low_Risk and 
Low_CulturalDistance. The former measures signified the riskier host countries for our 
purposes.  
 
Deal-specific controls 
Although some of our deal-related variables were the same as used for the other chapters, we 
explain their relevance here employing the ‘payment mode’ angle. Previous studies have 
predicted the consideration paid for a transaction, i.e. the deal size as an important aspect of 
M&As. Not only does it reflect managerial intent (see for example, Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1989) behind the deal, but also may act as a determinant for choice of payment method 
or financing. For instance, paying for an expensive foreign target tends to make the transaction 
riskier (although, it may be equally likely that the large size of the target makes cash payment 
infeasible). Deal size in our study is represented in transaction value (in logged GBP millions). 
Similarly, we controlled as follows, for certain other features of each of these international 
deals which have the potential to expose them to the risk of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; 
Hansen, 1987; Reuer et al., 2004;):  
 
Whether a bidder acquired full control of its target (at least 95% stake) or not, using full 
acquisition dummy; 
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Acquirer-specific controls 
The acquirer-specific variables used in our analysis are firm characteristics such as, size, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage and bidder stock run-up prior to the focal acquisition, all of which have 
been shown to influence payment mode choice in prior research (e.g., Servaes, 1991; Faccio & 
Masulis, 2005; Officer et al., 2009, etc.). All these variables were lagged, i.e. were taken as at 
the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction.  
Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of total asset value expressed in GBP millions.  
Tobin’s Q was taken as the ratio of a firm’s market value to its replacement value of assets. 
Leverage was computed as the percentage total debt of an acquiring firm over its common 
equity  
Bidder Stock run-up was computed as the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the stock price of 
each acquirer over the year preceding the announcement month. 
Whether a firm acquired outside its macro industry (based on Fama-French industry 
classification), using the Diversifying acquisition indicator. This equaled to one when an 
acquisition involved any industry other than the acquirer core macro industry, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Target firm-specific control 
Studies on payment modes (see for example, Chang, 1998; Officer et al., 2009) predict the 
valuation problem to be more acute with unlisted targets, which presumably are ‘difficult-to-
value’; hence, bidders tend to opt for a medium which can alleviate the associated information 
asymmetry. So, we included the following variable: 
listing status of the target firm, i.e. an indicator variable as to whether the foreign target was 
privately-held or not taking the value of one when unlisted and zero otherwise. 
 
Finally, year dummy variables were included to control for fixed time effects. Our sample 
period was had been associated with two major crises: the post-2000 dot-com bubble burst and 
the financial crisis beginning in late 2007. 
 
We employed therefore, an ordered logistic regression framework as our main empirical tests 
in order to estimate the impact of international orientation on the probability of choosing one 
or the other mode relative to the third. Ordered logistic models require that the data meet the 
“proportional odds assumption”, where the relationships between all pairs of outcome 
categories are the same (Brooks, 2008). The following specification was used: 
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Y∗ = Xβ +	,																	                                                                                                     (4.1)	
where, Y*i is the unobservable dependent variable based on Yi, which represent the observed 
categories of  different modes of payment, i.e. Cash, mixed and Stock (as detailed in sub-section 
4.7.1); and Xi is a vector of explanatory and control variables (as discussed above), which are 
assumed to predict preferred payment mode(s). Furthermore, β is the vector of regression 
coefficients, and εi represents a normally distributed disturbance term. Equation 4.2 shown 
below is the representative regression equation to model the group of acquisitions with higher 
levels of country risk (i.e. with the specification, High_Risk = 1) in order to test Hypothesis 1a: 
 
Payment_modeit = α1+ β1Amount_Intl_Expi + β2Amount_Intl_Exp2i + β3LN_TransactionVali 
+ β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it                                       (4.2)                                                 
 
For the next two regression models, the main predictor in Equation 4.2 (i.e. Amount_Intl 
experiencei) is substituted with the two other measures of TMT international orientation we 
use here. In Equation 4.3, Range_Intl experiencei is used instead, to test Hypothesis 2a and in 
Equation 4.4 we use BlauDivi representing the number of national diversity in the TMT of an 
acquiring firm i in the year preceding year of the announcement of a cross-country acquisition, 
in accordance with Hypothesis 3a. The control variables in the regressions below are the ones 
discussed earlier. 
 
Payment_modeit = α1+ β1Range_Intl_Expi + β2Range_Intl_Exp2i + β3LN_TransactionVali + 
β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti  + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it                                      (4.3)                                               
Payment_modeit = α1+ β1BlauDiv+ β2BlauDiv2i + β3LN_TransactionVali + 
β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti  + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it,                                     (4.4)                                              
 
Similarly, three sets of regression equations (Equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) identical to Equations 
4.2 – 4.4 are used to model the cross-border acquisitions with the specification, 
High_CulturalDistance = 1 so as to test Hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b respectively as provided 
below: 
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Payment_modeit = α1+ β1Amount_Intl_Expi + β2Amount_Intl_Exp2i + β3LN_TransactionVali 
+ β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it                                       (4.5)        
Payment_modeit = α1+ β1Range_Intl_Expi + β2Range_Intl_Exp2i + β3LN_TransactionVali + 
β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it                                       (4.6) 
Payment_modeit = α1+ β1BlauDiv+ β2BlauDiv2i + β3LN_TransactionVali + 
β4LN_AcquirerSizei + β5Leveragei + β6BHARi + β7TobinsQi + β8DiversifyingAcquisitioni + 
β9FullAcquisitioni + β10PrivateTargeti + β11-19YearDummyi +ε1it                                       (4.7) 
 
We also estimate analogous models for the sub-groups of acquisitions where both of these 
environmental uncertainties were less (by considering the sub-groups of Low_Risk and 
Low_CulturalDistance respectively, which are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
 
Table 4.1 reports our sample statistics including pairwise correlations of the variables used in 
our analyses.  
[ Insert Table 4.1 about here ] 
 
 
4.8 Results 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the estimation results from multivariate ordered logistic regression 
models based on our operationalization of the two environmental variables, country risk and 
cultural distance respectively, employed for our analyses as specified in the last section. Table 
4.2 reports how the possibilities of choosing cash or a mixed combination relative to that of 
stock varies with different measures of ‘international orientation’, in presence of both higher 
and lower levels of country risk. Whereas, Table 4.3 presents similar findings based on more 
and less cultural distance. Each two of the Models 1A and 1B; 2A and 2B; 3A and 3B shown 
in Table 4.2 and similarly Models 4A and 4B; 5A and 5B; 6A and 6B in Table 4.3, respectively 
has one measure of the mean-centered ‘orientation’ variable in linear and squared 
specifications (as discussed in our hypotheses). In both tables, we present the findings from 
each model by sub-dividing the total number of observations into two sub-samples. The model 
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specification ‘A’ representing the high, whereas ‘B’ the low specification of the environmental 
measures (detailed in last section) based on our binary indicators of High_Risk and 
High_CulturalDistance. Each orientation variable, as detailed below corroborates our 
conjectures when higher levels of the environmental uncertainties exist. We also report in the 
Appendix, Table 4.A which shows our baseline models showing impact of only the control 
variables using the aforementioned specifications.  
 
[ Insert Tables 4.2 and 4.3 about here ] 
 
We postulated under Hypotheses 1a and 1b respectively, that when conditions of greater 
country risk and cultural distance exist, the depth in average number of years of international 
experience of acquirer TMTs has a U-shaped relationship with the likelihood of the firm opting 
for cash or combination payment relative to stock swaps for its foreign host. It is seen that amid 
greater environmental risks as quantified by both the binary variables High_Risk and 
High_CulturalDistance respectively, a greater amount of average number of years of 
international experience of the TMT alleviates these environmental obstacles. Thus, bidder 
TMTs are more likely to choose cash or a combination payments in relation to stock payment 
i.e., ceteris paribus, log-odds of the relative choice of pure cash will rise by 0.01 in Model 1A. 
This is shown by positive coefficient estimates corresponding to the quadratic terms, while that 
of the linear terms pertaining to the depth variables were negative, as seen in Models 1A and 
4A. Therefore: (I) under conditions of high country risk, estimates of both the coefficients of 
the quadratic as well as the linear terms of international depth was were statistically significant 
at 5% and 1% levels in Model 1A; (II) also, when cultural distance was more, the said estimates 
for the quadratic term as well as the linear term in Model 4A showed significance at 1% level. 
However as anticipated, these findings were not maintained either in the situation of low 
country risk in Model 1B or that of low cultural distance in Model 4B. These results thus upheld 
our predictions regarding Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
 
These findings indicate that, when making decisions under high information asymmetry with 
greater country risk or cultural distance as explained earlier, lower numbers of years of 
international experience of TMTs of bidding firms leads to a higher probability of choosing 
only stock payment. Either they cannot make a superior judgement in paying for their foreign 
targets with a low depth of international exposure or presumably tend to be overconfident of 
their acquired skills. This could be the ascribable to the fact that these unpredictable and risky 
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deals require an appropriate judgement, taking into account all the pros and cons. But, as depth 
of their global exposure grows, the same TMTs seem to make a better decision on the most 
appropriate payment mode that could benefit the firm. Thus, only the most experienced TMTs 
in terms of increased number of years of international experience are likely to choose the right 
payment mode that would mitigate the adverse impacts of high uncertainty in foreign 
transactions. Therefore, if environmental concerns are not that acute, the depth of international 
exposure of TMTs does not seem effectively to affect payment choices of these acquiring firms 
(Models 1B and 4B). 
 
For instance, the trough of the U-shape implied by Model 1A corresponds to an average of 15 
years of TMT international experience, while the corresponding threshold for Model 4A is 
15.27 years on average. These estimates indicated that only past this threshold, benefits from 
international experience, will accrue to an executive team, making them manage payment 
decisions effectively to mitigate higher levels of country risks. In our sample of bidder TMTs, 
this threshold is visible only at the 95th percentile, whilst the median represented only 4.5 years 
of experience on average. 
 
The evidence from Models 2A and its counterpart 5A did not strongly support either 
Hypotheses 2a or 2b. In both cases under high environmental uncertainties, a U-shaped 
relationship was also postulated between the range of TMT international experience and the 
possibility of choosing the pure cash or mixed payment modes to alleviate uncertainty. 
Although the estimated coefficients corresponding to the linear terms of the breadth of TMT 
international exposure were significant at 5% and 1% levels in both the abovementioned 
Models 2A and 5A, the quadratic terms were not significantly different from zero. The negative 
coefficients of the linear terms suggest that if the range of TMT international experience is 
inadequate, it might lead to its misapplication, plausibly due to either incorrect generalizations 
thereof or over-optimism. It could be also likely that more breadth of international experience 
induce an over-optimism, which inhibits taking stock of the intricacies involved in the deal-at-
hand. While the coefficient estimates of the quadratic terms in these model specifications are 
positive, but fall short of conventional significance level in both models, which makes us 
unable to draw meaningful conclusions on their signs. Hence, neither Hypotheses 2a nor 2b are 
supported. Looking at the corresponding findings for lower levels of country risk and cultural 
distance, as seen in Models 2B and 5B respectively, in neither case are the linear and quadratic 
coefficients significant, therefore cannot be interpreted meaningfully. But these findings 
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conform to our expectation that breadth of international exposure, akin to depth would possibly 
not be as pertinent as in the cases of higher levels of these environmental risks. 
 
Lastly, Models 3A and 6A to some extent corroborated both Hypotheses 3a and 3b postulating 
a similar curvilinear relationship between diverse nationalities in TMTs and the probability of 
making a superior decision with respect to payment mode in the presence of larger 
environmental uncertainties. The coefficient estimates corresponding to both the linear and 
quadratic terms of the TMT national diversity index were significant at a generous 10% level 
in Model 3A. These findings point to the fact that a greater mix of different nationalities in the 
TMTs of bidding firms appears to contribute to higher odds of preferring to pay cash or a mixed 
combination to stock, when they decide on international acquisitions in countries with higher 
risk profiles. This effect tends to be prominent in nationally heterogeneous teams, perhaps 
ascribable to more competencies in decision-making in such firms. As also documented in the 
preceding Model 1A, we notice that a greater level of this measure of international orientation, 
beyond a cut-off (as shown by the quadratic coefficient) also facilitate more effective risk 
mitigation.  
 
However, our finding seems to be somewhat different in the case of high cultural distances. 
While our prediction of a U-shaped relationship signifying a larger mix of nationalities effect 
is not sustained in Model 6A, the coefficient of the quadratic term of TMT diversity index in 
Model 6B is positively significant at the 5% level. This result in the latter Model 6B is quite 
contrary to our expectation. In the case of Model 6A only the linear coefficient estimate turns 
out negatively significant at 5 % level. Therefore, in the case of more culturally distant foreign 
hosts (as depicted in Model 6A), it cannot be meaningfully inferred that after a certain cut-off 
point, a greater mix of nationalities amongst the bidder TMTs prompts a superior choice in 
increased probability of paying pure cash or combination of cash, stock, etc. in relation to pure 
stock, to mitigate uncertainty. It appears from our results that either the presence of a diverse 
mix of nationalities in TMTs on acquiring firm boards does not tend to make such TMTs more 
proficient to tackle the environmental challenge of cultural distances; or it does not seem to be 
a greater obstacle to overcome. So, diverse nationality mix within the TMT of an acquirer 
might not be effective in mitigating the risk of deal with a culturally disparate target.      
 
The trough of the U-shape implied by Model 3A under high country risk corresponds to the 
value of the Blau diversity index approximately equal to 0.50. Curiously, only a small minority 
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(roughly less than 10%) in the sample of TMTs possesses this diversity. Therefore, the benefits 
due to national diversity seem to be lost in by more than 90% of the bidder TMTs in our sample. 
 
The above results indicate that optimal international orientation of the TMTs of acquiring 
firms, as documented by curvilinear (U-shaped) association of these proxies (except in the case 
of the proxy for breadth of international experience) with the likelihood of choosing cash or 
mixed payment mode, is more useful in alleviating the risks under situations of high 
environmental uncertainties like country risk and cultural distance. Thus, in principle our 
findings are in accordance with the empirical predictions of the studies (e.g., Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006 Schmid & Dauth, 2014; etc.) supporting adequate 
levels of international exposure of the top executives.     
 
Quite a number of the control variables included in our model specifications proved to be 
statistically insignificant. The exceptions were logged deal size and bidder’s Tobin’s Q which 
were significant in all model specifications. Other controls which were generally significant in 
both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 were prior acquisition stock run-up (one year lagged abnormal return) 
of bidder firms and the full acquisition indicator. Whilst, private target status dummy in Table 
4.2 and both leverage and the binary diversifying acquisition controls in Table 4.3 showed 
significance mostly. Barring the transaction value control, all other significant controls are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of cash and mixed payments. Higher values of 
Tobin’s Q and stock run-up could signify an overvalued bidder and higher leverage inhibits its 
ability to pay cash (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Gregory & Bi, 2011; etc.). Hence, it is not 
surprising that such a bidder will have a greater preference to pay with its stock. These findings 
are consistent with the prior studies (e.g., Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2009). The same reasoning is applicable in the case of private target status and acquisitions of 
higher stakes, which imply that internationalization decisions involving both these criteria are 
more difficult to evaluate (e.g., Officer et al., 2009). Hence, acquirers would be more inclined 
to use stock swaps for them. However, a positive relationship with the deal value variable 
across all our model specifications, indicates that larger deals  have a higher chances of being 
paid for in cash or mixed modes compared to stock, implying rather overoptimistic and 
misjudged payment-related decision-making by teams of top executives when they opt for 
international acquisitions, ceteris paribus. The same logic applies for cases where there is a 
significant positive association of diversifying acquisitions with the dependent variable (Table 
4.3: Models 5A and 6A). In so far as the extant studies in payment modes are concerned, our 
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findings with respect to these frequently used controls therein are substantiated, although none 
of these studies look at payment decisions in M&As primarily from the perspective of bidder 
TMTs.  
 
4.9 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
A range of additional analyses were conducted to substantiate our Hypotheses as well as to rule 
out alternative explanations for our results. The results for robustness tests have been reported 
in the Appendix. 
 
   4.9.1 Other TMT characteristics: size, age, and tenure 
Since our measures of TMT ‘international orientation’ are influenced by ‘upper echelons’ 
studies (cf. Carpenter et al., 2004), we added some TMT-level controls to our above reported 
models. This was to account for the gamut of opinions that may arise during the process of 
decision-making amongst the bidding firm TMTs. These characteristics of top managers, 
namely, tenure (Herrmann & Datta, 2006); and age (Yim, 2013) as well as size of the executive-
team (Carpenter et al., 2004), have been theorized to affect executive decision-making at the 
team level for reasons other than their ‘international orientations’. Therefore, we used the 
variables capturing within-TMT averages and standard deviations (S.D.) of TMT tenures 
(specified as time a top executive devoted (a) to his or her role, (b) on the board of a particular 
firm, or (c) in the firm during his employment) and of TMT age (as in Chapter 3).  
 
Keeping TMT_Size common throughout, we added each of these remaining indicators one-by-
one to our above-discussed model specifications on high and low country risk and cultural 
distance. The results defended the findings from our Models 1A and 1B to 6A and 6B in most 
cases except showing weaker significance levels, evidencing that our basic findings were 
generally robust with these later inclusions. The coefficient of TMT_Size appeared to be 
negative in all these later models. But, we found that both average TMT age as well as TMT 
tenure on average and their variability (S.D.) seemed to have contradictory signs of estimated 
coefficients on the probability of paying in cash or choosing a mixed combination relative to 
using own stock by acquirers under situations of greater country risk and cultural distance. 
These results using TMT tenure and age do not affect our core findings in the original Models 
1A and 1B to 6A and 6B. Hence, this finding indicates that higher TMT age and tenure do not 
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appear to significantly influence choice of payment modes in relatively riskier cross-country 
acquisitions. However, our finding in respect of size of bidder TMTs is consistent (when the 
relevant coefficients turned out to be statistically significant) with prior evidence portraying 
inefficient decision-making by larger boards in general (e.g. Yermack, 1996). For the sake of 
brevity we only present the tables of findings which show both controls of TMT size with 
average of TMT age and standard deviation of TMT age (Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report the findings 
with these controls for country risk, while Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the results for cultural 
distance respectively).  
 
   4.9.2 Relative deal size 
Previous studies on payment modes (e.g., Faccio & Masulis, 2005) conjecture and document 
that the relative size of a transaction tends to affect the choice of medium of payment used. 
Such relative deal sizes are often depicted in studies as the amount paid for a deal relative to 
the size of the target firm or that of the acquiring firm. For our purposes, we constructed                                                                                                                              
Relative_DealSize  (as in Faccio & Masulis, 2005) dividing the transaction value paid for each 
acquisition in our sample by the corresponding lagged market capitalization as at the end of 
the previous year of a focal deal, for any acquiring firm. Using it as an added control, we further 
constructed a binary variable based on the median value of Relative_DealSize. This binary 
indicator was specified as bigger Relative_DealSize equal to one for the above median values 
and zero for the below median values. 
 
With this indicator replacing our base models’ control for transaction value, we reran analogous 
specifications of our core Models 1A and 1B to 6A and 6B. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in the Appendix 
present these results. The estimated coefficient of the new indicator turned out positive and 
highly significant at 1% level across all specifications, irrespective of higher or lower country 
risk and cultural distance, respectively. Our main findings on favorable impact of greater levels 
of ‘international orientations’ after a certain cut-off point (for each TMT proxy) in support of 
our hypotheses, were also corroborated. Ceteris paribus, for bigger relative deal size, acquiring 
TMTs show greater chance for using pure cash or mixed modes compared to own stock. As we 
argued in the case of larger deal values, we rationalize this result also as TMT preferences of 
payment medium, giving an impression as more of a source of overconfidence than of 
competence. 
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   4.9.3 Prior firm-level acquisition experience 
Prior IB studies (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Haleblian et al., 2006) revealed firm-
level acquisition experience as a prominent influencer of the subsequent acquisition decisions. 
In order to analyze how TMT international orientation may behave in the presence of such 
firm-level learning, we control for the latter. Hence, we constructed an additional variable(s) 
counting all acquisitions completed by the sample acquiring firms over the respective 5 and 3-
year periods preceding the cross-border acquisitions analyzed above. Using a linear and a 
quadratic term for the firm-level acquisition count variable with a mean-centering procedure, 
we followed similar model specifications as reported above. Whilst Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the 
Appendix report the original models (Models 1A and 1B to 6A and 6B) with the added control 
of 3-year previous firm acquisition experience, Tables 4.12 and 4.13 with that of 5-year. All 
our primary results pertaining to TMT international experience and diversity were upheld. But, 
both the linear and quadratic effects of this new control varied across model settings of both 
more and less country risk and cultural distance, respectively. Even in the limited cases they 
were statistically significant, they failed to show consistent effects. In no model the linear and 
quadratic coefficient estimates were both significant. Hence, the impact of this prior acquisition 
learning at firm-level could not be meaningfully interpreted. 
 
   4.9.4 Target country-specific knowledge 
Previous literature (e.g., Barney, 1988; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) also highlight host country 
experience as a potential facilitator of executive learning while effecting cross-border 
acquisitions. Such country-specific knowledge, abilities, and personal connections acquired by 
means of domicile or employment is likely to be a useful wisdom element aiding development 
of insight into markets and governance structures, disclosure and regulatory practices, culture, 
economy, institutions, etc. So, it can be postulated that targets located in the same host country 
can be a favorable destination for subsequent acquisitions (Ellis et al., 2011b; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). However, this may potentially lead to familiarity bias (cf. Huberman, 2001) 
as well as adverse selection (cf. Akerlof, 1970), whereby, acquiring firms may be more inclined 
to choose similar hosts due to familiar settings rather than optimal ones elsewhere. The amount 
of host country experience was expressed in average number of years among TMT members. 
We adopted mean-centered linear and quadratic specifications for the variables incorporating 
high environmental uncertainties, similar to our specifications of ‘international orientation’ 
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variables. The models presented in Table 4.14 in the Appendix failed to corroborate the 
beneficial impact of target country knowledge amongst bidder TMTs, since neither the linear 
nor the quadratic coefficient estimates was significant in situations of either high country risk 
or large cultural distance. 
 
   4.9.5 Clustering at bidder-level and target country-level 
The original specifications in Models 1A and 1B to 6A and 6B, were rerun with clustering 
separately at the bidding firm level and then at the target country-level to check the robustness 
of our original findings. The results with the latter clustering appeared to strongly substantiate 
these findings. However, the results in case of the latter clustering however suggested that 
insufficient levels of breadth of international experience of TMT, irrespective of high or low 
country risk and cultural distance, might not be too effective in choosing the pure cash or mixed 
payment modes.  Tables 4.15 and 4.16 in the Appendix report the original multivariate ordered 
logistic models with standard errors clustered at the acquiring firm level, whereas Tables 4.17 
and 4.18 those with clustering at the target country level. Therefore, our primary results were 
generally maintained with these clustered model specifications too.     
 
   4.9.6 Excluding financial firms 
When the financial firms based on Fama-French 17 industry classification are excluded from 
the initial sample, the results in principle are similar to the original models reported in Section 
4.8. So, we do not report these results for the sake of brevity. Thus without the financial firms, 
it is not only that our Research Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 3a, 3b are corroborated; but also, stronger 
significance levels of the relevant main predictors (depth of international exposure and Blau 
index) are found.   
 
4.10 Discussion and conclusion 
Payment modes in acquisitions have been a widely researched topic, but the focus had been on 
returns generated using a particular method of payment. Method of payment, being a crucial 
determinant of post-acquisition performance, needs to be made exercising abundant caution. 
We take a different approach in this study looking at two interrelated questions: (1) when and 
how does TMT ‘international orientation’ influence payment choice in cross-country 
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acquisitions and (2) what amount of such orientation is optimal for these acquirer TMTs in 
order to mitigate information asymmetry? We specifically undertake analysis of cross-border 
acquisition related decision-making by TMTs of acquiring firms as they are one of the most 
challenging ways of internationalization, therefore, involve complex strategic decisions. Our 
inherent contention is that pure stock swaps might not be an efficient alleviator of risk in cross-
country acquisitions as compared to pure cash or a mixed mode of exchange.  
 
Combining the insight from prior corporate finance and IB literatures with ‘upper echelons’ 
behavioural theory, we developed our hypotheses as to when TMT international orientation 
can be used to the advantage of bidding firms. In particular, we utilised these predictions to 
argue that bidding firm TMTs play a key role in making the payment choice for a foreign host. 
We build upon the contentions of Finkelstein et al. (2008) that personal characteristics of 
executives tend to be reflected in the riskier strategic choices as well as outcomes. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that a facet like ‘international orientations’ of bidder TMTs could facilitate a 
better choice of payment method to mitigate the adverse impact of high levels of information 
asymmetry predominant in the global market. We adopted in our analyses two frequently used 
measures of environmental uncertainties, viz. country risk and cultural distance and 
incorporated them in our models to look into how their harmful effects can be alleviated with 
the right balance of ‘international orientation’ in acquiring firm TMTs.  
 
Given the prior documented negative impact of managerial hubris and overconfidence with 
regard to strategic decisions, we postulated that initial level ‘TMT international orientations’ 
might not achieve an efficient choice of a greater likelihood of paying cash or a combination 
of cash, stock, etc. This is due to the fact that competency is likely to take some time to develop 
fully and that can happen only after a threshold. On the other hand, this initial level of 
orientations can bring about excessive optimism and self-assurance, resulting into an erroneous 
choice of payment mode which fails to mitigate the prevailing uncertainties. We further posited 
that at, advanced levels of ‘TMT international orientations’, efficacy of superior choice 
surfaces, since then confidence tends to be aligned better with competence.  
 
Our predictions were strongly supported in our empirical analyses. In terms of its amount of 
international experience in average number of years as well as national diversity of bidder 
TMTs, our results showed that past a certain cut-off point, inefficient choice pertaining to 
higher probability of stock payments will translate into a more suitable choice in respect of 
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either cash or a mixture of cash, stock, etc. Such payment preference then helps alleviation of 
information asymmetry under greater country risk and cultural distance. The range of such 
exposure with respect to number of countries showed weaker evidence for these predictions.  
  
A closer look at the economic implications of our findings show that the amount of 
international experience benefits only the most experienced teams, and that there are not many 
of them among the UK acquirers in our sample. For example, it takes an average of 15 years 
of international experience among TMT members for them to be capable of making an efficient 
choice in respect of more chance of cash or mixed payments, in the presence of high country 
risks. The beneficial effects of TMT national diversity would ensue after a threshold of nearly 
half (0.50) in terms of the Blau index of nationalities. Hence, possibly in our sample the 
predominant effect of TMT international orientation on payment choice is insufficiently 
depicted.  
  
This chapter broadens the horizons of future research on TMTs and their ‘international 
orientation’. While it is a first step documenting balance of confidence to attain competence, it 
can be taken forward further by looking at what levels of such combined orientation would be 
optimal to make right payment choices in respect of cross-borders acquisition decisions of 
firms from a number of home countries. While we have adopted two quantifiable specifications 
of environmental uncertainties, it may be worthwhile in future research to develop measures 
for others. In other words, future research could explore the optimal combination of executives 
necessary to this effect. It might be useful to understand how each facet of international 
orientation could be developed and used to complement one another and thereby to make 
effective choices in strategic decisions. Further, it would also be useful to extend how such 
TMT orientations could influence preferences for the varied sources of financing which in turn 
affects payment decisions in cross-country expansion decisions, thereby improving our 
understanding. 
  
We focus in this study a reconciliation of the theories and findings from totally divergent 
streams of literatures to present a holistic approach to TMT learning and international 
orientation in the context of challenging strategies such as internationalization. Specifically, 
our study investigates the role of such orientation in mitigating extremely high levels of 
environmental risks. We argued that this quality in appropriate amounts, if possessed by 
acquirer TMTs, will provide these firms an edge in using their abundant discretion to make 
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superior decisions mostly in situations with severe country risk and cultural distance. Further, 
we linked the behavioural aspects of TMT orientation with one of the most fundamental aspects 
of decision-making in such expansion decisions, namely, the choice of payment method. These 
are our main contributions. While, previous studies have considered mode of payments as one 
of the principal determinants of acquisition performance, we take a different approach in 
relating this choice of bidding firms with their TMT (mis-)judgement.  
 
Our study rests on the key assumption of a profit-maximizing setup, wherein an acquiring 
firm’s top executives take all actions based on their prior international exposures and diverse 
national cultures with a motive to maximize shareholder wealth of the firm. Thus, they are 
likely to avoid undesirable risks while making judgements on international acquisitions. 
Agency-related conflicts have not been considered in our study.  
 
Moreover, we have probed into only two quantifiable measures of information asymmetry, 
which also happens to be those most commonly studied. It would be more interesting to study 
the multifaceted uncertainty concerns that plague the international market for corporate control, 
many of which pose challenges of operationalization – how international orientation of TMT 
of bidding firms helps in effective mitigation of the same? Also, we considered only the 
acquiring firms’ perspectives of information asymmetry when deciding on a foreign host, rather 
than examining it also based on a target’s  viewpoint. A target firm may also encounter limited 
information problem in assessing a bidder’s offer (e.g., Chemmanur et al., 2009).      
  
Thirdly, as already highlighted in the previous two Chapters 2 and 3, this evidence is about 
acquiring firms from just a single country – the UK. Hence, our results of overoptimistic 
managerial behavior arising due to international orientation could particularly be an outcome 
of our UK research setting. Also, although we argue on the plausible benefits of diverse 
nationality on acquirer boards, our sample generally suffers from its absence. A comparative 
study with bidding firms from various countries may tackle this limitation. Further, it would 
be worthwhile to explore how country-specific governance structures interact with TMT 
international orientations to mitigate information asymmetry in making payment choices.  
 
Finally, operationalization of the explanatory variables used here, may require further 
improvement. These limitations have already been elaborated in the Chapter 2, hence not 
repeated here.  
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To sum up, this chapter is an extension of the payment mode literature to link such choice with 
TMT-level learning and orientation, which has not been investigated before. While, it adds to 
the existing studies on TMT-level factors, it also explores a new area of whether such 
orientations help to diminish risks and uncertainties in the international market. Hence, it not 
only strives to improve our knowledge on how the demographics of acquirer TMTs shape their 
behaviors, but in turn guides their payment preferences, assuming a profit-maximizing motive 
for their firms. However, the study on executive backgrounds and consequent behaviors with 
respect to payment mode choices, could be delved into further in the light of the steady 
worldwide rise in the number of mixed ethnic backgrounds.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
  Variable Mean Median S.D. 
Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Payment 
modes 2.57 3 0.56 
                          
                          
2 
Amount of 
int’l 
experience  
5.16 4.2 4.82 
-0.01                         
                         
3 
Range of 
int’l 
experience 
0.86 0.67 0.8 
-0.01 0.76**                       
                        
4 National diversity 0.22 0 0.25 
-0.01 0.45** 0.48** 
    
                
                       
5 Full 
acquisition 0.79 1 0.41 
-0.03 -0.08** -0.18** -0.06* 
    
              
                      
6 Transaction 
value 2 1.59 1.98 
0.29** 0.12** 0.18** 0.05* 0.01 
  
    
  
        
     
  
    
  
        
7 Diversifying 
acquisition 0.34 0 0.47 
-0.02 -0.08** -0.07** -0.07** 0.06* -0.17** 
        
      
      
        
      
8 Firm size 6.6 6.48 2.35 
0.12** 0.45** 0.46** 0.34** -0.04+ 0.30** -0.10**     
  
      
           
  
      
9 Cultural differences 1.45 0.69 1.57 
-0.04+ 0.16** 0.23** 0.15** -0.25** -0.04+ -0.11** 0.13** 
        
  
          
    
    
10 Country risk 0.15 0.08 0.17 -0.03 0.17
**
 0.28** 0.15** -0.32** -0.06* -0.14** 0.10** 0.58**   
    
  
                 
11 Private target  0.52 1 0.50 -0.10
**
 -0.19** -0.18** -0.11** 0.06* -0.20** 0.12** -0.27** -0.10** -0.09**       
                
12 Bidder Run-
up 0.15 0.05 0.55 
-0.05* -0.07** -0.06* -0.09** -0.02 -0.04+ 0.00 -0.18** -0.02 0.02 0.01     
 
          
    
13 Leverage 79.01 41.89 182.79 0.04
+
 0.06* 0.08** 0.12** -0.02 0.13** -0.04+ 0.30** 0.02 0.03 -0.14** 0.01   
              
14 Tobin’s Q 1.78 1.33 1.69 -0.11
**
 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.22** -0.05* -0.07* 0.02 0.12** -0.09** 
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Note to Table 4.1: Payment modes is the dependent variable in our model, based on the ordered variable taking values of 1 for pure cash payments, 2 for a mix of cash, stock, etc. and 3 for pure 
stock exchanges, respectively in an international acquisition by an UK acquiring firm. Amount of international experience is the average number of years of acquiring firms’ TMT members’ 
international career experience. Range of international experience is the average number of countries where acquiring firms’ TMT members’ gained their international career experience. National 
Diversity is the Blau index of national diversity of the acquiring firm TMT. All experience and diversity measures are measured at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border 
transaction. Full acquisition is an indicator variable denoting transactions where upon completion of the acquisition the acquirer gains full control of the target, i.e. at least 95% stake. Transaction 
value is expressed in GBP millions in natural logarithmic form. Diversifying acquisition is the indicator variable equal to one when an acquisition involved any industry other than the acquirer 
core macro industry, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the logarithm of total asset value of the acquiring firm (expressed in £ millions) and is lagged one year. Cultural differences variable is the 
distance between the target country and the country of the acquiring firm (i.e. the UK) using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index on the basis of four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001). Country 
risk is the Euromoney country risk index. Private target is an indicator variable equal to one where if foreign host is unlisted and zero otherwise. Bidder run-up is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
of the stock price of each acquirer over the year preceding the announcement month. Leverage is the percentage total debt of an acquiring firm over its common equity. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a 
firm’s market value to its replacement value of assets. These last two measures are also as at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-country deal. All the variables (except indicator 
binary variables) are winsorized at 1% level. The correlation table reports pairwise correlation coefficients with +, *, and **denoting the corresponding significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.2: Ordered logistic regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on the 
probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock payments in presence of higher and lower levels of 
country risks. 
       
  Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B 
              
Amount of int’l experience  
-0.0632** -0.0258       
(-2.74) (-1.24)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 
0.00642* -0.00124       
(2.57) (-0.32)         
Range of int’l experience 
    -0.360* -0.225     
    (-2.46) (-1.53)     
            
(Range of int’l experience) 2 
    0.0552 0.00870     
    (0.69) (0.06)     
            
National diversity       -0.731+ -0.623 
      (-1.92) (-1.64) 
            
(National diversity) 2 
      2.651+ 3.784 
        (1.69) (1.48) 
              
Firm size 
0.0129 0.0323 0.0267 0.0381 -0.0134 0.0276 
(0.32) (0.65) (0.63) (0.76) (-0.38) (0.60) 
            
Transaction value 
0.466** 0.432** 0.470** 0.437** 0.459** 0.421** 
(8.11) (6.80) (8.18) (6.85) (8.01) (6.66) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.115 -0.346* -0.107 -0.338* -0.123 -0.376* 
(-0.79) (-2.28) (-0.73) (-2.20) (-0.84) (-2.45) 
            
Firm leverage 0.000316 -0.000894 0.000211 -0.000855 0.000396 -0.000887 (0.91) (-1.51) (0.62) (-1.40) (1.19) (-1.41) 
  
            
Tobin’s Q -0.172** -0.0974+ -0.161** -0.0936 -0.173** -0.102+ (-2.95) (-1.73) (-2.72) (-1.64) (-2.98) (-1.83) 
  
          
Target status -0.231 -0.319+ -0.268+ -0.318+ -0.238 -0.304+ (-1.51) (-1.95) (-1.74) (-1.95) (-1.55) (-1.87) 
              
Diversifying acquisition 
0.216 -0.00951 0.222 0.0137 0.232 -0.00572 
(1.41) (-0.06) (1.45) (0.09) (1.52) (-0.04) 
              
Full acquisition 
-0.316* -0.372 -0.404* -0.364 -0.322* -0.302 
(-1.99) (-1.46) (-2.49) (-1.46) (-2.04) (-1.24) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.085** -3.622** -3.191** -3.500** -3.240** -3.383** 
  (-6.60) (-7.05) (-6.75) (-6.63) (-7.20) (-6.79) 
            
_cut2 0.0963 -0.420 -0.0127 -0.300 -0.0742 -0.180 
  (0.25) (-0.94) (-0.03) (-0.67) (-0.21) (-0.41) 
            
Observations 882 826 882 826 882 826 
              
 
Note to Table 4.2: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the above-mentioned effect. The measures 
of the amount and range of international experience and the national diversity index are mean-centred. All the other variables 
are defined the same way as in Table 4.1. While the Models 1A, 2A and 3A portray higher country risks, the Models 1B, 2B 
and 3B show lower country risks. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Ordered logistic regressions models explaining the effects of the acquirer’s TMT international orientation on the 
probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock payments due to high and low cultural distances. 
  Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
              
Amount of 
int'l exp 
-0.078** -0.0197       
(-3.34) (-0.96)       
            
 (Amount of 
int’l 
experience)2 
0.00789** -0.00135       
(2.96) (-0.42)         
              
Range of int'l 
experience 
    -0.454** -0.200     
    (-2.92) (-1.40)     
            
(Range of int'l 
experience) 2 
    0.0149 0.119     
    (0.17) (1.06)     
              
National 
diversity 
      -0.863* -0.478 
      (-2.15) (-1.31) 
            
(National 
diversity) 2 
      1.645 4.745* 
        (1.01) (2.03) 
              
Firm size 
0.0102 0.0404 0.0400 0.0403 -0.0144 0.0327 
(0.23) (0.91) (0.85) (0.87) (-0.37) (0.78) 
              
Transaction 
value 
0.471** 0.424** 0.481** 0.431** 0.465** 0.416** 
(7.46) (7.36) (7.62) (7.43) (7.39) (7.27) 
              
Lagged 
abnormal 
return 
-0.323* -0.166 -0.313* -0.153 -0.343* -0.172 
(-2.29) (-1.07) (-2.18) (-0.98) (-2.41) (-1.11) 
              
Leverage 
0.000592 -0.000861* 0.000437 -0.000820+ 0.000655 -0.000812+ 
(1.23) (-2.08) (0.91) (-1.95) (1.36) (-1.87) 
            
Tobins Q 
-0.170** -0.109+ -0.158** -0.104+ -0.154** -0.126* 
(-3.34) (-1.79) (-3.04) (-1.68) (-3.05) (-2.06) 
            
Target status 
-0.160 -0.255 -0.223 -0.238 -0.181 -0.219 
(-1.00) (-1.61) (-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.14) (-1.42) 
              
Diversifying 
acquisition 
0.249 -0.0115 0.273+ 0.000593 0.280+ 0.00433 
(1.56) (-0.08) (1.70) (0.00) (1.77) (0.03) 
              
Full 
acquisition 
-0.0856 -0.822** -0.185 -0.799** -0.0963 -0.757** 
(-0.51) (-3.03) (-1.11) (-2.91) (-0.59) (-2.85) 
            
Year fixed 
effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.155** -3.686** -3.241** -3.516** -3.361** -3.410** 
  (-6.22) (-7.22) (-6.38) (-6.88) (-6.92) (-7.14) 
            
_cut2 0.321 -0.742+ 0.251 -0.573 0.0932 -0.461 
  (0.77) (-1.69) (0.60) (-1.32) (0.24) (-1.12) 
            
Observations 792 916 792 916 792 916 
              
Note to Table 4.3: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the above-mentioned effect. The measures 
of the amount and range of international experience and the national diversity index are mean-centred. All the other variables 
are defined the same way as in Table 4.1. While the Models 4A, 5A and 6A portray higher cultural distance, the Models 4B, 
5B and 6B show lower cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix: Results of Robustness tests 
 
Table 4.A: Baseline models with only controls under the specifications of country risk and cultural distance. 
  Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B 
         
Firm size 
-0.0299 0.00731 -0.0387 0.0202 
  (-0.91) (0.17) (-1.07) (0.51) 
          
Transaction value 0.462** 0.429** 0.465** 0.424** 
  (8.03) (6.79) (7.35) (7.40) 
         
Lagged abnormal 
return -0.122 -0.356* -0.340* -0.164 
  (-0.83) (-2.33) (-2.41) (-1.05) 
          
Leverage 0.000377 -0.000879 0.000648 -0.000806+ 
  (1.14) (-1.40) (1.34) (-1.90) 
         
Tobins Q 
-0.175** -0.104+ -0.160** -0.116+ 
  (-3.02) (-1.85) (-3.12) (-1.93) 
          
Target status 
-0.243 -0.304+ -0.216 -0.221 
  (-1.59) (-1.87) (-1.37) (-1.42) 
         
Diversifying 
acquisition 0.228 0.000256 0.279+ -0.00573 
  (1.50) (0.00) (1.77) (-0.04) 
          
Full acquisition 
-0.305+ -0.330 -0.0939 -0.778** 
  (-1.94) (-1.35) (-0.58) (-2.97) 
         
Year fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
_cut1 
-3.494** -3.729** -3.627** -3.739** 
  (-8.32) (-7.68) (-7.92) (-8.05) 
         
_cut2 
-0.339 -0.536 -0.190 -0.801* 
  (-1.04) (-1.31) (-0.54) (-2.06) 
         
Observations 882 826 792 916 
          
Note to Table 4.A: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the controls only without the TMT predictors 
under the specifications of country risk and cultural distance. All these control variables are defined the same way as in Table 
4.1. While the Models 7A and 7B denote high and low country risk conditions; Models 8A and 8B portray higher and lower 
cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Table 4.4: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks.  
 
  Model 9A Model 9B Model 10A Model 10B Model 11A Model 11B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0653** -0.0210       
  (-2.81) (-1.01)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00491+ -0.0000531       
  (1.90) (-0.01)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.362* -0.189     
      (-2.45) (-1.29)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0384 -0.00594     
      (0.47) (-0.04)     
              
National diversity       -0.734+ -0.645+ 
        (-1.90) (-1.69) 
            
(National diversity) 2       2.661+ 3.821 
          (1.69) (1.45) 
            
Firm size 0.0176 0.00291 0.0301 0.0142 -0.0192 -0.00161 
  (0.41) (0.05) (0.67) (0.24) (-0.52) (-0.03) 
              
Transaction value 0.476** 0.430** 0.482** 0.432** 0.472** 0.420** 
  (8.21) (6.75) (8.32) (6.81) (8.15) (6.66) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.0915 -0.311* -0.0833 -0.305* -0.0996 -0.334* 
  (-0.66) (-2.02) (-0.60) (-1.96) (-0.71) (-2.16) 
              
Leverage 0.000284 -0.000294 0.000229 -0.000251 0.000410 -0.000277 
  (0.80) (-0.49) (0.66) (-0.42) (1.20) (-0.45) 
            
Tobins Q -0.159** -0.0898 -0.150* -0.0859 -0.162** -0.0941+ 
  (-2.75) (-1.59) (-2.55) (-1.50) (-2.81) (-1.68) 
              
Target status -0.237 -0.281+ -0.262+ -0.282+ -0.231 -0.275+ 
  (-1.55) (-1.72) (-1.69) (-1.74) (-1.50) (-1.70) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.233 -0.0232 0.245 -0.00515 0.256+ -0.0262 
  (1.52) (-0.16) (1.59) (-0.03) (1.67) (-0.18) 
              
Full acquisition -0.322* -0.354 -0.409* -0.356 -0.321* -0.300 
  (-2.01) (-1.39) (-2.51) (-1.43) (-2.02) (-1.23) 
            
TMT size -0.0530 -0.0252 -0.0662 -0.0267 -0.0424 0.0000741 
  (-1.26) (-0.52) (-1.62) (-0.55) (-1.02) (0.00) 
              
TMT average age 0.0365* 0.0102 0.0360* 0.00781 0.0369* 0.0117 
  (2.11) (0.45) (2.10) (0.33) (2.16) (0.50) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -1.431 -3.350** -1.592+ -3.375** -1.536 -2.980** 
  (-1.51) (-3.20) (-1.70) (-3.23) (-1.64) (-2.78) 
            
_cut2 1.758+ -0.0823 1.599+ -0.106 1.640+ 0.297 
  (1.92) (-0.08) (1.76) (-0.10) (1.80) (0.27) 
            
Observations 882 824 882 824 882 824 
  
            
 
Note to Table 4.4: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and average TMT age and TMT size as added controls. All control variables are defined the same way as in 
Table 4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and ** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks. 
 
  Model 12A Model 12B Model 13A Model 13B Model 14A  Model 14B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0617** -0.0118       
  (-2.63) (-0.56)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00591* 0.00119       
  (2.23) (0.32)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.375* -0.113     
      (-2.51)          (-0.76)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0667  0.00364     
      (0.81)          (0.03)     
              
National diversity       -0.641 -0.613 
        (-1.63) (-1.60) 
            
(National diversity) 2       2.470 3.699 
          (1.57) (1.40) 
            
Firm size 0.0276 0.00036 0.0459 0.0095 -0.0034 -0.0077 
  (0.64) (0.01) (1.03) (0.19) (-0.09) (-0.16) 
              
Transaction value 0.475** 0.436** 0.479** 0.437** 0.470** 0.427** 
  (8.12) (6.79) (8.22) (6.81) (8.04) (6.69) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.172 -0.339* -0.161 -0.336* -0.177 -0.362* 
  (-1.19) (-2.19) (-1.12) (-2.16) (-1.21) (-2.34) 
              
Leverage 0.000347 -0.000251 0.000261 -0.000239 0.000434 -0.000257 
  (0.99) (-0.42) (0.75) (-0.39) (1.28) (-0.41) 
            
Tobins Q -0.163** -0.083 -0.151* -0.0797 -0.165** -0.0856 
  (-2.72) (-1.46) (-2.49) (-1.39) (-2.76) (-1.52) 
              
Target status -0.165 -0.259 -0.199 -0.265 -0.166 -0.262 
  (-1.06) (-1.59) (-1.26) (-1.63) (-1.06) (-1.61) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.229 0.0158 0.235 0.0217 0.240 0.00942 
  (1.49) (0.11) (1.52) (0.14) (1.56) (-0.06) 
              
Full acquisition -0.318* -0.334 -0.404* -0.348 -0.322* -0.302 
  (-1.96) (-1.32) (-2.47) (-1.40) (-2.01) (-1.24) 
            
TMT size -0.0434 -0.0183 -0.060 -0.0215 -0.0402 0.00269 
  (-0.99) (-0.36) (-1.40) (-0.42) (-0.92) (0.05) 
              
TMT age standard deviation 0.0028 -0.00022 -0.00267 -0.00106 -0.00093* -0.00332 
  (0.10) (-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.12) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.118** -3.804** -3.265** -3.782** -3.305** -3.519** 
  (-6.01) (-6.28) (-6.25) (-6.19) (-6.52) (-6.07) 
            
_cut2 0.0863 -0.488 -0.0617 -0.466 -0.114 -0.194 
  (0.19) (-0.93) (-0.14) (-0.89) (-0.27) (-0.38) 
            
Observations 863 813 863 813 863 813 
              
 
Note to Table 4.5: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and standard deviation of TMT age and TMT size as added controls. All control variables are defined the same 
way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances. 
  Model  15A Model 15B Model 16A Model  16B Model 17A Model 17B 
            
Amount of int'l experience -0.0813** -0.0140        
  (-3.39) (-0.69)        
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00726** -0.00147        
  (2.68) (-0.44)        
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.470** -0.148    
      (-3.00) (-1.03)    
             
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0122 0.0992    
      (0.13) (0.88)     
             
National diversity         -0.891* -0.496 
          (-2.17) (-1.36) 
             
(National diversity) 2         1.694 4.583+ 
          (1.03) (1.94) 
              
Firm size 0.0105 0.0150 0.0415 0.0127 -0.0259 0.00552 
  (0.22) (0.31) (0.83) (0.24) (-0.63) (0.12) 
             
Transaction value 0.472** 0.428** 0.484** 0.433** 0.468** 0.422** 
  (7.48) (7.34) (7.66) (7.42) (7.43) (7.34) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.311* -0.122 -0.301* -0.110 -0.328* -0.124 
  (-2.22) (-0.79) (-2.12) (-0.72) (-2.32) (-0.81) 
             
Leverage 0.000573 -0.000388 0.000445 -0.000344 0.000633 -0.000332 
  (1.19) (-1.00) (0.92) (-0.89) (1.31) (-0.83) 
              
Tobins Q -0.168** -0.0908 -0.154** -0.0883 -0.154** -0.105+ 
  (-3.32) (-1.49) (-2.99) (-1.43) (-3.11) (-1.71) 
             
Target status -0.171 -0.214 -0.231 -0.199 -0.195 -0.186 
  (-1.04) (-1.37) (-1.40) (-1.30) (-1.20) (-1.21) 
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.250 -0.0262 0.281+ -0.0170 0.285+ -0.0113 
  (1.56) (-0.18) (1.74) (-0.12) (1.79) (-0.08) 
             
Full acquisition -0.0927 -0.771** -0.195 -0.744** -0.102 -0.716** 
  (-0.55) (-2.85) (-1.17) (-2.72) (-0.62) (-2.71) 
              
TMT size -0.0219 -0.0681 -0.0420 -0.0589 0.00143 -0.0435 
  (-0.51) (-1.44) (-0.98) (-1.29) (0.03) (-0.94) 
              
TMT average age 0.0157 0.0297 0.0210 0.0274 0.0187 0.0308 
  (0.79) (1.51) (1.09) (1.35) (0.98) (1.53) 
             
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
             
_cut1 -2.469* -2.540* -2.340* -2.481* -2.491* -2.128* 
  (-2.40) (-2.47) (-2.31) (-2.42) (-2.49) (-2.06) 
             
_cut2 1.007 0.457 1.156 0.516 0.965 0.877 
  (1.02) (0.44) (1.18) (0.50) (1.00) (0.84) 
              
Observations 792 914 792 914 792 914 
              
 
Note to Table 4.6: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and average TMT age and TMT size as added controls. All control variables are defined the same way as in 
Table 4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances. 
  Model 18A Model 18B Model 19A Model 19B Model 20A Model 20B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0787** -0.00727       
  (-3.29) (-0.34)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00751** -0.000461       
  (2.73) (-0.14)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.463** -0.115     
      (-2.95) (-0.80)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0221 0.132     
      (0.24) (1.18)     
              
National diversity       -0.807+ -0.438 
        (-1.93) (-1.20) 
            
(National diversity) 2       1.535 4.199+ 
          (0.92) (1.78) 
            
Firm size 0.00569 0.0336 0.0404 0.0321 -0.0280 0.0320 
  (0.12) (0.72) (0.83) (0.67) (-0.69) (0.74) 
              
Transaction value 0.485** 0.426** 0.494** 0.432** 0.481** 0.421** 
  (7.53) (7.31) (7.68) (7.37) (7.46) (7.27) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.396** -0.161 -0.391** -0.154 -0.410** -0.166 
  (-2.90) (-1.02) (-2.83) (-0.98) (-2.94) (-1.06) 
              
Leverage 0.000631 -0.000391 0.000505 -0.000371 0.000680 -0.000369 
  (1.29) (-1.02) (1.03) (-0.97) (1.39) (-0.95) 
            
Tobins Q -0.167** -0.0910 -0.153** -0.0864 -0.154** -0.103+ 
  (-3.20) (-1.49) (-2.86) (-1.39) (-2.96) (-1.66) 
              
Target status -0.100 -0.187 -0.158 -0.180 -0.125 -0.175 
  (-0.62) (-1.19) (-0.97) (-1.16) (-0.78) (-1.12) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.261 0.0166 0.288+ 0.0206 0.282+ 0.0280 
  (1.61) (0.12) (1.77) (0.14) (1.76) (0.19) 
              
Full acquisition -0.0858 -0.766** -0.183 -0.729** -0.0980 -0.732** 
  (-0.51) (-2.79) (-1.09) (-2.65) (-0.59) (-2.73) 
            
TMT size -0.0143 -0.0588 -0.0331 -0.0540 0.00664 -0.0390 
  (-0.32) (-1.18) (-0.74) (-1.11) (0.15) (-0.80) 
              
S.D. of TMT age -0.0226 0.0170 -0.0268 0.0198 -0.0255 0.0138 
  (-0.77) (0.62) (-0.92) (0.73) (-0.88) (0.50) 
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
            
_cut1 -3.373** -3.745** -3.502** -3.570** -3.576** -3.447** 
  (-6.27) (-6.16) (-6.39) (-5.98) (-6.63) (-6.25) 
            
_cut2 0.148 -0.724 0.0358 -0.547 -0.0750 -0.418 
  (0.32) (-1.35) (0.08) (-1.05) (-0.17) (-0.86) 
              
Observations 780 896 780 896 780 896 
              
 
Note to Table 4.7: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and standard deviation of TMT age and TMT size as added controls. All control variables are defined the same 
way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. +, *, and 
**
 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks.  
 
  Model 21A Model 21A Model 22A Model 22B Model 23A Model 23B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0612** -0.0252       
  (-2.74) (-1.18)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00533* -0.00111       
  (2.17) (-0.30)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.342* -0.216     
      (-2.43) (-1.40)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0870 0.0135     
      (1.11) (0.10)     
              
National diversity       -0.724+ -0.708+ 
        (-1.94) (-1.82) 
            
(National diversity) 2       3.638* 4.731* 
          (2.18) (1.96) 
            
Firm size 0.150** 0.236** 0.157** 0.243** 0.115** 0.226** 
  (3.87) (4.22) (3.85) (4.30) (3.37) (4.36) 
              
Bigger relative deal size 0.887** 1.414** 0.901** 1.428** 0.867** 1.374** 
  (5.62) (7.51) (5.71) (7.60) (5.51) (7.45) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.0631 -0.343* -0.0559 -0.335* -0.0714 -0.374** 
  (-0.48) (-2.40) (-0.43) (-2.32) (-0.55) (-2.61) 
              
Leverage 0.000400 -0.000995+ 0.000346 -0.000961 0.000517 -0.000978 
  (1.09) (-1.72) (0.95) (-1.63) (1.44) (-1.57) 
            
Tobins Q -0.118* -0.0236 -0.108* -0.0198 -0.124* -0.0321 
  (-2.24) (-0.41) (-2.03) (-0.34) (-2.36) (-0.57) 
              
Target status -0.362* -0.432** -0.383* -0.431** -0.360* -0.411* 
  (-2.40) (-2.61) (-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.38) (-2.50) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.0831 -0.110 0.0917 -0.0875 0.106 -0.0987 
  (0.54) (-0.71) (0.59) (-0.57) (0.69) (-0.65) 
              
Full acquisition -0.309+ -0.431+ -0.368* -0.420+ -0.311* -0.351 
  (-1.96) (-1.69) (-2.29) (-1.68) (-1.98) (-1.43) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -2.467** -2.442** -2.529** -2.312** -2.580** -2.176** 
  (-5.75) (-4.55) (-5.84) (-4.17) (-6.17) (-4.25) 
            
_cut2 0.561 0.711 0.496 0.837+ 0.439 0.984* 
  (1.50) (1.43) (1.33) (1.65) (1.22) (2.03) 
            
Observations 882 826 882 826 882 826 
              
 
Note to Table 4.8: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and relative deal size as added control. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 4.1. Models 
marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
 
Table 4.9: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances.  
 
  Model 24A Model 24B Model 25A Model 25B Model 26A Model 26B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0811** -0.0145       
  (-3.48) (-0.70)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00731** -0.0021       
  (2.76) (-0.68)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.473** -0.157     
      (-3.12) (-1.08)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0899 0.0849     
      (1.05) (0.75)     
              
National diversity       -0.869* -0.539 
        (-2.20) (-1.46) 
            
(National diversity) 2       3.173+ 5.262* 
          (1.84) (2.28) 
            
Firm size 0.167** 0.207** 0.191** 0.209** 0.129** 0.200** 
  (3.80) (4.41) (4.06) (4.31) (3.31) (4.56) 
              
Bigger relative deal size 1.170** 1.096** 1.180** 1.113** 1.122** 1.073** 
  (6.50) (6.75) (6.59) (6.88) (6.32) (6.69) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.306* -0.130 -0.299* -0.115 -0.330* -0.135** 
  (-2.33) (-0.92) (-2.26) (-0.81) (-2.53) (-0.96) 
              
Leverage 0.000720 -0.000957* 0.000614 -0.000915* 0.000827+ -0.000901* 
  (1.52) (-2.29) (1.30) (-2.16) (1.73) (-2.06) 
            
Tobins Q -0.131** -0.0313 -0.116* -0.0271 -0.118* -0.0493 
  (-2.68) (-0.55) (-2.32) (-0.47) (-2.44) (-0.88) 
              
Target status -0.325* -0.376* -0.373* -0.359* -0.340* -0.343* 
  (-2.07) (-2.39) (-2.37) (-2.32) (-2.16) (-2.22) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.111 -0.126 0.132 -0.114 0.152 -0.107 
  (0.68) (-0.87) (0.81) (-0.79) (0.94) (-0.74) 
              
Full acquisition -0.135 -0.803** -0.207 -0.777** -0.139 -0.732** 
  (-0.81) (-3.00) (-1.25) (-2.91) (-0.85) (-2.77) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -2.395** -2.811** -2.409** -2.635** -2.577** -2.479** 
  (-5.08) (-5.42) (-5.06) (-5.09) (-5.60) (-5.20) 
            
_cut2 0.959* 0.059 0.943* 0.230 0.755+ 0.398* 
  (2.30) (0.13) (2.24) (0.50) (1.88) (0.92) 
            
Observations 792 916 792 916 792 916 
              
 
Note to Table 4.9: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all controls 
as in Table 4.A and relative deal size as added control. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 4.1. Models 
marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks.  
  
 
Model 27A Model 27B Model 28A Model 28B Model 29A Model 29B 
            
Amount of int'l experience -0.0737** -0.0415+       
  (-2.82) (-1.88)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00775** 0.00110       
  (2.81) (0.27)       
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.404* -0.321*     
      (-2.47) (-2.04)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.102 0.0222     
      (1.14) (0.15)     
            
National diversity       -0.690+ -0.886* 
        (-1.72) (-2.24) 
            
(National diversity) 2       1.631 3.619 
        (0.92) (1.36) 
              
Firm size 0.0519 -0.00393 0.0502 0.00428 0.0134 -0.0137 
  (1.06) (-0.07) (1.04) (0.08) (0.32) (-0.27) 
            
Transaction value 0.455** 0.442** 0.458** 0.446** 0.447** 0.428** 
  (7.69) (6.66) (7.67) (6.72) (7.58) (6.50) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.111 -0.406* -0.0963 -0.400* -0.114 -0.457** 
  (-0.74) (-2.47) (-0.64) (-2.41) (-0.76) (-2.74) 
            
Leverage 0.000216 -0.000841 0.000150 -0.000795 0.000299 -0.000838 
  (0.62) (-1.36) (0.44) (-1.26) (0.89) (-1.27) 
              
Tobins Q -0.184** -0.154* -0.174** -0.151* -0.185** -0.157* 
  (-3.60) (-2.34) (-3.30) (-2.27) (-3.50) (-2.47) 
            
Target status -0.327* -0.407* -0.374* -0.411* -0.331* -0.410* 
  (-1.98) (-2.34) (-2.22) (-2.37) (-2.00) (-2.37) 
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.249 0.0360 0.255 0.0643 0.264 0.0267 
  (1.50) (0.23) (1.54) (0.41) (1.61) (0.17) 
            
Full acquisition -0.439** -0.425 -0.526** -0.432 -0.435** -0.384 
  (-2.59) (-1.53) (-3.00) (-1.59) (-2.61) (-1.46) 
              
3-year prior firm acquisition experience -0.0224 0.0230 -0.0142 0.0240 -0.0163 0.0271+ 
  (-1.47) (1.43) (-0.93) (1.48) (-1.07) (1.68) 
              
(3-year prior firm acquisition experience)2 0.000391 -0.00253 0.0000955 -0.00256 -0.000130 -0.00262 
  (0.23) (-1.48) (0.06) (-1.49) (-0.07) (-1.47) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -2.888** -4.280** -3.123** -4.201** -3.247** -4.200** 
  (-5.22) (-6.90) (-5.72) (-6.58) (-6.30) (-7.04) 
            
_cut2 0.296 -0.930+ 0.0495 -0.850 -0.0877 -0.847 
  (0.62) (-1.67) (0.11) (-1.50) (-0.20) (-1.56) 
            
Observations 789 776 789 776 789 776 
              
 
Note to Table 4.10: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A and 3-year prior firm-level acquisition experience as added control. All control variables are defined 
the same way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and 
**
 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.11: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances.  
  Model 30A Model 30B Model 31A Model 31B Model 32A Model 32B 
            
Amount of int'l experience -0.0947** -0.0282       
  (-3.53) (-1.29)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00900** 0.000738       
  (3.02) (0.22)       
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.514** -0.252+     
      (-2.97) (-1.66)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0571 0.0997     
      (0.54) (0.89)     
            
National diversity       -0.915* -0.668+ 
        (-2.15) (-1.76) 
            
(National diversity) 2       0.954 3.810 
        (0.50) (1.63) 
              
Firm size 0.0339 0.0194 0.0418 0.0224 -0.00819 0.0108 
  (0.63) (0.38) (0.77) (0.43) (-0.18) (0.23) 
            
Transaction value 0.498** 0.408** 0.506** 0.414** 0.491** 0.398** 
  (7.36) (6.91) (7.49) (6.97) (7.31) (6.80) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.315* -0.220 -0.301* -0.211 -0.336* -0.241 
  (-2.10) (-1.40) (-1.96) (-1.34) (-2.20) (-1.53) 
            
Leverage 0.000495 -0.000809* 0.000417 -0.000787+ 0.000594 -0.000764+ 
  (1.01) (-1.96) (0.85) (-1.91) (1.21) (-1.79) 
              
Tobins Q -0.149** -0.195** -0.135** -0.191** -0.133** -0.205** 
  (-2.95) (-2.73) (-2.59) (-2.66) (-2.62) (-2.87) 
            
Target status -0.253 -0.321+ -0.337+ -0.322+ -0.291+ -0.306+ 
  (-1.45) (-1.89) (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.69) (-1.82) 
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.269 0.0472 0.298+ 0.0634 0.320+ 0.0448 
  (1.57) (0.32) (1.74) (0.42) (1.89) (0.30) 
            
Full acquisition -0.202 -0.867** -0.321+ -0.887** -0.218 -0.842** 
  (-1.12) (-3.00) (-1.77) (-3.02) (-1.25) (-2.96) 
              
3-year prior firm acquisition experience -0.00910 0.00847 0.00126 0.00966 -0.00248 0.0116 
  (-0.58) (0.55) (0.08) (0.63) (-0.16) (0.75) 
            
(3-year prior firm acquisition experience)2 -0.000636 -0.00180 -0.000766 -0.00188 -0.000829 -0.00209 
  (-0.36) (-1.14) (-0.43) (-1.19) (-0.45) (-1.30) 
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
            
_cut1 -3.192** -4.089** -3.453** -4.016** -3.614** -3.985** 
  (-5.20) (-6.83) (-5.66) (-6.69) (-6.27) (-7.07) 
            
_cut2 0.435 -1.148* 0.179 -1.073* -0.0134 -1.041* 
  (0.85) (-2.15) (0.36) (-2.02) (-0.03) (-2.07) 
              
Observations 711 854 711 854 711 854 
              
 
Note to Table 4.11: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A and 3-year prior firm-level acquisition experience as added control. All control variables are defined 
the same way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. 
+
,
 *
, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.12: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks.  
  Model 33A Model 33B Model 34A Model 34B Model 35A Model 35B 
            
Amount of int'l experience -0.0721** -0.0351       
  (-2.75) (-1.60)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00779** 0.000994       
  (2.82) (0.24)       
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.403* -0.305+     
      (-2.46) (-1.94)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.104 0.0209     
      (1.15) (0.14)     
            
National diversity       -0.704+ -0.754+ 
        (-1.75) (-1.94) 
            
(National diversity) 2       1.862 3.598 
        (1.03) (1.35) 
              
Firm size 0.0490 -0.0265 0.0476 -0.0140 0.0108 -0.0347 
  (0.97) (-0.45) (0.95) (-0.24) (0.25) (-0.65) 
            
Transaction value 0.458** 0.453** 0.460** 0.457** 0.449** 0.440** 
  (7.73) (6.75) (7.71) (6.82) (7.64) (6.61) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.115 -0.408* -0.0988 -0.401* -0.117 -0.451** 
  (-0.77) (-2.44) (-0.66) (-2.38) (-0.77) (-2.68) 
            
Leverage 0.000197 -0.000809 0.000143 -0.000768 0.000273 -0.000805 
  (0.56) (-1.30) (0.42) (-1.23) (0.81) (-1.23) 
              
Tobins Q -0.185** -0.200** -0.175** -0.199** -0.185** -0.202** 
  (-3.56) (-3.04) (-3.28) (-2.99) (-3.46) (-3.14) 
            
Target status -0.326* -0.425* -0.376* -0.430* -0.334* -0.425* 
  (-1.97) (-2.44) (-2.23) (-2.46) (-2.01) (-2.45) 
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.241 0.0131 0.250 0.0411 0.255 0.00464 
  (1.45) (0.08) (1.51) (0.26) (1.54) (0.03) 
            
Full acquisition -0.436* -0.482+ -0.525** -0.491+ -0.437** -0.437+ 
  (-2.57) (-1.75) (-2.99) (-1.82) (-2.61) (-1.67) 
              
5-year prior firm acquisition experience -0.0140 0.0296* -0.00808 0.0300* -0.0101 0.0316** 
  (-1.36) (2.46) (-0.78) (2.47) (-0.96) (2.64) 
            
(5-year prior firm acquisition experience)2 -0.000268 0.000811 -0.000170 0.000900 -0.000527 0.000710 
  (-0.29) (0.95) (-0.18) (1.05) (-0.58) (0.84) 
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
            
_cut1 -2.942** -4.484** -3.160** -4.370** -3.298** -4.384** 
  (-5.17) (-7.07) (-5.62) (-6.68) (-6.19) (-7.23) 
            
_cut2 0.242 -1.099* 0.0120 -0.981+ -0.138 -0.995+ 
  (0.49) (-1.96) (0.02) (-1.72) (-0.31) (-1.83) 
              
Observations 789 776 789 776 789 776 
              
 
Note to Table 4.12: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A and 5-year prior firm-level acquisition experience as added control. All control variables are defined 
the same way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and 
**
 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.13: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances. 
  Model 36A Model 36B Model 37A Model 37B Model 38A Model 38B 
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0928** -0.0277       
  (-3.48) (-1.27)       
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00835** 0.000821       
  (2.77) (0.24)         
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.513** -0.252+     
      (-2.97) (-1.66)     
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0321 0.0973     
      (0.29) (0.88)     
              
National diversity       -0.858* -0.661+ 
        (-2.04) (-1.76) 
            
(National diversity) 2       0.723 3.634 
          (0.37) (1.59) 
            
Firm size 0.0231 0.00731 0.0293 0.0119 -0.0231 -0.000358 
  (0.41) (0.14) (0.51) (0.23) (-0.47) (-0.01) 
              
Transaction value 0.499** 0.412** 0.510** 0.417** 0.495** 0.402** 
  (7.32) (7.03) (7.44) (7.09) (7.26) (6.92) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.319* -0.205 -0.304* -0.195 -0.338* -0.225 
  (-2.11) (-1.29) (-1.97) (-1.23) (-2.20) (-1.41) 
              
Leverage 0.000528 -0.000738+ 0.000464 -0.000716+ 0.000646 -0.000692 
  (1.08) (-1.77) (0.95) (-1.72) (1.32) (-1.61) 
            
Tobins Q -0.167** -0.208** -0.160** -0.205** -0.149** -0.218** 
  (-3.51) (-2.98) (-3.28) (-2.91) (-3.15) (-3.09) 
              
Target status -0.278 -0.330+ -0.365* -0.331* -0.312+ -0.315+ 
  (-1.59) (-1.95) (-2.06) (-1.97) (-1.81) (-1.88) 
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.275 0.0292 0.311+ 0.0456 0.325+ 0.0246 
  (1.60) (0.19) (1.81) (0.30) (1.92) (0.17) 
              
Full acquisition -0.226 -0.901** -0.355+ -0.923** -0.238 -0.879** 
  (-1.25) (-3.10) (-1.94) (-3.12) (-1.36) (-3.07) 
            
5-year prior firm acquisition experience 0.000660 0.0173 0.00844 0.0180 0.00542 0.0190+ 
  (0.06) (1.52) (0.75) (1.57) (0.49) (1.66) 
              
(5-year prior firm acquisition experience)2 0.000777 0.000281 0.000974 0.000309 0.000562 0.000158 
  (0.83) (0.26) (1.07) (0.28) (0.60) (0.14) 
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.255** -4.184** -3.531** -4.100** -3.708** -4.085** 
  (-5.16) (-6.94) (-5.60) (-6.74) (-6.27) (-7.13) 
            
_cut2 0.378 -1.236* 0.115 -1.149* -0.102 -1.132* 
  (0.71) (-2.29) (0.22) (-2.14) (-0.21) (-2.20) 
            
Observations 711 854 711 854 711 854 
              
 
Note to Table 4.13: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A and 5-year prior firm-level acquisition experience as added control. All control variables are defined 
the same way as in Table 4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. 
+
,
 *
, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
154 
 
Table 4.14: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risk and cultural distance. 
  Model 39A Model 39B Model 40A Model 40B   
      
    
Average years of target 
country experience 
-0.0510 -0.0176 -0.0104 0.0262 
  
(-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.08) (0.50) 
  
       
(Average years of target 
country experience)2 0.00813 0.00137 -0.035 -0.00154 
  
(0.79) (0.17) (-1.12) (-0.23)    
         
Firm size -0.0315 0.00908 -0.0328 0.017 
  (-0.96) (0.20) (-0.90) (0.42) 
          
Transaction value 0.465** 0.433** 0.464** 0.419** 
  (8.02) (6.57) (7.45) (7.18) 
         
Lagged abnormal return -0.124 -0.354* -0.298* -0.163 
  (-0.84) (-2.31) (-2.01) (-1.04)    
          
Leverage 0.000397 -0.000878 0.000706 -0.000796+   
  (1.20) (-1.41) (1.45) (-1.87)    
         
Tobins Q -0.176** -0.102+ -0.170** -0.119*   
  (-3.06) (-1.81) (-3.33) (-1.97)    
          
Target status -0.237 -0.303+ -0.189 -0.219 
  (-1.55) (-1.87) (-1.20) (-1.41)    
         
Diversifying acquisition 0.238 0.00529 0.299+ -0.0128 
  (1.56) (0.04) (1.86) (-0.09)    
          
Full acquisition -0.299+ -0.324 -0.0726 -0.782**  
  (-1.90) (-1.32) (-0.44) (-2.99)    
  
       
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
          
_cut1 -3.419** -3.697** -3.674** -3.779** 
  (-7.75) (-7.43) (-7.36) (-7.96)    
         
_cut2 -0.260 -0.504 -0.194 -0.841*   
  (-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.48) (-2.09)    
         
Observations 882 826 792 916 
          
 
Note to Table 4.14: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A and target country knowledge as added control. All control variables are defined the same way as in 
Table 4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and cultural distance respectively and those marked B shows low country 
risk and cultural distance respectively. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.15: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks.  
  Model 41A Model 41B Model 42A Model 42B Model 43A Model 43B   
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0632* -0.0258                     
  (-2.38) (-0.95)                     
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00642* -0.00124                     
  (2.35) (-0.27)                       
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.360* -0.225                   
      (-2.06) (-1.19)                   
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0552 0.0087                   
      (0.55) (0.05)                   
              
National diversity       -0.731 -0.623 
        (-1.64) (-1.18)    
            
(National diversity) 2       2.651 3.784 
          (1.39) (1.21) 
            
Firm size 0.0129 0.0323 0.0267 0.0381 -0.0134 0.0276 
  (0.28) (0.54) (0.59) (0.62) (-0.32) (0.48) 
              
Transaction value 0.466** 0.432** 0.470** 0.437** 0.459** 0.421** 
  (7.31) (5.76) (7.24) (5.77) (7.17) (5.50) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.115 -0.346* -0.107 -0.338* -0.123 -0.376*   
  (-0.79) (-2.07) (-0.73) (-1.99) (-0.82) (-2.23)    
              
Leverage 0.000316 -0.000894 0.000211 -0.000855 0.000396 -0.000887 
  (0.71) (-1.10) (0.50) (-1.02) (0.95) (-1.02)    
            
Tobins Q -0.172* -0.0974 -0.161* -0.0936 -0.173* -0.102 
  (-2.45) (-1.34) (-2.28) (-1.24) (-2.52) (-1.42)    
              
Target status -0.231 -0.319+ -0.268+ -0.318+ -0.238 -0.304+   
  (-1.47) (-1.88) (-1.66) (-1.87) (-1.49) (-1.82)    
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.216 -0.00951 0.222 0.0137 0.232 -0.00572 
  (1.38) (-0.06) (1.41) (0.09) (1.47) (-0.04)    
              
Full acquisition -0.316+ -0.372 -0.404* -0.364 -0.322+ -0.302 
  (-1.85) (-1.26) (-2.41) (-1.27) (-1.88) (-1.10)    
            
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.085** -3.622** -3.191** -3.500** -3.240** -3.383** 
  (-5.74) (-5.83) (-5.88) (-5.43) (-6.26) (-5.69)    
            
_cut2 0.0963 -0.42 -0.0127 -0.30 -0.0742 -0.18 
  (0.23) (-0.83) (-0.03) (-0.58) (-0.18) (-0.36)    
            
Observations 882 826 882 826 882 826 
                            
 
Note to Table 4.15: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A with clustering at the acquirer firms’ level. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 
4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and ** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.16: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances. 
  Model 44A Model 44B Model 45A Model 45B Model 46A Model 46B 
             
Amount of int'l experience -0.0798** -0.0197                     
  (-2.88) (-0.75)                     
             
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00789** -0.00135                      
  (2.89) (-0.34)                      
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.454* -0.20                  
      (-2.52) (-1.08)                  
             
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0149 0.119                  
      (0.16) (0.92)                   
             
National diversity         -0.863+ -0.478 
          (-1.78) (-1.00)    
             
(National diversity) 2         1.645 4.745+   
          (0.84) (1.71) 
              
Firm size 0.0102 0.0404 0.04 0.0403 -0.0144 0.0327 
  (0.20) (0.74) (0.86) (0.70) (-0.33) (0.65) 
             
Transaction value 0.471** 0.424** 0.481** 0.431** 0.465** 0.416** 
  (6.90) (6.55) (6.90) (6.63) (6.80) (6.42) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.323* -0.166 -0.313* -0.153 -0.343* -0.172 
  (-2.24) (-0.96) (-2.08) (-0.89) (-2.28) (-0.98)    
             
Leverage 0.000592 -0.000861 0.000437 -0.00082 0.000655 -0.000812 
  (1.42) (-1.46) (0.95) (-1.37) (1.56) (-1.32)    
              
Tobins Q -0.170** -0.109 -0.158** -0.104 -0.154** -0.126 
  (-3.13) (-1.27) (-2.77) (-1.20) (-2.77) (-1.55)    
             
Target status -0.16 -0.255 -0.223 -0.238 -0.181 -0.219 
  (-0.91) (-1.60) (-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.02) (-1.40)    
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.249 -0.0115 0.273+ 0.000593 0.280+ 0.00433 
  (1.48) (-0.08) (1.66) (0.00) (1.68) (0.03) 
             
Full acquisition -0.0856 -0.822** -0.185 -0.799** -0.0963 -0.757**  
  (-0.47) (-3.04) (-1.04) (-2.86) (-0.54) (-2.89)    
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
             
_cut1 -3.155** -3.686** -3.241** -3.516** -3.361** -3.410** 
  (-5.50) (-6.26) (-5.88) (-5.76) (-6.19) (-6.08)    
             
_cut2 0.321 -0.742 0.251 -0.573 0.0932 -0.461 
  (0.70) (-1.49) (0.58) (-1.12) (0.23) (-0.95)    
              
Observations 792 916 792 916 792 916 
              
 
Note to Table 4.16: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A with clustering at the acquirer firms’ level. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 
4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.17: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments in presence of high and low country risks. 
  Model 47A Model 47B Model 48A Model 48B Model 49A Model 49B   
              
Amount of int'l experience -0.0632** -0.0258                     
  (-2.86) (-1.51)                     
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00642** -0.00124                     
  (2.65) (-0.34)                       
            
Range of int'l experience     -0.360* -0.225**                   
      (-2.53) (-2.63)                   
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0552 0.0087                   
      (0.66) (0.06)                   
              
National diversity       -0.731* -0.623+   
        (-2.41) (-1.68)    
            
(National diversity) 2       2.651+ 3.784*   
          (1.78) (1.96) 
            
Firm size 0.0129 0.0323 0.0267 0.0381 -0.0134 0.0276 
  (0.32) (0.66) (0.64) (0.81) (-0.36) (0.52) 
              
Transaction value 0.466** 0.432** 0.470** 0.437** 0.459** 0.421** 
  (8.70) (9.09) (8.86) (8.73) (8.63) (8.70) 
            
Lagged abnormal return -0.115 -0.346** -0.107 -0.338** -0.123 -0.376** 
  (-0.73) (-3.27) (-0.69) (-3.19) (-0.76) (-3.78)    
              
Leverage 0.000316 -0.000894+ 0.000211 -0.000855+ 0.000396 -0.000887+   
  (0.82) (-1.90) (0.57) (-1.71) (1.09) (-1.82)    
            
Tobins Q -0.172** -0.0974+ -0.161** -0.0936+ -0.173** -0.102*   
  (-3.72) (-1.72) (-3.45) (-1.66) (-3.69) (-2.23)    
              
Target status -0.231 -0.319+ -0.268 -0.318+ -0.238 -0.304+   
  (-1.29) (-1.87) (-1.44) (-1.95) (-1.29) (-1.94)    
            
Diversifying acquisition 0.216 -0.00951 0.222 0.0137 0.232 -0.00572 
  (1.37) (-0.06) (1.45) (0.09) (1.50) (-0.04)    
              
Full acquisition -0.316+ -0.372 -0.404* -0.364 -0.322+ -0.302 
  (-1.80) (-1.26) (-2.21) (-1.35) (-1.83) (-1.25)    
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
            
_cut1 -3.085** -3.622** -3.191** -3.500** -3.240** -3.383** 
  (-6.68) (-10.63) (-6.77) (-9.46) (-6.78) (-7.82)    
            
_cut2 0.0963 -0.42 -0.0127 -0.3 -0.0742 -0.18 
  (0.25) (-1.50) (-0.03) (-1.02) (-0.19) (-0.56)    
              
Observations 882 826 882 826 882 826 
                           
 
Note to Table 4.17: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A with clustering at the target country-level. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 
4.1. Models marked A show high country risk and those marked B shows low country risk. +, *, and ** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.18: Ordered logistic regressions models on the probability of choosing pure cash or mixed payments over pure stock 
payments due to high and low cultural distances.  
  Model 50A Model 50B Model 51A Model 51B Model 52A Mode 52B    
            
Amount of int'l experience -0.0798** -0.0197                     
  (-4.38) (-0.99)                     
            
(Amount of int’l experience)2 0.00789** -0.00135                     
  (3.16) (-0.48)                     
              
Range of int'l experience     -0.454** -0.200+                   
      (-3.07) (-1.65)                   
            
(Range of int’l experience)2     0.0149 0.119                   
      (0.17) (1.15)                   
            
National diversity       -0.863* -0.478 
        (-2.34) (-1.41)    
            
(National diversity) 2       1.645 4.745** 
        (1.20) (4.33) 
              
Firm size 0.0102 0.0404 0.04 0.0403 -0.0144 0.0327 
  (0.23) (0.88) (0.81) (0.87) (-0.32) (0.73) 
            
Transaction value 0.471** 0.424** 0.481** 0.431** 0.465** 0.416** 
  (7.24) (9.04) (7.59) (8.51) (7.23) (8.61) 
              
Lagged abnormal return -0.323+ -0.166 -0.313+ -0.153 -0.343* -0.172 
  (-1.92) (-0.87) (-1.84) (-0.82) (-2.09) (-0.86)    
            
Leverage 0.000592 -0.000861* 0.000437 -0.000820+ 0.000655 -0.000812+   
  (1.02) (-2.03) (0.74) (-1.84) (1.14) (-1.84)    
              
Tobins Q -0.170** -0.109 -0.158** -0.104 -0.154** -0.126+   
  (-3.80) (-1.45) (-3.41) (-1.37) (-3.50) (-1.74)    
            
Target status -0.16 -0.255 -0.223 -0.238 -0.181 -0.219 
  (-0.73) (-1.22) (-0.99) (-1.15) (-0.82) (-1.07)    
              
Diversifying acquisition 0.249 -0.0115 0.273+ 0.000593 0.280+ 0.00433 
  (1.59) (-0.07) (1.73) (0.00) (1.83) (0.03) 
            
Full acquisition -0.0856 -0.822** -0.185 -0.799** -0.0963 -0.757**  
  (-0.40) (-3.51) (-0.85) (-3.36) (-0.47) (-2.75)    
              
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
              
_cut1 -3.155** -3.686** -3.241** -3.516** -3.361** -3.410** 
  (-5.28) (-9.31) (-5.24) (-8.39) (-5.57) (-7.88)    
            
_cut2 0.321 -0.742* 0.251 -0.573 0.0932 -0.461 
  (0.64) (-2.11) (0.47) (-1.45) (0.19) (-1.12)    
            
Observations 792 916 792 916 792 916 
              
 
Note to Table 4.18: The table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients for the mean-centred TMT predictors, all 
controls as in Table 4.A with clustering at the target country-level. All control variables are defined the same way as in Table 
4.1. Models marked A show high cultural distance and those marked B shows low cultural distance. +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Moderating effects of TMT international orientation on announcement 
outcomes of serial acquirers  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Undoubtedly corporate takeover decisions involve substantial investments, therefore warrant 
considerable attention, especially when there are frequent acquisitions. The same issue is 
perhaps more relevant to the firms undertaking recurrent acquisition decisions abroad, being 
associated with inherent uncertainties and risks. Given its growing importance, the voluminous 
literature for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has looked at different factors 
affecting shareholder value such as; environmental uncertainties, firm and deal features and 
personal attributes of managers such as experience, personality, etc. (Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Yet, the examination of value creation by these serial acquirers9 in isolation from the single 
acquirers, is relatively scarce, particularly as far as their international expansions are 
concerned. We therefore, try to fill this gap by exclusively concentrating in this chapter on 
what are the key factors which might have a bearing on the announcement returns to these 
sequential bidding firms, transcending domestic borders.        
 
Hietala, Kaplan & Robinson (2000) argued that stock price reactions to acquiring firms’ 
takeover announcements, may signal a mass of relevant information including synergies 
involved, apparent valuation of targets as well as the acquirer firms, etc. Therefore, it could 
also be difficult to attempt to segregate the market responses in respect of cross-border 
acquisition announcements. Fuller et al., (2002) studied only firms acquiring a certain number 
of targets within a fixed time frame in their sample period. This was in order to examine other 
characteristics influencing the returns, holding their specific features constant. We follow 
Fuller et al., 2002 in choosing to focus on the stock returns of a sample solely comprising of 
repeated bidders. We distinguish a firm as ‘serial acquirer’, if it engaged in more than one 
cross-country acquisition within our entire sample period and analyse the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around each announcement of cross-border acquisition by the same bidding 
firm. Prior research (e.g., Stegemoller, 2001; Conn, Cosh, Guest & Hughes, 2004; Kengelbach, 
Klemmer, Schwetzler & Sperling, 2012; etc.) had mostly investigated the performances of 
                                                          
9
 All the terms ‘multiple bidders’, ‘repeated acquirers’,’ frequent acquirers’ ‘sequential acquiring firms’, etc. have been used 
in this chapter interchangeably to denote ‘serial acquirers’. 
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serial acquirers together with the one-time acquirers, opining that the latter group lagged behind 
the former in generating shareholder wealth. In this chapter, instead of looking at a similar 
comparison, we delve deeper into performance of only the multiple bidding firms, exploring 
the possible explanations behind such outcomes. 
 
However, the above view seems to be only partly substantiated by extant studies, specifically 
while analysing each consequent deals by serial acquirers. The previous researches (e.g. 
Schipper & Thompson, 1983; Loderer & Martin, 1990; etc.) looked into whether merger 
programmes generated higher returns in later deals. Their findings at best, indicated that in 
such programmes, successive returns were more likely to diminish. However, the later 
researches (e.g. Haleblian & Finkelstein 1999; Fuller et al., 2002; Billet & Qian, 2008; Aktas, 
et al., 2011; 2013; etc.) documented mixed results with divergent interpretations. These 
explanations put forward, underscoring different theories primarily pertaining to organizational 
learning (Hayward, 2002), managerial empire-building tendencies (Jensen, 1986), 
overconfidence or hubris (Roll, 1986), overvaluation (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003), and 
indigestion (Conn et al., 2004). Building upon these diverse postulates, in this chapter we 
explore two of the popularly focused upon theories in corporate finance, i.e. organisational 
learning (e.g. Aktas et al., 2013) and indigestion (e.g. Conn et al., 2004). Essentially we attempt 
to demystify which of the predicted effects either of learning or that of indigestion, 
predominantly influences the cross-border announcement abnormal returns to these multiple 
bidder firms.  
 
In our earlier chapters, we had discussed how some of the individual qualities of top executives 
on the boards of bidding companies including, international career experiences or host country 
knowledge, may shape their personalities, thereby get reflected in their decisions and outcomes. 
We also examined how these executive characteristics as well as a diverse mix of nationalities 
influenced their supposed ‘international orientation’ and thereby the decision-making process 
of the entire team. Furthermore, our results in the previous chapters suggested that the presence 
of such an internationally orientated team by itself may not be a sufficient condition to ensure 
superior strategic decisions in international acquisitions, leading to improved performances. In 
particular, we suggested a balance of such orientation amongst the top managers to benefit 
acquiring firms in respect of these two interrelated aspects. In this chapter, we investigate 
whether this postulated global-orientation of the TMTs of these serial acquirers, has any 
moderating effect on either learning or indigestion. In other words, we look into the following 
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additional questions in regard to consequent market reactions to the announcements of cross-
country acquisitions by frequent bidders, from the perspective of their TMT ‘international 
orientation’: (1) how does the TMT ‘international orientation’ of these firms affect either of 
these postulated effects? (2) if indigestion issues from frequent cross-border acquisition 
announcements are dominant, can such orientation alleviate it? (3) if experiential learning is 
prevalent, does the so-called learning from prior TMT orientation provide a stimulus to 
augment this learning effect further? Therefore, in this chapter we extend the notion of 
‘organizational learning’ (e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998) to experiential learning, if any, 
by the TMTs of these serial bidders pursuing international acquisition strategies. 
 
Our univariate analysis of three-day cumulative abnormal returns suggested ‘acquisition 
indigestion’ issues to be predominant. Our multivariate tests with 1777 cross-border 
announcements by 278 frequent bidder firms on the one hand, partly supported the univariate 
results of ‘indigestion effect’. On the other hand, we failed to detect any learning effect for 
these firms. In this respect, our results represented a departure from Aktas et al., (2011; 2013). 
Further, our analyses generally espoused a non-linear positive moderating effect of an 
optimally high number of internationally experienced TMT executives. This effect seemed to 
mitigate the adverse influences of both the number of past foreign acquisitions and the earlier 
cumulative transaction values by an acquirer. Our results mostly implied that it is only after a 
certain cut-off level of TMT orientation that a frequent bidder may benefit from this positive 
moderating impact, thereby corroborating our findings in the earlier chapters.         
 
This chapter attempts to make the following contributions: Firstly, we aim to study the 
plausible factors which have been identified by prior literature (e.g. Hayward, 2002; Conn et 
al., 2004; Billett & Qian, 2008; Aktas et al., 2013, etc.) to interpret their relative strengths 
affecting the cross-border announcement returns to the frequently acquiring firms. Thus, we 
also add to the relatively scant empirical evidence of studies focusing only on the overall 
performances of these firms. Secondly, this chapter also tries to link these factors with the 
incidence of a globally-oriented TMT to investigate whether the latter moderates the 
relationship between those factors and the successive returns of these bidders. Moreover, it 
further examines the nature of these moderating effects, delineating under what circumstances 
these observed effects may differ. Thirdly, contending about an optimal combination of so-
called globally oriented top executive team, we highlighted the practical but essential aspect of 
TMT orientation that had also been emphasized in our previous chapters, but hitherto under-
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researched in all the ‘upper echelons’, international business and the emergent stream of 
behavioral corporate finance. The second and third points are what we consider our prime 
contribution to the extant literature on serial acquirers. Fourthly, our research setting of cross-
border acquisitions helps us to distinguish the conditions under which different facets of TMT 
‘international orientation’ could have different effects on acquisition performances. For 
instance, the results here mostly supported our notion of the initial negative effect of the number 
of internationally experienced managers in contrast to that of a positive influence of the number 
of years of host country familiarity. Therefore, in this respect, our study not only offered a more 
nuanced picture of TMT proxies in comparison to composite measure of TMT employed in 
earlier papers (cf Nielsen, 2010). Last but not the least, we extend the conception of 
‘organisational learning’ from frequent acquisitions, complementing it with TMT-level 
orientation and learning.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Beginning with the theories explaining serial 
acquirers’ performances, we briefly review the background extant literature. The subsequent 
sections develops the research hypotheses built upon the motivating theories discussed in the 
first section, followed by the research design used and description of sample construction. 
Finally we discuss the empirical results of our testable hypotheses. The concluding section 
discusses the implications and limitations of this chapter, while making some suggestions for 
future research. 
 
5.2 Theoretical motivation 
The following prevailing postulates, envisaging value creation from M&A deals typically 
provide explanations of the empirical findings for the firms engaging in multiple acquisitions 
(see for example, Conn et al., 2004). All but the first of these premises affecting outcomes for 
these organizations, predict deteriorating performances from an acquiring firm’s perspective, 
summarised in the following paragraphs:  
 
(a) Organizational learning hypothesis: It postulates that subsequent acquisitions pursued by 
a firm to depend on the learning from its prior acquisition experience (e.g., Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998), gathered either from the number or the sequence of previous deals. This 
presumed learning is likely to be manifested in the better outcomes of the subsequent 
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acquisitions. Such adaptive learning is gained particularly by the ‘quality’ of past experience 
in terms of their nature, performance and timing (e.g. Hayward, 2002).  
 
While this hypothesis posits that experiential learning can impart the requisites for garnering 
shareholder wealth from subsequent acquisitions of a firm; yet there has been little support for 
the predicted beneficial impact of such experiential leaning on the performances of later M&A 
transactions (e.g. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). The probable defences cited are: inadequacy 
of enough time between deals (i.e. temporal interval between the focal and its previous 
acquisitions) and/or possibilities of drawing incorrect inferences or misapplications of learning 
from prior acquisitions (Hayward, 2002).  
 
(b) Indigestion hypothesis: The capacity of an organization to successful consolidation and 
assimilation of its previous acquisitions tend to be limited, not only with respect to the time 
allowed between a prior transaction and the focal one; but also due to the size of past 
transactions (Conn et al., 2004). For instance, a costlier acquisition in terms of its transaction 
value would entail more complex post-deal integration in addition to requiring a longer time. 
(Aktas et al., 2013) Similarly, deals undertaken by a firm in quick successions would restrict 
its capability to consolidate each one effectively creating a so-called ‘indigestion’ effect. These 
post-merger integration problems for a firm engaging in such multiple acquisitions are likely 
to be reflected by a deteriorating performance in each subsequent deal in comparison to that of 
the one immediately before.  
 
(c) The following two theories are somewhat related, so are being grouped together:  
 
(i) Merger Programme Announcement theory may predict a generally favourable market 
reactions to a ‘merger/acquisition programme’ announcement by a firm, which is anticipated 
to reduce successively with each subsequent deal. This could be due to the fact that since the 
event announcement is already recognized by the market; the impact gets absorbed into the 
market value of the firm (as envisaged by Fama (1970) in his contention of efficiency in capital 
markets), erasing any abnormal gains in the later acquisition announcements. However, this 
does not necessarily hypothesize a fall in profitability of later acquisitions. 
 
(ii) Diminishing Returns (also called Opportunity Set) hypothesis tries to provide an alternative 
explanation to an acquisition programme, when consecutive returns may show a declining 
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trend. Based on the economic principle of diminishing returns, this theory forecasts a gradual 
reduction in the efficiency of successive investments in relation to a merger programme 
announcement. The rationale behind such an assumption is that the best opportunities in the 
form of valuable targets, are acquired earlier than the weaker ones (Klasa & Stegemoller, 
2007). It further assumes that a dynamic creation of the prospective investments need not 
correspond to the speed of such an acquisition programme. Two related predictions result from 
these contentions: (I) a greater time interval between consecutive deals would tend to moderate 
the declining outcomes of the later acquisitions; (II) firms with greater acquisition intensity are 
likely to experience lower returns in each subsequent transaction. 
 
(d) Shleifer & Vishny (2003) contended that the principle of ‘overvaluation’ might be equally 
applicable to firms engaged in multiple acquisitions as they are to the single acquirers. They 
postulated that a bidder firm may be initially overvalued, but as it continues to be active in the 
corporate control market, any discrepancy in its share price tends to wane eventually. 
Furthermore, the possibilities of a firm taking advantage (e.g. choosing its overvalued stock to 
pay for the host) of any market misperception about its true value tends to be limited. This 
would be visible in the long-term performance effects of such a firm (e.g. Dong Hirshleifer, 
Richardson & Teoh (2006), Ang & Cheng, 2003). 
 
(e) Finally, the following three hypotheses present alternative explanations for outcomes 
experienced by serially acquiring firms from the perspective of their managerial motives: 
 
(i) Agency theory: Multiple acquisitions undertaken by the top executives of a firm may 
manifest signs of conflicts of interests with the firm’s owners, i.e. shareholders; such deals 
being solely motivated by self-interest objectives such as empire building (Jensen, 1986) etc. 
In these situations, subsequent deals are likely to show evidence of shareholder wealth 
destructions (e.g., Moeller et al., 2004).  
 
(ii) Hubris hypothesis: This theory originally developed by Roll (1986) and later extended by 
Billett & Qian, (2008), posits that the success of prior acquisitions may impart on a misguided 
notion of over optimism and bring about unwarranted confidence to the managers of an 
organization. This could have several manifestations including, greater likelihood of 
subsequent deals or, overbidding for them (Aktas et al., 2009); or, lack of due diligence whilst 
selection of prospective targets in misevaluation of envisaged synergies, non-optimal choice of 
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payment method, and/or high leverage taken to finance the deal, etc. Hence, we would expect 
to observe acute value destruction leading to worsening performance in later deals.  
 
(iii) Accounting Manipulations Hypothesis (Conn et al., 2005): postulates that if accounting 
manipulations are resorted to by multiple acquirer firms, the investors are more likely to 
discover such mismanagement. Therefore, price corrections are incorporated during later 
acquisition announcements which tend to eliminate the previously observed price gains. For 
instance, the price earning (PE) ratio of a serial bidder may explain its sequentially worsening 
acquisition returns. Such a firm would seek to takeover targets with lower PE ratios than it. In 
this way, the bidder tends to accumulate a larger earning price for own share, although at the 
cost of unsustainability of this strategy. This becomes more prominent as subsequent deals are 
transacted.            
 
5.3 Empirical evidence 
Commonly, studies in corporate finance as well as in organizational behaviour (e.g. 
Stegemoller, 2001 for US-based sample; Baker & Limmack, 2001; and Conn et al., 2004 for 
UK-based samples; etc.) have compared wealth impact of the one-time acquirers with the 
multiple ones. The general consensus of this research was that those firms undertaking more 
acquisitions garnered more favourable outcomes; although, there has been less focus on 
repeated bidders alone. However, extant studies indicate a somewhat different story when the 
performance differential is specifically estimated based on each subsequent acquisition 
conducted by a serial bidder. The earlier works (e.g. Schipper & Thompson, 1983; Asquith, 
Bruner & Mullins, 1983, etc.) examined firms engaged in acquisition programmes. The other 
related branch of research (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Aktas et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; etc.) looking 
at multiple bidders only, studied how these acquirers generally fare in the market for corporate 
control with respect to wealth creation in their subsequent transactions. 
 
The paper by Schipper & Thompson (1983) espoused the predictions of both 
merger/acquisition programmes, in relation to the diminishing returns hypotheses. While, 
documenting positive stock market reactions for firms throughout a one-year period from such 
an announcement, it also showed that subsequent deals undertaken as part of that programme, 
generated lower announcement abnormal returns in succession. Asquith et al. (1983) however, 
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found that forty-five (45%) of their sample bidders exhibited positive returns up to and 
including the fourth bid. Thus, this latter paper presented somewhat contradictory evidence 
compared to the former, in that they evidenced that the perceived benefits of any such 
programme may not essentially capitalize on its announcement effect. Hence, investors’ 
perception of each individual acquisition could also be distinguished in the bids following the 
very first one in a merger programme, as demonstrated by Asquith et al. (1983). The paper by 
Loderer & Martin (1990) found that the first of a series of corporate acquisitions were likely to 
earn significantly higher announcement abnormal returns. But, controlling for relative size of 
deals and ‘partial anticipation effect’ as postulated by merger programmes, the authors showed 
that despite the fact that the shareholders of acquiring firms are likely to gain, such returns tend 
to decrease over time. While, results of the former two studies were limited by their small 
samples, the latter examined the sequential performance effects in a relatively larger sample of 
US acquirers. All these studies generally substantiated the acquisition programme 
announcement theory.      
 
The cross-sectional analysis by Fuller et al. (2002) looked at how the public status of targets 
would affect the returns to US firms undertaking at least five acquisitions in a span of a five 
year period. They found acquisitions pertaining to unlisted and subsidiary targets proved more 
beneficial to this type of bidder firms. However, they found insignificant support for the 
argument that abnormal returns to a firm varies in the order in which successive acquisitions 
are conducted. In other words, their empirical evidence failed to uphold the predictions relating 
to deteriorating wealth effects, experienced by a serial bidder with its deals of a higher order.  
Moeller et al. (2005) while investigating whether acquisitive strategies during the 1990’s 
merger waves were value generating, observed that large loss-making deals were typical of a 
serial acquirer after a series of profitable acquisitions. They further found that value-destructive 
deals typically followed unsuccessful deals. Moeller et al. (2005) justified their findings as 
evidence of either excessive managerial discretion (Jensen, 2003) leading to sub-optimal 
growth strategies, causing a reduction of shareholder wealth or that pursuing growth through 
acquisition choices had become unsustainable. Nevertheless, Moeller et al.’s (2005) results 
indicated that repeat acquirers were likely to destroy more value than they could potentially 
generate.  
 
While the papers discussed in the previous paragraph differ in their reported findings, quite a 
few studies indicate detrimental subsequent performances of frequent bidders (e.g. Malmendier 
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& Tate, 2008; Billet & Qian, 2008). The negative outcomes of the higher order deals even 
though the first of these had been profitable, usually tend to underpin particularly the hubris 
hypothesis. For instance, Billett & Qian (2008) highlighted the progressively deteriorating 
returns after an initial success as likely manifestations in both greater propensities for own-
company stock purchase by top executives such as CEOs, as well as the undertaking of 
subsequent acquisitions. The empirical works of others (e.g. Rosen, 2006; Antonio, Gao & 
Petmezas, 2008) documented a persistency in stock performances of later acquisitions for 
multiple bidders. In other words, both these papers documented (the former with US acquirers 
whilst, the latter with UK ones) that announcement returns to a bidding firm for a focal 
acquisition, has a positive relationship with that of its immediately preceding acquisition. Also, 
a paper by Zhu (2011) provides similar results to these two studies but in respect of cross-
border transactions, where the persistent impacts observable either as positive or negative 
tended to be more prominent in cases of shorter time intervals between two such consecutive 
acquisitions.  
 
Notwithstanding the above explanation of ‘self-attribution bias’ (Billet & Qian, 2008) of top-
ranked managers/CEOs  as to why consecutive abnormal returns to an acquiring firm may 
decline, few studies (e.g. Ahern, 2008; Aktas et al., 2009; 2011) attempt alternative 
justifications. For instance, Aktas et al. (2009; & 2011) posit that such decreasing trends in 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the later deals, was not necessarily a result of just CEO 
hubris. Rather, it seemed to be attributable to learning to value potential targets better by 
rational CEOs, reflected in more aggressive bidding, thereby involving more expensive targets 
and shortening interval between successive acquisitions. In their sub-sample of reportedly 
‘hubris-infected’ CEOs, the observations were contradictory though: CARs tended to increase 
in higher order of deals. Further, they found that during acquisition programmes market 
perceptions on bidding by CEOs, seemed to affect their subsequent bidding behaviour (Aktas 
et al., 2011). Whereas, Billett & Qian (2008) reported CEOs to develop overconfidence over 
time ascribable to the success from their prior acquisitions, Aktas et al. (2009) investigated 
behaviour of CEOs initially induced by over-optimism and/or overconfidence. The latter 
authors sub-categorised CEOs based on twofold proxies of insider trading before deal 
announcements and negative CARs of the first acquisition of the declared merger programme.  
 
Some studies (e.g. Moeller et al., 2005) have drawn attention to the issue of the relative size of 
the M&A transaction, particularly with regard to the target size. This problem is also 
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highlighted by the theory on ‘acquisition-indigestion’. Ahern (2010) however, offered a 
different interpretation of diminishing CARs observed through an acquisition programme. A 
bidding firm grows larger while pursuing such a merger programme, opting for optimum sized 
hosts which would maximize its return. Hence, the relative profitability of consecutive 
acquisitions might show a decline.    
 
As mentioned before, the frequent bidders seem to outperform both in respect of operating 
performance and stock return indicators (Conn et al., 2004) their comparable peers, irrespective 
of the acquired listing status of target firms as well as the payment mode adopted. But, the 
probable inference of learning from experience per se is not straightforward, as suggested from 
the mixed empirical evidence in extant management, strategy and organizational behaviour 
studies (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). For instance, as suggested by Haleblian & Finkelstein 
(1999) based on the behavioural learning theory in psychology research, a U-shaped 
(curvilinear) relationship existed between the previous acquisition experience of a firm with its 
current return from a takeover. That is, the greater the exposure, the more would be the ability 
to suitably apply such learning to subsequent acquisitions and garner benefits. The study by 
Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) also indicated that the similarity of previously acquired targets 
with the proposed one, would be likely to generate a superior outcome for a bidding firm. 
However, Hayward (2002) puts forward rather conflicting observations that learning from prior 
acquisitions only seems to matter for a focal deal if and only if: (a) the former incurred minor 
losses; (b) the focal target was to a certain extent comparable to the former target; and finally 
(c) the time intervals for the previous deals with respect to the present one was neither too short 
nor too long. So, the precondition of target similarity as conjectured earlier (e.g. Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999) was arguably not a potential facilitator of acquirer profitability in Hayward’s 
(2002) findings. His rationale was that identical targets might not add value to learning, whilst 
a totally diverse one in relation to that previously acquired, disrupts the process of knowledge 
transfer. Also, the time elapsed from the earlier deal or ‘time between deals’ (TBDs) seemed 
to play a key contributing part in gaining knowledge from previous acquisitions; although, 
Hayward’s (2002) findings were limited by a smaller sample.   
 
Nonetheless, the role of TBD in experiential learning by acquiring firms has further been 
advanced by Aktas et al. (2013). Their empirical findings substantiated the fact that for those 
firms engaging in multiple acquisitions, TBDs shared a significant negative relationship with 
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the order of their deals. They reasoned this observed declining trend in TBDs for higher deal 
sequences, as being indicative of a process of learning by these frequent acquirers.       
 
The above review of existing research strongly suggests that bidding firms, undertaking 
multiple acquisitions tend to destroy value as hypothesized in most theories discussed in the 
foregoing paragraphs. Presumably every such firm is faced with a conspicuous challenge since 
with each successive deal it grows in diversity and size. It is the potential balance struck 
between gathering the requisite skills to suitably value targets through repeated deals on the 
one hand, whilst competently managing the associated multiplying integration costs on the 
other. On top of this, heterogeneity of such frequent acquisitions exacerbates manifold their 
complexity due to the involvement of foreign hosts. In the international context, the presence 
of multifarious uncertainties and risks both at the host country-level (e.g. socio-economic and 
business environments) and/or at the target firm-level (e.g., asset intangibility, etc.), may 
complicate such trade-off further. Moreover, what has been coined as ‘organizational 
experience’ in management and strategy research is also synonymous with the experiential 
learning of a bidder TMT while pursuing multiple acquisitions. For instance, Kroll et al. (2008) 
suggest that such knowledge gained by bidder directors is likely to produce better acquisition 
outcomes for these firms. Therefore, it becomes necessary to delve into the role played by 
TMTs in these sequentially bidding firms as strategic decision-makers. In particular, we are 
interested in studying how internationally-oriented TMTs fare, when deciding upon frequent 
acquisitions.  
 
5.4 Does TMT international orientation have a moderating impact?  
In our previous chapters we have discussed the insight from postulations on ‘upper echelons’ 
as to how the cognitions and perceptions of individual managers translate into ‘orientations’ 
and how these ‘orientations may interact in the executive group to influence major strategies 
(Finkelstein et al., 2008). We also reviewed this research laying down how among other things, 
international experiences from education, previous careers, mix of diverse nationalities, etc. 
are likely to facilitate superior decision-making at the top executive-level, while expanding 
globally. We believe that this knowledge can enable the generation of beneficial outcomes for 
a firm which seeks to cross-borders from its home country not just once, but repetitively. This 
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is based on the latent assumption that past acquisition successes for a frequently bidding firm 
would most likely retain the same team of top executives.     
 
In retrospect, the idiosyncratic personalities of top executives could also be latently responsible 
for overoptimistic assessments and associated judgements, which might impair shareholder 
value. As stated in the last paragraph in the previous section (Section 5.3), that global scenario 
makes decision-making exceedingly difficult as well as taxing. So, potential misuse or 
misapplication of prior international exposure may not be unlikely. The extant studies 
documenting hubris and self-attributive bias of top managers (CEOs have been the focus here) 
(Roll, 1986; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Billett & Qian, 2008) have specifically championed 
these apparent discrepancies in managerial behavior, as already reviewed in our earlier 
chapters. Also, as argued before, there might also be a predisposition to accredit earlier positive 
performances to their collective ‘international orientation’. If these behavioral patterns 
obfuscate the decision-making process for TMTs of bidding firms when these firms choose to 
internationalize over and over again, its globally orientated TMT would no longer benefit its 
shareholders. Rather, such a TMT would expedite shareholder wealth destruction in deals 
following the previously successful ones.         
 
In the earlier chapters we had also underscored that not a single manager, but rather it is the 
entire team of managerial personnel (Cyert & March, 1963) which is likely to be accountable 
for strategies pertaining to cross-border diversification. We also emphasized the wealth of 
discretion available to the overall TMT during strategic decisions such as global diversification 
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2005; Finkelstein et al., 2008). The last two paragraphs stated 
advantages as well as disadvantages of the international experience gained earlier and 
nationality mix, if present in an acquiring firm’s top managerial team. We will attempt here to 
explore whether these observable personal traits shaping the ‘international orientation’ of the 
entire TMT would positively or negatively moderate the returns of an acquiring firm 
undertaking sequential cross-border deals. 
 
5.5 Research hypotheses 
As evident from the review of existing literature concerning sequentially bidding firms, 
emphasis had been on probing as to whether such firms in aggregate create value for their 
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shareholders or destroy shareholders’ wealth. We have also underlined in previous chapters the 
critical interplay of various risks and uncertainties which tend to obfuscate preferences to 
venture in the global market for corporate control.  These could be categorised to include 
information ambiguities nested at the different levels of the target-country as well as acquirer 
industry and firm, to mention a few. Our fundamental premise is that sequential cross-border 
acquisitions are considerably complicated events which tend to impede easy extrapolation of 
standardised knowledge transferable to those following. In the following paragraphs therefore, 
building on the theory, intuitions and empirical findings of the studies discussed, we will 
investigate how some of the above-specified drivers affect the announcement abnormal returns 
to a frequent acquirer. Specifically, our principal aim is to investigate each of these particular 
determinants to look at their influence on the focal announcement return of a firm engaging in 
sequential cross-border acquisitions. Our further objective is to examine the catalysing effect 
of bidder TMT’s ‘international orientation’ on the association of each of these factors with the 
announcement CARs of this type of bidder. Therefore, we basically explore whether and under 
what circumstances such an internationally-oriented TMT strives to act effectively as a catalyst 
and/or mediator in order to induce and enhance ‘organizational learning’ and/or alleviator of 
‘integration-indigestion’ as this firm acquires multiple foreign hosts. 
 
The key indicators identified in earlier research to impact on the creation of value by a serially 
acquiring firm which we focus upon are – the number of deals, the aggregate value of 
acquisitions conducted in the previous years, and TBDs. While number of deals and TBDs by 
a frequent bidder have been endorsed as drivers of experiential learning by Aktas et al. (2011, 
2013), they could potentially disrupt value creation for later deals, as had been also suggested 
in Section 5.3. However, the cumulative sum of transaction values is a factor which suggests a 
limited capability to integrate past acquisitions by a repeating bidder. Prior literature on firms 
engaging in multiple acquisitions (e.g., Conn et al., 2004, Billet & Qian, 2008; Aktas et al., 
2009; 2013, etc.) has suggested that the ‘sequences of deals’ are one of the likely determinants 
of profitability. Furthermore, these studies choose various ways of defining these repeated 
bidders depending on the ‘number’ or ‘counts’ of previous deals conducted by such a firm 
within a specific time during the overall sample period. More explicitly, all the above-
mentioned papers have estimated the return differential for each subsequent transaction in 
comparison to its previous one to infer how sequential bidder firms fare. For instance, Conn et 
al. (2004) found that the bid order showed a significantly negative effect on the acquisition 
announcement returns. Further this documented persistent decline in performances seemed 
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more glaring in the case of the first-time unsuccessful acquirer. Billet & Qian (2008) however, 
rationalised this deteriorating trend as arising from ‘self-attributive’ behavioural disorder. Top 
managers could be more inclined to impute past acquisition successes to their own expertise, 
which would more likely to inflate their ego whilst taking a toll in the deals that follow. Further, 
the favourable impact of theorized skills and insight brought on from previously conducted 
transactions might wane over time as pointed out by Hayward (2002). However, Aktas et al. 
(2009; & 2011) rationalised this declining trend across the later deals as evidence of CEO 
learning, rather than hubris. All these findings and explanations have mostly been for samples 
with domestic M&A deals, although they could be equally applicable to the cross-border 
transactions.   
 
Rather, we would anticipate that when firms engage in sequential cross-border acquisitions, 
given their complexity and riskiness, the above predictions too are likely to strengthen. If a 
bidder engages in too many of these deals within a short interval, it might face integration 
issues. Fewer foreign deals on the other hand, would help it to build upon from these 
experiences of encountering the multitude of uncertainties of acquiring foreign targets. 
Therefore, broadly speaking, we could expect that an improvement in announcement returns 
would signify the beneficial impact of experiential learning by bidder firms as they perform 
repeated acquisitions involving foreign hosts. A decline would however provide support for 
the theories positing the drawbacks of frequent acquisitions. Hence, depending on the relative 
incidence of either beneficial or detrimental impact of preceding acquisitions, we propose the 
following competing hypotheses in alternative form: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between the number of cross-country deals in 
the previous three-years and the abnormal returns at the announcement of the current deal. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between the number of cross-country deals in 
the previous three-years and the abnormal returns at the announcement of the current deal.     
 
As put forward by Hayward (2002) and Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) acquisition strategies 
being pursued for multifarious objectives, it could be extremely complicated to apply and 
transfer appropriate inferences to the subsequent acquisitions. So, it might not be 
straightforward to apply experience learning to the later cross-border acquisitions, in which 
environmental risks and uncertainties play a significant role. However, Aktas et al., (2013) 
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chose a research design to infer learning effects from the past acquisitions as discussed in the 
later paragraphs.  
 
Both the papers by Hayward (2002) and Aktas et al. (2009; 2013) draw our attention to another 
key factor, viz., ‘TBDs’. The duration between two deals could hypothetically indicate the 
gaining of requisite expertise as well as capability to efficiently manage repetitive deals so that 
post-deal integration does not impede the envisaged value creation. The underlying principle 
is that balancing integration costs becomes a serious challenge as the size of the bidder grows 
by virtue of frequent acquisitions. For instance, Hayward (2002) conjectures that a smaller time 
interval between consecutive deals could impair the process of taking root of the experience 
thus, hindering learning. Moreover, experience from acquisition per se does not ensure superior 
subsequent performance (Hayward 2002, p.2). The contradictory effect of ‘memory lapse’ or 
‘memory loss’ or ‘forgetfulness’ (Hayward, 2002) could occur in the opposite case, if such 
acquisitions were spaced too far apart in time, when learning cannot be gained. This notion was 
also supported by Aktas et al., (2013). 
 
Aktas et al., (2013) theoretically modelled the selection of TBDs by firms, in order to maximise 
their expected profits from acquisitions net of integration costs. Aktas et al., (2013) posited 
that below a certain threshold or limiting value for TBDs, learning was likely to increase as 
TBD increased. Contrarily, beyond that limiting TBD, prior acquisitive exposure seemed to be 
insufficient for experience building, termed by them as ‘memory loss’ effect. Using this 
framework the authors theorised that during the process of ‘experience building’, an inverse 
relationship between TBDs and deal order would imply learning to be increasing. But in the 
‘memory loss’ situation, a positive correlation between the TBDs and deal sequences would 
also indicate gains from learning experience. Therefore, they inferred that in either case a 
bidder firm is positioned to reap gains from net learning from repetitive acquisitions, regardless 
of post-deal integration costs.  
 
While we anticipate cross-country acquisitions to be riskier than domestic ones, both the 
opposite rationales explained above could be equally applicable for them. So, the returns of 
subsequent international acquisitions could be affected, depending upon the time duration 
between two consecutive ones. Therefore, combining the insight from both Hayward (2002) 
and Aktas et al. (2013), we could postulate the following: (a) if the elapsed time from the 
immediately previous cross-country acquisition to the focal one, showed a positive correlation 
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with the announcement returns of the focal deal, a likely ‘experience-building’ effect is in play; 
(b) the contrary case of a negative correlation between these variables would indicate a 
‘memory-loss’ situation.  
 
The literature on M&As unanimously underscores that inadequacies of post-merger integration 
(PMI) period is one of the primary causes why such transactions fail to garner desired benefits 
(see for example, Shrivastava, 1986). This is especially the case for larger M&A transactions, 
where more time and resources are necessary for PMI (Aktas et al., 2013). So, if a firm engages 
in multiple acquisitions simultaneously or within a short time interval, the capability for PMI 
may become saturated, leading to more acute effects on its overall profitability. Based on the 
above discussions and arguments, we put forward two competing hypotheses in the alternative 
form: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between the time elapsed since the previous 
cross-country acquisition and the announcement abnormal returns of the current deal. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative relationship between the time elapsed since the previous 
cross-country acquisition and the announcement abnormal returns of the current deal.    
    
The theory on indigestion suggests that for those firms which acquire frequently, returns from 
successive deals may show a declining trend. This could be due to the fact that firms are likely 
to have limited internal resources. As contended in the preceding paragraph, for all acquirers, 
integration takes time and also requires a post-integration recovery phase (Kengelback et al., 
2012), which is particularly accentuated for serially bidding firms. Further, after undertaking a 
costly acquisition or one having a greater relative deal size, if a frequently bidding firm does 
not allow sufficient time for PMI, performances in later deals could deteriorate.  
 
In the international context, ‘acquisition-indigestion’ could intensify further if higher 
cumulative values of deals are undertaken, assuming the post-merger integration issues to be 
more complicated in view of the environmental uncertainties. Assuming a shorter time period 
prior to a focal foreign deal, we could therefore, anticipate that the greater the aggregate value 
of the earlier international deals undertaken in that duration, the greater resources would have 
to be devoted towards PMI; hence, the more severe would be the foreign-acquisition-
indigestion issue. On the other hand, a smaller cumulative value of the number of cross-border 
acquisitions in this shorter interval before a similar focal deal ceteris paribus, may generate a 
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favourable outcome for a bidding firm. This is under the twin assumptions that: firstly, a lower 
value would not exacerbate a resource bottleneck that may arise as a result of deals undertaken 
in quick succession, accentuating the PMI problems; and secondly, deal managing experience 
would build through those smaller deals executed earlier, thereby learning to assess the 
underlying risks and information ambiguities in the global context better. Thus, we propose 
two competing hypotheses replicating scenarios where indigestion problem could be low and 
where it could be severe, expressed in alternative form:   
 
Hypothesis 3a: The aggregate deal value of all the previous cross-border acquisitions 
undertaken in a shorter time interval has a positive relationship with the announcement 
abnormal returns of the focal deal. 
Hypothesis 3b: The aggregate deal value of all the previous cross-border acquisitions 
undertaken in a shorter time interval has a negative relationship with the announcement 
abnormal returns of the focal deal. 
 
In the preceding section we have made a case both for apparent merits and demerits of 
‘international orientation’ for the bidder TMTs. In what follows we base our contentions on 
whether and how the role played by globally-minded TMTs, may harmonise host choices while 
deciding upon repeated cross-country acquisitions. In line with the previous chapters, we 
invoke here observable and quantifiable elements of managerial ‘international orientation’ in 
order to empirically test whether such traits could be valuable for serially bidding firms, 
embarking on cross-country acquisitions. To be more precise in our current framework of 
sequential international acquisitions, we re-examine the proxies constructed in Chapter 2, 
looking at the role played by executive teams’ ‘international orientation’ on the short-run 
performance of these firms.  
 
The number of executive team members endowed with knowledge acquired by dint of their 
earlier international experience, had been one of our proxies in Chapter 2. We had also 
conjectured the beneficial (e.g., broader awareness of institutional and cultural norms 
internationally, etc.) as well as the detrimental (e.g., misperceiving risks involving foreign 
hosts, hubristic attitude; etc.) impacts of having a greater number of these managers with such 
exposure. From the perspective of firms repeatedly engaging in cross-border acquisitions, this 
particular TMT attribute, seems relevant. This is because such globally-oriented TMTs are 
specially-enabled to tap this wisdom in order to garner better outcomes for their respective 
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firms. Concurrently, they are prima facie susceptible to exploiting this purported knowledge 
(e.g., due to their hubris as suggested by Roll, 1986 or adopting more overenthusiastically 
adventurous strategies) to bring about destruction of shareholders wealth. For instance, in the 
latter situation, the TMT of a firm might prefer to decide upon greater number of cross-country 
acquisitions with the misconceived notion of such strategy being the best alternative for its 
firm. Therefore, it seems that only a higher proportion of executives with international 
experience in the TMTs of bidders, is not by itself a pre-requisite in ensuring a promising 
outcome where serial acquirers are concerned. It can be contended that with sufficiently high 
number of such knowledgeable executives on the team, it may be necessary to balance 
unfounded confidence against the required skill to undertake repeated cross-border deals.  
 
Our second benchmark to classify the TMT of a bidder as internationally oriented is the ‘Blau 
diversity index’ (adopted in both Chapters 3 and 4) which is the yardstick determining the mix 
of nationalities on the team of managers of a firm. We had also debated the favorable (e.g., 
enriched cognizance of global environment opacities, etc.) and unfavorable (e.g., ineffective 
communication, etc.) consequences of having higher proportions of dissimilar nationalities on 
the TMT of a bidder firm going for cross-border acquisitions. 
 
The final aspect of TMT ‘international orientation’ here, which we also adopted in Chapter 2 
was, familiarity of the host country. Higher average years of such exposure can be considered 
to be both an advantage (e.g., more advantage in negotiating the deal with foreign target, etc.) 
as well as a disadvantage (e.g., excess information leading to needless risk-taking, etc.) for the 
overall TMT of an acquirer. 
 
In Chapter 3, where we examined one-year post-acquisition bidder performance with the pre-
requisite of presence of internationally-oriented TMT for such firms, we had explicitly 
examined the conditions leading to learning to manage acquisitions in a global scenario. 
Looking at the position of a firm seeking to acquire frequently as well as, drawing upon our 
deliberations and empirical findings in both Chapters 2 and 3, it seems that the presence of 
either a greater nationally diverse team of top executives or a higher average number of years 
of acquaintance with a host country, may not generate consistently better returns. Weighing up 
the pros and cons of these two proxies, we expect in such scenarios that higher levels of both 
these indicators of TMT ‘international orientation’ (cf. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Benabou, 
2013) could lead to unwarranted complacency in choices of targets, when embarking upon 
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multiple cross-country acquisitions. Hence, a probable balance of both the aforementioned 
indicators could seem to be optimal from the strategic standpoint of such a sequential acquiring 
firm.    
 
Therefore, with respect to a serial bidder intending to generate a sustainable favourable 
performance from its repeated cross-border acquisitions, such a firm would deem it essential 
to develop some sort of competitive advantage. This could occur if its ‘internationally-oriented 
TMT has the capability to make value-added strategic decisions. Hence, we propose to look 
again at ‘international orientation’ of TMTs of these acquiring firms’ from three angles: (i) 
number of these internationally experienced executives; (ii) mix of nationalities amongst them 
indicated by Blau diversity index; and (iii) amount of target country familiarity of managers in 
years, on average. In other words, we propose that a curvilinear (U-shaped) association 
between the internationally oriented managers on TMTs of repeatedly acquiring firms with 
their announcement returns.  
 
Following our arguments in the preceding paragraphs, we would conjecture: (1) a non-linear 
(U-shaped) association of the number of internationally knowledgeable TMTs and the 
abnormal returns on a cross-country acquisition announcement by a serial acquirer. (2) an 
opposite curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship of the announcement returns to a multiple 
bidder with either its TMT national diversity or average years of TMT experience of foreign 
targets. If the beneficial effects of learning are reflected in acquisition announcement 
performance of these frequent bidders, we conjecture that appropriate levels of bidder TMT 
‘international orientation’ beyond a threshold, would further enrich experiential learning. This 
in turn would generate persistently profitable outcomes for multiple international acquisitions. 
In contrast, depending upon whether the negative effects of higher deal numbers or ‘memory-
lapse’ or ‘indigestion’, are in play, a suitably balanced internationally-orientated TMT after a 
cut-off point as hypothesized above, is likely to moderate their negative effects. Thereby the 
unfavorable sequential performances would be toned down while still learning through 
repeated cross-border acquisitions could be facilitated.  
 
The discussions of the foregoing premises lead us to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between number of the previous cross-border acquisitions and 
the announcement returns of the focal deal is moderated by the presence of (i) a higher number 
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of internationally-experienced executives in acquiring firms’ TMTs in a curvilinear (U-shaped) 
manner; but in an opposite curvilinear manner (inverted U-shaped) by (ii) greater national 
diversity, and (iii) a higher average number of years familiarity with the target country. 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between time elapsed between two cross-border acquisitions 
and the announcement returns of the focal deal is moderated by the presence of (i) a higher 
number of internationally-experienced executives in acquiring firms’ TMTs in a curvilinear 
(U-shaped) manner; but in an opposite curvilinear manner (inverted U-shaped) by (ii) greater 
national diversity, and (iii) a higher average number of years familiarity with the target 
country. 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between aggregate deal value of all cross-border acquisitions 
within the previous three years and announcement returns of the focal deal is moderated by 
the presence of (i) a higher number of internationally-experienced executives in acquiring 
firms’ TMTs in a curvilinear (U-shaped) manner; but in an opposite curvilinear manner 
(inverted U-shaped) by (ii) greater national diversity, and (iii) a higher average number of 
years familiarity with the target country. 
 
5.6 Sample, research design and variable construction  
Using our original sample, we dropped the single acquirers, retaining only the group of firms 
which conducted more than one cross-border acquisitions. Precisely, we created a multiple 
acquirer indicator variable in our original sample, taking the value of one, which comprised of 
approximately 90% of our original sample and dropped the 10% taking the value of zero. This 
research design focusing solely on the sequential acquiring firms is also consistent with that 
used by Fuller et al. (2002) in order to reduce firm-specific variation in the overall sample.  The 
fact that frequent bidders are the norm in the UK has also been acknowledged by Conn et al. 
(2004). Thus, filtering out the single bidders we were left with 1777 cross-border acquisitions 
by 278 firms. We adopted this research strategy of categorising a multiple bidder based on 
whether the firm conducted more than one cross-border transaction during our sample period, 
rather than using some other criteria (e.g. Fuller et al’s (2002) categorisation of multiple 
acquirers) so as not to reduce the number of observations further. Also our purpose is to 
simultaneously investigate whether ‘international orientation’ computed before each 
acquisition announcement had any effect on our main explanatory variables as detailed below 
in the next sub-section. Prior research has classified serial acquirers in different ways. For 
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instance, Fuller et al. (2002) defined a serial acquirer if a firm conducted at least five 
acquisitions in a window of three years; whereas Kengelbach et al. (2012) and Billett & Qian 
(2005) did so if more than one acquisition was conducted within the same time period and if at 
least two public targets were acquired within the duration of five years, respectively. Again 
Conn et al. (2004) adopted a different classification based on the intensity of acquisitiveness. 
Whereas Conn et al., (2004) investigated bidder performance throughout the series of deals, 
our aim in this chapter is somewhat different. We study the impact of number of previous cross-
country deals, sum of the values paid for them (within a timeframe of three years, as mentioned 
above) and TBDs on the present foreign acquisition. Hence, we employ our own criteria for 
classification of serially acquiring firms.  
Moreover, due to our three-year rolling window specification for two of our explanatory 
variables (explained in detail in  the paragraphs on ‘variables construction’), we were required 
to use the first three years of our sample to generate deal-history (cf. Billett & Qian, 2008). 
Therefore, we added the cross-border announcements of the frequently bidding firms in our 
sample from the year 1996 onwards, although the final sample starts from the year 1999 
onwards, similar to the previous chapters. 
 
Our key questions are: which of the effects is more dominant on the short-term performance of 
serial acquirers, viz., learning (experience-building) or memory loss and/or indigestion? 
Accordingly, we use pooled OLS regression models detailed below to explain abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of an international acquisition. Before presenting detailed model 
specifications, we explain the operationalization of key variables of interest. Most of the 
variables used for this analysis being similar to the ones used in the first chapter are just 
mentioned, only the ones not used hitherto have been discussed in details here. In line with the 
variable operationalization used in the previous chapters, all the variables were used in 
winsorized forms at the one percentage level, except the indicator variables. 
 
   5.6.1 Dependent variable(s) 
Our primary measure to ascertain the short term performance of serial acquirers was, a three-
day CARs which has also been the dependent variable in our regression analyses as also used 
in Chapter 2 on short-run returns. So, detailed explanation of computation of CARs is not 
repeated here. 
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We also supplemented our analysis with a longer term measure of performance using, a one-
year post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (detailed computation is given 
in Chapter 3 on longer term returns) for our regression models. 
 
   5.6.2 Independent variables 
In accordance with the studies on serial bidders reviewed in the earlier sections, the following 
variables were chosen to explore their plausible influence on the short-run performance of such 
firms. Their operationalization is detailed below: 
 
(1) Classifying each acquirer using its unique identifier, we sorted the respective cross-country 
deals by their announcement dates. Thereby a deal count (DC) was computed for each firm for 
each of its transaction in the ascending order of the event announcement dates (see for example 
Aktas et al., 2013). This DC variable was generated on the basis of a rolling three-year window. 
(cf. Billett & Qian, 2008 where a rolling window of five-years was used). This selection of a 
timeframe of three years was to reduce noise as might be the case if a five-year window was 
chosen.  
 
For each bidder, we also computed a ranking to ascertain the order) of deals in the ascending 
order of the event announcement dates throughout the whole sample period. These sequences 
of cross-border acquisitions by a firm termed as ‘deal order’ (DO), was used to check the 
robustness of our results using the DC regressor.  
 
(2) We chose the TBDs as time elapsed between a focal international acquisition and the one 
immediately before it, counted as the number of days between those two deal announcements. 
There being quite a few acquirers in our sample which announced more than one such 
transaction on the same date, although they had different completion dates. So, we chose the 
difference between two announcement days as our measure for TBDs. However, Aktas et al. 
(2013) proposed a different measure of TBDs as time difference between deal date of 
announcement of the present one and the date of completion of its preceding one, assuming 
post-acquisition learning based on PMI costs too. Also, since our fundamental assumption is 
that international orientation of bidder TMTs contribute to pre-acquisition learning (reflected 
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in the choice of the foreign host, choice of payment mode, deal negotiation; etc.) we selected 
this way of computation of TBDs.  
 
(3)  In order to compute the aggregate value of cross-country acquisitions (termed as aggregate 
deal value and abbreviated as ADV) undertaken by a frequently acquiring firm, we also used a 
three-year window prior to a focal foreign deal (to be consistent with our computation of DC). 
For each such firm, we summed the cumulative values paid for the international acquisitions 
undertaken (based on their dates of announcement) within the three-year time interval. The 
reason for this way of computation of ADV has already been explained in our ‘Hypotheses’ 
section.    
 
We applied exactly the same specifications of TMT ’international orientation’ variables for a 
bidding firm as we had done in the previous chapters. In particular, for the main part of our 
analysis, we employed three of our previous measures, as mentioned in the ‘Hypotheses’ 
section. We supplement our analysis with the other instruments of TMT orientation, viz. depth 
and breadth of international experience of TMT (described in details in Chapter 3).  
 
These explanatory variables namely, DC, TBD and ADV along with the TMT variables utilized 
for our analyses were mean-centered to alleviate potential collinearity problems and to make 
the interpretation of the results easier (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). 
 
   5.6.3 Control variables 
Control variables analogous to the first chapter were included in this analysis are categorized 
as (a) deal-specific; (b) bidder-specific; and (c) target-specific. They are discussed below and 
also have the same specification as in Chapter 2. 
  
Deal-specific controls  
Logarithm of transaction value (in £ millions); three different modes of payment, i.e. cash, 
stock and a combination of both along with debt depicted with two indicator variables Cash 
and Stock; one binary variable namely, full acquisition showing total control denoted by at least 
ninety-five percentage stake in the target. 
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Acquirer-specific controls 
These variables are all lagged by one year, i.e. that preceding the cross-border acquisition by a 
firm:  Acquirer size as logarithm of market capitalization; and its profitability as Acquirer ROA. 
We also use an indicator variable, diversifying acquisitions and the TMT size (i.e. the number 
of top managers in an acquiring firm). 
 
Host-specific controls 
These are: cultural distance; country risk for the target; one-year lagged GDP per capita of a 
target country in USD thousands; while target firm-specific control was its listing status 
whether it is a public or private company or a subsidiary. Two binary variables were created 
based on target firm listing status: Private target as one if unlisted and zero otherwise and 
Listed target as one if target firm is listed and zero otherwise. 
 
We estimated the performance of the serial bidders in the short-run using the following 
regression (Equations 5.1 to test Hypotheses 1(a) v 1(b); Equations 5.2, 5.4 and 5.6 showing 
the respective TMT orientation variables with the DC predictor, as discussed in Section 5.5 on 
‘Research hypotheses’; and Equations 5.3, 5.5, and 5.7 to test Hypotheses 4(i), (ii) and (iii)): 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_MktCapi + 
β6tROAi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi 
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +ε1it        (5.1) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_MktCapi + 
β6tROAi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi 
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tN_Exec_Intl_Expi + β16tN_Exec_Intl_Exp2i +ε1it                                                                 (5.2) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_TotAssetsi 
+ β6tROEi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi  
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tN_Exec_Intl_Expi + β16tN_Exec_Intl_Exp2i + β17t(DC*N_Exec_Intl_Exp)i  
+β18t(DC*N_Exec_Intl_Exp2)i + ε1it                                                                                                       (5.3) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_MktCapi + 
β6tROAi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi 
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+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tBlauNtlDivi + β16tBlauDivNtl2i +ε1it                                                                                               (5.4) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_TotAssetsi 
+ β6tROEi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi  
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tBlauNtlDivi + β16tBlauNtlDiv2i + β17t(DC*BlauNtlDiv)i  +β18t(DC*BlauNtlDiv2)i 
+
 
ε1it                                                                                                                                                                                 (5.5) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_MktCapi + 
β6tROAi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi 
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tAvgYrTCExpi + β16tAvgYrTCExp2i +ε1it                                                                                       (5.6) 
CARit = α1t + β1tDCi + β2tCashi + β3tStocki + β4tLog_DealVali + β5tLog_TotAssetsi 
+ β6tROEi + β7tDiversifyDumi + β8tCultDisti + β9tCountryRiski + β10tGDP_PerCapi  
+β11tFullAcquisitioni + β12tPvtTargeti + β13tPubTargeti + β14tTMTSizei +  
β15tAvgYrTCExpi + β16tAvgYrTCExp2i + β17t(DC*AvgYrTCExp)i  
+β18t(DC*AvgYrTCExp2)i + ε1it                                                                                                                  (5.7) 
In each of the above equations, CARit is the three-day CARs estimated for a serially acquiring 
firm computed at the announcement of its cross-border acquisition on day t, εit is the error term. 
While the first equation includes the main predictor variable DC with controls, the latter two 
includes the linear and quadratic terms of TMT variable (i) i.e. number of internationally 
knowledgeable executives, with the last model having the interactions of DC variable with 
linear and quadratic forms of TMT proxy (i). 
 
 Our main regression coefficient of interest is β1t in Equation (5.1), which signifies the 
regression coefficient of the main explanatory variables DC. Similarly in Equation (5.2), along 
with β1t, our main coefficients of interest are: β15t and β16t (these two are the coefficients of the 
linear and quadratic TMT proxy (i)). Finally for Equation (5.3) β17t and β18t (linear and 
quadratic interactions with DC predictor and TMT proxy (i)) along with β1t, β15t and β16t 
represent the coefficients which we are interested in.  
 
The above seven equations are representative of the models used in our analysis. For each of 
the main predictors TBD and ADV, we have a similar set of seven models, where instead of 
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the DC regressor, we have TBD and ABD in each of the above seven models and their 
respective interactions with the TMT proxies. For the sake of brevity, only the models testing 
the central hypotheses with the ones testing for moderating interaction effects of TMT 
variables, are given below: 
 
CARit = α2t + ϒ1tTBDi + ϒ2tCashi + ϒ3tStocki + ϒ4tLog_DealVali + ϒ5tLog_MktCapi + ϒ6tROAi 
+ ϒ7tDiversifyDumi + ϒ8tCultDisti + ϒ9tCountryRiski + ϒ10tGDP_PerCapi 
+ϒ11tFullAcquisitioni + ϒ12tPvtTargeti + ϒ13tPubTargeti + ϒ14tTMTSizei +ε2it                             (5.8) 
CARit = α2t + ϒ1tTBDi + ϒ2tCashi + ϒ3tStocki + ϒ4tLog_DealVali + ϒ5tLog_TotAssetsi + 
ϒ6tROEi + ϒ7tDiversifyDumi + ϒ8tCultDisti + ϒ9tCountryRiski + ϒ10tGDP_PerCapi  
+ϒ11tFullAcquisitioni + ϒ12tPvtTargeti + ϒ13tPubTargeti + ϒ14tTMTSizei +  
ϒ15tN_Exec_Intl_Expi + ϒ16tN_Exec_Intl_Exp2i + ϒ17t(TBD*N_Exec_Intl_Exp)i  
+ϒ18t(TBD*N_Exec_Intl_Exp2)i + ε2it                                                                                                                            (5.9) 
CARit = α2t + ϒ1tTBDi + ϒ2tCashi + ϒ3tStocki + ϒ4tLog_DealVali + ϒ5tLog_TotAssetsi + 
ϒ6tROEi + ϒ7tDiversifyDumi + ϒ8tCultDisti + ϒ9tCountryRiski + ϒ10tGDP_PerCapi  
+ϒ11tFullAcquisitioni + ϒ12tPvtTargeti + ϒ13tPubTargeti + ϒ14tTMTSizei +  ϒ15tBlauNtlDivi + 
ϒ16tBlauNtlDiv2i + ϒ17t(TBD*BlauNtlDiv)i  +ϒ18t(TBD*BlauNtlDiv2)i + ε2it                                 (5.10) 
CARit = α2t + ϒ1t TBD i + ϒ2tCashi + ϒ3tStocki + ϒ4tLog_DealVali + ϒ5tLog_TotAssetsi + 
ϒ6tROEi + ϒ7tDiversifyDumi + ϒ8tCultDisti + ϒ9tCountryRiski + ϒ10tGDP_PerCapi  
+ϒ11tFullAcquisitioni + ϒ12tPvtTargeti + ϒ13tPubTargeti + ϒ14tTMTSizei +  ϒ15tAvgYrTCExpi + 
ϒ16tAvgYrTCExp2i + ϒ17t(TBD *AvgYrTCExp)i  +ϒ18t(TBD *AvgYrTCExp2)i + ε2it          (5.11)                               
In the above set of four models, Equation 5.8 tests Hypotheses 2(a) v 2(b), whereas Equations 
5.9, 5.10, and 5.7 are to test Hypotheses 5(i), (ii) and (iii) with exactly same explanation of the 
regression coefficients (ϒt here) as explained above in case of βt.  
CARit = α3t + δ1tADVi + δ2tCashi + δ3tStocki + δ4tLog_DealVali + δ5tLog_MktCapi + δ6tROAi 
+δ7tDiversifyDumi +δ8tCultDisti + δ9tCountryRiski + δ10tGDP_PerCapi + δ11tFullAcquisitioni 
+ δ12tPvtTargeti + δ13tPubTargeti + δ14tTMTSizei +ε3it                                                                                 (5.12) 
CARit = α3t + δ1tADVi + δ2tCashi + δ3tStocki + δ4tLog_DealVali + δ5tLog_TotAssetsi + δ6tROEi 
+ δ7tDiversifyDumi + δ8tCultDisti + δ9tCountryRiski + δ10tGDP_PerCapi + δ11tFullAcquisitioni 
+ δ12tPvtTargeti + δ13tPubTargeti + δ14tTMTSizei +  δ15tN_Exec_Intl_Expi + 
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δ16tN_Exec_Intl_Exp2i + δ17t(ADV*N_Exec_Intl_Exp)i  + δ18t(ADV*N_Exec_Intl_Exp2)i + ε3it                                                                                                       
(5.13)
 
CARit = α3t + δ1tADVi + δ2tCashi + δ3tStocki + δ4tLog_DealVali + δ5tLog_TotAssetsi + δ6tROEi 
+ δ7tDiversifyDumi + δ8tCultDisti + δ9tCountryRiski + δ10tGDP_PerCapi + δ11tFullAcquisitioni 
+ δ12tPvtTargeti + δ13tPubTargeti + δ14tTMTSizei + δ15tBlauNtlDivi + δ16tBlauNtlDiv2i + 
δ17t(ADV*BlauNtlDiv)i  + δ18t(ADV*BlauNtlDiv2)i + ε3it                     (5.14)                  
CARit = α3t + δ1t ADV i + δ2tCashi + δ3tStocki + δ4tLog_DealVali + δ5tLog_TotAssetsi + δ6tROEi 
+ δ7tDiversifyDumi + δ8tCultDisti + δ9tCountryRiski + δ10tGDP_PerCapi + δ11tFullAcquisitioni 
+ δ12tPvtTargeti + δ13tPubTargeti + δ14tTMTSizei + δ15tAvgYrTCExpi + δ16tAvgYrTCExp2i + 
δ17t(ADV *AvgYrTCExp)i  + δ18t(ADV *AvgYrTCExp2)i + ε3it            (5.15) 
 
In the above set of four models, Equation 5.12 tests Hypotheses 3(a) v 3(b), whereas Equations 
5.13, 5.14, and 5.15 are to test Hypotheses 6(i), (ii) and (iii) with exactly same explanation of 
the regression coefficients (δt here) as explained above in case of βt. 
 
[ Insert Table 5.1 about here ] 
 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of variables used in our 
analyses. The sample summary statistics for the sample of multiple bidders being by and large 
similar to the original sample, is not discussed here separately. 
 
5.7 Results 
   5.7.1 Univariate tests 
 
[ Insert Table 5.2 about here ] 
 
Table 5.2 reports both MM and MAR model based CARs of the acquiring firms over a three-
day event window surrounding the cross-border acquisitions announcements, grouped as a 
function of the key explanatory variables, DC, TBD and ADV respectively. In particular, the 
table shows how the CARs of the serially bidding firms behave when the said predictors are 
low (or high), based on the respective median-based values of these predictors.  
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Looking at the DCs by each multiple bidder in a window of previous three years, we find that 
the ones which perform more than the median number of deals  (which is at least three cross-
border transactions in the sample), show slightly lower mean CARs (0.0051 in MM) than their 
counterparts (0.0080), which conducts less than the median count. However, the two-tailed p-
value for the t-test reveals that the average CARs between these two groups are not significantly 
different than zero. Wilcoxon rank-sum test10 also for either MM or MAR model fail to show 
statistical significance between these two groups.  
 
The average CARs for the serial acquirers categorized by the higher and lower median of the 
natural logarithm of the TBDs, also fail to corroborate any significant difference. This is the 
case either for t-test or for Wilcoxon rank-sum test for both MM and MAR model.  
 
Finally, the difference in mean CARs for frequent acquirers, based on higher and lower than 
the median of the prior three-year ADVs (expressed in natural logarithm of the sum of such 
deal values), reveals that the former has significantly lower CARs than the latter group. 
Specifically, for those repeated bidders which engage in previous acquisitions with greater 
aggregate deal values, indeed suffer from PMI problems or ‘acquisition-indigestion’, compared 
to the firms with lesser ADV. The difference between the average CARs between these two 
groups is significant at 5% level for the MM and at 1% level for MAR model respectively. The 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for both models also corroborates that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the mean CARs of these two categories of serial bidders. 
 
Therefore, our univariate results for the serial acquirers fail to indicate that CARs on average, 
in respect of higher counts of deals as well as the TBDs, significantly differ from zero. 
Notwithstanding these results, our Hypothesis 3(b) proposing indigestion due to PMI problems, 
is supported since the CARs of multiple acquirers with higher ADV are significantly lower 
than the opposite group. In the following sub-section, we will analyze the findings of the 
multivariate models to see how they support these univariate results. 
 
                                                          
10 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test used here is a non-parametric analogue (based on the assumption that our dependent 
variable CARs are not normally distributed) to the independent samples t-test that we have used for our above purpose to 
ascertain whether statistically significant different in average CARs exist between the stated categorisations of our key 
predictors.  
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   5.7.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
[ Insert Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 about here ] 
                                      
The main body of results tabulated in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 respectively, presents the three-
day CARs11 for the sequentially acquiring firms using computed using MM. The CARs from 
MAR model are reported in the Appendix in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 respectively. Basically the 
models marked with letter ‘A’ in each of these tables show the multivariate regression estimates 
corresponding the main regressors (1) DC, (2) TBD and (3) ADV respectively, with the control 
variables, as detailed in the last Section 5.6. Thus, these serve as our base models in accordance 
with Hypotheses 1a v 1b predicting the impact of DCs; Hypotheses 2a v 2b on TBDs and 
Hypotheses 3a v 3b looking at the effect of ADVs on acquirer CARs. The models marked with 
letter ‘B’ in each of these tables show the additional impact due to the introduction of the TMT 
‘international orientation’ proxies in the base models. Finally, the models marked with letter 
‘C’ extends the previous models marked ‘B’ adding the interaction between the key 
independent variables, with these TMT indicators. These models marked ‘C’ therefore, denote 
the curvilinear interactions of each of the key predictors with the respective international 
orientation variable, proposed by Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 respectively, in Section 5.5. We opted 
to report the plausible impact of interaction separately in models marked ‘C’ so as to investigate 
the difference, if any, in association of these primary explanatory variables as well as the TMT 
proxies with CARs, with and without the respective interactions. 
 
In effect, Model 1A in Table 5.3 explores the impact of the predictor, namely prior DCs over 
a three-year period before a focal cross-country acquisition by a serial bidder on its abnormal 
returns on the announcement of such a focal transaction testing Hypotheses 1a v 1b. Similarly, 
Models 1B and 1C respectively, relate to both DCs as well as internationally experienced 
executives in TMT, with the latter model showing the interaction effect as posited in 
Hypothesis 4(i). Similarly, Models 2B and 2C respectively, trace plausible impacts of these 
DCs in addition to the Blau diversity index, Model 2C being proposed by Hypothesis 4(ii). 
Finally Models 3B and 3C respectively, depict the same for the exposure to the target country 
expressed in years on average, Model 3C reflecting the conjecture by Hypothesis 4(iii). The 
results in Table 5.3 demonstrate that, the sign of the coefficient estimate for the DCs in all these 
                                                          
11 CARs have been multiplied by 100 for ease of reporting estimated regression coefficients. 
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models is positive, except in Model 1C. But since none are significantly different from zero, 
the theorized benefits of prior international deals by Hypothesis 1a, cannot be implicitly 
inferred.  
 
The same is also true when ‘international orientation’ variables mentioned above, are 
introduced in Models 1B, 2B and 3B respectively. The quadratic interaction term between DCs 
and TMT indicator (i) in Model 1C (the number of internationally-experienced managers in 
TMT specified in Section 5.5), is significant at 5% level. Therefore, it appears that the supposed 
disadvantages, postulated for frequent foreign acquisitions by competing Hypothesis 1b, seem 
to be mitigated by a sufficiently high number of these managers in TMTs. In particular, the 
cut-off point shown by Model 1C indicates that at least about 2 (two) of such knowledgeable 
managers on the TMT of a serial acquirer can possibly positively moderate the apparent 
negative effect (although statistically not significant) of three-year prior DCs. Just a median of 
the said TMTs in our sample belonged to this category. However, by themselves, even a greater 
number of these executives (in Model 1C, the estimated coefficient of the quadratic term is 
negative and significant at 10% level) tend to misapply their previous wisdom, everything else 
held constant. This apparent adverse impact of presumably greater number of top managers on 
the boards of frequent bidding firms is inconsistent with our proposed impacts of this 
determinant, discussed in Section 5.5; and seems to be ascribable to our sample. It is also 
possible that the earlier exposure to cross-country deals by a frequent bidder coupled with the 
presence of internationally experienced managers, tend to make its entire TMT rather 
overoptimistic and/or complacent. So, the team’s competence in managing subsequent deals is 
likely to be impaired. Moreover, it is conceivable that in cross-country deals due to multifarious 
prevailing uncertainties and risks, the likely behavioral bias of bidder TMTs may be amplified. 
The complement MAR Model 10C (in the Appendix in Table 5.6) however showed stronger 
significance. E.g., the quadratic interaction term in is significant at 1% level, while the 
estimated coefficient of the quadratic term for this TMT proxy is negative and significant at 
5% level. 
 
However, neither proxies of the mix of nationalities on TMTs, nor years of acquaintance with 
foreign host(s) on average (denoted as TMT indicators (ii) and (iii) respectively, in Section 5.5 
on ‘Research hypotheses’), seems to moderate the effect of earlier DCs over the pre-specified 
window (as evident for Models 2C and 3C, respectively). Therefore, neither Hypothesis 4(ii) 
nor 4(iii) is maintained. Although generally the predicted impacts for the TMT indicator (iii), 
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were upheld for Model 3C, the postulated non-linear impact is not sustained (the linear 
coefficient estimate being positive and significant at 5% level, while that of the quadratic is 
negative but not significant12).  However, in the case of its MAR counterpart (Model 12B in 
Table 5.6 in the Appendix), we document a significant inverted U-shaped association of this 
TMT determinant with the three-day CARs of multiple bidders, upholding the proposed 
influence of this variable argued in Section 5.5. Particularly, both the linear and quadratic 
coefficient estimates are significant at 5% level and conform to their postulated signs, i.e. 
positive, and negative, respectively. Economically, this finding implies that about 7 (seven) 
years of host country exposure on average may bring about a detrimental impact from TMT 
decision-making in cross-country acquisitions. This would be likely to get reflected on serially 
acquiring firm’s stock performance as announcement effect. This finding lends some 
credibility to our contention in Section 5.5 that greater amount of host-country experience on 
the board of a frequent bidder may contribute to irrational decision-making, which could have 
adverse outcome. But, the national diversity indicator of TMT orientation failed to show any 
consistent results in either of the Models 2B or 2C; also in the case of the MAR Models 12B 
and 12C in Table 5.6 in the Appendix.  
 
In view of the above discussion, it appears that neither of our Hypotheses 1a nor 1b is 
corroborated since past DCs over the three-year period, does not by itself appear to have any 
statistically significant influence on the announcement returns of a frequently acquiring firm. 
Therefore, we are unable to draw an inference as to whether the number of prior deals 
conducted have an adverse impact on the serial acquirer announcement returns in line with that 
evidenced by Conn et al., 2004; Billet & Qian, 2008, etc.   However, only if a higher (2 as 
above) number of internationally experienced executives exists in the TMT of a multiple 
bidder, the relationship between the DC-predictor and CARs of such a firm are likely to get 
benefitted, thereby corroborating Hypothesis 4(i). Finally, we also noticed that too much 
knowledge of a foreign host (i.e. 7 or more such executives in TMT) can be detrimental for a 
serial acquirer, although MM does not imply this result.  
 
The three-day CARs based on MM in Table 5.4 (Models 4A; 4B, 4C; 5B, 5C; and 6B, 6C 
respectively) examines the impact of the time elapsed from the previous cross-country 
acquisition on that of the current announcement outcome of a multiple bidding firm, as 
                                                          
12
 In Chapter 2, we observed similar results for the variant of this TMT indicator, i.e. the number of target-country 
knowledgeable managers in the TMT. 
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conjectured under Hypotheses 2a v 2b. In all these models, we found a persistently negative 
influence of the ‘TBDs’ regressor on the abnormal announcement returns, indicating 
‘forgetfulness’ as theorised by Hypothesis 2b. In other words, it seems that either too fast-paced 
cross-border transactions or greater time elapsed between two sequential deals undertaken, 
affects the process of development of such deal experience, as claimed by Hayward (2002) and 
Aktas et al., (2013). Therefore, frequent acquirers of international targets seem less likely to 
benefit from their earlier deals. Economically, this implies everything else constant, when the 
TBD predictor increases (decreases) by one standard deviation, the magnitude of average 
frequent acquirer CARs decreases (increases) by 11 basis points (b.p.) in Model 4A and by 15 
b.p. in Model 4C respectively.  
 
Further, the coefficient of TMT indicator (i) is negative for the linear term in both Models 4B 
and 4C and significant at 5%, while that of the quadratic term is positive as well as significant 
at 10% level only for Model 4C. This suggests that the initial detrimental effect of having 
internationally experienced executives in TMT, ultimately reverses when there are 4 of such 
managers in TMT. This result upholds our postulations on the influence of this TMT variable 
on the CARs of the frequent bidder, being in contrast to the negative non-linear impact that is 
documented for this TMT determinant in Table 5.3. Also in Model 6C, the linear term 
coefficient of TMT orientation determinant (iii) is positively significant at 10% level, implying 
the benefits of having host country acquainted managers in TMT. Finally, we fail to find any 
statistically significant moderating impact of the determinants of TMT ‘international 
orientation’ (in any of the Models 4C, 5C and 6C) on the negative relationship between the key 
explanatory variable, TBDs and the CARs of a repetitive acquirer. Therefore, we can infer that 
the estimated coefficients of the TMT proxies generally conform to their predicted signs in all 
these models, although Hypothesis 5 (i), (ii) and (iii) on the possible moderating impacts of 
these TMT variables do not show sufficient evidence to be upheld. The MAR-based CAR 
models (Models 13A, 13B, 13C; 14B, 14C and 15B, 15C) are presented in Table 5.7 in the 
Appendix showed analogous results as Table 5.4, except for the statistical significance for TMT 
proxies. 
 
The third and last key explanatory variable employed in our analysis to test Hypotheses 3a v 
3b so as to predict the three-day abnormal returns to announcement of cross-country 
acquisitions by multiple bidders, is the transacted worth of the prior deals aggregated over a 
window of three years (also ADV) by each serial bidder. Models 7A; 7B, 7C; 8B, 8C and 9B, 
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9C respectively, in Table 5.5 present the key findings, the complement MAR models (Models 
16A, 16B, 16C; 17B, 17C and 18B, 18C) being reported in the Appendix in Table 5.8. Only 
for Model 7C in Table 5.5, the likely impact of PMI problems, ceteris paribus, is at play 
(depicted by the negative sign of the ‘ADV’ predictor, significant at 10% level), while all other 
models showed non-significant relationship of this regressor with CARs, albeit negative. 
Ceteris paribus, serial bidders conducting higher aggregate value of deals within a shorter time 
interval experience lower CARs by about 25 b.p. as implied by Model 7C, attributable to an 
‘indigestion effect’. It indicates that whilst pursuing frequent international acquisitions, if a 
firm consistently pays larger transaction-values, cumulatively such high-cost deals may take a 
toll on its resources obtainability to integrate the subsequent transactions. Moreover, since such 
a firm also may undertake these deals within such small time period (three years by virtue of 
our research design), its integrating ability presumably becomes restricted, as suggested by 
Kengelbach et al. (2012). Finally, this result upholds the disadvantageous impact of ADV on 
the CARs of a serial bidder as predicted by Hypothesis 3b, as we identified in our univariate 
analysis too.  
 
[ Insert Figure 5.1 about here ] 
 
Likewise Table 5.3, TMT orientation determinant (i), is the only proxy (Model 7C in Table 
5.5) that documents a positive moderating effect on the negative relationship between ADV 
and a multiple bidder’s announcement CARs. Specifically, the coefficient of quadratic 
interaction term of this TMT variable is positively significant in Model 7C at 5% level. It 
indicates that the apparent ‘integration-indigestion’ could be avoided by virtue of better 
decision-making by the specially endowed managers on the board, thus supporting Hypothesis 
6(i). Economically, it entails having a similar number (two) of internationally experienced 
executives in a multiple acquirer TMT, as also evident in Model 1C in Table 5.3. Figure 5.1 
depicts a flatter slope for the quadratic term interaction effect of this TMT determinant when 
the value of ADV predictor is high. This slope implies that presence of an optimum number of 
internationally knowledgeable managers in bidder TMTs would reduce the adverse influence 
of the ADV predictor on CARs. However, the incidence of these top executives in the 
managerial team by itself, tends to impede this expected positive catalytic effect (as seen from 
the negative linear coefficients in Model 7C, significant at 1% level; and Model (7B)13, 
                                                          
13 In Table 5.3 a similar result for Model 1B were noticed, although significant at 10% level. 
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significant at 5% level respectively). But, we cannot be meaningfully conclude whether this 
disadvantage persists if a bidder TMT has more of such managers, since the quadratic term has 
a coefficient estimate which is not statistically significant. This is in contrast to what is depicted 
in Model 1C in Table 5.3. This unfavourable linear influence implies that either initial presence 
of managers with international knowledge or more of them in an acquirer TMT would lead to 
inferior outcomes, possibly because of unwarranted confidence or optimism bias in the team. 
TMT national diversity, represented by proxy (ii) solely by itself (neither in Model 8B nor 
Model 8C), failed to show either any significant impact on an acquirer CARs or a moderating 
effect predicted by Hypothesis 6(ii). Finally, the average years of target country familiarity by 
itself, denoted by TMT determinant (iii), defends its favourable influence (positive significant 
linear term only in Model 9B), although no significant non-linear effect is detected. The 
corresponding MAR Model 18B with this TMT determinant however, upholds the postulated 
non-linear effect of this TMT variable on the acquirer CARs. But in neither case any significant 
interaction effect of this proxy is detected; so, Hypothesis 6(iii) is also rejected. The MAR 
model three-day CARs in Table 5.8 thus, echo what we observed in the case with the MAR-
based models with the DCs predictor in Table 5.6. 
 
In respect of the control variables employed in our analysis, just a few, namely, diversifying 
cross-border acquisition and full control indicators, lagged bidder size and listed foreign 
target(s) are statistically significant in the models with the DCs predictor. While public host is 
not significant in any of the models with the TBD regressor; for ADV, neither size of bidding 
firm nor full control indicator, is significant. Only diversifying dummy is consistently 
significant across all model specifications. Each of the said variables affects the frequent 
acquirer CARs negatively, implying less favorable market perception, ceteris paribus, 
upholding in principle the findings of some of the studies looking at serial acquirers (e.g., Conn 
et al., 2004; Kengelback et al. 2012). There is some indication that TMT size control is 
negatively significant, especially in the case of ADV as the main independent variable, 
consistent with earlier research (e.g. Yermack, 1996). All other controls failed to show 
statistical significance, even at 10% level in all our regression specifications. 
 
The discussions on our findings from the multivariate analysis so far, portray a significantly 
detrimental impact of TBDs on the three-day CARs of multiple acquirers, upholding 
Hypothesis 2b. This result supports the empirical evidence of Hayward, 2002, rather than Aktas 
et al., 2013. Prior three-year DCs are not significantly different from zero, while three-year 
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earlier ADVs show a significant negative effect on the CARs only in Model 7C, supporting 
Hypothesis 3b, albeit not very strongly. Nevertheless, the multivariate result of ADV implied 
by Model 7C substantiates our univariate results, also corroborating to the indigestion effect 
documented by Kengelback et al. 2012. As far as the determinants of TMT ‘international 
orientation’ are concerned, only the predicted U-shaped positive moderating effect of an 
optimal number of internationally knowledgeable managers in TMT (2 in both Model 1C in 
Table 5.3 and Model 7C in Table 5.5 respectively), proposed by Hypotheses 4(i) and 6(i), are 
upheld. These results indicate a favourable influence of this TMT proxy (i) on the relationships 
of DCs and ADVs respectively, with the acquirer CARs on average. By themselves, the TMT 
proxies generally uphold our predictions as detailed in Section 5.5 on ‘Research hypotheses’.  
 
5.8 Additional analyses for robustness 
A number of supplementary tests were carried on to conform to our results to Hypotheses 1 to 
6, discussed in the previous sub-section on ‘Multivariate analyses’. All these tables are 
provided in the Appendix. Basically, we re-estimated all the models discussed above using the 
following different specifications involving: a variant of DC predictor, eleven-day CARs, one-
year post acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), year-fixed effects, multilevel 
modelling and some additional variants of TMT proxies (detailed in relevant sub-sections). For 
the last two analyses using the alternative TMT determinants, we report only the CARs based 
on MM for the sake of brevity. 
 
   5.8.1 Additional predictor ‘deal orders’ 
We also checked the robustness of the findings with the three-year period DCs, by using 
another variant, the deal order (DO) predictor (as explained in the sub-section on ‘Independent 
variables’). While the DCs regressor predicts the impact of the number of its prior cross-
country acquisitions within a three-year period on the current announcement return of a 
multiple bidder; the DOs ascertain a similar effect using the sequence (or rank) of prior deals 
throughout the entire sample period. The limitation of this computation is that if an acquirer 
conducts infrequent deals (e.g. its first deal is in the year 1999, while its next deal is after 6 
years, i.e. in 2004), the interpretation of learning cannot be done since the acquisitions are too 
far-spaced in time (Hayward, 2002). 
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The results using DO as regressor are reported in the Appendix under Tables 5.9 and 5.10, the 
former table being based on MM, whilst the latter on MAR model. Interestingly, DOs predictor 
shows a consistently negative (unlike the DC predictor in Table 5.3) but, statistically non-
significant relationship with the three-day announcement CARs for all models, except for 
Model 22C in Table 5.10. This result provides some support to our Hypothesis 1b, albeit not 
robust across the model specifications. 
 
While TMT indicator (i) is no longer significant by itself, we still detect its positive quadratic 
moderating effect (although at a generous 10% level) only in case of the MAR Model 22C. 
The other results pertaining to TMT indicators (ii) and (iii) reaffirmed the results in Table 5.3 
and its counterpart in Table 5.6. Hence, the observed non-linear impact of the TMT variable 
(i), supporting Hypothesis 4(i) in our basic findings, is only substantiated in the said MAR 
model.  
 
   5.8.2 Eleven-day CARs 
Tables 5.11, 5.13 and 5.15 in the Appendix replicate the main Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 
respectively, whereas MAR models in Tables 5.12, 5.14 and 5.16 replicate Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 
5.8 which are also in the Appendix. A longer event window of eleven-day announcement CARs 
as against the three-day CARs is reported using these tables. The overall results from eleven-
day CAR models uphold our core findings from the three-day CAR models with respect to the 
key predictors and the TMT indicators. However, the following exceptions were observed: 
      (a) The coefficient of the DC variable was negatively significant at 5% level in MAR Model 
28C in Table 5.12.  Also, quite a few models in Table 5.11 as well as Table 5.12 showed 
negative DC, although insignificant. 
      (b) The adverse non-linear effect of greater number of such managers as portrayed by TMT 
proxy (i) is see only for MAR Model 28C.  
      (c) National diversity (TMT proxy (ii)) after a cut-off point (precisely, an index of .23 or 
higher in Model 26C in Table 5.11) is seen to have a beneficial effect on the abnormal returns 
of the serial acquirers. This effect was not anticipated in the contentions in our ‘Hypotheses’ 
section in respect of this TMT indicator.  
      (d) The predicted ‘forgetfulness’ ascribable to detrimental influence of TBDs by 
Hypothesis 2(b) is confirmed only in Model 33C in Table 5.13. Apart from only Models 35B 
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and 35C in Table 5.14, for all other MAR models, TBD regressor showed significantly negative 
influence.   
      (e) The international orientation proxy (iii) (average years of host country familiarity) 
shows a negative linear moderating effect in MM Model 33C in Table 5.13. However, a 
significant beneficial non-linear moderation effect only in MAR Model 36C of Table 5.14 is 
observed. This indicates that particularly when a frequent bidder has on board managers with 
approximately seven or more years of target country exposure (interaction of the quadratic term 
of this TMT variable with TBD predictor is significant at 10% level here), the adverse effect 
of ‘forgetfulness’ on acquirer CARs seems to be mitigated. 
      (f) All models in Table 5.15 demonstrate the significant negative association of the ADV 
regressor strongly upholding ‘indigestion’ under Hypothesis 3b. However, the MAR models in 
Table 5.16 sparingly do so only in case of Model 40C and 42B.  
      (g) However, the positive non-linear moderation by the TMT orientation determinant (i) 
(number of internationally endowed managers) was only observable for the MAR Model 40C 
in Table 5.16.  
 
The foregoing shows our Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4(i), 5(iii) and 6(i) are supported partially at 
best. Further, our general predictions on the proposed effects of TMT variables on serial bidder 
CARs are generally upheld. We noticed some changes in significance among the control 
variables from our basic findings in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. For instance, the eleven-day CARs 
models show only the full control indicator to retain significance across all model 
specifications. Also, private target status (except for models with TBD predictor), both 
payment modes indicators: only stock (significant for most models with ADV and TBD as 
regressor) and only cash (only for those with TBD as regressor) and GDP per capita of the 
target country (only for some of the MM models with TBDs) show significance. The 
relationship shown by these controls in all cases ceteris paribus, conform to the predictions in 
literature, except that shown by the private target status. In our case for serial bidders acquiring 
cross-border targets, this control variable negatively affects their CARs, whereas extant studies 
(see for instance, Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002) acknowledge a positive effect of such 
privately-held targets on acquirer CARs. This observed effect may be typical to our research 
design highlighting the information asymmetries and risks involved in the cross-country 
transactions, which may likely to get accentuated manifold by for private targets.  
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   5.8.3 One-year BHARs 
To check the robustness of our core findings as well as to see whether the above results hold 
in a further longer term, we employ a greater length period: post-acquisition one-year 
(BHARs). This is also on the lines of Billett & Qian (2008). Tables14 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 in the 
Appendix replicate Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. In Table 5.17, it is seen that the three-
year prior DCs in all the models show a statistically significant negative influence on the one-
year BHARs for the frequently acquiring firms. Table 5.19 also portrays a similar significantly 
detrimental consequence of the cumulative transaction value (ADV regressor) during the three-
year period before a focal international acquisition on the post-acquisition BHARs for these 
firms. The results in both tables strongly suggest that PMI issues adversely affect multiple 
bidder returns in the longer term. However, Table 5.18 depicts a somewhat different result. A 
positively significant relationship of the time elapsed (between the preceding cross-country 
acquisition and the focal deal) with these BHARs. While this impact could indicate a positive 
learning from the experience of such previous acquisitions as argued by Aktas et al. (2013); it 
could also signify the postulated negative impact of PMI issues on the returns envisaged from 
a transaction (Kengellbach et al., 2012). The latter effect may override any benefits, if the 
TBDs are lower. In our model specifications, the multiple deals within a short period of three-
years presumably without sufficient time for each acquisition to be integrated, are likely to take 
a toll on the subsequent returns. Notwithstanding these two probable interpretations for the 
observed relationship between TBDs and BHARs, since both the ADV and the DC predictors 
strongly indicate an ‘acquisition-indigestion’ effect, a similar explanation seems the most 
plausible rationalisation of this observed impact of TBDs. Hence, our findings for BHAR 
models seem to suggest this diminishing profitability problem. 
 
In respect of the ‘international orientation’ variables, neither they by themselves were 
significant, nor did they have any meaningful moderating impact on the key predictors in any 
of the models.  
 
Therefore, the one-year post-acquisition announcement BHAR models underpin the adverse 
influence of undertaking frequent cross-country deals as well as resultant ‘indigestion’, 
                                                          
14 The models here follow the same specifications as in the case of three-day CAR models. For instance, in Table 5.17, the 
model marked ‘A’ has the key predictor: DCs over three-year prior period of the present international acquisition; models; 
marked ‘B’ includes both the said predictor as well as internationally experienced executives on TMT, while models marked 
with ‘C’ has the interaction between the key predictor and TMT orientation proxy including the said variables in the models 
marked ‘B’.  
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supporting both Hypotheses 1b and 3b. Moreover, the findings also suggest Hypothesis 2b is 
upheld. The control variables which showed significance differ for these models. The stock 
binary variable and generally the TMT size (in Tables 5.17 and 5.19) and cultural distance with 
the host country (Table 5.19), cash only and diversifying acquisitions indicator variables 
together with lagged return on asset of serial acquirers (Table 5.18) show significance for 
certain models. Ceteris paribus, the coefficient estimates of all these variables has their 
predicted signs as in the previous literature. 
 
   5.8.4 Year-fixed effects and exclusion of financial firms 
Two major crises took place during our sample period: the post-2000 dot-com bubble burst and 
the financial crisis beginning in late 2007. Hence, year dummy variables were introduced to 
control for fixed time effects for both MM and MAR models pertaining to the three-day CARs.  
 
Also, using the same MM and MAR models we performed the same tests without including 
the sample of financial firms, initially included. Although the corresponding results are not 
presented here for the sake of brevity however, they are largely consistent with those reported 
earlier. Nevertheless, the originally significant variables weaken somewhat as well as the 
overall model significance suffer, especially for the MM-based CARs in the case of year-fixed 
effects inclusion. However, in the latter case (i.e. excluding the financial firms), the original 
findings are well substantiated. 
 
   5.8.5 Multilevel models 
Extant studies (e.g., Nielsen and Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska and Trojanowski, 2014) have 
adopted a multilevel research design, arguing that such structure seems more appropriate where 
acquisitions are not only nested within firms, which in turn are nested within industries; and 
also within different host countries. Therefore, in addition to the pooled OLS models which we 
have used as our primary research methodology, a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression 
framework is also employed to check the sensitivity of the core findings using the former 
method.  
 
The test of our hypotheses with the same model specifications showed our main results 
obtained, are roughly consistent with those of the pooled OLS method. Particularly, the positive 
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non-linear interaction of the number of TMT executives with international exposure (proxy (i)) 
is upheld for the three-year prior DCs as well as the ADV predictors in both MM and MAR 
specifications. Hence, Hypotheses 4(i) and 6(i) are consistently maintained. Also, the latter 
predictor shows a stronger significant negative relation with three-day MM models of CARs 
of multiple bidders, unlike what is seen in case of the pooled OLS regressions. This result 
therefore, substantiates Hypothesis 3b thereby also defending our core finding. Further, the 
quadratic term of TMT proxy (i) is not significantly different than zero. The findings pertaining 
to the other two TMT indicators and their interactions largely conform to those from the pooled 
OLS method. Finally, the controls variables which showed statistical significance for the linear 
regression models, are mostly significant for the multilevel models too. But, some of the overall 
MAR models with the three-year prior ADV predictor while, all the MAR and MM models 
with the TBD predictor, showed insignificant likelihood ratio chi-square values15. Hence, the 
multilevel models have not been reported here. 
 
   5.8.6 Other TMT proxies: depth and breadth of international experience 
In our earlier chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), two other determinants of TMT ‘international 
orientation’ had been used: viz., (iv) amount of international experience in average number of 
years (henceforth referred to as depth) and also, (v) range of such exposure (henceforth referred 
to as breadth). We rerun our tests of the hypotheses pertaining to our key regressors with these 
two variants of our TMT proxy (i) (the number of internationally knowledgeable executives). 
The results are reported in the Appendix as Tables 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 for MM specification 
only, where these tables marked replicate the main body of Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. 
For example, Table 5.20 presents the models of three-day CARs, Models 52B and 53B have 
depth and breadth of TMT international experience as additional variables in the specified 
model with the DC regressor, while Models 52C and 53C include their respective interactions.  
 
The key explanatory variables: DC, TBD and ADV generally show similar results in the 
presence of the TMT proxies of (iv) depth and (v) breadth of international experiences of TMT 
members for a frequent acquirer, as evident from our key analyses in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 
respectively. In Tables 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22, the quadratic term for the depth of international 
                                                          
15
 Also, the MAR model specification (C) with TBD predictor and national diversity proxy together with their interaction term 
did not converge. For MM models, three-year prior DC predictor with target country familiarity as well as their respective 
interactions (model specifications B and C) failed to converge. These convergence problems and the insignificant chi-square 
values of the mentioned multi-level MAR and MM models are considered a limitation of our analysis. 
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experience is positively significant for all but Model 52C in Table 5.20. This suggests that after 
attaining on average 6 (six) or more years of international experience, a frequent acquirer TMT 
would make better decisions leading to a beneficial impact on the announcement CARs of these 
firms (Model 56C in Table 5.22). A lower depth of international exposure would however, not 
be advantageous. A negative non-linear moderation impact of TMT depth is visible on the 
relationship between TBDs regressor and CARs (Model 54C in Table 5.21 shows the quadratic 
interaction term involving depth and TBD to be significant at 1% level). Since TBDs show a 
negative effect on the CARs, it seems that the adverse influence of TBD outweighs the positive 
impact of the depth variable. 
 
The breadth variable by itself is never significant. However, for its interaction with the DC 
predictor, a meaningful positive moderating effect (for the Model 53C in Table 5.20, the 
coefficient of the interaction between DC and quadratic breadth term is positive and significant 
at 5% level) of the breadth variable was noticed. This defends our previous finding showing 
positive moderating impact of the TMT proxy (i); and in effect defending Hypothesis 4(i).  
 
The control variables which were mostly significant in the above model specifications are 
diversifying acquisition and full control indicators, lagged acquirer size and listed target 
dummy variable. The lagged return on assets shows significance only for some models. The 
signs of these coefficients were in harmony with those evidenced in the prior studies.     
 
Thus, out of these two variants of TMT orientation determinant (i), only (iv) depth by itself 
beyond a cut-off is seen to positively affect the three-day CARs of these frequently acquiring 
firms. Yet, the (v) breadth proxy positively moderates the relationship between prior DCs and 
these CARs beyond a threshold, thereby upholding Hypothesis 4(i); while the moderating 
impact of depth proxy seems to be offset by the strength of the negative relationship between 
TBDs and CARs.  
 
   5.8.7 Further tests with high and low quartile(s) of TMT proxies  
As a further test of our Hypotheses numbered 1 to 6, a different categorization i.e., a distribution 
in the highest and lowest quartiles of the TMT-level orientation variables is also employed. We 
chose to report for the sake of brevity only the MM specifications in Tables 5.23, 5.24 and 
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5.25, respectively, in the Appendix. These models also follow similar specifications with ‘B’ 
and ‘C’ as followed until now.  
 
In Table 5.23 showing DCs as the main predictor, Models 58B, 58C; 60B, 60C; 62B, 62C 
represent the high quartile specification of the TMT determinant (i), (ii) and (iii). These models 
marked with ‘B’ are without interaction term, whereas models with ‘C’ have the interaction 
term of the respective high quartile TMT variable and the DCs. Similarly, Models 59B, 59C; 
61B, 61C; 63B, 63C are the low quartile specification of these TMT proxies with and without 
interaction terms.   While none of the interaction terms with the DC predictor in Table 5.23 are 
significant for any of the models, the TMT determinants (i), (ii) and (iii) by themselves are in 
some. The TMT proxy (iii) (average years of target country familiarity) shows an apparently 
contradictory relationship with the CARs to that observed in Table 5.3. Whilst the high quartile 
variant of this TMT determinant is positive (e.g., Model 62B); that of the low quartile is 
negative (e.g., Model 63B). A relook at our sample reveals that seventy-fifth percentile shows 
a meagre 0.75 average years of target country experience, while the ninetieth percentile has 5 
years of such exposure on average. In our non-linear key model specifications, we found the 
inflection point beyond which this proxy could have a detrimental impact on the returns of a 
frequently acquiring firm (Model 3B in Table 5.3) to be around 7 years in average. This implies 
that in our sample, TMTs less than even ten percentage, show this amount of years of foreign 
host acquaintance. So, the initial advantage of having such endowed executives in the team, is 
reflected in the positive association of its high quartile specification with the announcement 
CARs. While in the low quartile of this TMT determinant, where virtually TMTs have no such 
exposure, shows a negative association. This actually strengthens our core non-linear results 
with this TMT control. 
 
The TBDs regressor in the presence of the quartile-wise distributed TMT proxies (Models 64B 
– 69C in Table 5.24), consistently upholds our main results in Table 5.5, corroborating 
Hypothesis 2b. However, two significant interaction effects, hitherto non-existent are 
observed: (1) for TMT proxy (i), a positive linear moderating impact of its high quartile variant 
(Model 64C), providing partial support for Hypothesis 5(i); (2) for TMT determinant (iii), a 
negative moderating influence of its high quartile classification (Model 68C), which goes 
against our postulated influence for this TMT variable. But, in neither case the concerned TMT 
variable by itself, is significant.       
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Finally, the ADV predictor maintained its unfavorable influence on bidder CARs (Model 70C 
in Table 5.25), upholding Hypothesis 3b, underpinning our key finding in the case of Model 
7C in Table 5.5, although all the other (Models 70B – 75C in Table 5.25) also show negative 
estimates. Also the positive moderating impact of the TMT variable (i) for its high quartile 
category is seen (Model 70C), partially substantiating Hypothesis 6(i) since this is a linear 
interaction effect. This finding therefore, defends our core result with respect to this TMT 
variable. This high quartile TMT proxy (i) however, is negatively significant in the case of both 
Models 70B and 70C. 
 
From the foregoing discussions, it can be inferred that with high and low quartiles 
classifications of the said TMT determinants (i), (ii) and (iii), our main results (in Tables 5.3, 
5.4 and 5.5, respectively), are mostly defended (also in the case of MAR models, not reported 
here, we document similar results), since Hypotheses 2b and 3b respectively, are consistently 
upheld. Finally, the helpful moderating effect of the TMT proxy (i) is supported with respect 
to the TBD regressor (this effect has not been observed before) and the ADV regressor albeit, 
not for DCs. Although these interaction effects of the number of internationally knowledgeable 
managers in high quartile, with the said predictors are linear here, nevertheless they lend some 
support to Hypotheses 5(i) and 6(i) respectively, where we postulated positive curvilinear 
interactions. We also found somewhat conflicting moderating influence of TMT determinant 
(iii) with the TBD predictor, which may be attributable to the significant negative impact of 
the TBD predictor on the bidder CARs. Moreover, the apparent contradictory effect of high 
and low quartiles of the TMT variable (iii) as against its linear and quadratic specifications, 
seemed to be typical of our sample where more than ninety percentage of TMTs of the 
acquiring firms had less than the threshold number of years of target country exposure on 
average (as captured in the high quartile) so as to reap its potential benefits.        
 
5.9 Discussion and conclusion  
In this chapter, we primarily look at the how the UK stock market perceives those firms 
engaging in multiple cross-border acquisitions from the perspectives of three different crucial 
aspects. They are: the number of the previous foreign transactions undertaken as well as their 
aggregate values during a period of three years prior to the focal transaction; and finally, the 
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time elapsed between these sequential transactions. Our study has been motivated by a 
combination of different branches of research. First, both extant corporate finance and IB 
literatures (e.g. Hayward, 2002, Billett & Qian, 2008; Aktas et al., 2013, etc.), presents rather 
inconsistent empirical evidence on the performance of these repeatedly acquiring firms. 
Second, it remains unclear as to whether such firms learn from frequent acquisition experiences 
to deal better with the information asymmetry pertaining to foreign hosts; or PMI issues disrupt 
this learning process and manifest as inferior outcomes. Third, ‘upper echelons’ theory as well 
as IB studies had underpinned the role of ‘international orientation’ of the TMT of acquiring 
firms, in making strategic decisions, like international acquisitions amid multifarious 
uncertainties and risks. Based upon these numerous predictions and findings from all of these 
strata of research, we have focused in this chapter to explore whether these factors in 
combination with TMT ‘international orientation’ variables affect the abnormal returns to these 
firms and if so how.  
 
We relook in this chapter at the various explanations in respect of short-term wealth creation 
by these sequential bidders, proposed by prior research in the context of the collective effect of 
managerial orientation. Basically, we attempt in this chapter with our research design to 
ascertain which of the posited effects between experiential learning and ‘acquisition-
indigestion’ is predominant as far as profitability of these serially bidding firms is concerned. 
Both the number of similar acquisitions undertaken before a focal cross-country acquisition 
(DCs) within a three-year window and also, the temporal interval between the present 
acquisition and its immediately preceding one (TBDs), aimed to assess whether the impact of 
learning produced superior stock reaction to these firms. Finally, our conjecture was that the 
higher collective value of these acquisitions (ADV) in the three-year period prior to the current 
deal would be more likely to cause indigestion, manifested in worsening announcement returns 
of the later foreign acquisitions. Also, depending on the relative dominance of the aforesaid 
impacts, we further looked into whether and how the claims on TMT ‘international orientation’ 
moderated those impacts and in turn affected the short-run returns to these firms. Since the 
extant studies contended both positive influences (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011; Piaskowska 
& Trojanowski, 2014) as well as damaging impacts (e.g., Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Billett & 
Qian, 2008) of such executive orientation, we posited the following non-linear impact of 
globally-oriented top managers: (i) U-shaped effect of number of managers with international 
experience; and inverted U-shaped influences for either (ii) mix of nationalities in bidder 
TMTs; or (iii) number of years of knowledge about host country. Accordingly, our premise 
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was that if TMTs of these firms possessed all or any of the said facets in optimal amounts (i.e. 
above or below the respective thresholds), better profitability to such firms can be ensured, no 
matter whether either learning or indigestion is prevalent.  
 
Looking at the stock market reactions to announcements of cross-border acquisitions for these 
multiple bidder firms, our findings failed to corroborate any ‘learning effect’ from past similar 
acquisitions (Aktas et al., 2013). Instead, we found a significant detrimental impact of TBDs 
which underscores that earlier transaction(s) cannot benefit these serial acquirers in garnering 
higher values for the similar subsequent acquisitions. This result indicates the hypothesized 
‘forgetfulness’ effect (Hayward, 2002; Aktas et al., 2013). Further, PMI problems leading to 
the predicted ‘indigestion’ effect of recurrent acquisitions, was partially upheld in our 
multivariate results, although the univariate tests strongly confirmed this. Further, the 
additional post-acquisition performance analysis with one-year BHARs, strongly evidenced 
this indigestion effect. Also, the positive association observed between TBDs and the 
consequent BHARs seemed to imply the PMI problems, as already highlighted in the case of 
the other explanatory variables.  
 
In respect of TMT orientation factors, our specific prediction emphasizing the curvilinear 
association (inverted U-shape) with announcement returns of these firms, was substantiated for 
the TMT proxy of average years of host country knowledge, as mentioned in the preceding 
sections on our findings. However, we encountered mixed results with respect to the TMT 
proxies of the number of internationally experienced managers and national diversity. In any 
case the fact that insufficient number of managers with international experience is not 
beneficial, has been consistently upheld in our findings. Our previous chapters have highlighted 
the fact that TMTs of acquirer firms pursuing acquisition decisions transcending their domicile 
borders, would presumably benefit from having an optimal combination of internationally 
oriented managers on their team. This concept of a balanced mix of executives appears more 
pertinent in the context of these multiple bidding firms. There are not many of these among the 
UK acquirers in our sample. For example, it takes an average of 7 years of target country 
experience among the TMT members to have a more positive effect on post-acquisition 
performance, compared to a TMT with no such knowledge.    
 
With respect to our arguments regarding the curvilinear moderating impact of these TMT 
variables, our main findings upheld a U-shaped interaction effect(s) only in the case of an 
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optimum number of internationally knowledgeable executives, documented for the DCs as well 
as the ADV regressors. Thus, this result upheld our Hypotheses 4(i) and 6(i) and, also sustained 
the robustness tests. E.g., when we substituted the number of such managers with the breadth 
of international experience of TMT, the latter also documented a positive non-linear 
moderating influence on the association between prior DCs and the announcement returns of 
the current cross-border acquisition. Thus, our key result for this TMT variable was defended. 
In this vein our study on serial bidders in respect of cross-country acquisition decisions and 
their outcomes, substantiates the empirical findings of the existing researches (e.g., Carpenter 
et al., 2001; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014) depicting the favorable impact of 
internationally orientated top managers. But, additional analyses with a different specification 
for this TMT proxy, i.e., depth of TMT international experience, documented an unfavorable 
non-linear moderating effect with the TBD regressor. A similar negative interaction (although 
linear) was also observed with the TBD predictor and the high quartile classification of average 
years of host country familiarity. These findings could have been primarily due to the 
overriding negative effect of the TBD regressor on the repeated acquirer announcement returns.  
 
This study is not without limitations. Since the single home country constraint, and the TMT 
variables operationalization restrictions are similar and have been already emphasized in our 
earlier chapters, those discussions are not repeated here. Second, our original sample where we 
had one-time bidders, had to be omitted for this chapter. Thereby the final sample was reduced 
quite a bit. This compromise is because we used a research design akin to Fuller et al., 2002 in 
order to obtain a clearer picture of solely the performances of these sequential bidders, 
assuming acquirer-specific characteristics to be constant. Third, the moderation effects of TMT 
variables detected in our findings, are perhaps not strong enough to be economically viable. 
However, ours is in line with empirical studies attempting to document such impacts, which 
tend to be smaller (Dawson, 2014).      
 
In summary, this chapter is an addition to the relatively fewer studies investigating how 
plausible factors such as, prior number of deals and their sum of values as well as their time 
intervals affect the performances of the multiple bidding firms in the short-term. It is also a 
departure from the extant research concerning such frequent acquirers in that their 
announcement abnormal returns are evaluated here from the perspective of the so-called global 
orientation of the TMTs of such firms. Specifically, the central premise is how those factors 
are shaped by such TMT orientation. Our key contribution in this chapter is to attempt to 
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establish a link between how these factors might interplay to affect expansion decisions abroad 
and consequently their outcomes, when an internationally oriented TMT exists on the board of 
such an acquirer. This chapter thus, paves the way for future research by documenting a balance 
in TMT orientation, which can also be considered as our practical contribution. Not only this, 
but our result on positive curvilinear moderating impact of TMT international orientation on 
the factor(s) adversely affecting serial acquirer announcement returns, highlights our principal 
findings from the previous two chapters. How can TMTs be designed so that multiple 
acquisitions can bring about positive outcomes? How is it possible to induce a balance between 
learning and PMI problems while considering multiple international acquisitions? How can the 
conflicting impacts of the number of internationally knowledgeable managers and amount of 
host country familiarity be optimally combined? These are questions which future research can 
look into. Also, given the persistent increase of mixed ethnic background individuals globally, 
we would need to relook the relationships we have explored here. It would be an interesting 
extension to study how mixed ethnicity and biculturalism shape individual manager’s 
cognitions and behaviors and thereby are reflected in frequent acquisition decisions and the 
consequences thereof.     
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
  Variable Mean Median S.D. Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 CAR - MM 0.673 0.283 4.72                     
2 
TBD 4.43 4.88 2.04 -0.04                    
  
      
                   
3 DC - 3 years prior 4.86 3.00 5.25 -0.02 -0.31
**
 
                  
     
  
                  
4 ADV - 3 years prior 
4.88 4.81 2.53 
-0.08** -0.22** 0.55                  
                          
5 Num TMT int’l experience  2.13 2.00 1.65 
-0.06* -0.08** 0.30** 0.52**                 
                    
6 National diversity 0.23 0.20 0.25 
-0.003 
-0.06* 0.26** 0.35** 0.52**                
                    
7 Avg years host country 
experience 1.27 0.00 2.89 
0.02 0.01 0.06* 0.11** 0.17** 0.12**               
                    
8 Cash 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.02 0.09
**
 -0.05* -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.04+              
                    
9 Stock 0.03 0.00 0.16 
-0.01 0.02 
-0.07* -0.10** -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.21**             
                    
10 Full acquisition 0.79 1.00 0.41 -0.05
*
 
0.01 0.02 
-0.06* -0.08** -0.06* 0.08** -0.04+ -0.03            
                    
11 Transaction value 2.02 1.61 2.00 
0.00 0.12** -0.03 0.24** 0.11** 0.06* 0.11** 0.37** 0.05* 0.01           
                    
12 Diversifying acquisition 0.34 0.00 0.47 -0.07
*
 
-0.03 0.05* -0.08** -0.06* -0.08** 0.02 -0.06* -0.08** 0.06* -0.17**          
                    
13 Acquirer size 6.75 6.78 2.27 -0.08
**
 -0.13** 0.41** 0.83** 0.52** 0.37** 0.13** 0.04+ -0.10** -0.03 0.29** -0.12**         
                    
14 Acquirer profitability 6.10 6.97 13.3 
-0.02 
-0.07* 0.05* 0.08** -0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.06* -0.17** 0.04+ -0.001 0.05* 0.23**        
                    
15 Cultural differences 1.46 0.69 1.57 
-0.01 
-0.07* 0.16** 0.20** 0.15** 0.15** -0.29** -0.04+ 0.01 -0.26** -0.04 -0.11** 0.15** -0.07*       
  
                    
16 Country risk 0.15 0.08 0.16 
0.02 -0.04 0.11** 0.15** 0.16** 0.16** -0.21** -0.01 0.05+ -0.34** -0.06* -0.13** 0.12** -0.04+ 0.58**      
  
                    
17 GDP per capita 27.5 31.5 14.1 -0.01 0.07
*
 -0.14** -0.17** -0.17** -0.15** 0.23** 0.01 -0.05* 0.30** 0.04* 0.13** -0.11** 0.07** -0.53** -0.84**     
  
                          
18 Private target  0.52 1.00 0.50 
0.01 -0.02 0.00 
-0.24** -0.19** -0.13** -0.06* -0.11** -0.02 0.05* -0.21** 0.13** -0.27** 0.03 -0.11** -0.08** 0.12**    
  
                    
19 Listed target 0.10 0.00 0.30 
-0.04+ 0.03 0.06* 0.26** 0.19** 0.16** 0.11** 0.10** 0.09** -0.22** 0.31** -0.09** 0.24** 0.01 0.02 0.07** -0.09** -0.35**   
  
                    
20 TMT size 4.09 4.00 1.72 -0.05
*
 -0.09** 0.19** 0.31** 0.57** 0.25** 0.01 -0.04 -0.10** 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.34** 0.07** 0.04+ 0.01 -0.12** -0.08** 0.05* 
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Note to Table 5.1: CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the serial bidder firms announcing a cross-border acquisition computed over a 3-day event window (i.e. from day -1 to day +1 
following the announcement) using market model. TBD is the measure of time elapsed between each two successive acquisitions by the same firm. DC -3 years prior represents the number of 
previous deals in a three-year period by each firm before the focal one. ADV – 3 years prior shows the aggregate transacted value of the deals within an earlier period of three years before the 
current deal. Number TMT international experience is the number of top managers of acquiring firms’ international career experience. National Diversity is the Blau index of national diversity of 
the acquiring firm TMT.  Average years of host country experience is the average number of years of target country experiences of the acquiring firms’ TMT members. All experience and diversity 
measures are measured at the end of the financial year preceding the focal cross-border transaction. Cash and Stock are indicator variables for transactions paid purely in cash and stock, respectively. 
Full acquisition is an indicator variable denoting transactions where upon completion of the acquisition the acquirer gains full control of the target, i.e. at least 95% stake. Transaction value is 
expressed in GBP millions in logarithmic form. Diversifying acquisition is the indicator variable equal to one when an acquisition involved any industry other than the acquirer core macro industry, 
and zero otherwise. Firm size is the logarithm of market capitalization value of the acquiring firm (expressed in £ millions). ROA is the ratio of return on assets of acquirer firms. Both Acquirer 
size and ROA are lagged by one-year. Cultural differences variable is the distance between the target country and the country of the acquiring firm (i.e. the UK) using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
index on the basis of four cultural dimensions by Hofstede (2001). Country risk and GDP per capita are the Euromoney country risk index and one-year lagged GDP per capita (in USD thousands) 
of the host country. Private and listed targets are binary variables for host firm status for privately held and public firms, respectively. TMT size is the number of executive directors on the board 
of directors of the acquiring firm. All the variables (except indicator binary variables) are winsorized at 1% level. The key explanatory variables TBD, DC and ADV as well as the TMT determinants 
are centered values. The correlation table reports pairwise correlation coefficients with +, *, and **denoting the corresponding significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.2: The effects of the explanatory variables on CARs surrounding the announcement of a cross-country acquisition by 
serial acquirers: univariate analysis. 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Abnormal 
Explanatory variable < 
= median 
Explanatory variable > 
median 
Tests for the 
significance of the 
difference 
return 
measure  
(3-day 
CAR) Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. t-test 
statistic 
Wilcoxon 
test 
statistic    
Prior 3-year 
window deal counts 
(DCs)  
MM 0.00797 0.05150 0.00513 0.04495 1.190 0.577 
MAR 0.00909 0.05140 0.00579 0.04467 1.387 0.798 
  
  N = 716 N = 921    
Time between 
consequent deals 
(TBDs) 
MM 0.00596 0.04311 0.00571 0.04998 0.112 0.243 
MAR 0.00750 0.04291 0.00617 0.05016 0.587 0.889 
  
  
N = 746 N = 1031     
Prior 3-year 
window aggregate 
deal value (ADV) 
MM 0.00950 0.05087 0.00410 0.04567 2.245* 2.082* 
MAR 0.01096 0.05015 0.00445 0.04578 2.722** 2.503* 
    N = 699 N = 923     
 
Note to Table 5.2: The explanatory variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. Three-day CARs here are grouped 
according to each of the three main independent variables which are expressed in higher and lower than their respective sample-
based median values. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.3: CARs based on Market model for DC regressor. 
 
  
Model 
1A 
Model 
1B 
Model 
1C 
Model 
2B 
Model 
2C 
Model 
3B 
Model 
3C   
Prior 3-year window deal count  0.0163 0.0194 -0.0253 0.0142 0.044 0.0131 0.00645 (0.63) (0.73) (-0.75) (0.53) (0.83) (0.50) (0.18) 
Cash 0.138 0.128 0.149 0.146 0.137 0.129 0.144 (0.45) (0.42) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.42) (0.47) 
Stock -1.279 -1.173 -1.212 -1.268 -1.273 -1.319 -1.325 (-1.11) (-1.01) (-1.05) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.16)    
Full acquisition -0.657* -0.693* -0.700* -0.649* -0.649* -0.673* -0.678*   (-2.01) (-2.11) (-2.12) (-1.99) (-1.99) (-2.06) (-2.08)    
Transaction value 0.0111 0.0141 0.00396 0.0111 0.0138 -0.0049 -0.00665 (0.13) (0.17) (0.05) (0.13) (0.16) (-0.06) (-0.08)    
Diversifying acquisition -0.635* -0.637* -0.629* -0.630* -0.629* -0.701** -0.691**  (-2.46) (-2.46) (-2.43) (-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.67) (-2.63)    
Cultural differences -0.0422 -0.0445 -0.0578 -0.043 -0.0418 0.00354 0.00306 (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.62) (-0.47) (-0.45) (0.04) (0.03) 
Country risk 0.963 1.444 1.456 0.906 0.839 0.873 0.862 (0.62) (0.91) (0.92) (0.59) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56) 
GDP per capita 0.0161 0.0194 0.0189 0.0158 0.0151 0.0112 0.0117 (0.96) (1.13) (1.09) (0.94) (0.89) (0.67) (0.69) 
Acquirer size -0.145* -0.0925 -0.0936 -0.154* -0.149* -0.150* -0.153*   (-2.05) (-1.20) (-1.22) (-2.14) (-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.15)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0165 -0.0206 -0.0191 -0.0161 -0.0164 -0.0149 -0.0142 (-1.22) (-1.48) (-1.37) (-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.10) (-1.05)    
Private target -0.326 -0.333 -0.311 -0.327 -0.33 -0.323 -0.332 (-1.22) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.23) (-1.21) (-1.24)    
Listed target -0.955* -0.882+ -0.920+ -0.974* -0.987* -1.001* -1.030*   (-1.99) (-1.84) (-1.93) (-2.01) (-2.02) (-2.09) (-2.16)    
TMT size -0.0959 -0.0155 -0.0235 -0.103 -0.104 -0.112 -0.114 (-1.21) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-1.42) (-1.45)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -0.216+ -0.185                       
  (-1.84) (-1.26)                       
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.0154 -0.0997+                       
  (0.50) (-1.78)                       
3-year deal count * (i)(a)     -0.0127                       
    (-0.74)                       
3-year deal count * (i)(b)     0.0168*                       
    (2.51)                       
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.385 -0.0379                   
      (0.59) (-0.04)                   
National diversity2 (ii)(b)      -0.527 2.412                  
     (-0.19) (0.50)                  
3-year deal count * (ii)(a)         0.0932                   
        (0.67)                   
3-year deal count * (ii)(b)         -0.555                   
        (-0.80)                   
Average years host country experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.241* 0.326+   
          (2.19) (1.91) 
Average years host country experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0194 -0.0222 
          (-1.58) (-1.04)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(a)             -0.016 
            (-0.72)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(b)             0.000504 
            (0.15) 
Constant 2.485** 1.629 1.744+ 2.614** 2.591** 2.897** 2.921**  
  (2.78) (1.57) (1.66) (2.86) (2.83) (3.17) (3.21) 
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 
F 2.12** 2.256** 2.319** 1.873* 1.67* 2.041** 1.875* 
 
 
Note to Table 5.3: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the effects of the 3-year prior deal counts on the cumulative 
abnormal returns (calculated using Market model) over a three-day period for serial acquirer firms announcing international 
acquisitions. The key explanatory variables DC across 3-year period as well as the TMT determinants are mean-centered 
values. Model 1A shows the base model with the main explanatory variable DC along with the controls as proposed by either 
Hypothesis 1(a) or (b). Models 1B and 1C has the TMT proxy (i) of number of executives with international experience: B 
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without and C with interaction between DC and the said proxy (i) respectively; similarly, Models 2B and 2C has the TMT 
proxy (ii) of mix of TMT nationalities: B without and C with interaction between DC and the said proxy (ii) respectively; last, 
3B and 3C has the TMT proxy (iii) of average number of years of target country experience: B without and C with interaction 
between DC and the said proxy (iii) respectively. The Models 1C, 2C and 3C respectively are based on Hypothesis 4(i), (ii) 
and (iii). All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using 
robust standard errors in parentheses and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.4: CARs based on Market model for TBD regressor.   
 
  
Model 4A Model 4B Model 4C Model 5B Model 5C Model 6B Model 6C    
Time between consequent 
deals (TBDs) 
-0.121+ -0.120+ -0.166* -0.127* -0.298* -0.121+ -0.203*   
(-1.90) (-1.88) (-1.97) (-1.97) (-2.28) (-1.90) (-2.29)    
Cash 0.301 0.293 0.302 0.314 0.33 0.292 0.287 (1.03) (1.01) (1.04) (1.07) (1.13) (1.00) (0.99) 
Stock -0.322 -0.195 -0.213 -0.308 -0.271 -0.300 -0.301 (-0.24) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.23)    
Full acquisition -0.580+ -0.604+ -0.600+ -0.567+ -0.559+ -0.591+ -0.604+   (-1.77) (-1.84) (-1.83) (-1.73) (-1.70) (-1.80) (-1.85)    
Transaction value 0.021 0.0283 0.039 0.0258 0.0253 0.0114 0.0113 (0.26) (0.35) (0.48) (0.32) (0.31) (0.14) (0.14) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.793** -0.800** -0.811** -0.791** -0.782** -0.840** -0.849**  (-3.08) (-3.12) (-3.16) (-3.07) (-3.05) (-3.19) (-3.22)    
Cultural differences -0.106 -0.105 -0.107 -0.102 -0.107 -0.0772 -0.0839 (-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.17) (-1.11) (-1.17) (-0.84) (-0.91)    
Country risk 1.187 1.54 1.483 1.286 1.313 1.161 1.28 (0.73) (0.93) (0.90) (0.78) (0.80) (0.71) (0.78) 
GDP per capita 0.0188 0.0217 0.0214 0.0192 0.0182 0.0159 0.0165 (1.10) (1.26) (1.24) (1.13) (1.07) (0.93) (0.96) 
Acquirer size -0.107 -0.0533 -0.0532 -0.116+ -0.121+ -0.112+ -0.112+   (-1.62) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-1.71) (-1.77) (-1.66) (-1.67)    
Acquirer ROA -0.00996 -0.0142 -0.0154 -0.00927 -0.00916 -0.00805 -0.00842 (-0.69) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.59)    
Private target -0.135 -0.12 -0.113 -0.13 -0.159 -0.144 -0.146 (-0.52) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.50) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.56)    
Listed target -0.441 -0.367 -0.396 -0.434 -0.421 -0.473 -0.499 (-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-0.83) (-0.95) (-1.02)    
TMT size -0.0715 -0.0148 -0.0197 -0.0803 -0.081 -0.0832 -0.0818 (-0.90) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-1.01) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.03)    
Num TMT int’l experience 
(i)(a) 
  -0.242* -0.236*                       
  (-2.11) (-2.05)                       
Num TMT int’l experience2 
(i)(b) 
  0.0501 0.0578+                       
  (1.62) (1.84)                       
TBD * (i)(a)     0.0239                       
    (0.58)                       
TBD * (i)(b)     0.021                       
    (1.12)                       
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.504 0.599                   
      (0.79) (0.94)                   
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -3.135 -3.406                   
      (-1.17) (-1.27)                   
TBD * (ii)(a)         -0.479                   
        (-1.50)                   
TBD* (ii)(b)         2.593                   
        (1.53)                   
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.170 0.190+   
          (1.56) (1.72) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0154 -0.0183 
          (-1.24) (-1.44)    
TBD * (iii)(a)             -0.0918 
            (-1.57)    
TBD * (iii)(b)             0.00846 
            (1.29) 
Constant 1.717+ 0.86 0.872 1.938* 2.024* 2.010* 2.038*   
-1.84 -0.78 -0.79 -2.03 -2.13 -2.1 -2.13 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.019 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.023 
F 2.01** 2.238** 2.111** 1.832* 1.755* 1.824* 1.701* 
 
 
Note to Table 5.4: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the effects of the time interval between the immediately 
previous deal and the current one on the cumulative abnormal returns (using Market model) over a three-day period for the 
multiple bidder firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variable, TBD as well as the TMT 
determinants are mean-centered values. The model specifications are similar as explained in case of Table 5.3, except that base 
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Model 2A has the main independent variable TBD with controls in line with Hypothesis 2(a) or (b), whilst the Models 4C, 5C 
and 6C are based on Hypotheses 5(i), (ii) and (iii) respectively and Models marked ‘B’ report the TMT variables in addition 
to model specification ‘A’. Bidder-specific control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same 
way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.5: CARs based on Market model for ADV regressor. 
 
  
Model 7A Model 7B Model 7C Model 8B Model 8C Model 9B Model 9C    
Prior 3-year 
window 
aggregate deal 
value (ADV) 
-0.114 -0.0936 -0.181+ -0.118 -0.173 -0.137 -0.0807 
(-1.21) (-0.98) (-1.68) (-1.25) (-1.52) (-1.45) (-0.70) 
Cash 0.141 0.128 0.166 0.161 0.179 0.122 0.112 (0.44) (0.40) (0.51) (0.49) (0.55) (0.38) (0.35) 
Stock -0.847 -0.65 -0.73 -0.831 -0.765 -0.886 -1.009 (-0.64) (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.77) 
Full acquisition -0.562 -0.605+ -0.649+ -0.545 -0.527 -0.568 -0.578+ (-1.60) (-1.72) (-1.85) (-1.56) (-1.52) (-1.63) (-1.66) 
Transaction value 0.0132 0.0145 0.000639 0.0156 0.00617 -0.00118 0.000474 (0.15) (0.16) (0.01) (0.18) (0.07) (-0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.600* -0.600* -0.599* -0.589* -0.593* -0.675* -0.665* 
(-2.19) (-2.19) (-2.19) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.40) (-2.36) 
Cultural 
differences 
-0.0902 -0.0936 -0.114 -0.0916 -0.0937 -0.0427 -0.0528 
(-0.93) (-0.96) (-1.18) (-0.94) (-0.97) (-0.44) (-0.54) 
Country risk -0.357 0.294 0.087 -0.412 -0.337 -0.433 -0.284 (-0.21) (0.17) (0.05) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.17) 
GDP per capita -0.00461 0.000308 -0.00157 -0.00489 -0.00406 -0.0097 -0.00904 (-0.26) -0.02 (-0.09) (-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.54) (-0.50) 
Acquirer size 0.0157 0.0754 0.088 -0.00575 -0.0117 0.0277 0.0186 (0.15) (0.68) (0.78) (-0.05) (-0.11) (0.26) (0.17) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0257+ -0.0321* -0.0303* -0.0244+ -0.0236 -0.0243 -0.0239 (-1.71) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.59) 
Private target -0.283 -0.281 -0.314 -0.297 -0.305 -0.29 -0.284 (-1.02) (-1.01) (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.10) (-1.04) (-1.02) 
Listed target -0.758 -0.662 -0.676 -0.803 -0.79 -0.791 -0.769 (-1.46) (-1.27) (-1.31) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.52) (-1.45) 
TMT size -0.121 -0.00998 -0.00554 -0.139+ -0.143+ -0.137 -0.135 (-1.44) (-0.09) (-0.05) (-1.66) (-1.70) (-1.64) (-1.61) 
Num TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
  -0.299* -0.357**         
  (-2.40) (-2.89)         
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 (i)(b) 
  0.0254 -0.0502         
  (0.79) (-0.92)         
ADV * (i)(a)     -0.00174         
    (-0.04)         
ADV * (i)(b)     0.0298*         
    (2.10)         
National diversity 
(ii)(a) 
      0.886 0.968     
      (1.29) (1.41)     
National 
diversity2 (ii)(b) 
      -1.858 -3.144     
      (-0.63) (-1.00)     
ADV * (ii)(a)         0.101     
        (0.36)     
ADV* (ii)(b)         0.800     
        (0.68)     
Average years 
host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.247* 0.211 
          (2.12) (1.61) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0206 -0.0125 
          (-1.60) (-0.68) 
ADV * (iii)(a)             0.0352 
            (0.61) 
ADV * (iii)(b)             -0.00661 
            (-0.89) 
Constant 2.250* 1.143 1.325 2.569* 2.628* 2.555* 2.537* (2.14) (0.97) (1.11) (2.42) (2.45) (2.41) (2.38) 
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.026 
F 1.747* 2.222** 2.083** 1.634* 1.531+ 1.686* 1.569+ 
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Note to Table 5.5: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the impact of the aggregate deal value (ADV) in the previous 
three-year period of the current acquisition on the cumulative abnormal returns (using Market model) over a three-day period 
for the multiple bidder firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variable, ADV as well as the TMT 
determinants are mean-centered. The model specifications are similar as explained in case of Table 5.3, except that base Model 
3A has the main independent variable ADV with controls in line with Hypothesis 3(a) or (b), whilst the remaining Models 
marked ‘C’ are based on Hypotheses 6(i), (ii) and (iii) respectively, whereas the Models marked ‘B’ have the TMT proxies in 
addition to base model ‘A’ . Bidder-specific control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same 
way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 5.1: The graph below illustrates the positive quadratic interaction effect of the Num of TMT int’l experience on the negative relationship of ADV predictor on the 3-day announcement 
CARs using MM. 
 
 
-2.1
-1.6
-1.1
-0.6
-0.1
0.4
0.9
1.4
1.9
2.4
2.9
3.4
Low Prior 3-year aggregate
deal value
Medium Prior 3-year
aggregate deal value
High Prior 3-year aggregate
deal value
3
-
d
a
y
 
C
A
R
s
Low Num TMT int'l
experience
Medium Num TMT
int'l experience
High Num TMT
int'l experience
216 
 
Appendix: Tables for Robustness checks  
Table 5.6: Replicates Table 5.3 except that the three-day CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
  Model 10A Model 10B 
Model 
10C Model 11B Model 11C Model 12B Model 12C    
Prior 3-year window deal 
count  
0.0156 0.0173 -0.0317 0.013 0.0405 0.012 0.00404 
(0.62) (0.67) (-0.99) (0.50) (0.77) (0.47) (0.11) 
Cash 
0.053 0.0468 0.0686 0.0588 0.0525 0.0462 0.061 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) 
Stock -1.481 -1.409 -1.459 -1.47 -1.481 -1.514 -1.52 (-1.29) (-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.32) (-1.32)    
Full acquisition -0.644* -0.667* -0.675* -0.637+ -0.643* -0.665* -0.669*   (-1.96) (-2.02) (-2.05) (-1.95) (-1.97) (-2.03) (-2.05)    
Transaction value 0.0192 0.0221 0.0123 0.0184 0.0214 0.000596 -0.00111 (0.23) (0.26) (0.15) (0.22) (0.25) (0.01) (-0.01)    
Diversifying acquisition -0.559* -0.560* -0.554* -0.552* -0.558* -0.635* -0.625*   (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.13) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-2.41) (-2.37)    
Cultural differences -0.0707 -0.0722 -0.0865 -0.0729 -0.0726 -0.0243 -0.0245 (-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.94) (-0.79) (-0.79) (-0.26) (-0.26)    
Country risk 1.658 1.959 1.962 1.563 1.492 1.568 1.551 (1.06) (1.23) (1.23)  (1.00) (0.95) (1.01) (0.99) 
GDP per capita 0.014 0.0163 0.0154 0.0136 0.0129 0.0087 0.00912 (0.81) (0.93) (0.88) (0.79) (0.75) (0.51) (0.53) 
Acquirer size -0.197** -0.166* -0.167* -0.207** -0.204** -0.199** -0.202**  (-2.79) (-2.16) (-2.18) (-2.90) (-2.85) (-2.80) (-2.83)    
Acquirer ROA -0.00662 -0.00909 -0.00769 -0.00629 -0.007 -0.00483 -0.00419 (-0.51) (-0.68) (-0.58) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.37) (-0.32)    
Private target -0.42 -0.424 -0.398 -0.421 -0.417 -0.418 -0.426 (-1.58) (-1.59) (-1.49) (-1.58) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.60)    
Listed target -1.039* -0.994* -1.037* -1.065* -1.079* -1.079* -1.107*   (-2.14) (-2.05) (-2.15) (-2.17) (-2.19) (-2.23) (-2.30)    
TMT size -0.0931 -0.048 -0.0607 -0.0994 -0.099 -0.114 -0.116 (-1.17) (-0.47) (-0.60) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.43) (-1.47)    
Num TMT int’l experience 
(i)(a) 
  -0.138 -0.0833                      
  (-1.17) (-0.57)                      
Num TMT int’l experience2 
(i)(b) 
  0.0173 -0.108*                      
  (0.57) (-2.02)                      
3-year deal count * (i)(a)     -0.018                      
    (-1.07)                      
3-year deal count * (i)(b)     0.0188**                      
    (2.91)                      
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.363 0.196                  
      (0.56) (0.21)                  
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       0.31 2.823                  
      (0.11) (0.59)                  
3-year deal count * (ii)(a)         0.0341                  
        (0.25)                  
3-year deal count * (ii)(b)         -0.437                  
        (-0.63)                  
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.276* 0.364*   
          (2.56) (2.17) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0241* -0.0275 
          (-2.01) (-1.32)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(a)             -0.017 
            (-0.78)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(b)             0.000667 
            (0.21) 
Constant 2.913** 2.379* 2.534* 3.009** 3.005** 3.382*** 3.404** (3.20) (2.26) (2.39) (3.26) (3.25) (3.65) (3.69) 
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.029 
F 2.263** 2.205** 2.398** 2.038** 1.825* 2.257** 2.089** 
 
 
 
217 
 
Table 5.7: Replicates Table 5.4 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 13A Model 13B Model 13C Model 14B Model 14C Model 15B Model 15C   
Time between consequent deals 
(TBDs) 
-0.134* -0.133* -0.176* -0.138* -0.281* -0.134* -0.205*   
(-2.10) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-2.15) (-2.11) (-2.10) (-2.37)    
Cash 0.232 0.226 0.237 0.241 0.254 0.225 0.222 (0.79) (0.77) (0.81) (0.82) (0.86) (0.77) (0.76) 
Stock -0.716 -0.623 -0.637 -0.706 -0.674 -0.683 -0.674 (-0.53) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.50)    
Full acquisition -0.596+ -0.613+ -0.610+ -0.587+ -0.581+ -0.608+ -0.620+   (-1.80) (-1.85) (-1.84) (-1.78) (-1.75) (-1.84) (-1.88)    
Transaction value 0.0349 0.0404 0.0522 0.0386 0.0377 0.0247 0.0241 (0.43) (0.50) (0.64) (0.47) (0.46) (0.30) (0.30) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.752** -0.757** -0.769** -0.748** -0.741** -0.800** -0.809**  (-2.92) (-2.95) (-2.99) (-2.91) (-2.89) (-3.05) (-3.08)    
Cultural differences -0.135 -0.134 -0.137 -0.133 -0.137 -0.11 -0.115 (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.20) (-1.26)    
Country risk 1.893 2.132 2.083 1.952 1.973 1.869 1.969 (1.14) (1.27) (1.24) (1.17) (1.19) (1.13) (1.18) 
GDP per capita 0.0164 0.0185 0.0183 0.0168 0.0159 0.0136 0.014 (0.93) (1.04) (1.03) (0.95) (0.90) (0.77) (0.79) 
Acquirer size -0.182** -0.145+ -0.146+ -0.192** -0.196** -0.184** -0.184**  (-2.73) (-1.92) (-1.92) (-2.83) (-2.88) (-2.70) (-2.71)    
Acquirer ROA -0.00131 -0.00415 -0.00541 -0.000652 -0.000511 0.000602 0.000317 (-0.10) (-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.05) (-0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Private target -0.196 -0.186 -0.178 -0.196 -0.221 -0.206 -0.209 (-0.76) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.76) (-0.85) (-0.80) (-0.81)    
Listed target -0.565 -0.515 -0.547 -0.57 -0.558 -0.587 -0.611 (-1.13) (-1.02) (-1.09) (-1.13) (-1.10) (-1.18) (-1.23)    
TMT size -0.06 -0.0247 -0.0311 -0.0685 -0.0691 -0.0741 -0.0731 (-0.75) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.92) (-0.91)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -0.171 -0.164                       
  (-1.49) (-1.43)                       
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.04 0.0482                       
  (1.28) (1.51)                       
TBD * (i)(a)     0.0309                       
    (0.74)                       
TBD * (i)(b)     0.0203                       
    (1.07)                       
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.483 0.563                   
      (0.76) (0.89)                   
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -2.303 -2.552                   
      (-0.85) (-0.95)                   
TBD * (ii)(a)         -0.420                   
          (-1.30)                   
TBD* (ii)(b)         2.153                   
          (1.25)                   
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.175 0.194+   
          (1.63) (1.81) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0172 -0.0202 
          (-1.42) (-1.63)    
TBD * (iii)(a)             -0.0771 
            (-1.35)    
TBD * (iii)(b)             0.00748 
            (1.19) 
Constant 2.335* 1.745 1.76 2.536** 2.611** 2.637** 2.668**  
  (2.47)  (1.57) (1.59) (2.64) (2.72) (2.73) (2.77) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.026 
F 2.342** 2.355** 2.211** 2.114** 1.978** 2.152** 1.983** 
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Table 5.8: Replicates Table 5.5 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 16A Model 16B 
Model 
16C 
Model 
17B 
Model 
17C 
Model 
18B 
Model 
18C    
Prior 3-year window aggregate deal 
value (ADV) 
-0.0968 -0.0811 -0.189+ -0.100 -0.144 -0.121 -0.0946 
(-1.04) (-0.87) (-1.79) (-1.08) (-1.28) (-1.29)     (-0.83)    
Cash 0.0545 0.045 0.0878 0.0666 0.0728 0.0366 0.0359 
-0.17 -0.14 -0.27 -0.21 -0.22 -0.11 (0.11)    
Stock -1.249 -1.08 -1.19 -1.241 -1.209 -1.278 -1.388 (-0.92) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.95) (-1.02)    
Full acquisition -0.495 -0.531 -0.590+ -0.485 -0.48 -0.503 -0.514 (-1.42) (-1.52) (-1.70) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.46) (-1.49)    
Transaction value 0.0204 0.0232 0.00764 0.0212 0.0165 0.00477 0.00536 
-0.23 -0.26 -0.09 -0.24 -0.18 -0.05 (0.06)    
Diversifying acquisition -0.550* -0.550* -0.545* -0.542* -0.541* -0.630* -0.616*   (-2.02) (-2.02) (-2.01) (-1.99) (-1.98) (-2.26) (-2.21)    
Cultural differences -0.103 -0.105 -0.129 -0.105 -0.107 -0.0568 -0.0653 (-1.07) (-1.10) (-1.36) (-1.09) (-1.12) (-0.58) (-0.67)    
Country risk 0.137 0.663 0.425 0.0605 0.095 0.068 0.134 
-0.08 -0.39 -0.25 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 (0.08)    
GDP per capita -0.00835 -0.004 -0.00635 -0.00864 -0.00829 -0.0136 -0.0132 (-0.46) (-0.22) (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.75) (-0.72)    
Acquirer size -0.065 -0.0186 -0.00211 -0.0817 -0.0857 -0.0495 -0.0586 (-0.61) (-0.17) (-0.02) (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.47) (-0.55)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0144 -0.0194 -0.0174 -0.0134 -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0122 (-0.98) (-1.28) (-1.16) (-0.92) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-0.83)    
Private target -0.37 -0.368 -0.409 -0.382 -0.39 -0.378 -0.375 (-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.48) (-1.38) (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.36)    
Listed target -0.806 -0.731 -0.744 -0.846 -0.836 -0.829 -0.800 (-1.54) (-1.40) (-1.43) (-1.60) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.51)    
TMT size -0.119 -0.0398 -0.0374 -0.132 -0.134 -0.139+ -0.137+  (-1.43) (-0.36) (-0.34) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.66) (-1.65)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -0.247* -0.321**          
  (-1.96) (-2.57)          
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.0332 -0.0503          
  -1.04 (-0.98)          
ADV * (i)(a)     -0.0134          
    (-0.32)          
ADV * (i)(b)     0.0369**          
    (2.70)          
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.629 0.664      
      (0.92) (0.98)      
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -0.576 -1.332      
      (-0.20) (-0.43)      
ADV * (ii)(a)         -0.00832      
        (-0.03)      
ADV* (ii)(b)         0.679      
        (0.59)      
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.262* 0.237+   
          -2.32 -1.86 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0233+ -0.0166 
          (-1.87) (-0.93)    
ADV * (iii)(a)             0.00465 
            (0.08)    
ADV * (iii)(b)             -0.00369 
            (-0.52)    
Constant 2.914** 2.022+ 2.248+ 3.121** 3.177** 3.237** 3.250**  
-2.72 -1.67 -1.85 -2.89 -2.92 (3.01) (3.01)    
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.03 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.027 
F 1.828* 2.151** 2.20** 1.706* 1.554+ 1.84* 1.717* 
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Table 5.9: CARs based on Market model for DO predictor. 
 
  
Model 
19A Model 19B Model 19C Model 20B Model 20C Model 21B Model 21C    
Prior deal order 
(DO) 
-0.0136 -0.012 -0.034 -0.0179 -0.0157 -0.0129 -0.0141 
(-0.85) (-0.75) (-1.55) (-1.06) (-0.43) (-0.81) (-0.61)    
Cash 0.162 0.159 0.171 0.163 0.166 0.148 0.16 (0.55) (0.54) (0.58) (0.55) (0.56) (0.50) (0.54) 
Stock -0.913 -0.842 -0.843 -0.92 -0.932 -0.964 -0.974 (-0.79) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.85)    
Full acquisition -0.644* -0.661* -0.647* -0.635* -0.629+ -0.667* -0.676*   (-1.98) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-2.06) (-2.08)    
Transaction 
value 
0.0177 0.0211 0.0127 0.0171 0.0184 0.00308 -0.00152 
(0.22) (0.26) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.04) (-0.02)    
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.769** -0.772** -0.774** -0.759** -0.757** -0.825** -0.805**  
(-3.07) (-3.08) (-3.09) (-3.03) (-3.00) (-3.26) (-3.17)    
Cultural 
differences 
-0.0528 -0.0524 -0.0548 -0.0557 -0.0545 -0.00162 -0.0047 
(-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.02) (-0.05)    
Country risk 1.414 1.589 1.692 1.374 1.437 1.312 1.342 (0.94) (1.05) (1.12) (0.92) (0.94) (0.88) (0.90) 
GDP per capita 0.0195 0.0211 0.0233 0.0198 0.0207 0.0144 0.0152 (1.21) (1.29) (1.42) (1.23) (1.25) (0.90) (0.94) 
Acquirer size -0.126+ -0.0996 -0.097 -0.138* -0.132+ -0.139* -0.143*   (-1.86) (-1.32) (-1.26) (-2.00) (-1.87) (-2.03) (-2.09)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0133 -0.0153 -0.0133 -0.0127 -0.0129 -0.0115 -0.011 (-1.04) (-1.17) (-1.01) (-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.90) (-0.86)    
Private target -0.126 -0.129 -0.124 -0.129 -0.126 -0.135 -0.155 (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.61)    
Listed target -0.783 -0.742 -0.776 -0.826+ -0.820+ -0.852+ -0.888+   (-1.63) (-1.54) (-1.61) (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.78) (-1.85)    
TMT size -0.0392 -0.0053 -0.00962 -0.0516 -0.0501 -0.052 -0.052 (-0.50) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.66) (-0.66)    
Num TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
  -0.128 -0.131                       
  (-1.17) (-1.21)                       
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 
(i)(b) 
  0.024 0.0195                       
  (0.80) (0.66)                       
deal order * 
(i)(a) 
    0.00282                       
    (0.25)                       
deal order * 
(i)(b) 
    0.00672                       
    (1.39)                       
National 
diversity (ii)(a) 
      0.54 0.582                   
      (0.85) (0.93)                   
National 
diversity2 (ii)(b) 
      -0.0462 -0.134                   
      (-0.02) (-0.05)                   
deal order * 
(ii)(a) 
        0.0658                   
        (0.68)                   
deal order* 
(ii)(a) 
        -0.171                   
        (-0.37)                   
Average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.250* 0.255*   
          (2.33) (2.46) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0193 -0.0197+   
          (-1.59) (-1.73)    
deal order * 
(iii)(a) 
            -0.00992 
            (-0.68)    
deal order * 
(iii)(b) 
            -0.000096 
            (-0.04)    
Constant 1.797* 1.356 1.264 1.926* 1.816+ 2.258* 2.283*   
  (2.04) (1.34) (1.22) (2.15) (1.95) (2.50) (2.53) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
R-squared 0.019 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.02 0.024 0.025 
F 2.079** 2.061** 1.991** 1.848* 1.66** 2.01** 1.881** 
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Note to Table 5.9: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the effect of the immediately preceding deal order (DO) on 
the cumulative abnormal returns (using Market model) over a three-day period on the current acquisition for a multiple bidder 
firm announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variable, DO as well as the TMT determinants are mean-
centered. The model specifications are similar as explained in case of Table 5.3, except that base Model 19A has the main 
independent variable DO with controls, whilst the remaining models have the TMT variables also. Models marked ‘B’ do not 
have interaction terms with DO and TMT proxies; those marked ‘C’ include the interaction terms. Bidder-specific control 
variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row 
are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.10: Same as Table 5.9 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 
22A 
Model 
22B 
Model 
22C 
Model 
23B 
Model 
23C 
Model 
24B Model 24C   
Prior deal order  
-0.0155 -0.0149 -0.0383+ -0.0209 -0.0127 -0.015 -0.017 
(-0.98) (-0.94) (-1.79) (-1.25) (-0.35) (-0.96) (-0.76)    
Cash 0.0735 0.0736 0.087 0.071 0.0724 0.0607 0.076 (0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.26) 
Stock -1.174 -1.136 -1.143 -1.184 -1.186 -1.217 -1.228 (-1.01) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.07)    
Full acquisition -0.666* -0.671* -0.658* -0.658* -0.663* -0.693* -0.704*   (-2.06) (-2.07) (-2.02) (-2.04) (-2.04) (-2.14) (-2.18)    
Transaction value 0.0296 0.0324 0.0243 0.0281 0.0291 0.0125 0.00703 (0.37) (0.41) (0.30) (0.35) (0.36) (0.16) (0.09) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.706** -0.705** -0.709** -0.694** -0.698** -0.772** -0.748**  (-2.81) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.76) (-2.76) (-3.04) (-2.94)    
Cultural differences -0.0888 -0.0891 -0.0915 -0.0937 -0.0947 -0.0363 -0.0399 (-0.99) (-0.99) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.06) (-0.40) (-0.44)    
Country risk 2.163 2.21 2.298 2.09 2.051 2.057 2.09 (1.43) (1.45) (1.51) (1.38) (1.33) (1.36) (1.38) 
GDP per capita 0.0184 0.0192 0.0212 0.0187 0.0183 0.0129 0.0137 (1.12) (1.16) (1.26) (1.14) (1.08) (0.78) (0.83) 
Acquirer size -0.172* -0.166* -0.165* -0.186** -0.185** -0.182** -0.187**  (-2.55) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.71) (-2.64) (-2.67) (-2.73)    
Acquirer ROA -0.00263 -0.00312 -0.00111 -0.00207 -0.00232 -0.000653 -0.0000562 (-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.05) (-0.00)    
Private target 
-0.201 -0.203 -0.198 -0.206 -0.203 -0.211 -0.234 
(-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.92)    
Listed target -0.885+ -0.877+ -0.915+ -0.943+ -0.946+ -0.950* -0.991*   (-1.83) (-1.80) (-1.88) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-1.97) (-2.05)    
TMT size -0.0392 -0.0395 -0.0449 -0.0525 -0.051 -0.0573 -0.0575 (-0.50) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.73) (-0.73)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -0.0488 -0.0528                       
  (-0.44) (-0.49)                       
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.0235 0.0197                       
  (0.78) (0.67)                       
deal order * (i)(a)     -0.000452                       
    (-0.04)                       
deal order * (i)(b)     0.00790+                       
    (1.66)                       
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.57 0.567                   
      (0.90) (0.92)                   
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       0.8 0.926                   
      (0.30) (0.33)                   
deal order * (ii)(a)         0.014                   
        (0.15)                   
deal order* (ii)(a)         -0.127                   
        (-0.28)                   
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.288** 0.293**  
          (2.74) (2.89) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0246* -0.0250*   
          (-2.08) (-2.24)    
deal order * (iii)(a)             -0.0122 
            (-0.86)    
deal order * (iii)(b)             -0.0000335 
            (-0.02)    
Constant 2.201* 2.066* 2.005+ 2.307* 2.309* 2.725** 2.753**  (2.47) (2.02) (1.92) (2.55) (2.47) (2.99) (3.03) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.029 
F 2.316**  2.147**  2.071**  2.121**  1.883* 2.29**  2.202**  
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Table 5.11: 11-day CARs based on market model for DC predictor. 
 
  
Model 
25A Model 25B Model 25C Model 26B Model 26C Model 27B Model 27C    
Prior 3-year 
window deal 
count  
-0.025 -0.0241 -0.0852 -0.0334 0.0306 -0.0304 -0.035 
(-0.58) (-0.55) (-1.63) (-0.76) (0.40) (-0.70) (-0.53) 
Cash 0.547 0.543 0.568 0.535 0.518 0.515 0.533 (1.10) (1.09) (1.14) (1.07) (1.04) (1.04) (1.07) 
Stock -1.854 -1.81 -1.882 -1.842 -1.861 -1.982 -1.988 (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.99) (-1.05) (-1.06) 
Full acquisition -1.220* -1.234* -1.246* -1.221* -1.228* -1.235* -1.241* (-2.17) (-2.19) (-2.21) (-2.19) (-2.20) (-2.20) (-2.21) 
Transaction 
value 
0.0425 0.0443 0.0336 0.033 0.0395 0.0185 0.0163 
(0.33) (0.35) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.14) (0.13) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.307 -0.307 -0.303 -0.291 -0.296 -0.409 -0.397 
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.91) (-0.88) 
Cultural 
differences 
-0.0647 -0.0656 -0.0831 -0.0796 -0.078 0.0389 0.0377 
(-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.54) (-0.52) (-0.51) (0.25) (0.24) 
Country risk 2.006 2.186 2.176 1.53 1.374 1.797 1.800 (0.76) (0.82) (0.82) (0.59) (0.53) (0.69) (0.68) 
GDP per capita 0.0311 0.0325 0.0311 0.0297 0.0282 0.0221 0.0228 (1.14) (1.16) (1.11) (1.09) (1.03) (0.81) (0.83) 
Acquirer size -0.238+ -0.219 -0.222+ -0.264* -0.256+ -0.266* -0.269* (-1.87) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-2.03) (-1.95) (-2.09) (-2.11) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0263 -0.0278 -0.0263 -0.0259 -0.0271 -0.0234 -0.0227 (-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.96) (-0.98) (-1.01) (-0.88) (-0.85) 
Private target -0.891+ -0.894+ -0.857+ -0.893+ -0.891+ -0.879+ -0.892+ (-1.94) (-1.95) (-1.87) (-1.95) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.94) 
Listed target -0.473 -0.447 -0.501 -0.574 -0.605 -0.613 -0.652 (-0.63) (-0.59) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.81) (-0.87) 
TMT size -0.0798 -0.0535 -0.0742 -0.0794 -0.0796 -0.0946 -0.0974 (-0.63) (-0.34) (-0.47) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.75) (-0.77) 
Num TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
  -0.0834 0.0115         
  (-0.44) (0.05)         
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 
(i)(b) 
  0.0115 -0.145         
  (0.22) (-1.60)         
3-year deal 
count * (i)(a) 
    -0.0275         
    (-0.88)         
3-year deal 
count * (i)(b) 
    0.0241*         
    (2.11)         
National 
diversity (ii)(a) 
      0.388 -0.230     
      (0.35) (-0.15)     
National 
diversity2 (ii)(b) 
      7.692 13.75+     
      (1.59) (1.75)     
3-year deal 
count * (ii)(a) 
        0.133     
        (0.54)     
3-year deal 
count * (ii)(b) 
        -1.095     
        (-1.04)     
Average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.394* 0.485+ 
          (2.21) (1.84) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0219 -0.0236 
          (-1.13) (-0.76) 
3-year deal 
count * (iii)(a) 
            -0.0165 
            (-0.41) 
3-year deal 
count * (iii)(b) 
            0.00018 
            (0.03) 
Constant 3.235* 2.915 3.145+ 3.111+ 3.082+ 3.916* 3.949* (2.00) (1.61) (1.72) (1.87) (1.84) (2.39) (2.40) 
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.025 
F 1.739* 1.583+ 1.666* 1.813* 1.663* 1.932** 1.730* 
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Note to Table 5.11: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the association of 3-year prior deal counts with the 
cumulative abnormal returns (calculated using Market model) over an eleven-day period for serial acquirer firms announcing 
international acquisitions. The key explanatory variables DC across 3-year period as well as the TMT determinants are mean-
centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as detailed in Table 5.3. +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.12: Same as Table 5.11 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 
28A 
Model 
28B 
Model 
28C 
Model 
29B 
Model 
29C 
Model 
30B 
Model 
30C    
Prior 3-year window deal count  -0.0398 -0.0394 -0.106* -0.0506 0.0252 -0.0468 -0.0635 (-0.95) (-0.93) (-2.07) (-1.18) -0.34 (-1.11) (-0.97)    
Cash 0.226 0.227 0.255 0.214 0.198 0.199 0.215 (0.46) (0.47) (0.52) (0.44)    (0.41) (0.41) (0.44)    
Stock -2.616 -2.666 -2.745 -2.597 -2.63 -2.733 -2.741 (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.42) (-1.34) (-1.36) (-1.42) (-1.42)    
Full acquisition -1.064+ -1.054+ -1.067+ -1.062+ -1.081* -1.092* -1.095*   (-1.92) (-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.97)    
Transaction value 0.151 0.146 0.134 0.139 0.148 0.117 0.116 (1.18) (1.14) (1.05) (1.09) (1.15) (0.92) (0.91)    
Diversifying acquisition -0.291 -0.29 -0.287 -0.27 -0.289 -0.43 -0.417 (-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-0.96) (-0.93)    
Cultural differences -0.16 -0.159 -0.178 -0.178 -0.178 -0.0473 -0.0462 (-1.07) (-1.06) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-0.31) (-0.30)    
Country risk 3.649 3.537 3.524 3.055 2.852 3.426 3.368 (1.41) (1.35) (1.34) (1.20) (1.11) (1.33) (1.30)    
GDP per capita 0.0163 0.0146 0.0131 0.0145 0.0126 0.00536 0.00562 (0.59) (0.52) (0.46) (0.53) (0.46) (0.19) (0.20)    
Acquirer size -0.423** -0.429** -0.432** -0.458** -0.451** -0.444** -0.446** (-3.38) (-3.22) (-3.24) (-3.60) (-3.52) (-3.56) (-3.56)    
Acquirer ROA -0.00526 -0.00476 -0.00319 -0.00468 -0.00693 -0.00171 -0.000963 (-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.17) (-0.25) (-0.06) (-0.04)    
Private target -1.119* -1.118* -1.078* -1.121* -1.106* -1.109* -1.115* (-2.49) (-2.48) (-2.40) (-2.50) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.46)    
Listed target -0.437 -0.449 -0.508 -0.566 -0.605 -0.568 -0.591 (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.74) (-0.79) (-0.75) (-0.78)    
TMT size -0.0832 -0.0791 -0.102 -0.0853 -0.0835 -0.112 -0.115 (-0.66) (-0.51) (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.89)  (-0.92)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   0.0637 0.170         
  (0.34) (0.76)         
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   -0.0367 -0.205*         
  (-0.70) (-2.26)         
3-year deal count * (i)(a)     -0.0305         
    (-0.98)         
3-year deal count * (i)(b)     0.0261*         
    (2.31)         
National diversity (ii)(a)       0.602 0.292     
      (0.57) (0.20)     
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       9.106+ 15.92*     
      (1.95) (2.10)     
3-year deal count * (ii)(a)         0.0596     
        (0.25)     
3-year deal count * (ii)(b)         -1.160     
        (-1.13)     
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.517** 0.640*   
          (2.95) (2.40)    
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0368* -0.0446 
          (-1.99) (-1.42)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(a)             -0.0252 
            (-0.62)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(b)             0.00175 
            (0.27)    
Constant 5.171** 5.362** 5.616** 5.066** 5.064** 6.059** 6.074** (3.29) (3.04) (3.16) (3.15) (3.14) (3.81) (3.80)    
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.027 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.036 
F 2.758** 2.521** 2.508** 2.926** 2.744** 2.986** 2.647** 
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Table 5.13: 11-day CARs based on Market model for TBD predictor. 
 
  
Model 
31A Model 31B Model 31C Model 32B Model 32C Model 33B Model 33C    
Time between 
consequent 
deals (TBDs) 
-0.148 -0.148 -0.155 -0.144 -0.0182 -0.150 -0.321* 
(-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.22) (-1.54) (-0.11) (-1.61) (-2.28) 
Cash 0.976* 0.977* 0.986* 0.962* 0.957+ 0.946+ 0.936+ (2.01) (2.01) (2.03) (1.97) (1.96) (1.95) (1.93) 
Stock -2.453 -2.34 -2.334 -2.464 -2.474 -2.509 -2.508 (-1.36) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.40) (-1.39) 
Full acquisition -0.966+ -0.979+ -0.980+ -0.980+ -1.011+ -0.970+ -0.998+ (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.77) (-1.70) (-1.75) 
Transaction 
value 
-0.0485 -0.0393 -0.03 -0.052 -0.0599 -0.0577 -0.0581 
(-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.48) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.715 -0.721 -0.732 -0.704 -0.708 -0.767+ -0.787+ 
(-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.70) (-1.75) 
Cultural 
differences 
-0.059 -0.0609 -0.0622 -0.0671 -0.0643 0.00966 -0.0043 
(-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.43) (0.06) (-0.03) 
Country risk 3.73 3.847 3.856 3.558 3.493 3.665 3.912 (1.45) (1.48) (1.48) (1.38) (1.36) (1.43) (1.52) 
GDP per capita 0.0588* 0.0611* 0.0612* 0.0583* 0.0591* 0.0545* 0.0556* (2.15) (2.20) (2.20) (2.14) (2.16) (1.99) (2.03) 
Acquirer size -0.168 -0.149 -0.151 -0.183 -0.179 -0.198+ -0.198+ (-1.42) (-1.14) (-1.15) (-1.49) (-1.45) (-1.66) (-1.67) 
Acquirer ROA -0.00444 -0.00545 -0.00604 -0.00412 -0.00319 -0.00181 -0.00257 (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.08) 
Private target -0.632 -0.627 -0.618 -0.659 -0.648 -0.641 -0.645 (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.40) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.46) 
Listed target 0.657 0.679 0.648 0.582 0.601 0.539 0.484 (0.93) (0.95) (0.90) (0.81) (0.83) (0.76) (0.69) 
TMT size -0.16 -0.174 -0.183 -0.164 -0.165 -0.156 -0.154 (-1.25) (-1.10) (-1.14) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.22) (-1.19) 
Num TMT int’l 
experience 
(i)(a) 
  -0.146 -0.139         
  (-0.78) (-0.74)         
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 
(i)(b) 
  0.078 0.0839         
  (1.50) (1.59)         
TBD * (i)(a)     0.0418         
    (0.68)         
TBD * (i)(b)     0.00652         
    (0.23)         
National 
diversity (ii)(a) 
      0.216 0.172     
      (0.20) (0.16)     
National 
diversity2 
(ii)(b) 
      2.979 2.726     
      (0.69) (0.63)     
TBD * (ii)(a)         -0.0606     
        (-0.14)     
TBD* (ii)(b)         -2.015     
        (-0.92)     
Average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.196 0.237 
          (1.12) (1.31) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.00655 -0.0129 
          (-0.34) (-0.61) 
TBD * (iii)(a)             -0.190* 
            (-2.06) 
TBD * (iii)(b)             0.0177 
            (1.60) 
Constant 1.153 0.782 0.802 1.180 1.174 1.497 1.557 (0.70) (0.41) (0.42) (0.69) (0.68) (0.88) (0.91) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.029 
F 2.064** 1.877* 1.706* 1.924** 1.797* 1.879* 1.853* 
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Note to Table 5.13: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the time interval between the immediately previous deal 
and the current one on the cumulative abnormal returns (calculated using Market model) over an eleven-day period for serial 
acquirer firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variables TBD as well as the TMT determinants are 
mean-centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as detailed in Table 5.4. +, *, and ** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.14: Same as Table 5.13 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 
34A Model 34B Model 34C Model 35B Model 35C Model 36B Model 36C    
Time between 
consequent deals 
(TBDs) 
-0.154+ -0.154+ -0.219+ -0.148 0.0433 -0.155+ -0.329*   
(-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.77) (-1.62) -0.27 (-1.71) (-2.42)    
Cash 0.609 0.609 0.623 0.589 0.578 0.579 0.565 (1.29) (1.29) (1.32) (1.24) (1.22) (1.23) (1.20) 
Stock -3.418+ -3.377+ -3.401+ -3.434+ -3.458+   -3.451+ -3.483+   (-1.90) (-1.87) (-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.93)    (-1.92) (-1.93)    
Full acquisition -0.968+ -0.972+ -0.967+ -0.987+ -1.021+   -0.977+ -1.003+   (-1.73) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.77) (-1.82)    (-1.75) (-1.80)    
Transaction value 0.0755 0.0787 0.0951 0.0703 0.0625 0.0627 0.0639 (0.63) (0.65) (0.79) (0.58) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.578 -0.581 -0.598 -0.565 -0.573 -0.647 -0.667 
(-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.36) (-1.29) (-1.31)    (-1.45) (-1.50)    
Cultural 
differences 
-0.154 -0.155 -0.158 -0.165 -0.16 -0.0821 -0.0966 
(-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.16) (-1.12)    (-0.57) (-0.67)    
Country risk 5.215* 5.263* 5.185* 4.985+ 4.909+   5.148* 5.410*   (2.02) (2.01) (1.98) (1.94) (1.91) (1.99) (2.09) 
GDP per capita 0.0425 0.0433 0.043 0.0418 0.043 0.0374 0.0388 (1.54) (1.55) (1.53) (1.52) (1.56) (1.35) (1.40) 
Acquirer size -0.369** -0.361** -0.361** -0.386** -0.381**  -0.396** -0.396** (-3.23) (-2.83) (-2.83) (-3.30) (-3.25)    (-3.45) (-3.45)    
Acquirer ROA 0.0094 0.00895 0.00711 0.00966 0.0105 0.0126 0.0117 (0.27) (0.25) (0.20) (0.28) (0.31) (0.37) (0.34) 
Private target -0.744+ -0.742+ -0.731+ -0.778+ -0.757+   -0.757+ -0.757+   (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.75)    (-1.75) (-1.75)    
Listed target 0.602 0.611 0.566 0.509 0.522 0.489 0.435 (0.85) (0.86) (0.80) (0.72) (0.74) (0.69) (0.62) 
TMT size -0.163 -0.167 -0.175 -0.167 -0.168 -0.167 -0.163 (-1.29) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-1.30) (-1.31)    (-1.32) (-1.28)    
Num TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
  -0.0543 -0.0449                      
  (-0.30) (-0.25)                      
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 (i)(b) 
  0.027 0.0386                      
  (0.52) (0.73)                      
TBD * (i)(a)     0.0391                      
    (0.66)                      
TBD * (i)(b)     0.0304                      
    (1.10)                      
National 
diversity (ii)(a) 
      0.169 0.0898     
      (0.16) (0.09)     
National 
diversity2 (ii)(b) 
      4.269 4.12     
      (1.03) (0.99)     
TBD * (ii)(a)         0.123     
        (0.28)     
TBD* (ii)(b)         -3.004     
        (-1.37)        
Average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.254 0.290+   
          (1.47) (1.65) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0138 -0.0191 
          (-0.75) (-0.95)    
TBD * (iii)(a)             -0.203*   
            (-2.23)    
TBD * (iii)(b)             0.0176+   
            (1.68) 
Constant 3.340* 3.196+ 3.215+ 3.332* 3.293*   3.782* 3.821*   (2.07) (1.75) (1.76) (2.01) (1.99) (2.29) (2.30) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.030 0.03 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.038 
F 2.814** 2.495** 2.403** 2.673** 2.527** 2.559** 2.544** 
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Table 5.15: 11-day CARs based on Market model for ADV predictor. 
 
  
Model 
37A 
Model 
37B 
Model 
37C 
Model 
38B 
Model 
38C 
Model 
39B 
Model 
39C    
Prior 3-year window aggregate deal 
value (ADV) 
-0.390* -0.381* -0.462** -0.402* -0.424* -0.435** -0.364+ 
(-2.45) (-2.38) (-2.59) (-2.53) (-2.13) (-2.73) (-1.83) 
Cash 0.193 0.188 0.226 0.202 0.230 0.136 0.123 (0.36) (0.35) (0.42) (0.38) (0.43) (0.25) (0.23) 
Stock -3.132 -3.041 -3.105 -3.14 -3.061 -3.300+ -3.438+ (-1.56) (-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.57) (-1.53) (-1.67) (-1.72) 
Full acquisition -1.293* -1.313* -1.349* -1.299* -1.269* -1.293* -1.304* (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.28) (-2.21) (-2.16) (-2.20) (-2.21) 
Transaction value 0.0989 0.100 0.0863 0.0931 0.0821 0.0746 0.0767 (0.73) (0.74) (0.64) (0.69) (0.60) (0.55) (0.57) 
Diversifying acquisition 
-0.167 -0.167 -0.169 -0.154 -0.164 -0.302 -0.293 
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.62) (-0.60) 
Cultural differences -0.0614 -0.0628 -0.0824 -0.0772 -0.0772 0.0619 0.0504 (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.48) (0.37) (0.30) 
Country risk 0.304 0.586 0.382 -0.113 -0.019 0.0815 0.27 (0.11) (0.21) (0.13) (-0.04) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.10) 
GDP per capita 0.00543 0.00775 0.00604 0.0042 0.00534 -0.00541 -0.00461 (0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (-0.19) (-0.16) 
Acquirer size 0.173 0.198 0.209 0.134 0.130 0.176 0.166 (0.92) (1.01) (1.07) (0.69) (0.67) (0.93) (0.87) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0386 -0.0413 -0.0394 -0.0366 -0.036 -0.0358 -0.0355 (-1.36) (-1.41) (-1.34) (-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-1.23) 
Private target 
-0.857+ -0.857+ -0.887+ -0.894+ -0.894+ -0.864+ -0.856+ 
(-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.80) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.76) (-1.74) 
Listed target -0.209 -0.169 -0.187 -0.344 -0.34 -0.35 -0.328 (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.24) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.45) (-0.42) 
TMT size -0.147 -0.105 -0.0983 -0.166 -0.171 -0.164 -0.161 (-1.10) (-0.61) (-0.57) (-1.23) (-1.27) (-1.23) (-1.20) 
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -0.132 -0.184         
  (-0.65) (-0.91)         
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.0177 -0.0593         
  (0.33) (-0.69)         
ADV * (i)(a)     0.00747         
    -0.10         
ADV * (i)(b)     0.0272         
    (1.16)         
National diversity (ii)(a)       1.03 1.14     
      (0.89) (1.00)     
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       4.892 3.723     
      (0.97) (0.65)     
ADV * (ii)(a)         0.273     
        (0.58)     
ADV* (ii)(b)         0.167     
        (0.07)     
Average years host country experience 
(iii)(a) 
          0.460* 0.418* 
          (2.42) (2.01) 
Average years host country experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0282 -0.0189 
          (-1.37) (-0.75) 
ADV * (iii)(a)             0.0479 
            (0.49) 
ADV * (iii)(b)             -0.00812 
            (-0.78) 
Constant 1.799 1.321 1.486 1.987 1.981 2.364 2.334 (0.92) (0.62) (0.69) (1.00) (0.98) (1.21) (1.19) 
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.031 
F 1.781* 1.639* 1.501+ 1.867* 1.729* 2.033** 1.936** 
 
Note to Table 5.15: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the aggregate deal value (ADV) in the previous three-year 
period of the current acquisition on the cumulative abnormal returns (calculated using Market model) over an eleven-day 
period for serial acquirer firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variables ADV as well as the TMT 
determinants are mean-centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as detailed in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.16: Same as Table 5.15 except that the CARs used here are based on MAR model. 
 
  
Model 
40A Model 40B Model 40C Model 41B Model 41C Model 42B Model 42C    
Prior 3-year 
window 
aggregate deal 
value (ADV) 
-0.233 -0.228 -0.347+ -0.245 -0.223 -0.285+ -0.273 
(-1.46) (-1.43) (-1.92) (-1.55) (-1.15) (-1.79) (-1.36)    
Cash -0.0491 -0.0529 -0.00599 -0.0454 -0.0301 -0.106 -0.103 (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.21) (-0.20)    
Stock -3.836+ -3.852+ -3.974+ -3.851+ -3.821+ -3.987+ -4.074+   (-1.82) (-1.80) (-1.86) (-1.83) (-1.82) (-1.91) (-1.93)    
Full acquisition -0.995+ -0.994+ -1.060+ -1.008+ -0.990+ -1.001+ -1.011+   (-1.73) (-1.73) (-1.84) (-1.77) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.77)    
Transaction value 0.191 0.186 0.169 0.184 0.18 0.162 0.162 (1.43) (1.40) (1.27) (1.38) (1.33) (1.22) (1.22) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.162 -0.163 -0.158 -0.15 -0.159 -0.323 -0.31 
(-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.68) (-0.65)    
Cultural 
differences 
-0.164 -0.165 -0.191 -0.182 -0.18 -0.0367 -0.0433 
(-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.22) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-0.23) (-0.27)    
Country risk 1.791 1.83 1.569 1.329 1.367 1.57 1.596 (0.65) (0.66) (0.56) (0.49) (0.50) (0.57) (0.58) 
GDP per capita -0.00818 -0.00894 -0.0115 -0.0095 -0.00898 -0.0202 -0.0200 (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.69) (-0.68)    
Acquirer size -0.168 -0.159 -0.141 -0.206 -0.205 -0.155 -0.162 (-0.89) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-0.82) (-0.86)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0136 -0.0145 -0.0124 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0104 -0.00968 (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.31)    
Private target -0.983* -0.984* -1.029* -1.021* -1.014* -0.994* -0.993*   (-2.04) (-2.04) (-2.13) (-2.12) (-2.11) (-2.07) (-2.06)    
Listed target -0.149 -0.134 -0.147 -0.290 -0.297 -0.275 -0.249 (-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.32)    
TMT size -0.157 -0.12 -0.118 -0.172 -0.174 -0.183 -0.182 (-1.19) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-1.30) (-1.32) (-1.39) (-1.39)    
Num TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
  -0.00297 -0.0853         
  (-0.01) (-0.44)         
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 (i)(b) 
  -0.0349 -0.127         
  (-0.65) (-1.48)         
ADV * (i)(a)     -0.0153         
    (-0.23)         
ADV * (i)(b)     0.0407+         
    (1.80)         
National diversity 
(ii)(a) 
      0.907 0.956     
      (0.82) (0.87)     
National 
diversity2 (ii)(b) 
      6.197 6.016     
      (1.29) (1.13)     
ADV * (ii)(a)         0.206     
        (0.45)     
ADV* (ii)(b)         -0.482     
        (-0.22)     
Average years 
host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.539** 0.522**  
          (2.92) (2.62) 
Average years 
host country 
experience2 
(iii)(b) 
          -0.0380* -0.0329 
          (-1.98) (-1.40)    
ADV * (iii)(a)             -0.00656 
            (-0.07)    
ADV * (iii)(b)             -0.00207 
            (-0.21)    
Constant 4.638* 4.560* 4.809* 4.755* 4.699* 5.302** 5.323**  (2.44) (2.19) (2.29) (2.47) (2.42) (2.79) (2.80) 
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.03 0.03 0.036 0.036 
F 2.244** 2.068** 1.916** 2.372** 2.134** 2.556** 2.303** 
 
 
230 
 
 
 
Table 5.17: 1-year BHARs for DC predictor. 
 
  
Model 
43A 
Model 
43B 
Model 
43C 
Model 
44B 
Model 
44C 
Model 
45B 
Model 
45C   
Prior 3-year window deal count  -0.613** -0.604** -0.649** -0.594** -0.620* -0.615** -0.629**  (-3.81) (-3.75) (-3.26) (-3.62) (-2.09) (-3.81) (-2.66)    
Cash 3.271 3.221 3.266 3.296 3.324 3.322 3.311 (1.41) (1.40) (1.42) (1.42) (1.43) (1.43) (1.42) 
Stock -13.61+ -12.88+ -12.80+ -13.63+ -13.67+ -13.44+ -13.44+   (-1.76) (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.74)    
Full acquisition 0.74 0.517 0.52 0.728 0.673 0.692 0.699 (0.29) (0.20) (0.21) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) 
Transaction value -0.102 -0.0531 -0.0788 -0.0848 -0.0828 -0.121 -0.12 (-0.19) (-0.10) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.22)    
Diversifying acquisition -1.907 -1.891 -1.844 -1.929 -1.981 -1.976 -1.981 (-0.95) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-0.96) (-0.99) (-0.96) (-0.96)    
Cultural differences -0.651 -0.663 -0.685 -0.613 -0.622 -0.707 -0.704 (-0.89) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.94) (-0.94)    
Country risk 2.579 4.928 5.112 3.636 3.621 2.703 2.625 (0.19) (0.36) (0.37) (0.27) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) 
GDP per capita -0.136 -0.111 -0.108 -0.131 -0.131 -0.136 -0.137 (-1.01) (-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.02)    
Acquirer size 0.117 0.323 0.328 0.185 0.169 0.174 0.178 (0.20) (0.50) (0.50) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) 
Acquirer ROA 0.0448 0.0274 0.0323 0.0427 0.0392 0.0453 0.0449 (0.30) (0.18) (0.21) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) 
Private target -1.803 -1.826 -1.843 -1.783 -1.73 -1.82 -1.805 (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.87) (-0.85)    
Listed target 4.186 4.478 4.435 4.45 4.451 4.362 4.401 (1.28) (1.37) (1.36) (1.35) (1.35) (1.32) (1.33) 
TMT size -0.914 -0.706 -0.655 -0.905 -0.894 -0.962+ -0.961+   (-1.63) (-1.02) (-0.93) (-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.68) (-1.67)    
Num TMT int’l experience (i)(a)   -1.152 -1.202         
  (-1.34) (-1.42)         
Num TMT int’l experience2 (i)(b)   0.338 0.261         
  (1.33) (0.91)         
3-year deal count * (i)(a)     0.0489         
    (0.41)         
3-year deal count * (i)(b)     0.0104         
    (0.23)         
National diversity (ii)(a)       -1.114 -1.416     
      (-0.23) (-0.30)     
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -16.79 -15.51     
      (-0.77) (-0.67)     
3-year deal count * (ii)(a)         -0.548     
        (-0.59)     
3-year deal count * (ii)(b)         1.169     
        (0.28)     
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.192 0.173 
          (0.26) (0.23) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.047 -0.0446 
          (-0.62) (-0.57)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(a)             -0.00266 
  
          (-0.02)    
3-year deal count * (iii)(b)             0.00207 
            (0.09) 
Constant 8.599 4.482 4.168 8.705 8.896 8.899 8.863 (1.07) (0.51) (0.47) (1.08) (1.10) (1.09) (1.09) 
Observations 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 
R-squared 0.02 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.02 
F 2.734** 2.600** 2.425** 2.473** 2.617** 2.43** 2.158** 
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Note to Table 5.17: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the association of 3-year prior deal counts with the one-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (calculated using Market Adjusted Returns model) for serial acquirer firms 
announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variables DC across 3-year period as well as the TMT determinants 
are mean-centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as detailed in Table 5.3. Bidder-specific control 
variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row 
are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.18: 1-year BHARs for TBD predictor. 
 
  
Model 
46A Model 46B Model 46C Model 47B Model 47C   Model 48B Model 48C    
Time between consequent 
deals (TBDs) 
1.293** 1.293** 1.043+ 1.277** 1.363+   1.294** 1.367*   
(3.04) (3.04) (1.85) (3.01) (1.95) (3.04) (2.57) 
Cash 6.019** 6.044** 6.020** 6.085** 5.989**  6.072** 5.988**  (2.73) (2.74) (2.72) (2.75) (2.70) (2.75) (2.70) 
Stock -8.411 -8.062 -8.248 -8.296 -8.551 -8.091 -8.531 (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.05)    (-1.00) (-1.08)    
Full acquisition 1.219 1.174 1.194 1.3 1.477 1.186 1.246 (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.52) (0.58) (0.47) (0.50) 
Transaction value -0.772 -0.739 -0.703 -0.755 -0.695 -0.791 -0.764 (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.29) (-1.39) (-1.26)    (-1.46) (-1.41)    
Diversifying acquisition -4.421* -4.454* -4.448* -4.467* -4.478*   -4.487* -4.451*   (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.27) (-2.28)    (-2.22) (-2.20)    
Cultural differences -0.913 -0.921 -0.939 -0.871 -0.838 -0.98 -0.974 (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.24) (-1.15) (-1.11)    (-1.27) (-1.26)    
Country risk 21.86 22.09 21.68 22.7 23.30+   21.91 21.93 (1.57) (1.58) (1.54) (1.63) (1.67) (1.57) (1.57) 
GDP per capita 0.112 0.119 0.116 0.114 0.12 0.111 0.112 (0.85) (0.91) (0.88) (0.87) (0.91) (0.85) (0.85) 
Acquirer size 0.113 0.174 0.178 0.180 0.173 0.180 0.185 (0.19) (0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) 
Acquirer ROA 0.243* 0.239* 0.235* 0.242* 0.233*   0.244* 0.242*   (2.33) (2.20) (2.16) (2.34) (2.27) (2.31) (2.29) 
Private target -1.497 -1.492 -1.49 -1.38 -1.409 -1.515 -1.439 (-0.72) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.67)    (-0.73) (-0.69)    
Listed target 3.438 3.484 3.497 3.798 3.569 3.637 3.753 (1.02) (1.04) (1.04) (1.11) (1.05) (1.07) (1.11) 
TMT size -0.729 -0.814 -0.801 -0.711 -0.708 -0.793 -0.78 (-1.30) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.26) (-1.26)    (-1.38) (-1.36)    
Num TMT int’l experience 
(i)(a) 
  -0.525 -0.522                       
  (-0.68) (-0.67)                       
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 (i)(b) 
  0.311 0.334                       
  (1.18) (1.26)                       
TBD * (i)(a)     -0.0553                       
    (-0.20)                       
TBD * (i)(b)     0.0931                       
    (0.77)                       
National diversity (ii)(a)       -0.797 -0.959     
      (-0.17) (-0.21)        
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -14.62 -12.56     
      (-0.73) (-0.63)        
TBD * (ii)(a)         2.666     
        (1.31)     
TBD* (ii)(b)         -1.639     
        (-0.17)        
Average years host 
country experience (iii)(a) 
          0.220 0.151 
          (0.29) (0.20) 
Average years host 
country experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0525 -0.0413 
          (-0.69) (-0.52)    
TBD * (iii)(a)             -0.0321 
            (-0.09)    
TBD * (iii)(b)             -0.0112 
            (-0.33)    
Constant -4.472 -5.674 -5.658 -4.544 -4.963 -4.113 -4.407 (-0.56) (-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-0.63)    (-0.51) (-0.55)    
Observations 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360 
R-squared 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.037 
F 3.171** 2.822** 2.669** 2.822** 2.895** 2.841** 2.684** 
 
 
Note to Table 5.18: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the association of the time interval between the immediately 
previous deal with the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (calculated using Market Adjusted Returns model) 
for serial acquirer firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory variables TBD as well as the TMT 
determinants are mean-centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as detailed in Table 5.4. Bidder-specific 
control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each 
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row are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.19: 1-year BHARs for ADV predictor. 
 
  
Model 
49A 
Model 
49B 
Model 
49C  Model 50B Model 50C Model 51B Model 51C 
Prior 3-year window 
aggregate deal value 
(ADV) 
-1.599* -1.559* -1.538+ -1.556+ -1.562+ -1.600* -1.599+ 
(-2.01) (-1.96) (-1.78) (-1.96) (-1.68) (-2.00) (-1.78) 
Cash 2.47 2.45 2.557 2.473 2.437 2.527 2.571 (0.97) (0.97) (1.01) (0.97) (0.96) (0.99) (1.00) 
Stock -16.04* -15.12+ -14.75+ -15.99* -16.07* -15.76* -16.73* (-2.05) (-1.93) (-1.88) (-2.01) (-2.03) (-2.01) (-2.24) 
Full acquisition -0.492 -0.683 -0.52 -0.498 -0.538 -0.528 -0.631 (-0.19) (-0.26) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.24) 
Transaction value -0.152 -0.104 -0.142 -0.137 -0.126 -0.165 -0.165 (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Diversifying acquisition -1.121 -1.109 -1.228 -1.161 -1.142 -1.158 -1.009 (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.56) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.45) 
Cultural differences -1.402+ -1.415+ -1.449+ -1.347+ -1.350+ -1.488+ -1.556+ (-1.77) (-1.79) (-1.80) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.85) (-1.92) 
Country risk 0.085 2.374 1.946 1.681 1.563 0.306 0.276 (0.01) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP per capita -0.148 -0.123 -0.122 -0.143 -0.145 -0.146 -0.145 (-1.02) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.99) 
Acquirer size 1.333 1.505 1.471 1.476 1.475 1.396 1.318 (1.35) (1.46) (1.43) (1.48) (1.46) (1.40) (1.32) 
Acquirer ROA -0.00674 -0.0245 -0.015 -0.0143 -0.0148 -0.00691 0.00241 (-0.04) (-0.14) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.04) (0.01) 
Private target -1.773 -1.74 -1.721 -1.639 -1.65 -1.79 -1.772 (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.76) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.80) (-0.79) 
Listed target 4.494 4.736 4.583 4.993 5.001 4.724 5.055 (1.30) (1.38) (1.33) (1.44) (1.44) (1.35) (1.45) 
TMT size -1.045+ -0.906 -0.812 -0.973+ -0.966 -1.091+ -1.095+ (-1.77) (-1.24) (-1.09) (-1.65) (-1.64) (-1.81) (-1.80) 
Num TMT int’l experience 
(i)(a) 
  -1.172 -1.065         
  (-1.29) (-1.20)         
Num TMT int’l 
experience2 (i)(b) 
  0.393 0.123         
  (1.46) (0.30)         
ADV * (i)(a)     0.347         
    (1.00)         
ADV * (i)(b)     -0.0169         
    (-0.15)         
National diversity (ii)(a)       -3.789 -3.931     
      (-0.74) (-0.78)     
National diversity2 (ii)(b)       -17.67 -16.64     
      (-0.79) (-0.68)     
ADV * (ii)(a)         -0.416     
        (-0.19)     
ADV* (ii)(a)         0.418     
        (0.04)     
Average years host country 
experience (iii)(a) 
          0.0904 -0.07 
          (0.11) (-0.08) 
Average years host country 
experience2 (iii)(b) 
          -0.0383 0.0152 
          (-0.48) (0.16) 
ADV * (iii)(a)             -0.205 
            (-0.53) 
ADV * (iii)(b)             -0.0115 
            (-0.27) 
Constant 3.497 -0.300 -0.450 2.766 2.855 3.608 3.94 (0.35) (-0.03) (-0.04) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) (0.39) 
Observations 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 
R-squared 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.021 
F 1.681* 1.615+ 1.453+ 1.555+ 1.448+ 1.517+ 1.529+ 
 
 
Note to Table 5.19: Multiple linear regressions models explaining the association of the aggregate deal value (ADV) in the 
previous three-year period of the current acquisition with the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (calculated 
using Market Adjusted Returns model) for serial acquirer firms announcing international acquisitions. The key explanatory 
variables TBD as well as the TMT determinants are mean-centered values. Models here signify the same specifications as 
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detailed in Table 5.5. Bidder-specific control variables are lagged one year. All the other variables are defined the same way 
as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.20: MM-based CARs with TMT Depth and Breadth proxies for DCs. 
 
  
Model 52B Model 52C Model 53B Model 53C 
Prior 3-year window deal 
count  
0.0175 0.00166 0.018 -0.0223 
(0.66) (0.05) (0.66) (-0.68) 
Cash 0.121 0.123 0.131 0.132 (0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) 
Stock -1.282 -1.282 -1.217 -1.213 (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.05) (-1.05) 
Full acquisition -0.622+ -0.650* -0.656* -0.641+ (-1.91) (-2.00) (-2.00) (-1.95) 
Transaction value 0.0187 0.0188 0.0115 -0.00292 (0.22) (0.22) (0.14) (-0.03) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.622* -0.628* -0.636* -0.627* (-2.41) (-2.42) (-2.45) (-2.40) 
Cultural differences -0.0418 -0.0495 -0.0397 -0.0584 (-0.45) (-0.53) (-0.43) (-0.64) 
Country risk 0.926 0.892 1.24 1.635 (0.59) (0.57) (0.78) (1.04) 
GDP per capita 0.0167 0.017 0.0186 0.0209 (0.97) (0.99) (1.09) (1.21) 
Acquirer size -0.156* -0.155* -0.122 -0.129 (-1.99) (-2.00) (-1.55) (-1.64) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0184 -0.0184 -0.018 -0.0162 (-1.35) (-1.35) (-1.29) (-1.16) 
Private target -0.299 -0.297 -0.323 -0.31 (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.21) (-1.16) 
Listed target 
-0.973* -0.973* -0.918+ -0.944* 
(-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.89) (-1.96) 
TMT size -0.0529 -0.0525 -0.0952 -0.112 (-0.65) (-0.65) (-1.19) (-1.40) 
Amount of int’l experience 
(iv)(a) 
-0.0351 -0.028     
(-0.89) (-0.55)     
Amount of int’l experience2 
(iv)(b) 
0.0101* 0.00536     
(2.05) (0.71)     
3-year deal count * (iv)(a)   -0.00151     
  (-0.21)     
3-year deal count * (iv)(b)   0.000767     
  (0.92)     
Range of int’l experience 
(v)(a) 
    -0.244 0.00246 
    (-0.95) (0.01) 
Range of int’l experience2 
(v)(b) 
    0.133 -0.278 
    (0.92) (-1.18) 
3-year deal count * (v)(a)       -0.0486 
      (-1.16) 
3-year deal count * (v)(b)       0.0611* 
      (2.16) 
Constant 2.095* 2.140* 2.124* 2.200* (2.11) (2.15) (2.16) (2.22) 
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.025 
F 2.197** 2.266** 2.039** 2.235** 
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Table 5.21: MM-based CARs with TMT Depth and Breadth proxies for TBDs. 
 
  
Model 54B Model 54C Model 55B Model 55C 
Time between consequent deals (TBDs) -0.116+ 0.0733 -0.123+ -0.103 
(-1.84) -0.88 (-1.91) (-1.18)    
Cash 0.281 0.266 0.296 0.297 (0.96) (0.92) (1.01) (1.02) 
Stock 
-0.279 -0.33 -0.25 -0.238 
(-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.18)    
Full acquisition -0.549+ -0.551+ -0.585+ -0.588+   (-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.77) (-1.79)    
Transaction value 0.027 0.018 0.0227 0.0161 (0.33) (0.22) (0.28) (0.20) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.791** -0.796** -0.791** -0.780**  (-3.10) (-3.13) (-3.06) (-3.01)    
Cultural differences -0.1 -0.112 -0.0997 -0.103 
(-1.10) (-1.23) (-1.09) (-1.13)    
Country risk 1.199 0.878 1.497 1.493 (0.72) (0.53) (0.89) (0.89) 
GDP per capita 0.0202 0.0178 0.0211 0.0209 (1.16) (1.03) (1.23) (1.21) 
Acquirer size -0.101 -0.0956 -0.0681 -0.0723 (-1.29) (-1.24) (-0.88) (-0.94)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0126 -0.012 -0.0123 -0.0115 (-0.85) (-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.76)    
Private target -0.0974 -0.0522 -0.117 -0.118 (-0.37) (-0.20) (-0.45) (-0.45)    
Listed target 
-0.424 -0.4 -0.373 -0.345 
(-0.85) (-0.80) (-0.74) (-0.68)    
TMT size -0.0307 -0.0283 -0.0749 -0.0762 (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.94) (-0.96)    
Amount of int’l experience (iv)(a) -0.0506 -0.0493     (-1.31) (-1.28)     
Amount of int’l experience2 (iv)(b) 0.0101* 0.00846+     
(2.03) (1.77)     
TBD * (iv)(a)   0.0137                   
  (0.88)                   
TBD * (iv)(b)   -0.00715**                   
  (-3.02)                   
Range of int’l experience (v)(a)     -0.289 -0.281 
    (-1.17) (-1.14)    
Range of int’l experience2 (v)(b)     0.108 0.0955 
    (0.71) (0.62) 
TBD * (v)(a)       -0.0335 
      (-0.31)    
TBD * (v)(b)       -0.0288 
      (-0.37)    
Constant 
1.194 1.301 1.28 1.332 
(1.14) (1.26) (1.23) (1.27) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.022 0.032 0.020 0.020 
F 2.141** 2.364** 2.027** 1.821* 
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Table 5.22: MM-based CARs with TMT Depth and Breadth proxies for ADV. 
 
  
Model 56B Model 56C Model 57B Model 57C 
Prior 3-year window aggregate deal value 
(ADV) 
-0.116 -0.0307 -0.116 -0.128 
(-1.21) (-0.27) (-1.21) (-1.25) 
Cash 0.114 0.119 0.136 0.144 (0.35) (0.37) (0.42) (0.44) 
Stock -0.8 -0.762 -0.793 -0.769 (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.58) 
Full acquisition -0.528 -0.53 -0.545 -0.549 
(-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.56) (-1.56) 
Transaction value 0.0247 0.0285 0.0127 0.00838 (0.28) (0.32) (0.14) (0.09) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.574* -0.578* -0.601* -0.600* (-2.10) (-2.11) (-2.18) (-2.18) 
Cultural differences -0.0933 -0.0878 -0.0883 -0.0916 (-0.96) (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.96) 
Country risk -0.552 -0.426 -0.181 -0.159 (-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.11) (-0.09) 
GDP per capita -0.00451 -0.00411 -0.00226 -0.00212 (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.12) (-0.12) 
Acquirer size -0.00683 -0.0232 0.0282 0.021 (-0.06) (-0.20) (0.26) (0.19) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0283+ -0.0284+ -0.0265+ -0.0262+ (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.73) (-1.72) 
Private target -0.241 -0.23 -0.277 -0.279 (-0.87) (-0.83) (-0.99) (-1.00) 
Listed target 
-0.801 -0.861+ -0.747 -0.753 
(-1.55) (-1.68) (-1.42) (-1.44) 
TMT size -0.0581 -0.055 -0.116 -0.118 (-0.67) (-0.63) (-1.36) (-1.39) 
Amount of int’l experience (iv)(a) -0.0351 -0.0302     
(-0.81) (-0.71)     
Amount of int’l experience2 (iv)(b) 0.0129* 0.0171**     
(2.48) (2.66)     
ADV * (iv)(a)   0.00548     
  (0.34)     
ADV * (iv)(b)   -0.00304     
  (-1.44)     
Range of int’l experience (v)(a)     -0.174 -0.157 
    (-0.65) (-0.60) 
Range of int’l experience2 (v)(b)     0.136 0.0796 
    (0.89) (0.43) 
ADV * (v)(a)       0.00727 
      (0.08) 
ADV * (v)(b)       0.016 
      (0.27) 
Constant 1.826 1.81 1.949+ 2.029+ (1.60) (1.58) (1.74) (1.76) 
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.026 0.029 0.021 0.021 
F 2.067** 1.899* 1.771* 1.577+ 
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Notes to Tables 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22: Multiple linear regressions models with similar specifications of explanatory variables 
and controls as Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 respectively, except that instead of the TMT proxy (i) viz., the number of internationally 
experienced top managers, two other variants namely, (iv) amount of international experience (depth) in years and (v) range 
of international experience in number of countries (breadth), respectively have been used. All the other variables are defined 
the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, 
*
, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.23: MM-based CARs for quartile distribution of TMT proxies for DC predictor. 
 
  
Model 
(4(i-a)B) 
Model 
(4(i-a)C) 
Model 
(4(i-
b)B) 
Model 
(4(i-
b)C)    
Model 
(4(ii-
a)B) 
Model 
(4(ii-
a)C) 
Model 
(4(ii-
b)B) 
Model 
(4(ii-
b)C) 
Model 
(4(iii-
a)B) 
Model 
(4(iii-
a)C) 
Model 
(4(iii-
b)B) 
Model 
(4(iii-
b)C) 
Prior 3-year 
window deal 
count  
0.0233 0.00588 0.0173 0.0014 0.0161 0.0146 0.0142 0.032 0.0138 0.019 0.0151 -0.00869 
(0.85) (0.17) (0.66) (0.04) (0.59) (0.38) (0.54) (1.03) (0.53) (0.63) (0.58) (-0.19)    
Cash 0.129 0.14 0.141 0.145 0.138 0.138 0.147 0.139 0.13 0.136 0.129 0.134 (0.42) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) -0.48 (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44) 
Stock -1.293 -1.281 -1.21 -1.228 -1.279 -1.278 -1.267 -1.259 -1.33 -1.335 -1.318 -1.32 (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.10) (-1.10)    (-1.16) (-1.17) (-1.15) (-1.15)    
Full acquisition -0.687* -0.678* -0.681* -0.675* -0.657* -0.656* -0.648* -0.636+   -0.677* -0.679* -0.685* -0.688*   (-2.09) (-2.07) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-2.01) (-2.00) (-1.98) (-1.95)    (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.09) (-2.09)    
Transaction 
value 
0.00375 -0.0022 0.0154 0.0178 0.011 0.0106 0.0116 0.0109 -0.0039 -0.00436 0.0007 -0.00072 
(0.04) (-0.03) (0.18) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.01)    
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.630* -0.611* -0.634* -0.629* -0.635* -0.634* -0.630* -0.616*   -0.687** -0.682** -0.670* -0.666*   
(-2.44) (-2.34) (-2.45) (-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.43) (-2.43) (-2.39)    (-2.62) (-2.59) (-2.56) (-2.54)    
Cultural 
differences 
-0.0485 -0.0486 -0.0414 -0.0404 -0.0423 -0.042 -0.0424 -0.042 -0.00523 -0.0034 -0.00347 -0.00114 
(-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.45)    (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.01)    
Country risk 1.209 1.227 1.192 1.209 0.96 0.965 0.903 0.922 0.874 0.813 0.904 0.824 (0.78) (0.79) (0.76) (0.77) (0.62) (0.62) (0.59) (0.60) (0.57) (0.52) (0.59) (0.53) 
GDP per capita 0.0173 0.0177 0.0177 0.0168 0.0161 0.0161 0.0157 0.0158 0.0122 0.0119 0.0133 0.0128 (1.03) (1.05) (1.04) (0.97) (0.95) (0.95) (0.94) (0.94) (0.73) (0.71) (0.80) (0.76) 
Acquirer size -0.113 -0.108 -0.123+ -0.119 -0.145* -0.145* -0.155* -0.152*   -0.150* -0.149* -0.149* -0.147*   (-1.60) (-1.49) (-1.67) (-1.62) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-2.16) (-2.11)    (-2.13) (-2.13) (-2.11) (-2.09)    
Acquirer ROA -0.019 -0.0182 -0.0185 -0.0195 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0161 -0.0152 -0.0153 -0.0151 -0.0155 -0.0153 (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.36) (-1.41) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.13)    (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.15) (-1.13)    
Private target -0.34 -0.332 -0.338 -0.325 -0.326 -0.326 -0.327 -0.343 -0.324 -0.323 -0.325 -0.326 (-1.27) (-1.24) (-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.28)    (-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.22)    
Listed target -0.913+ -0.911+ -0.923+ -0.911+ -0.956* -0.954+ -0.974* -0.976*   -1.011* -1.010* -1.016* -1.017*   (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-2.01) (-2.01)    (-2.10) (-2.10) (-2.11) (-2.12)    
TMT size -0.0189 -0.0123 -0.0736 -0.0803 -0.0958 -0.0957 -0.109 -0.113 -0.105 -0.106 -0.115 -0.116 (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.89) (-0.98) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.36) (-1.42)    (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.45) (-1.47)    
High quartile: 
num TMT int’l 
experience (i-
a) 
-0.753+ -1.126+                     
(-1.78) (-1.95)                     
3-year deal 
count * (i-a) 
  0.0511                     
  (0.94)                     
Low quartile: 
num TMT int’l 
experience (i-
b) 
    0.339 0.153                 
    (1.10) (0.39)                 
3-year deal 
count * (i-b) 
      0.0452                 
      (0.83)                 
High quartile: 
national 
diversity (ii-a) 
        0.0118 -0.0103             
        (0.04) (-0.02)             
3-year deal 
count * (ii-a) 
          0.00371             
          (0.07)             
Low quartile: 
national 
diversity (ii-b) 
            -0.192 0.0452         
            (-0.72) (0.12)         
3-year deal 
count * (ii-b) 
              -0.0547         
              (-0.98)            
High quartile: 
average years 
host country 
experience (iii-
a) 
                0.645* 0.76     
                (2.04) (1.62)     
3-year deal 
count * (iii-a) 
                  -0.0242     
                  (-0.40)     
Low quartile: 
average years 
host country 
experience (iii-
b) 
                    -0.511+ -0.662 
                    (-1.70) (-1.50)    
3-year deal 
count * (iii-b) 
                      0.0318 
                      (0.58) 
Constant 2.095* 1.987* 2.044* 2.059* 2.485** 2.479** 2.707** 2.674**  2.535** 2.546** 3.034** 3.046**  (2.29) (2.15) (2.03) (2.05) (2.78) (2.74) (2.94) (2.89) (2.84) (2.85) (3.16) (3.16) 
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 
F 2.256** 2.136** 2.147** 2.113** 1.990* 1.865* 2.009* 1.913* 2.148** 2.015** 2.043** 1.929* 
 
 
Notes to Table 5.23: Multiple linear regressions models with similar specifications of explanatory variables and controls as 
Table 5.3, except that instead of the linear and squared terms of TMT variables (i), (ii) and (iii), their respective highest and 
lowest quartile specifications have been used: Models numbered 58, 60 and 62 show the high quartiles of TMT variables (i), 
(ii) and (iii) and Models numbered 59, 61 and 63 respectively, show the low quartile specifications of the same TMT variables. 
Also, the models marked with letter ‘B’ do not have the interaction terms of the main regressor, DCs with TMT variables (i), 
(ii) and (iii), while the models marked with letter ‘C’ have the interaction terms of the main regressor, DCs with the said TMT 
variables. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using 
robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.24: MM-based CARs for quartile distribution of TMT proxies for TBD predictor. 
 
  
Model 
64B 
Model 
64C 
Model 
65B 
Model 
65C 
Model 
66B 
Model 
66C 
Model 
67B 
Model 
67C 
Model 
68B 
Model 
68C 
Model 
69B 
Model 
69C 
Time between 
consequent deals 
(TBDs) 
-0.120+ -0.166* -0.125+ -0.103 -0.122+ -0.113 -0.123+ -0.221*   -0.123+ -0.044 -0.124+ -0.254*   
(-1.88) (-2.38) (-1.95) (-1.23)    (-1.90) (-1.51) (-1.93) (-2.40)    (-1.92) (-0.64) (-1.93) (-1.98)    
Cash 0.296 0.292 0.309 0.313 0.303 0.302 0.303 0.312 0.294 0.264 0.287 0.276 (1.02) (1.00) (1.06) (1.08) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.07) (1.01) (0.90) (0.98) (0.94) 
Stock -0.342 -0.376 -0.238 -0.226 -0.318 -0.319 -0.317 -0.3 -0.325 -0.381 -0.318 -0.34 (-0.26) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-0.17)    (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.23)    (-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.24) (-0.26)    
Full acquisition -0.587+ -0.594+ -0.592+ -0.593+   -0.581+ -0.584+ -0.578+ -0.593+   -0.587+ -0.601+ -0.601+ -0.601+   (-1.79) (-1.81) (-1.80) (-1.80)    (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.76) (-1.80)    (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.83) (-1.84)    
Transaction value 0.0176 0.0288 0.0274 0.0294 0.0217 0.0205 0.0229 0.017 0.0148 0.0182 0.0134 0.0162 (0.22) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) (0.20) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.793** -0.806** -0.787** -0.786**  -0.796** -0.796** -0.787** -0.780**  -0.819** -0.831** -0.820** -0.820**  
(-3.08) (-3.13) (-3.06) (-3.06)    (-3.09) (-3.09) (-3.06) (-3.04)    (-3.12) (-3.16) (-3.14) (-3.15)    
Cultural differences -0.106 -0.111 -0.103 -0.102 -0.105 -0.105 -0.107 -0.11 -0.0857 -0.0965 -0.0703 -0.0727 (-1.16) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-1.12)    (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.17) (-1.21)    (-0.93) (-1.04) (-0.77) (-0.79)    
Country risk 1.272 1.272 1.492 1.534 1.202 1.194 1.175 1.153 1.162 1.433 1.151 1.266 (0.78) (0.78) (0.90) (0.93) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (0.87) (0.70) (0.77) 
GDP per capita 0.019 0.0188 0.0208 0.0211 0.0188 0.0188 0.0189 0.0185 0.017 0.019 0.0162 0.0171 (1.12) (1.10) (1.21) (1.22) (1.10) (1.10) (1.11) (1.09) (1.00) (1.11) (0.95) (1.00) 
Acquirer size -0.0903 -0.0867 -0.0711 -0.0711 -0.104 -0.104 -0.120+ -0.120+   -0.112+ -0.115+ -0.113+ -0.115+   (-1.31) (-1.25) (-1.00) (-1.00)    (-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.77) (-1.78)    (-1.69) (-1.74) (-1.70) (-1.72)    
Acquirer ROA -0.0114 -0.013 -0.0138 -0.0138 -0.00998 -0.00988 -0.0094 -0.00879 -0.00894 -0.00976 -0.00844 -0.00877 (-0.77) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.92)    (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.60)    (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.58) (-0.61)    
Private target -0.133 -0.119 -0.139 -0.136 -0.132 -0.132 -0.143 -0.163 -0.139 -0.141 -0.136 -0.131 (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.54) (-0.53)    (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.63)    (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.51)    
Listed target -0.409 -0.439 -0.386 -0.389 -0.432 -0.428 -0.468 -0.453 -0.474 -0.497 -0.503 -0.498 (-0.82) (-0.88) (-0.78) (-0.78)    (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.93) (-0.90)    (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.01) (-1.00)    
TMT size -0.031 -0.0384 -0.0433 -0.0451 -0.0718 -0.0723 -0.0834 -0.0861 -0.0756 -0.0747 -0.0893 -0.0905 (-0.32) (-0.40) (-0.52) (-0.55)    (-0.90) (-0.91) (-1.04) (-1.09)    (-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.13) (-1.14)    
High quartile: num 
TMT int’l 
experience (i)(a) 
-0.357 -0.303                                   
(-0.90) (-0.76)                                   
TBD * (i)(a)   0.319*                                   
  (2.02)                                   
Low quartile: num 
TMT int’l 
experience (i-b) 
    0.517+ 0.523+                   
    (1.71) (1.73)                 
TBD * (i)(b)       -0.0509                 
      (-0.41)                    
High quartile: 
national diversity 
(ii-a) 
        -0.0767 -0.0822             
        (-0.29) (-0.30)             
TBD * (ii)(a)           -0.0408                           
          (-0.29)             
Low quartile: 
national diversity 
(ii-b) 
            -0.188 -0.198         
            (-0.73) (-0.77)            
TBD* (ii)(b)               0.176         
              (1.40)         
High quartile: 
average years host 
country experience 
(iii-a) 
                0.322 0.407     
                (1.05) (1.34)     
TBD * (iii)(a)                   -0.406*                   
                  (-2.45)                   
Low quartile: 
average years host 
country experience 
(iii-a) 
                    -0.472+ -0.497+   
                    (-1.65) (-1.74)    
TBD * (iii)(b)                       0.177 
                      (1.21) 
Constant 1.507 1.527 1.048 1.033 1.710+ 1.711+ 1.943* 1.999*   1.741+ 1.718+ 2.227* 2.229*   (1.54) (1.56) (0.99) (0.98) (1.84) (1.84) (2.02) (2.08) (1.87) (1.84) (2.22) (2.22) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.02 0.019 0.025 0.02 0.022 
F 1.964* 2.085** 2.221** 2.117** 1.878* 1.764* 1.930* 1.925* 1.896* 2.011** 1.939* 1.857* 
 
 
Notes to Table 5.24: Multiple linear regressions models with similar specifications of explanatory variables and controls as 
Table 5.4, except that instead of the linear and squared terms of TMT variables (i), (ii) and (iii), their respective highest and 
lowest quartile specifications have been used: Models numbered 64, 66 and 68 show the high quartiles of TMT variables (i), 
(ii) and (iii) and Models numbered 65, 67 and 69 respectively, show the low quartile specifications of the same TMT variables. 
Also, the models marked with letter ‘B’ do not have the interaction terms of the main regressor, TBDs with TMT variables (i), 
(ii) and (iii), while the models marked with letter ‘C’ have the interaction terms of the main regressor, TBDs with the said 
TMT variables. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic 
using robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5.25: MM-based CARs for quartile distribution of TMT proxies for ADV predictor. 
 
  
Model 
70B 
Model 
70C 
Model 
71B 
Model 
71C 
Model 
72B 
Model 
72C 
Model 
73B 
Model 
73C 
Model 
74B 
Model 
74C 
Model 
75B 
Model 
75C    
Prior 3-year 
window 
aggregate 
deal value 
(ADV) 
-0.105 -0.183+ -0.096 -0.13 -0.115 -0.139 -0.117 -0.0765 -0.131 -0.141 -0.126 -0.0889 
(-1.12) (-1.84) (-1.00) (-1.14) (-1.22) (-1.37) (-1.24) (-0.73) (-1.37) (-1.46) (-1.32) (-0.65) 
Cash 0.124 0.151 0.158 0.160 0.143 0.152 0.159 0.174 0.126 0.119 0.127 0.121 (0.38) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44) (0.47) (0.49) (0.54) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39) (0.37) 
Stock -0.867 -0.87 -0.726 -0.756 -0.846 -0.804 -0.831 -0.798 -0.888 -0.879 -0.873 -0.879 (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.67) 
Full 
acquisition 
-0.593+ -0.57 -0.582+ -0.604+ -0.561 -0.546 -0.545 -0.529 -0.573 -0.572 -0.579+ -0.577+ 
(-1.69) (-1.62) (-1.66) (-1.72) (-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.52) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.65) 
Transaction 
value 
0.00137 -0.0058 0.0171 0.0184 0.0122 0.00508 0.016 0.0116 0.000861 0.00207 0.00747 0.00965 
(0.02) (-0.07) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.06) (0.18) (0.13) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.11) 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
-0.592* -0.602* -0.599* -0.590* -0.596* -0.601* -0.590* -0.600* -0.655* -0.656* -0.627* -0.628* 
(-2.16) (-2.20) (-2.19) (-2.15) (-2.17) (-2.18) (-2.15) (-2.18) (-2.34) (-2.34) (-2.25) (-2.25) 
Cultural 
differences 
-0.0975 -0.107 -0.0891 -0.0887 -0.0922 -0.091 -0.0915 -0.0907 -0.0511 -0.0524 -0.0571 -0.0574 
(-1.00) (-1.11) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.93) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.58) (-0.58) 
Country risk -0.112 -0.124 -0.0082 0.0362 -0.379 -0.327 -0.435 -0.407 -0.419 -0.343 -0.379 -0.321 (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.00) (0.02) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.19) 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0017 -0.00202 -0.00442 -0.00372 -0.005 -0.00453 -0.00841 -0.00802 -0.00656 -0.00617 
(-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.34) 
Acquirer size 0.0514 0.0594 0.0311 0.0375 0.00972 0.0113 -0.0083 -0.00939 0.0214 0.021 0.0206 0.0202 (0.47) (0.55) (0.29) (0.34) (0.09) (0.11) (-0.08) (-0.09) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Acquirer 
ROA 
-0.0289+ -0.0260+ -0.0292+ -0.0295+ -0.0256+ -0.0254+ -0.0244 -0.0242 -0.0248+ -0.0251+ -0.0252+ -0.0254+ 
(-1.88) (-1.71) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-1.71) (-1.70) (-1.64) (-1.63) (-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.68) (-1.69) 
Private target -0.297 -0.299 -0.296 -0.302 -0.285 -0.284 -0.297 -0.292 -0.289 -0.287 -0.282 -0.279 (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.09) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.01) (-1.00) 
Listed target -0.704 -0.733 -0.716 -0.693 -0.774 -0.761 -0.806 -0.814 -0.815 -0.832 -0.8 -0.815 (-1.36) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.34) (-1.48) (-1.45) (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.53) (-1.54) 
TMT size -0.0247 -0.0254 -0.0931 -0.0923 -0.12 -0.119 -0.149+ -0.153+ -0.129 -0.128 -0.134 -0.134 (-0.24) (-0.25) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.76) (-1.81) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-1.60) (-1.60) 
High 
quartile: num 
TMT int’l 
experience 
(i)(a) 
-0.852* -1.300**                     
(-2.02) (-2.75)                     
ADV * (i)(a)   0.324*                     
  (2.23)                     
Low quartile: 
num TMT 
int’l 
experience 
(i)(b) 
    0.467 0.541+                 
    (1.42) (1.67)                 
ADV * (i)(b)       0.0931                 
      (0.74)                 
High 
quartile: 
national 
diversity 
(ii)(a) 
        0.152 0.0974             
        (0.53) (0.32)             
ADV * (ii)(a)           0.0767             
          (0.65)             
Low quartile: 
national 
diversity 
(ii)b) 
            -0.400 -0.423         
            (-1.42) (-1.52)         
ADV* (ii)(b)               -0.0892         
              (-0.78)         
High 
quartile: 
average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
                0.644+ 0.635+     
                (1.94) (1.89)     
ADV * 
(iii)(a) 
                  0.0588     
                  (0.39)     
Low quartile: 
average years 
host country 
experience 
(iii)(a) 
                    -0.401 -0.394 
                    (-1.30) (-1.25) 
ADV * 
(iii)(b) 
                      -0.0496 
                      (-0.39) 
Constant 1.809+ 1.664 1.725 1.711 2.259* 2.201* 2.725* 2.693* 2.208* 2.188* 2.601* 2.572* (1.68) (1.55) (1.51) (1.50) (2.15) (2.10) (2.55) (2.52) (2.11) (2.09) (2.40) (2.36) 
Observations 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
R-squared 0.023 0.028 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.022 
F 1.974* 2.133** 2.032** 1.919* 1.696* 1.613+ 1.767* 1.680* 1.776* 1.670* 1.665+ 1.560+ 
 
Notes to Table 5.25: Multiple linear regressions models with similar specifications of explanatory variables and controls as 
Table 5.5, except that instead of the linear and squared terms of TMT variables (i), (ii) and (iii), their respective highest and 
lowest quartile specifications have been used: Models numbered 70, 72 and 74 show the high quartiles of TMT variables (i), 
(ii) and (iii) and Models numbered 71, 73 and 75 respectively, show the low quartile specifications of the same TMT variables. 
Also, the models marked with letter ‘B’ do not have the interaction terms of the main regressor, ADV with TMT variables (i), 
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(ii) and (iii), while the models marked with letter ‘C’ have the interaction terms of the main regressor, ADV with the said TMT 
variables. All the other variables are defined the same way as in Table 5.1. The second line in each row are the t-statistic using 
robust standard errors in parenthesis and +, *, and ** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 General discussion on principal findings  
The fundamental assumption of this thesis is: environmental information ambiguities are likely 
to be alleviated by the superior decision-making capability of a balanced internationally-
oriented top executive team of an acquiring firm. Therefore, the central aim of this thesis was 
to explore if and how the feature of ‘international orientation’, operationalised as international 
experience, host country familiarity and national diversity respectively, of the TMTs, plays a 
role in cross-border acquisition choices and consequential outcomes. This was examined in the 
four main empirical chapters, taking into consideration both the positive and the negative 
aspects of this particular TMT characteristic. The first two chapters investigated the influences 
of decision-making by the so-called globally oriented TMTs, exhibited in the performance of 
their firms in both short and longer event windows. The third chapter instead, focused on an 
important aspect of decision-making with respect to choice of payment mode. The final chapter 
studied the moderating roles of these TMTs while examining the short-term performance of 
the serially acquiring firms. The findings generally suggested that these special features of the 
TMTs provided the acquirers with some sort of a ‘comparative advantage’ as far as improved 
decision-making as well as favourable longer terms returns, was concerned. The initial sample 
consisted of 642 acquiring firms from the UK, listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
announcing 2,278 foreign expansions, ranging from the years 1999 until 2008. The preparation 
of the combined final dataset using this sample has been covered in details in the first empirical 
chapter (Chapter 2). This combined dataset was used with some variations in each of the 
chapters due to data availability issue. The following paragraphs summarize the key results 
obtained in these chapters.   
 
Chapter 2 studied the market reaction to these bidder stocks (in terms of their three-day CARs) 
on their announcements of cross-country acquisitions in the presence of globally-oriented 
TMTs. Some statistically significant association, albeit not robust, was seen only in the 
combined model(s) with all the chosen TMT indicators of ‘international orientation’ and the 
three-day CARs (both MM and MAR model based) of the bidding firms. While a negative 
influence of the number of internally experienced managers was detected, a positive impact of 
the number of executives with host country familiarity and a weak beneficial effect of number 
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of foreign nationals were documented. Overall, the short-run findings indicated that initial 
investor reaction to cross-country announcements by bidding firms with ‘internationally 
oriented’ TMTs may (not) strongly recognize this apparent comparative advantage. 
Nevertheless, the weak evidence of curvilinear associations of some of the TMT proxies used 
in our analysis with the CARs suggested that acquirer returns in a longer term warrant deeper 
examination. Not only this, but they also indicated that an optimal balance of ‘globally-
oriented’ TMTs might facilitate better decision-making and consequent beneficial outcomes.           
 
Chapter 3 therefore, explored one-year from the post-acquisition announcements to these 
bidders, both in terms of financial market and operating profitability, i.e. BHARs and ROA 
and ROE. Using a mixed-effects linear regression framework, our findings brought to light an 
eventual advantage for the bidders for those their internationally oriented TMTs seemed to 
have achieved a competence in managing global expansion choices. Specifically, considering 
the international experience in number of years and across the range of countries for the TMTs 
of these bidding firms, we documented a U-shaped (curvilinear) relationship between these 
exposure on average, and post-acquisition financial as well as operating performances of these 
firms. This observed association was reversed to an inverted u-shaped relationship when the 
impact of nationality mix in the executive teams of such acquirers, was tested with respect to 
their one-year returns. Further, the predominant effect of TMT international orientation on 
post-acquisition performance in the sample was negative, with the majority of the sample 
TMTs being unable to meet these criteria. However, we did not observe any evidence of 
abnormal performance using one-year post-acquisition CTARs (similar to the extant studies 
adopting CTAR methodology), in view of the methodological concerns levelled at the 
computation of BHARs.  
 
The objective of study in Chapter 4 was how the likelihood of choosing a certain method of 
payment for the foreign host by an internationally-oriented TMT of a bidding firm, could 
mitigate the adverse forces of information asymmetry prevalent in global expansion modes. 
Two most commonly studied sources of environmental uncertainties, i.e. country risk and 
cultural distance (see for example, Miller, 1992; Hofstede, 2001; etc.) were considered in this 
context. The crux of the findings was that the right balance of international orientation at the 
TMT-level of these firms, whereby competence was likely to override overconfidence, could 
alleviate uncertainties in the presence of greater levels of country risk and cultural distance, 
essentially through a greater probability of choosing more cash or mixed payment mode. 
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Basically these results were in line with those of Chapter 3 in that initial levels of TMT 
orientation indeed proved inadequate; hence, detrimental with respect to payment choices, 
which transformed favourably only after surpassing the minimum cut-off point(s).      
 
In the final core chapter of this thesis (Chapter 5) our purpose was to investigate predominance 
of the two effects i.e., learning (see Aktas et al, 2013) or indigestion from PMI problems (see 
Conn et al, 2004), as manifested in the three-day announcement returns of the serially acquiring 
firms in our initial sample. This was explored by looking at the influences of three key 
predictors, i.e. the number of prior acquisitions, their cumulative deal values and the elapsed 
time between two consecutive acquisitions by a multiple bidder, on its current abnormal 
returns. The univariate as well as the multivariate analyses generally indicated that PMI 
problems plagued subsequent acquisition announcement returns, rather than the benefits of 
learning; particularly PMI issues seemed to be accentuated, when one-year post-acquisition 
BHARs were examined. We also noticed the postulated influence of ‘memory lapse’ 
(Hayward, 2002; Aktas et al., 2013) whilst examining the effect of the time between deals 
regressor. Furthermore, only one of the TMT indicators on international orientation, viz., the 
number of internationally experienced executives, upheld the predicted beneficial curvilinear 
moderating impact, alleviating the documented unfavourable impacts of either ‘memory lapse’ 
or PMI. We also observed an inverted U-shape association of the TMT proxy of average years 
of host country exposure with the returns of a multiple bidder, whilst that on national diversity 
of the team failed to show any such significant relationship. These findings are important not 
only from the viewpoint that they underscore the critical findings of the previous two chapters, 
but they seem more relatable in the context of these serially bidding firms.  
 
6.2 General limitations of this thesis 
While Chapter 2 elaborates and discusses the data-specific limitations, the remaining chapters 
explain the other specific limitations. The common limitations which pertain to the whole thesis 
are summarised here once again: 
 
First, this thesis focuses on uncertainties arising out of information ambiguities merely from 
the viewpoint of decision-making problems for acquiring firms with respect to cross-border 
targets. Similar issues which could also be faced by these target firm(s) in respect of assessing 
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an offer(s) from prospective acquirer(s), as contended by Eckbo et al. (1990); Chemmanur et 
al. (2009); etc., have not been considered here. Moreover, only the quantifiable and most 
generic forms of environmental uncertainties, i.e. country risk and cultural distance were 
studied in this context, when there could be many other unobservable elements, hence, difficult 
to be operationalised. For example, some factors at the individual-level such as, physical, 
cognitive, and psychic distance, liability of foreignness, as well as associated relational hazards 
(Zaheer, 1995; Delios & Henisz, 2003; etc.) intensify the information ambiguity in 
international acquisitions. 
 
Second, the consequences of TMT decision-making focused on in three of the key empirical 
chapters were based principally on event-study methodology. While event studies over shorter 
windows run has been widely accepted (Brown & Warner, 1985), but longer-term event studies 
are still viewed with some caution. Hence, the findings of Chapter 3 may be treated in this 
light.       
 
Third, with respect to the TMT-related data in our sample, a common issue had been that a 
larger proportion of acquirer TMTs failed to meet the criteria, set and adopted in this thesis, to 
qualify them as ‘internationally-orientated’. This could have had a potential impact, reducing 
the power of our tested models as well as, discerning of the true patterns in the combined dataset 
may have become complicated further.  
 
Fourth, the principal focus of this thesis has been on the behavioural bias of executives, like 
hubris (Roll, 1986); self-attribution (Billett & Qian, 2008) to analyse their team decision-
making process and consequences. The agency-related interest conflicts (Jensen, 1986) have 
not been dealt with here. 
 
Fifth, the sample selection of bidding firms is from the UK where two basic features of 
acquisitions had more frequently been observed (e.g., Doukas & Ptzemas, 2007): method of 
payment in cash and its equivalents and privately-held targets. These aspects have been 
identified (see for instance, Malmendier & Tate, 2008) as a likely catalyst contributing to 
managerial behavioural bias. Further, the board executive teams in the sample generally had a 
common nationality, being from a single country. These factors could have been a potential 
inducer of the observed results, especially pertaining to the findings of Chapter 4 examining 
payment mode preferences of bidder TMTs.    
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Finally, the quantification of the TMT-specific variables suffered from an inadequacy of 
relevant information, which restricted their accurate operationalization. E.g. demographic 
heterogeneity in TMT continues to be one of the most commonly researched aspects, influence 
of which remains the most ambiguous. Further, the demographic dimensions that have been 
used here (as generally used in TMT research), may contain more noise than purer 
psychological measures (Finkelstein et al., 2008).  This issue was also highlighted in Chapter 
2 in respect of inadequacy of relevant information about international career experience.    
 
6.3 Policy implications and direction for future research 
The notions that the TMTs being primary strategic decision makers in an organization, their 
psychology and dispositions influence organisational outcomes, have been recognised in recent 
research (e.g. Finkelstein et al., 2008; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014). Based on these underlying 
premises, the intent of this thesis as already mentioned, has fundamentally been to investigate 
and explore the decision-making process of bidder TMTs as well as to analyse the outcomes. 
Thereby it expanded and enriched the research focus of behavioural corporate finance using 
the concept of an ‘insider team’, rather than being limited by examination of CEO traits. The 
results from this thesis suggested that managerial attributes may act as a double-edged sword, 
particularly in situations of high discretion such as cross-border acquisitions, when a balance 
of competence and confidence is warranted to ensure better judgements and organizational 
consequences.  
This finding can have several policy implications for the executive boards of internationalising 
firms from the perspectives of appointments and managing talents and desired skills within 
their directorial teams. For instance, different combinations of experience at an individual-level 
and that of the indicators of ‘international orientation’ could be optimally chosen by acquiring 
firms. Such selection of expertise would depend on these firms’ respective profiles of business 
risk and also that of the range of industries as well as countries of operation and expansion 
strategies. An optimal set of choice of top managerial personnel can primarily contribute to a 
source of comparative advantage for a firm. Moreover, a balance of team confidence arising 
from diverse experience as well as national cultural mix, would presumably be more desirable, 
so as not to generate unwarranted (over)optimism, bringing about adverse consequences for 
the firm. Further, from a regulatory point of view, if the distribution of power and the resultant 
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interactions due to power differences can be monitored (e.g., by regulating CEO dominance in 
a TMT) in the team of top executives, strategic decisions can be made more transparent, 
efficient, involving less friction, also discouraging any ‘groupthink’ (Benabou, 2013) 
phenomenon that is likely to occur.  
 
Not only the organizations which opt for global expansions or the multinational ones as 
discussed in the last paragraph, the findings of this thesis can also have implications for the 
firms which are more domestically-focused. Irrespective of their geographic scope, these firms 
may also need a talented bank of these globally minded managers. This is because, 
globalisation of business norms and cultures necessitates more interactions with foreign 
business partners and diverse workforce and customers, which can be dealt with efficaciously 
only by the executives who have cross-cultural competence (Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 
2014).    
 
Apart from the above implications from a practicable viewpoint, there can be a number of ways 
in which the findings of this thesis can be investigated further and expanded in scope. Each of 
the individual chapters discusses a few of these plausible avenues based on its scope. In this 
concluding chapter, we re-consider them taking a more general overview: 
 
In the main chapters, different facets of TMT ‘international orientation’ have been utilised, to 
document different results on performance. A semblance of all these different traits to prescribe 
a comprehensive set of ‘international orientation’ for these firms may also be looked at in 
addition to it. Some preliminary examination to this effect has been done using factor analysis 
in Chapter 2. This can be re-examined and explored further in future work.   
 
There can be considerable scope of refining and redefining the determinants of international 
orientation by combining the data on managerial characteristics (such as specific areas of 
expertise) with that of psychology of their observed behaviours (such as cognitive patterns and 
risk orientations). This can be studied in later research. Also, we can refine some of the TMT 
proxies used for the core chapters. E.g., a more nuanced measure of the amount in years of 
international experience (depth) as well as the range from different countries of international 
experience (breadth), can be obtained if the functional and industry specifications can be added 
(Finkelstein et al., 2008).  
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Further, the notion of an optimally internationally-oriented TMT in the face of the 
operationalisation drawbacks mentioned above, could impede its application of its advantages 
in a straightforward manner. For instance, the data on managerial traits can be improved if an 
in-depth psychometric collection of data from diverse settings is possible. A similar case of 
inadequacy with extant TMT data is that psychological and experience-related characteristics 
of executives are inseparable and later research needs to explore the how they affect one 
another (Finkelstein et al., 2008).   
 
In view of the unobservable sources of information asymmetry in cross-country M&As as 
contented in Sub-section 6.2, more sophisticated research tools or quantification measures need 
to be developed to account for and capture these ambiguous idiosyncratic factors.  
 
Rather than focusing on a single country of acquiring firms, it would be more interesting to 
expand the scope of each of these individual chapters to the expanse of a wider range of 
countries, e.g., the developed nations bloc, US & EU. This would help us to compare and 
analyse whether the present inferences hold with respect to a larger sample of bidder TMTs. 
This is also important from the point of view of resolving any sample-selection issues (as 
explained above) that may have unwittingly cropped up. Moreover, using a larger sample is 
likely to produce findings which could be generalized, which might not be the case when 
considering a single-country study. Also, if we can get access this way to the TMT data of the 
target firms, our understanding of the process of negotiation of the deals would improve, 
thereby we can infer on whether and how a takeover generates wealth for the shareholders of 
the combined firm. 
 
Finally, future research could also explore how the ‘international orientation’ of TMTs could 
help their firms in respect of formulating better strategies to thrive and stay competitive in the 
face of the challenges of globalisation in order to improve overall firm value. Particularly, we 
can explore in future work, a more complex framework of TMTs, delineating the role played 
CEO to have a better understanding of how decision-making process is evolved in 
internationalisation strategies and their plausible consequences on shareholders wealth. Further 
in future research, we can also control for the individual TMT stakes in their firms, which can 
express their ‘revealed beliefs’ (e.g. Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Thus, we may also account 
for any agency problems. This would provide a more comprehensive measure of managerial 
behavior predicted to influence strategic consequences of a firm.  
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